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Abstract 
 
 In 1940 1.8 million French soldiers were taken as prisoners of war by Germany. During
the coming months most of these men were deported into Germany for use as slave laborers. 
Nearly a million were still held in Germany in 1945 when they were liberated by Allied and 
Soviet forces. This is a study the prisoners’ life in captivity and their problems reintegrating into 
postwar society. Throughout the war the Vichy government led the French peopleto be ieve that 
its collaborative relationship with Nazi Germany ensured that the prisoners in Germany received 
proper treatment. This propaganda campaign misled the French people in several ways. One 
misperception shared by much of the population was that the prisoners’ time in Germany was o 
more uncomfortable than life for them had been in occupied France. The French people also 
mistakenly believed that the prisoners had, by and large, remained loyal to the despised Vichy 
regime long after it had lost its support among the domestic population. In 1945 the prisoners 
were welcomed home, but not in the manner they expected. They were treated like refuge s of a 
national catastrophe rather than as honorable veterans. The French provisional government did 
not recognize them as anciens combattants and initially did not extend to them the benefits 
traditionally associated with this status. A significant number found reintegratin  in o society 
difficult and developed dysfunctions that today would be associated with post-traumatic stress 
disorder. This work argues that the combined effects of years in captivity and a disappointing 
homecoming resulted in the widespread development of such problems among the ex-prisoners. 
 
Keywords: France, World War II, Vichy, Prisoners of War, Nazi Germany, Henri Frenay, 
Deportees, Geneva Conventions, Charles DeGaulle, Fourth Republic, French Provisional 
Government, Displaced Persons, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, Postwar Reintegration, 
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Introduction  
 Few topics have received as much attention by modern historians as World War II.
Despite this, some significant aspects of the conflict are rarely addressed. Among these is the 
captivity of French prisoners of war in Germany from 1940-45. When Germany conquered 
France in 1940 it took over 1.8 million French soldiers prisoner. The vast majority of these men 
were deported to Germany where they spent the remainder of the war as forced laborers.1 For 
five years one in seven of all French males between 20 and 40 years of age were h ld inside Nazi 
Germany, almost completely cut off from contact with their homeland and loved ones. 
Practically no French family was left unaffected.2 
 Throughout the war the Vichy government led the French people to believe that its
collaborative relationship with Nazi Germany ensured that the prisoners received proper 
treatment. The propaganda campaign spreading this message was designed to incr ase the 
regime’s domestic political support by portraying it as the protector of the prisoners. Direct links 
were established between proper care of the prisoners in Germany and support for the Vichy 
government and its policy of collaboration. The campaign misled the French peoplein several 
ways. One misperception fostered was that the prisoners’ time in Germany was no more 
uncomfortable than life for most in occupied France. In actuality most of the prisone s lived a 
Spartan existence in Germany, defined by poor living conditions, social isolation and hard labor. 
The French people were also led to believe that the prisoners had, by and large, remained loyal 
                                                
1 The only large group of POWs not deported into Germany were the approximately 200,000 non-white colonia  
soldiers taken prisoner. See Raffael Scheck, Hitler’s African Victims, The German Army Massacres of Black French 
Soldiers in 1940, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Martin C. Thomas, “The Vichy Government and 
French Colonial Prisoners of War, 1940-1944,” French Historical Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2002), 665-6 or chapter 
two of this work. 
2 Yves Durand, La Captivité: Histoire des prisonniers de guerre français 1939-1945. 2e ed. (Paris: Fédération 
Nationale des Combattants Prisonniers de Guerre et Combattants d’Algérie, Tunisie, Maroc, 1981), 21-7. 
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followers of the Vichy regime long after it had lost its support among the domestic population. 
As this work establishes, the prisoners in Germany held the Vichy government, and almost 
everything associated with it, save Marshal Pétain himself, in low regard. Collaboration in 
particular received almost no support from the captives after 1941. Despite the disconnect 
between the prisoners’ actual experience of captivity and their representation in the propaganda 
campaign, the reserved nature of their homecoming in 1945 demonstrated that a significant 
portion of the French people had accepted the false portrayal as accurate. 
 In 1945 the prisoners were warmly welcomed home, but not in the manner they expected. 
They were treated more like refugees of a national catastrophe than as honorable veterans.3 The 
new provisional government did not even recognize the former prisoners as veterans, calling into 
question the whole nature of their service as honorable or valuable. A significant number of the 
returnees found reintegrating into society difficult and developed dysfunctions that today would 
be associated with post-traumatic stress disorder. This work argues that the combined effects of 
their years in captivity and disappointing homecoming helped bring about more widespread 
development of these problems than would have occurred otherwise. The prisoners were 
stigmatized by the messages contained in the wartime propaganda and struggled for years 
following their liberation to overcome the misconceptions and prejudices it caused. 
 This work is built around exposing the divergences between the prisoners’ actual 
experiences of capture and captivity and the understandings the French population at large 
developed about these same topics, the motives and/or misunderstandings which caused the 
divergences to develop, and the long term consequences they carried. It is the story of one of 
Nazi Germany’s war crimes, its massive program of deportation and slave labor, a crime often 
                                                
3 See for example Megan Koreman, “A Hero’s Homecoming: The Return of the Deportees to France, 1945,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 32, no. 1 (1997), 9-22 and François Cochet, L s exclus de la victoire: Histoire des 
prisonniers de guerre, déportés et S.T.O. (1945-1985), (Paris: S.P.M., 1992). 
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given limited attention due to its being overshadowed by the horrific genocidal campaigns waged 
at the same time. This work also tells a specifically French story about the radical political goals 
of the Vichy regime, and that regime’s willingness to sacrifice the welfare of many of its subjects 
in pursuit of those aims. Finally, it is a timeless story about the lasting damage war inflicts on 
individuals and societies. Damage that continues to play out well after peace has been declared. 
 While the French prisoners’ captivity experience, the Vichy propaganda campaign, and 
the prisoners’ homecoming in 1945 have been the subject of past scholarship, no single work has 
yet been produced uniting all three elements into a single narrative structure. This work achieves 
that goal by broadly conceptualizing the study of “the captivity” as extending from 1940 to at 
least 1947. Without the defeat of 1940 the Vichy regime would never have come to power. If the 
French people were to be convinced to continue to support the new regime after its radical 
domestic agenda and policy of collaboration became better understood by the population, it had 
to demonstrate the soundness of its policies. One way the Vichy government attempted to 
demonstrate the benefits of supporting it was by portraying itself as the government best 
positioned to ensure the prisoners were well cared for in Germany and negotiate for their release. 
This propaganda campaign, and the regime’s intentionally deceptive representation of the 
prisoners, significantly contributed to the French public’s misconceptions about the captivity. 
These misconceptions largely shaped the prisoners’ disappointing homecoming in 1945, a 
reception which created or exacerbated many of the ex-captives postwar struggles. Beyond 
furthering our understanding of the three topics listed above, this work also makes a unique 
contribution by demonstrating how these elements were interrelated, thus increasing the 
relevance of each individual topic. 
 
 4
Elements of the Study: The captivity, the propaganda and the homecoming  
 Through use of memoir literature and a careful examination of the conquest of France in 
May/June 1940 this work establishes that most French prisoners had limited control over if and 
how they were taken prisoner. In so doing, this work challenges a historical interpretation that 
became so prominent during the 1960’s and 1970’s that it remained largely unchallenged for a 
generation and which continues to inform the work of some scholars even today. This 
interpretation held that the internal political divisions and overall “decadence” of interwar French 
society had so eroded the nation’s moral fiber that, when tested by war, French soldiers were 
eager to surrender soon after encountering enemy troops in combat. 4 This work shows why that 
point of view is at best overly simplistic, overlooking the actual experience of the vast majority 
of French soldiers that summer. These soldiers, most young men with little or no military 
experience, operated in a chaotic environment and received unclear and contradit ry orders 
from their superior officers and government. Most soldiers taken prisoner during the first five 
weeks of the campaign surrendered reluctantly and only after receiving orders to lay down arms. 
The majority of the prisoners surrendered during the sixth and final week of fighting, after 
Marshal Pétain had already informing the French people via national radio address that he had 
taken the reins of government and was calling for an “end to the fighting.” Many Fre ch soldiers 
                                                
4 For some of the better known works sharing this interpretation see Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle: France 1940. 
(Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1969); William Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic: An Inquiry into the 
Fall of France in 1940, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969); Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat, A Statement of 
Evidence Written in 1940, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co. 1968); Jacques Benoist-Méchin, Sixty Days that Shook 
the West; The Fall of France, 1940,”(New York: Putnam, 1963); Guy Chapman, Why France Fell; The Defeat of 
the French Army, (New York: Holt, 1969); and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, La Décadence, 1932-1939, (Paris: 
Imprimerie nationale, 1979). For more recent works which continue to hold to this interpretation see for example 
Benjamin Martin, France in 1938, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2005) and Piers Brendon, The Dark 
Valley; A Panorama of the 1930’s. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000). John C. Cairns supplies an overview and 
critique of this school of writing when it was cresting in “Some Recent Historians and the “Strange Defeat” of 
1940,” Journal of Modern History 46, no. 1 (1974), 60-85. 
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believed this announcement constituted a national surrender, making further resistanc 
pointless.5  
 The French collapse of 1940 is much more convincingly explained as a military defeat
caused by specific strategic miscalculations than as one caused by flaws in the French national 
character.6 French soldiers in 1940 performed no better, and no worse, than did those from any 
other nation attacked by Germany throughout the first three years of the war. Britain was spared 
occupation in 1940 due to a body of water, not superior morality. Geography seems a more likely 
cause than virtue in explaining the Soviet Union’s survival the following year. Nevertheless, this 
“decadent” interpretation supplied an explanation for 1940 which served the needs of certain 
segments of the French and British leadership, and perhaps the interpretation’s political and 
emotional utility explains its widespread acceptance more so than does its validity. Presenting 
the defeat as caused by republican decadence served the Vichy’s regime’s purposes as an 
argument in favor of its program for national reform based on authoritarianism and socially 
conservative policies. French “decadence” as the primary cause for the defeat served the interests 
of British politicians and historians as it allowed them to distance themselves from hared 
responsibility. William Irvine eloquently summed up the debate with the statemen , “it was not 
decadence that lead to 1940; it is 1940 that has led us to view the late Third Republic as 
                                                
5 Durand, 43. 
6 The key works here are Robert Doughty’s works, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army 
Doctrine, 1919-1939, (Hamden: Archon Books, 1985) and Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940, 
(Hamden: Archon Books, 1990) and Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac’s two volume work, Les Français de l’an 40, La 
Guerre, oui ou non?, and Ouvriers et soldats, (Paris: Gallimard, 1990). Also of significant value are Julian Jackson, 
The Fall of France, The Nazi Invasion of 1940, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Eugina C. Kiesling, 
Arming Against Hitler: France and the Limits of Military Planning, (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1996); 
Ernest May, Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France, (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000); and perhaps the path 
finding work in this field, Robert Young, In Command of France: French Foreign Policy and Military Planning, 
1933-1940, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978). 
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decadent.”7 This work demonstrates that there is no need to resort to an argument as esoteric as 
that of the “decadence” school to explain why the Allies were defeated in 1940 and why so many 
French soldiers were taken that summer. 
 Few prisoners were prepared for the harsh conditions of their first weeks in captivity. 
They were even more surprised to find themselves deported to Germany for indefinite 
employment as forced laborers. This massive deportation took the French prisoners and public 
by surprise. From their perspective the war had all but ended on 24 June 1940 when the armis ic  
between Germany and the new Vichy regime came into effect. What the French did not foresee 
was that Germany had always intended to plug the prisoners of war (POWs) into its growing 
slave labor economy to support the nation’s continuing war efforts. Most previous scholarship on 
the situation in France in 1940 has not satisfactorily addressed the background of this mass 
deportation. When the deportation has been addressed in more depth than simply as an event 
which “happens”, it has been either incorrectly treated as an ad hoc German respo se to an 
unexpectedly lengthy war, or as an evolving policy responding to an unforeseen situation.8 By 
placing the deportation into the larger context of German prisoner of war and labor deportation 
policies as they had evolved since 1914 this work demonstrates why the captivity is bes 
understood as a preplanned German policy, and though unknown to the French people at the 
time, likely the almost inevitable fate of the prisoners taken in 1940. 
 The prisoners’ lives in captivity have been reconstructed through use of Vichy mail 
censor reports, German, French and Red Cross reports, first-person accounts and historical
                                                
7 William Irvin, “Domestic Politics and the Fall of France in 1940,” from The French Defeat of 1940, 
Reassessments, ed. Joel Blatt, (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1998), 5. 
8 See for example Robert Paxton, Vichy France, Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944. (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1972), 53; Robert Gilda, Marianne in Chains: Everyday Life in the French Heartland under the German 
Occupation. (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2002), 74. Only Ulrich Herbert, a specialist on Nazi labor policy, has 
clearly presented the deportation as a pre-planned policy, and even in his work the significance of the point is 
obscured as it is made almost in passing. See, Hitl r’s Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany 
Under the Third Reich, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 95. 
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studies. By choice, this work focuses almost exclusively on the experience of enlisted POWs 
instead of those of captured officers. Enlisted men, who made up 98% of all French prisoners in 
Germany, experienced a much harsher captivity than did the officers. By sheer weight of 
numbers the enlisted experience must be seen as the normative one and that of the officers’ as 
exceptional. Officers were held separately from enlisted men in permanent camps called Oflags. 
Unlike enlisted personnel, officers were not required to work. The biggest struggle for officers 
who did not volunteer to work was finding ways to fight depression and boredom until their 
liberation. It was not uncommon for Oflag prisoners to organize university level classes mong 
themselves, put on theatrical productions and form groups to discuss political and social matters. 
The life of the enlisted prisoners was a far cry from this experience. Unlike the officers, 
relatively few of the enlisted prisoners lived in prison camps. Nine out of ten were assigned to 
smaller worksites, called kommandos. At first most prisoners worked as agricultural laborers. As 
the war progressed the French prisoners were more likely to find themselves assigned to 
industrial sites, often in factories directly employed in the German war effort. Research for this 
work revealed that the enlisted prisoners’ lives were defined by sixty plus hour work-weeks, an 
almost obsessive preoccupation with food and the other necessities of life, and their struggle 
against feelings of isolation, helplessness and depression, a state of mind long referred to by 
French soldiers as cafard.9 The same sources established how poorly informed the prisoners’ 
were about events back in France, how little interest the enlisted prisoners had for political 
matters, and the increasing scorn they held for the Vichy regime as their captivity wore on. 
                                                
9 For more on the living and working conditions of French prisoners of war, see Durand; Jacques Evrard, L  
Déportation des Travailleurs Français dans le IIIe Reich, (Paris: Les Grandes Études Contemporaines, Fayard, 
1972); Ulrich Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany Under the Third Reich, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and chapters 3-9 of this work. 
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 The Vichy government portrayed the prisoners’ lives in captivity in a way th t might 
have been fairly accurate for some of the officers, but certainly not for the typical enlisted 
prisoner. So divorced from reality was the Vichy portrayal of the captivity hat historian Sarah 
Fishman concluded that the French people were “given the impression that the prisoners were at 
an extended summer camp of sorts.”10 This Vichy portrayal was strengthened in the postwar by a 
preponderance of memoirs and accounts of life in Germany written by former Oflag inmates as 
opposed to enlisted personal. Returning prisoners were frustrated by the almost co plete lack of 
comprehension the French public had about their years in captivity. 
 The Vichy government prioritized keeping abreast of the prisoners’ thoughts and 
opinions while they were in captivity, as well as those of their loved ones back in France. 
Throughout the war the government produced a surveillance report every two weeks compiled 
by reading tens of thousands of letters either written by the prisoners, or sentto them from 
France. Through these reports, supplemented by other archival reports and memoirs, the 
prisoners’ state of mind and communal opinions on several key topics were reconstructed in this 
work. While the Vichy government continued to portray the prisoners as loyal supporters of the 
regime, the above sources clearly established that by the winter of 1941/42 support for the Vichy 
regime has almost entirely disappeared. Rather than remain stubborn supporters of th  regime, 
the prisoners had followed nearly the same political trajectory as the res of the French people, 
moving from a widespread embrace of Marshal Pétain’s regime in 1940, quickly towards 
disillusionment, and finally arriving at nearly universal scorn for the regim  within little more 
than a year.  
                                                
10 Sarah Fishman, “Grand Delusions: The Unintended Consequences of Vichy France’s Prisoner of War 
Propaganda,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 26, No. 2, Apr. 1991, 236. 
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 Other surprising findings unaddressed in previous studies of the captivity also emerged 
from this archival research, among them the initial hostility between French POWs and deported 
French civilian workers inside Germany,11 the prisoners’ surprisingly rapid embrace of faith in 
an Allied victory during the winter of 1942/43,12 and how this newfound hope emboldened 
greater defiance on their part to resist both their German jailers and Vichy attempts to exploit 
them.13 
 In 1945 nearly one million French prisoners still remained inside the crumbling Rech. 
These men were liberated by the advancing Allied and Soviet armies and arrive  back in France, 
along with a like number of deported civilian workers and political and racial deportees, in one 
great wave dubbed Le Grand Retour. Previous scholarship has described the return as being 
poorly organized from an administrative standpoint; a finding confirmed in this work.14 In 1945, 
much of the French population saw the prisoners of war as having failed in their milita y duty of 
protecting the nation and as not having suffered unduly while in German captivity. Their time in 
captivity was not seen as a sacrifice on the same level as that of the resistanc  members or 
soldiers of the reconstituted French army. The French government legitimized this perception by 
refusing to extend veteran status to the returning prisoners of war. The prisoners had expected to 
be treated like any other group of veterans and their sense of injustice in not fiding this to be the 
                                                
11 There is practically no secondary literature on the relationship between the French workers and prisoners in 
Germany during the war. Chapter six of this work expands on this topic as do two of the author’s earlir works, 
“Shared Sacrifice and the Return of the POW’s and Deportees to France, 1945,” Proceedings of the Western Society 
for French History, Vol. 35, (2007), 277-288; and “The Long Holiday; The community of three million French 
captives in Germany 1940-1945,” unpublished paper pr sented at the Council for European Studies Sevententh 
International Conference, Montreal, Canada, April 2010. 
12 This is another topic for which there is practically no secondary literature. The findings presented in chapter seven 
of this work, based on French mail survalence reports, challenge Ulrich Herbert’s characterization of  the detained 
foreigners in Germany continueing expectation of a German victory throughout 1943 and even into 1944. Herbert 
appears to have relied on German archival sources, which are convincingly contradicted by the French sources.  
13 See chapters seven and eight of this work. 
14 See François Cochet, Les exclus de la victoire: Histoire des prisonniers de guerre, déportés et S.T.O. (1945-
1985), (Paris: S.P.M., 1992); Christophe Lewin, Retour des prisonniers de guerre francais: naissance et 
développement de la F.N.P.G., 1944-1952, (Paris: Publication de la Sorbonne, 1986); Sarah Fis man, We Will Wait: 
Wives of French Prisoners of War, 1940-1945, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) and Koreman. 
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case was manifest in the wave of political protests they organized soon after their return. The 
prisoners’ return and their postwar efforts have received both sympathetic, and somewhat 
critical, treatment by a small number of past scholars. François Cochet argu d that the 
repatriation effort was riddled with poor planning and judgmental policies. His study 
encompasses not only the return of the POWs in 1945, but also that of the nearly one million 
other French citizens who had been deported into Germany either as workers, political risoners 
or targets for genocide. The lack of unity between these different groups upon their return limited 
what each was able to accomplish postwar. Christophe Lewin found the former POWs effective 
in organizing on their own behalf following their liberation, but to have been out of step with the 
overall French community due to their long separation. The mutual lack of comprehension 
between the prisoners and the French public resulted in the prisoners pursuing an agenda which 
appeared to threaten national unity by promoting group specific over communal goals.  
 This work expands on the above earlier scholarship by contextualizing the administration 
of the return and the provisional government’s treatment of the former prisoners within the full 
story of the captivity. Cochet and Lewin tend to treat the events of 1944-45 in relative isolation 
from the defeat of 1940 and the Vichy prisoner of war policies during 1940-44.15 The prisoners 
were received by a nation predisposed by years of misinformation to think of them as having 
endured a relatively mild captivity,16 a nation which had also been dealing with crisis and 
deprivation since 1940 and was ill-equipped to address the needs of any new specific group. The 
                                                
15 While both excellent works in most ways, both Lewin’s and Cochet’s book suffer from this same problem of not 
placing the homecoming and postwar experience within s larger chronological context. Lewin’s study focuses on 
the F.N.C.P.G., a federation formed in 1945, and openly states that he limited his study to 1944-52 (21). The subtitle 
of Cochet’s work is “The history of the prisoners of war, deportees and S.T.O. (1945-1985)” with his scholarship 
focused on 1945-54. Neither works address the beginning of the captivity in 1940, and only briefly touch on the 
lives of the prisoners in Germany from 1940-45 and Vichy policies. Yves Durand’s and Pierre Gascar’s (Histoire de 
la captivité des Français en Allemagne (1939-1945), (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1967)) works suffer from the 
opposite problem, both concluding their studies with the return of the prisoners to France. 
16 See chapter six. 
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prisoners’ reception was also shaped by the government’s prioritization of national unity over 
individual demands for recognition.17 Henri Frenay, the man tapped by General DeGaulle to 
head the repatriation effort, in many ways personified these attitudes towards the former 
prisoners. The provisional government’s ministry overseeing the prisoners’ welfare was 
grudgingly headed by a man who looked down upon the POWs for their failures in 1940 and 
their passive acceptance of captivity. Frenay oversaw the development of a repatriation plan 
which foresaw no desire on the part of returnees to demand special recognition for their wartime 
sacrifices nor seek long-term public aid during their reintegration period. He envisioned rapidly 
and efficiently processing the returnees at the nation’s borders, demobilizing them, and sending 
them off with a third class train ticket so they could quietly meld back into French society, 
putting the last six years of service and captivity behind them. 18 DeGaulle and Frenay did not 
see the prisoners as men deserving elevated recognition for their wartime servic , and the 
provisional government’s policies conformed to this judgment. 
 The former POWs unwillingness to conform to the above repatriation plan is the subject 
of this work’s epilogue. Unlike the other groups of returning French citizens, the former 
prisoners of war were represented by pre-existing advocacy organizations. One of these 
organizations had developed originally under the Vichy government’s sponsorship, later moving 
into the resistance, and two others as resistance movements from their creation, one Gaullist and 
the other Communist. These groups combined in 1944 to form a united prisoner of war 
movement in France, a movement that following the liberation transformed itself in o a political 
advocacy organization. In 1945 this group took the name the Fédération Nationale des 
Combattants Prisonniers de Guerre (F.N.C.P.G.). Under the leadership of a young François 
                                                
17 See chapter nine. 
18 For examples of these attitudes see Frenay’s own autobiography, The Night Will End, (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Co., 1976), 314 & 341. 
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Mitterrand the F.N.C.P.G. began a long campaign to win increased recognition and benefits for 
the prisoners. The values and goals of this movement during the key years of 1945-47 were 
reconstructed through an examination of the federation’s actions and membership newsletters. 
This work documents the former prisoners’ struggles for recognition and benefits during the 
immediate postwar years. Judging by the F.N.C.P.G.’s priorities the ex-POWs found establishing 
their position in the nation’s collective memory as honorable veterans at least as important as any 
of the more tangible benefits for which they fought. 
  
A few notes on terminology and sources 
 This work used the terms “forced labor” and “slave labor” almost interchangeably. While 
“forced labor” appears to be the more commonly used term by historians to describe the us  of 
prisoners of war as workers within Nazi Germany during the war, I believe that “slave labor” is 
at least equally descriptive of their state, if not the more accurate term, as “slavery” more closely 
describes the conditions of the prisoners’ captivity. Prisoners of war in Germany were forced to 
work 60 plus hours a week, often seven days a week, in assigned jobs. These jobs often put the 
prisoners’ lives and health at risk. The prisoners were often not compensated at all for this work, 
and if they did receive payment the sum was meager and often in the form of “camp script” or 
via notation in an account book which they could never actually transform into cash. Thus the 
prisoners were either minimally compensated for their work, or completely uncompensated. The 
prisoners of war were not allowed to leave their jobs. Failure to satisfactorily pe form their duties 
led to punishment, often of a physical or inhumane nature. Prisoners had no functioning legal 
protection in Nazi Germany after the Vichy government assumed the position a their 
“protecting power” in November, 1940. They could be, and frequently were, mistreated even to 
the point of murder, without consequence. In recent legal negotiations between war crimes 
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victims seeking compensation for forced labor and the German government, a distinction was 
made between forced labor and slave labor which argued that the former was a temporary 
condition, while the later permanent and thus more serious.19 While this argument proved helpful 
in advancing negotiations within the specific context of that legal battle, it is problematic on 
many levels to historians. The first of these problems is the lack of compelling vidence that 
Nazi Germany ever intended to voluntarily set free productive POW laborers. If the overall 
history of German POW labor policy is examined, not just that of the treatment of western 
prisoners, one recognizes that more found release through death than by any other means prior to 
1945. When Germany did liberate prisoners of war during the war they tended to send home 
sickly men who could not be used profitably as workers. The historical record indicates that Nazi 
German POW labor policy called for the indefinite use of prisoners as workers, until their 
usefulness (or lifespan) was used up, not their temporary utilization. A second reality the 
“forced” vs. “slave” laborer argument stumbles upon is its implication that Nazi German 
intended to keep its “forced laborers” alive, while intending to work its “slave laborers” to death. 
Undoubtedly Nazi Germany did practice a policy of exploiting the labor of its captives marked 
for extermination until their bodies gave out; however, that reality more argues against 
designating groups targeted for murder as “slave laborers” rather than simply as victims of 
genocide who happened to be used as slave laborers prior to their murder. The fact that Frenc  
and many other groups of prisoners of war were not targeted for extermination does not 
invalidate their designation as “slave laborers.” An argument that contends that the usage of the 
term “slavery” is inappropriate as the prisoners of war were presumably not being placed into a 
category which was, or would become, hereditary, overlooks the fact that in most ties and 
                                                
19 See Stuart Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice; Looted Assets, Slave Labor, and the Unifinished Business of World War II. 
(New York: Public Affiars, 2003), 206-7, for the background to this manner of distingishing the two grups. 
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places slavery was not necessarily a hereditary state of being. Most hist rical references to 
slavery from outside the modern Western cultural sphere (i.e. classical world, pre-Columbian 
America, African, Chinese, etc.) treat slavery as a temporary state, most often fallen into by 
individuals who were captured during wartime. “Forced laborer” implies coercion and 
punishment, while “slave laborer” implies a reality closer to what World War II German captives 
experienced, a life almost totally devoid of power, protection and options. French World ar II 
POWs were not meaningfully compensated for their work, had no legal rights, could not return 
home and faced a captivity of indefinite duration. Theirs was a slave-like exist nce. 
 While this work has primarily relied upon original archival research and past scholarship, 
it has also made extensive use of memoirs and shorter memory accounts (témoignages) to flesh 
out points or provide examples. In some cases, such as the character study of Henri Frenay in 
chapter nine of this work, memoirs have also been analyzed to help construct intepreta ions. The 
use of memoir literature is always a problematic exercise for historians. Memories can be 
subconsciously changed by later events, knowledge and influences, and often memories are 
intentionally censored by their authors. When used with caution, these works retain a significant 
degree of value. Isolated and perplexing comments found in individual memoirs are difficult to 
work with; however, when a specific point of view or telling of events is repeated in esse tially 
the same manner in several sources, it can be afforded more weight and trust. The use of memory 
documents is perhaps even more problematic in the case of France and World War II than it is in 
other fields of historical research. Henry Rousso’s work has demonstrated how the French 
“collective memory” of the war years has been altered during the last two generations by 
changing cultural discourses. Since the liberation, France has gone through phases in which it 
was first in denial of its Vichy past and, later, unrealistically accepting of Vichy and 
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collaboration as representative of the nation as a whole during the war. As these cultural trends 
swept over the nation, the French collective memory of the war years changed accor ingly.20 
Rousso does not belittle the value of memoirs despite his recognition of their shortcomings. He 
finds memoirs no less reliable than most other forms of historical interpretation of this era, and 
often valuable in their willingness to address in unique ways topics that the academi  community 
has already either settled upon a standard interpretation of, or seemingly decided to ignore as a 
group. He argues that prior to the 1970’s the French historical community tended to avoid the 
war years, making wartime memoirs more important in the development of a historical 
understanding of France during this period given that memoir writers were the only group 
willing to tread into this minefield of a topic.21 Rousso reminds us that while memoirs confront 
historians with interpretive challenges, no form of representing the past comeswithout its own 
collection of complicating issues, or without its unique qualities. 
 Another factor that must be kept in mind when using memory texts produced by former 
prisoners of war is the issue of their psychological state when these memories were being 
formed. A common symptom produced by captivity in prisoners is a latent feeling of guilt at 
being captured, a feeling often transformed into extreme criticalness and even hate directed at 
organizations and other prisoners. Paranoid suspiciousness and strong moral condemnation can 
also result from this state of mind.22 Taking these factors into account, direct expressions of 
opinions in the memoirs have been viewed with caution, while more concrete descriptions of 
events and conditions which span a cross-section of the works surveyed have been privileged as 
                                                
20 Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome, History and Memory in France since 1944, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 10-11. 
21 Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome, 258-265. 
22 Jonathan Vance, “From Barbed-Wire Disease” in Encyclopedia of Prisoners of War and Internment, d. Jonathan 
Vance, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2000), 19-20. 
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more useful. A prisoner’s expression of support for or derision of an individual leader or 
organization can be attributed to countless possible factors, some of which may be the result of 
the psychological consequences of their captivity. Widespread agreement in the memoirs on 
conditions, such as the lack of mail or insufficient food, contain fewer of these pitfalls. This 
work treats each memoir as the work of a single unique individual, and when necessary, 
contextualizes these individual accounts within the larger body of research conducted. The 
memoirs used in this study come from individuals spanning the ideological, regional and class 
spectrums of French society. All that they share in common is that they were all composed by 
men who fought in 1940 and played their small role in the captivity. Each contribute to this study 
by reminding us that history is the composite of countless all-too-human stories.
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Chapter 1: The Evolution of Prisoner of War Policy 
 
Germany’s conquest of France in 1940 and the huge number of prisoners taken during the 
campaign are well worn historical topics. Less well known is the fate of the prisone s following 
the defeat. During the summer of 1940 the victors began transporting approximately 1.5 million 
French prisoners of war into Germany. Most of these men would not see France agi  until 1945. 
During their five year captivity the French POWs were used as forced laborers to keep the Third 
Reich’s war economy functioning while so many of Germany’s young men were under arms. 
This massive deportation and lengthy captivity came as a surprise to the French people, but 
perhaps it should not have. The action was consistent with German policies developed during the 
First World War for the use of prisoners of war and conscripted foreign civilians as forced 
laborers during times of war.  
This historical context is needed to properly understand why the French prisoners wer  
deported and what plans Germany had for their usage. One limitation of previous studies of the 
captivity is their failure to demonstrate the larger historical context in wh ch German policies 
were developed. Works by Yves Durand, Christophe Lewin and François Cochet which are in 
most ways excellent, present the captivity as an unexpected event which just seemed to have 
happened. In doing so these works leave the reader with the impression that deportation is an 
event unique to the Second World War and one which could not have been foreseen. This 
chapter demonstrates why the deportation should not have come as a surprise to the French 
people, why it was an act consistent with German policy from 1914-18, and, more recently, to 
policies enacted in Poland the previous year.  
This chapter will also demonstrate that Germany’s forced labor policies develop d during 
World War I broke a consensus formed during the 19th century across the western world that 
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prisoners of war held certain natural rights while in captivity. This viewpoint developed during 
the late 18th and 19th centuries as part of the larger discourse on “natural rights.” Later, in the 
second half of the 19th century, these rights were codified in a series of international agreements 
signed by all western nations. The emerging consensus held that nations were expect d to respect 
the prisoners’ right to humane treatment and their freedom from being forced to work directly in 
support of their captor’s war effort. From 1915 through 1918 Germany employed over tw 
million prisoners as slave laborers in jobs directly related to war aims. By employing the men in 
war related work, and reducing expenditures on their maintenance to a minimum, Germany 
transformed its prisoners from an economic burden on the nation into a significant productive 
asset. Even though Germany’s World War I slave labor programs violated international 
standards, after the war no Germans were held accountable. Given the benefits and lack of 
penalties, it was to be expected that Germany would return to, and if possible expand upon, its 
use of slave labor when it next embarked on war.  
When the French prisoners arrived in Germany in 1940 they found hundreds of thousands 
of Polish prisoners of war taken the previous year already integrated into the German war 
economy. Through conquest Germany was building a pool of what would eventually become 
millions of slave laborers. This chapter demonstrates that the development of Germany’s 
prisoner of war policies during the First World War and its massive slave labor economy during 
World War II did not develop by happenstance, it was a product of planning. It also demonstrates 
how the German planners developed their policies in conscious violation of the international 
standards in order to increase productivity. The Third Reich’s slave-labor economy was not a 
new innovation; it was just a more expansive version of the policies Germany developed and 
implemented in World War I. 
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Background on the changing view of prisoners of war in the modern era 
Throughout history war captives faced uncertain fates. The capture and care of prisoners 
made demands on the conqueror’s resources. Unless the capturing force had some expectation 
that these expenses would be offset by rewards, such as the likelihood that the captives ould be 
transformed into loyal subjects, or of their being exchangeable for ransom or enemy held 
prisoners, their treatment depended upon little more than good will. 
As the Western World entered the modern era two meta-historical transformations 
dramatically altered the status of prisoners of war. These transformatins, products of the dual 
revolution, were the acceptance of the concept of “natural” or “human rights,” and the 
emergence of industrial economies.1 It is worth emphasizing at this point that the section below 
examines only changes happening in areas where the values growing out of the Enlig t nment 
and Liberalism dominated international relations, specifically Europe, the Americas and Japan. 
The shared cultural influences of these areas produced a consensus viewpoint regarding proper 
treatment of prisoners of war. From the late 19th century through the early 20th century it would 
seem that, in regards to war prisoners, all these nations were metaphorically spe king the same 
language. 
Prisoners of war and Natural Rights during the 18th and 19th centuries 
By the 19th century the concept that all humans possessed some form of “natural rights”, 
among which was a right to life, was accepted, to one degree or another, throughout the western 
world. When this acceptance of a “natural right” to life was extended to warfare it ollowed that 
the indiscriminate killing of disarmed prisoners of war, or their inhuman treatment, was seen as 
uncivilized behavior. Historian Richard Speed summarized the traditional status of pri oners of 
                                                
1 E(ric) J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848, (New York: Mentor Books, 1962), 17-20. Hobsbawm 
presents the “dual revolution” thesis in the introduction to this book and then develops it throughout the first three 
chapters. 
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war in the opening statement of his study of World War I prisoners:  “Throughout history the 
fate of a prisoner of war has been a function of his value in a financial, political, or military 
transaction.”2 The widespread acceptance of the concept of natural rights during the modern era 
brought about a change which conflicted with Speed’s equation. If civilized behavior included 
respecting that all men possessed a natural right to life and humane treatment, then, treatment of 
prisoners in a manner consistent with these values could be expected independent of their 
“financial, political, or military” value.  
Examples of this acceptance of prisoners’ natural rights to life and humane tre tment can 
be found throughout the era of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. During the American 
Revolutionary War both the British and American governments made demands that their 
prisoners be treated humanely, and specific diplomatic posts were created to ensure that their 
treatment rose to “the most basic rights of humanity.”3 During the Napoleonic Wars the French 
Directory passed a decree in 1799 which established, at least rhetorically, that all soldiers 
surrendering to the French would have their natural right to life recognized. Problems associated 
with prisoner-taking greatly expanded during these wars. Large battles resulted in the capture of 
over ten thousand soldiers in a single day - prisoners who might require care during several years 
of captivity. Despite the financial and administrative burdens the French and British generally 
provided their prisoners with at least minimally humane care in most instances.4 Prisoners held 
by the French and British were provided with regular food, shelter and medical care. Even 
though Russia and Spain, at least officially, recognized that an acceptable level of care for 
                                                
2 Richard B. Speed III. Prisoners, Diplomats, and the Great War:  A Study in the Diplomacy of Captivity. (New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 1. 
3 Charles Sanders Jr., While in the Hands of the Enemy: Military Prisons of the Civil War, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 2005), 9. 
4 Rory Muir. Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1998), 257. 
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prisoners was proper, the high mortality rates of these prisoners attest to the gap between reality 
and rhetoric in these cases. 
The widespread outcry stemming from revelations of poor treatment of prisoners during 
the Crimean War and the American Civil War gave further evidence to the growin  acceptance 
that prisoners of war should be treated humanely. By the end of the war 30,218 Union prisoners 
died in Confederate captivity nearly matched by the 25,976 Confederates who died while in 
Union hands. So strong was the public and official outrage regarding the treatment of prisoners 
that Captain Henry Wirz, the commandant of the Andersonville prison, was tried and hangein 
November 1865.5 
The first international conventions on wartime codes of conduct addressed the treatm nt 
of prisoners in the 1860s. The Geneva Convention of 1864 stipulated that wounded and sick 
prisoners of war should be returned to their home forces as soon as their health permited. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which was formed in 1864 in respons to the 
what many Westerners saw as the needless excesses of cruelty and inhumanity displayed during 
the Crimean War, expanded its mission in 1870 to include ameliorating the conditions of 
captivity for prisoners of war. It is perhaps as a result of this growing wave of attention that the 
largest instances of mass war captivity up to that point in history, the German capture of 723,500 
French prisoners during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, produced no examples of prisoner
abuse comparable to those found in earlier conflicts. The Germans quickly mobilized the 
resources and bureaucracy necessary to provide at least a “humane” level of car  f r this 
enormous number of prisoners. While the prisoners were certainly not well-cared for, suffering 
                                                
5 On public outrage caused by the Confederate treatment of Northern prisoners see Sanders 218-265. William Best 
Hesseltine’s Civil War Prisons, A Study in War Psychology (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1930) is a full 
study of how Northern leaders used reports of prisoners of war abuse to maintain public support for the continuation 
of the war, and to justify the mistreatment of Confederate prisoners of war as a retaliatory tool to encourage the 
Confederates to improve conditions in their prison camps. 
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from lack of adequate food, shelter and medical care, their living conditions were significantly 
better than those of earlier conflicts. One indication of this is that the mortality ate among the 
French prisoners was somewhere between three and four percent, roughly a third of w at it had 
been among prisoners during the American Civil War. While the French government itself could 
do little to help the prisoners, non-governmental organizations helped hold the German 
government accountable for the care of these captives. The ICRC and newspapers provided an 
unprecedented amount of information to the public by providing lists of known prisoners and 
reports on camp conditions.6 The weight of international public opinion encouraged Germany to 
treat its prisoners in a humane manner, and, at least based upon mortality rates, Gemany 
accepted this responsibility. The final example of mass prisoner taking prior to World War I 
produced more evidence that nation’s had accepted the concept of proper treatment of prisoners 
of war. During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 fewer than one percent of the 70,000 Russian 
prisoners in Japanese hands died in captivity. In stark contrast to World War II, during this war 
the Japanese treated their European captives with respect and humanity.7 While Japan is not a 
western nation per se, its conduct in international matters during this period was heavily 
influenced by the cultural norms of the west and they openly modeled their treatment of 
prisoners of war on western examples.8 The Russian treatment of Japanese prisoners was also 
generous.   
The apparent consensus which had emerged in the West during the 19th c ntury regarding 
prisoner treatment was codified in the Hague Convention of 1899. This convention established 
rules regarding prisoners’ living standards, property rights, and access to medical care. The 
                                                
6 Rachel Chrastil, Organizing for War, France 1870-1914, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010), 
34-5.  
7 Philip A. Towle, “Japanese Treatment of Prisoners in 1904-1905 – Foreign Officer’s Reports,” Military Affairs, 39, 
Issue 3 (1975): 115. 
8 Towle, 116-117. 
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convention placed restrictions on physical punishment and forbade forcing prisoners to perform
excessive labor or work associated with military operations. Inspection of pris ne  camps to 
ensure compliance with these rules was instituted. So universal was international agreement on 
the matter of humane treatment of prisoners of war, not only in words but also in the concrete 
examples of the Franco-Prussian and Russo-Japanese wars, that the internatio al community 
only briefly addressed the matter during the follow up 1907 Hague Convention. All nations 
which took part in World War I signed the Hague Conventions and thus were bound to their 
guidelines in 1914. In the years just prior to World War I there was some justification in seeing 
the matter of humane treatment of prisoners as a settled issue. What would cause this consensus 
to fall apart was the second historical meta-trend mentioned above, industrialization. 
 
Prisoners of War and the Era of Total War 
 When confronting questions about the treatment of prisoners of war it is easy to skip over 
an earlier fundamental question – why do armies take prisoners in the first place?  War pits two 
groups against one another, each intent on maiming and killing the other, until one achieves 
victory. What causes one, when it has gained such advantage over its opponent that resistances 
ceases, to stop killing and maiming?  What causes two individuals to go from trying to kill each 
other one moment to becoming guards and prisoners the next?  Compassion certainly plays a role 
in this matter, although its unpredictability and cultural variation makes it perha s too much of a 
“moving target” to lend itself easily to historical arguments. Throughout most of hist ry there 
have been two reasons for prisoner taking better suited to historical studies. Armies took 
prisoners because either they were valuable, or because they believed doing so encourag d more 
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enemy soldiers to surrender.9 The relatively small numbers of prisoners taken in wars fought 
before the modern era bears witness to the weakness of these motivations.  
It would appear that, until recently, armies saw the taking of prisoners as simply more 
trouble than it was worth. The acceptance of the concept of natural rights in the Western world 
changed this situation. By the second half of the 19th century almost all western nations agreed 
that they would accept the surrender of enemy soldiers, and care for them in a humanemanner, 
until the war’s end. Taking and caring for prisoners was a sacrifice. Prisoners were a drain on 
resources. Western states saw this sacrifice as part of the price of membership in the family of 
civilized nations. The employment of prisoners of war in work such as farming or infrastructure 
upkeep could partially offset the expense of housing, feeding and guarding them, but in no cases 
did it result in the prisoners “paying their own way.”  Even where prisoner agricultural or 
infrastructure labor was administered most efficiently, such as in the United States and Britain 
during World War II, the benefits derived did not come close to offsetting the cost of 
maintenance.10 Returning to the question as to why armies take prisoners of war, the answer 
given by a western military leader in 1900 would be very different from the traditional answer 
summarized by Richard Speed’s quote above. The modern western military leade would explain 
that armies took prisoners and cared for them in a humane manner because that is what was 
expected of “civilized” nations. 
World War I  
When Europe went to war in 1914 all the belligerent nations found themselves under a 
common set of obligations based upon their signature of the Hague Conventions. When the war 
                                                
9 Niall Ferguson’s essay “Prisoner Taking and Prisoner Killing in the Age of Total War: Towards a Political 
Economy of Defeat,” (War in History 11, no 2, 148-192) deals with some of these fundamental aspects of prisoner 
taking in stark military terms (see pages 148-154).  
10 Gerald H. Davis, “Prisoners of War in Twentieth-Century War Economies,” Journal of Contemporary History 12, 
no. 4 (1977): 628-630. 
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did not end quickly the burdens of these obligations weighed heavy on the belligerents. By 1915 
Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia found themselves burdened with hundreds of thousands 
of enemy prisoners. The war made greater and greater economic demands on the belliger nts. 
Limited resources forced hard choices on nations. The 1916/1917 fiscal year budget of Austria-
Hungary demonstrated the tension between resource allocation and care of prisoners. In that year 
2.5% of Austria-Hungary’s total war expenditures were consumed by the expense of caring for 
1.8 million prisoners, more than what was spent on explosives, motor cars or aircraft.11 The 
conundrum facing the combatants of World War I was how to continue to treat prisoners of wa  
in accordance with international standards, while at the same time prevent them from becoming 
such an economic drain as to diminish their chances for victory. Modern industrial wars 
introduced a new dynamic into the matter of prisoner treatment – at what point did military 
expediency outweigh a nation’s international commitments to civilized behavior. 
In 1915 the three nations holding the largest numbers of prisoners of war, Germany, 
Austria-Hungary and Russia, had all implemented policies which violated international 
agreements, in the hope that through these transgressions they could transform their prison rs 
from economic burdens to assets. The amount and type of work these three nations demanded of 
their prisoners, and the level of their maintenance, all fell outside international sta dards. Over 
the next three years prisoners became an indispensable labor source for these nation  in forestry, 
agriculture, road repair and mining. Left unchecked, this effort to maximize valu while 
minimizing expenses would almost inevitably lead to abuse. Nowhere was the economic 
potential of captive laborers more systematically exploited than in Germany. 
                                                
11 Davis, 629. 
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German Forced Labor practices during World War I 
The combined economic might of France, Britain, Russia and the United States was 
significantly greater than that of Germany and her allies in World War I. The Germans hoped 
exploitation of captive workers would narrow this gap. The German military leadership’s 
tendency to make their first response to any setback an extreme one was demonstrated i  the 
rapid adjustment they made in their prisoners of war policies in 1914-15.12 Their desire for 
increased national productivity overpowered their desire to honor international agreements 
within a few months of the outbreak of hostilities. 
Germany did not plan to use prisoners of war and civilian deportees for economic gain in 
1914; rather, it was a response to the unexpected duration of the war. Once embraced, forced 
labor policy was tuned for greater efficiency from 1915 forward. As historian Odon Abbal stated, 
during World War I Germany developed a “system of internment which, through trial and error, 
was organized to produce a substantial yield of manpower from a source which was both 
unexpected and invaluable.”13 Previous studies of German prisoner of war policy in World War I 
agree on the lack of pre-war preparation. After inspecting several camps holding Brit sh 
prisoners of war in 1914 American doctor Daniel McCarthy concluded, “Evidently no 
forethought or provision had been made” for dealing with the incoming flow of prisoners in 
1914.14 Ulrich Herbert’s later historical study confirmed this impression. “No thought had been 
given to [prisoners of war] by the War Ministry in its preparation for the war economy.”15 The 
lack of German planning in general regarding forced labor utilization during wartime is given 
further credence by the government’s initial decision to expel all foreign seasonal agricultural 
                                                
12 For more on the German military’s tendency to immediately resort to extreme solutions see Isabel Hull, Absolute 
Destruction; Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2005), 143-58. 
13 Abbal, 6. 
14 Daniel J. McCarthy, The Prisoner of War in Germany, (New York: Moffat, Yard and Company, 1918), 22. 
15 Herbert, 16. 
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workers upon the outbreak of war, a decision reversed the following month. By October, German 
fears of labor shortages resulted in a third decree which prevented all foreign workers, not just 
agrarian workers, from returning home for the balance of the war.16 This final decree 
transformed tens of thousands of foreigners, mostly Polish or Italian unskilled workers, into 
virtual captivies for the next four years. 
Another indication that the Germans had given little thought to prisoner of war policy
before the war are the abysmal conditions of their prisoner camps during 1914 and 1915. The 
most notorious case of neglect occurred at Wittenberg where 15,000 prisoners were held in a 
rough 10-acre camp. So overcrowded was the camp that three prisoners shared each mattress.
Typhus broke out in 1914 and ran rampant until February 1915 when the Germans sent a team of 
interned British doctors into Wittenberg to assess the situation. Upon receiving their report all 
German personnel abandoned the camp and refused to reenter it until August. During those six 
months the camp was run by the inmates, receiving supplies hoisted over the barbed wire f nces 
by German cranes. Fortunately typhus tends to sicken, not kill, and only a few hundred of the 
thousands infected died before the outbreak was brought under control.17 The international news 
coverage given to Wittenberg and other neglected camps embarrassed Germany into llowing 
neutral inspection to commence in March 1915. These inspections had initially been refused in 
violation of the rules of the Hague Conventions.18 
German expectations for a quick victory in 1914 go a long way in explaining the lack of 
thought they put into prisoner of war policy. Their handling of prisoners during the first months 
                                                
16 Herbert, 18. After this decree these workers becam in effect stateless serfs. They had no access to the German 
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17 McCarthy, 105-120. 
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of the war indicate that the Germans planned to simply house them in rough camps for a short 
period of time until peace settled the matter. Their decision not to exchange prisoners with 
France and Britain made sense only in a short war scenario. As Germany’s population base was 
smaller than its adversaries, one to one prisoner exchanges would have disproportionately 
benefited Germany in a war determined by attrition and industrial production. Their refusal to 
exchange indicates their policy was based on the expectation that the war would be short.19  
The military setbacks during the fall of 1914 caused the Germans to confront the 
problems, and opportunities, of holding hundreds of thousands of prisoners. Despite not planning 
on doing so before the war, Germany was the first nation to mobilize prisoners of war into units 
and assign them to long-term employment unconnected to their own maintenance. In April 1915, 
the Germans began using prisoners of war in the mining and iron industries,20 and in September 
1915 as POW labor companies in combat zones. Initially only Russian prisoners were used in 
this manner.21 Prisoner labor quickly boomed into an enormous project. By August 1916, 
1,625,000 POWs were working for the Germans. Roughly half of these prisoners were used in 
those areas which prisoners of war had previously worked: 45% were employed in agricultural 
jobs, 6% in maintaining prison camp services and 2% in public works. The innovation 
introduced by Germany in 1915 was the usage of 331,000 prisoners in industrial work (20% of 
working prisoners) and 253,000 (16%) in the war zone supporting the German army. 22 These 
practices violated the Hague Conventions as they forced the prisoners to work under life-
threatening conditions and perform work with a military purpose. 
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Recognizing that they were fighting a long war of attrition against a more populous and 
productive coalition Germany began shifting its economy to best support the war effort. In the 
spring of 1915 they began to experiment how best to mobilize the “unexpected and 
indispensable” manpower reservoir found in their prison camps. Even greater than Germany’s 
need for agricultural workers was its need for industrial workers.  So many factory workers were 
called to military service in 1914 that Germany’s industrial output dropped to 63% of its prewar 
level in 1915.  In October 1914, the German army was demobilizing arms workers who were 
more needed in factories than at the front line.23 The Germans estimated prisoners of war to be 
between 50% and 75% as efficient as German civilian industrial workers.24 Even at this reduced 
level of efficiency forced labor in industrial settings would be more productive than forced labor 
in jobs in which prisoners of war had been traditionally employed. To keep maintenance costs 
low the amount of food provided to the prisoners by the Germans was reduced to a level which 
should have resulted in malnutrition.25 Logically, this insufficient diet should have resulted in 
reduced productivity due to the declining health of the workforce. This result was largely 
avoided because the prisoners’ rations were supplemented by aid from their home countris. 
Ninety-seven percent of western prisoners of war received supplemental food nd clothing.26 In 
effect France and Britain subsidized the German war economy by feeding an  clothing their 
countrymen who were being forced to work for their enemy. Italian, Russian and Serbian 
prisoners of war, 94% of whom received no supplemental aid from home and thus had to get by 
solely on rations, suffered more from this policy of neglect. During the war 2.3% of pris ne s 
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from Western Europe and America died in captivity. The mortality rate among Italians and 
Slavic prisoners was 5.34%, more than twice as high as their Western companions.27 
A second German forced labor innovation during World War I which violated 
international agreements was the conscription of civilians in occupied territori s. In October 
1916, the Germans began forcibly relocating Belgian workers into Germany. German war 
minister Falkenhayn proposed deporting 400,000 Belgian workers.28 An economic official was 
even more enthusiastic, hoping at least 700,000 Belgians would eventually be deported.29 The 
deportees, referred to as “detachments of free laborers” by the Germans, were held in detention 
camps. These civilians were not technically forced to work; instead they were compelled to 
volunteer in order that they might be released from their detention camps. Lack of food and 
unsanitary conditions leading to the spread of epidemic diseases made escape from th se camps a 
compelling reward.30 A combination of resistance and international outrage caused the Germans 
to discontinue civilian deportations in February 1917.31 The International Committee of the Red 
Cross estimated that 100,000 French and Belgian civilians were deported to Germany during this 
five month experiment in forced labor.32 Eight hundred of the 61,000 Belgian workers taken into 
Germany died.33  
While deportations to Germany ceased, the German exploitation of labor within occupied 
territories intensified during the last two years of the war. Over sixty-two thousand Belgian 
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workers joined more than one hundred thousand French civilians taken from their homes and 
forced to work for the German Army behind the lines.34 These workers remained in captivity 
throughout the war and suffered a mortality rate between two and four percent.35 By January 
1918, 372,318 Belgians were either working inside Germany or for the Germans in occupied 
territories.36 While not all civilians in occupied France, Belgium and Luxemburg were deported 
or turned into forced laborers, Germany saw their ability to do so as a “presumptive right” from 
the beginning of the war.37 Germany’s inability to profitably utilize these civilian deportees in 
industry was probably more important than international outrage in limiting the scal  of its 
civilian deportation program. 
If the Germans were somewhat disappointed in the contributions of civilian deportees, 
their hopes of transforming the prisoners of war into a productive element of their national 
economy were borne out. Forced labor by prisoners and deported civilians played a major role in 
propping up their economy during the last three years of the war. Each German worker replaced 
by a forced laborer freed up one more body for military service. The yearly dr fts cut deeper and 
deeper into Germany’s manpower reserve, eventually making the nation heavily dependent on its 
growing army of slave laborers. German dependence on slave labor was perhaps most starkly 
displayed by their treatment of Russian prisoners in 1918. One stipulation of the peace treaty 
between Germany and the newborn Soviet Union was a full exchange of prisoners. In November 
1918, eight months after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ended hostilities between the two nations, 
more than one and a half million Russian prisoners were still working for the Germans.38 Eight 
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months after the war between the two nations had officially ended, Germany continued to refuse 
to allow the Russian prisoners to leave. By 1918 forced labor by prisoners of war and civilians 
had become absolutely crucial to Germany. In that year approximately 400,000 prisoners of war 
worked directly for the German army, while another two million worked within Germany 
itself.39 
 
Two Pathways 
Germany was not the only nation to use prisoners of war as laborers during World War I. 
The need for manpower was strong enough that, by 1916, all nations employed their prisoners in 
some way. Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary developed policy largely along similar lines. 
France and Britain took a different path. With the limited exception of a twelve-month period 
from June 1916 to May 1917 when the French and British armies used German prisoners of war 
as laborers in the war zone, the Western Allies’ treatment of prisoners largely conformed to 
international standards. 
The British and French used prisoners as laborers on a smaller scale than did Germany, 
Austria-Hungary and Russia. The Western Allies also used prisoners only as general laborers, 
while Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia used them in industrial work when possible. France 
and Britain assigned prisoners to specific projects for limited periods of time, such as in 1918 
when the French used approximately 50,000 German prisoners to help bring in the harvest. By 
way of comparison Austria-Hungary employed more than twenty times that number as y ar-long 
agricultural workers throughout 1917 and 1918.40 Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary each 
used more than a million prisoners of war as laborers from 1916 forward. In addition to 
agricultural work, Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary also used prisoners in mines, on 
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railroads and in other industrial settings. The proportion of prisoners working in agriculture vs. 
industry was roughly two to one in Germany and Russia.41 France and Britain used prisoners as 
temporary replacements for specific needs, while Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary 
integrated them as permanent fixtures in centrally controlled war economies. 
As had been the case in the past, the British and French spent more feeding, housing and 
guarding their prisoners than they received in return from the prisoners’ labor.42 S  profitable 
had the prisoners in German hands become that Germany, as mentioned above, refused to part 
with their Russian prisoners of war in 1918 and were planning to massively expand their usag  
of Italian prisoners and civilian deportees in 1917-18 when they thought Italy near collapse.43 It 
appeared that treating prisoners in accordance with international standards and employing them 
in a profitable manner were mutually exclusive practices. 
The prisoner of war policies between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia on the one 
hand, and the Western Allies on the other, were also distinguished by the relative l vels of 
violence and neglect prisoners’ were subjected two in the different systems. The clearest 
example of French and British abuse of German prisoners occurred between June 1916 and May 
1917 when German prisoners were forced to repair trenches and roads near the front line.44 This 
practice violated the Hague Conventions as it forced the prisoners to work under life-threat ning 
conditions and perform a military task. Germany had been using Russian prisoners as laborers 
along the western front in the war zone since September 1915, but had held French, British and 
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Belgian prisoners inside Germany.45 The Germans retaliated against the Allied use of German 
prisoners near the front by forcing British and French prisoners to work alongside the Russians 
in the war zone. The publicity the Germans gave their retaliatory campaign captured the attention 
of the French civilian government. In March 1917, the National Assembly intervened and 
ordered the army to withdraw all German prisoners at least thirty kilometers behind the front 
lines. After this French decision was announced the German government agreed to follow suit 
but failed to follow through on the agreement and continued to use French and British prisoners 
and civilians in the combat zone throughout the remainder of the war.46 The French used 33,112 
German prisoners of war as laborers in combat zones in 1917, about 8% as many compared to 
the 400,000+ prisoners and conscripted civilians the German Army directly employed in 1918.47 
While in 1917 the French and British governments reigned in prisoner abuse, it escalated 
in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia throughout the war. Prisoners in German captivity had 
always been subjected to selective violence. Its use grew in 1917 and 1918 in tandem with 
German and Austro-Hungarian desperation. Heather Jones, the foremost historian on prisoner 
abuse by the German Army during World War I, described the situation during the final year:  
“[The German army’s] use of violence had become less and less rational… [it] was 
indiscriminate and no longer understood as a punishment for a specific deed… From the 
[German military high command’s] standpoint violence against prisoners had become 
irrational.”48 During the fall of 1918 the prisoners in Germany and Austria-Hungary received so 
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little food that their situation became critical. Photographs of Italian prisoners held in Austria, 
who during the last year of the war had been rationed as little as three hundred calo ies a day at 
times, could easily be confused with images of death camp inmates from the next European 
war.49 Following the armistice the German Army freed French and British prisoner f war by 
driving them across no man’s land into Allied lines.  A French 10th Army message described 
their reception: “These unfortunates are in a terrifying state of thinness a d of exhaustion. … A 
great number of them have not even had the strength to reach our lines and lie in ditches along 
the roads in front of our front lines.”50 French aid workers found desperate conditions in the 
camps located within Germany. Starvation, lack of shelter and medical neglect had left many 
prisoners emaciated and apathetic. In some cases the camps had simply been abandoned y their 
guards and administrators during the final days. Food parcels sent from the prisoners’ h m  
countries several months earlier were found in warehouses.51 Judging by conditions in November 
1918, had the war continued into the spring, the mortality rate in the camps would have certainly 
grown considerably. 
What seems to have developed during the war was a split in how prisoners of war were 
treated in Central and Eastern Europe versus how they were treated in Western Europe. While 
each nation developed their prisoner of war policy independently, and undoubtedly there are 
many unique factors to consider in each case, it is noteworthy that the most explitative and 
abusive practices were found in nations governed by authoritarian regimes, whil democratically 
governed nations more closely followed pre-war humanitarian guidelines. The British and 
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French governments, responding to popular sensibilities, ordered their armies to halt specific 
forms of prisoner abuse. These Allied interventions reversed a trend of escalating violence. The 
German, Russian and Austro-Hungarian governments lacked the democratic underpinnings of 
the Western governments. In these nations the level of violence directed against prisoners of war 
and civilians escalated, almost unchecked, throughout the conflict.52 After the failure of their 
1918 offenses, defeat was at the Central Powers’ doorstep. Increasingly unchecked by public 
opinion and international condemnation, the German government and military vented their 
frustration through pointless acts of destruction and violence throughout 1918.53 The prisoners of 
war were but one of many defenseless targets during this endkampf. This was a pattern to be 
tragically repeated in 1944/45. 
 
Lessons Learned from World War I 
 
The Economic Potential of Forced Labor during Wartime 
Any doubts as to the ultimate success of the German effort to profit from their usage of 
prisoners of war were settled in their postwar accounting. The Reichstag Investigative 
Subcommittee on International Law reported in 1927 that, “only a future age looking back will 
be able to fully and properly evaluate what was achieved by using POW’s as laborers, and to 
recognize what an essential contribution their work was to the maintenance of the war 
economy.”54 During World War I the Germans learned that an efficiently organized program of 
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forced labor coupled with low maintenance costs could transform prisoners of war from a burden 
into a significant economic asset. Looking back on what they had accomplished from 1915 to 
1918 the Germans saw, “the cost-benefit ratio was from [their] point of view, very favorable.”55 
 While the Germans saw their wartime usage of prisoners of war as an economic success 
story the same could not be said about their civilian labor program. Several factors contributing 
to the failure of the civilian program were connected to the German proclivity to ignore the 
importance of logistics and planning during wartime.56 The Germans paid little attention to the 
administrative needs of their labor deportation programs before implementation. The first group 
of Belgian workers was actually rounded up and deported several weeks before written 
guidelines had been issued.57 The Germans had not cultivated relationships with Belgian officials 
and so the Germans had to identify and round up the workers themselves. The deportations took 
on more of the form of a crude sweep rather than a selective conscription. The Germans had lso 
failed to prepare adequate transportation and housing for the deportees. After being shipped via 
cattle cars to unprepared concentration camps, or “collection areas” as the German Army 
instructed them to be called, many more workers became sick and combative than would have 
had the program been more humanely organized. After being taken into custody the deportees 
went unfed for days while being herded into camps that lacked food stores, clothing and even 
blankets.58 The German government had failed to liaison with specific business to integrate the 
deportees into the workforce. Most German businesses, fearing resistance and sabotage, were 
reluctant to use the deportees unless they were accompanied by army securityp rsonnel, a 
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service the army provided for prisoner of war laborers, but failed to anticipate would be needed 
for civilian laborers. In sum; lack of planning resulted in the Germans deporting tens of 
thousands untrained, sick and hostile workers into Germany where they were shunned by the 
businesses for whom they had originally been conscripted. Before the program was canceled in 
March 1917 more Belgians died or were sent home due to poor health (13,950) than agreed to 
sign work contracts with German firms (12,000).59 
 The Belgian deportation program contained the characteristic flaw of so many programs 
emerging from the German militaristic culture of the 19th and 20th centuries, the coupling of great 
expectations and inadequate means.60 One lesson which could logically be drawn from this 
program’s failure was that if the Germans hoped to use deported civilian workers productively 
during subsequent wars they would need to invest more heavily in administration and more 
actively involve employers within Germany in the planning and implementation stages of the 
program. A larger program of forced conscription would be needed to justify this greater effort 
on the German’s part. A program of forced civilian labor might work if done on a grand sc le,
but was unlikely to succeed if done on a limited scale. As Herbert concluded in his study of the 
World War I forced labor program; “It became evident that workers could be forced to work only 
at great effort and expense – there was no such thing as a ‘little bit’ of forced labor.”61 The 
organization of the civilian labor program implemented by Germany in 1939 indicates th  the 
program’s planers may have taken this same lesson from the failed World War I prog am. 
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The German Public Reaction to Foreign Forced Labor 
Ever conscious of the importance of maintaining public support for their regime, the Nazi 
party recognized that social, as well as economic, factors had to be taken into consideration 
while determining the viability of a program which would forcible import millions of foreigners 
into Germany. A program of civilian forced labor would require more than just a large 
investment of state resources; it would also require the acquiescence of the German population. 
Only a few thousand civilian deportees had gone to work in German factories during World War 
I. A group of this size, working in a small number of sites, garnered little attention i  a nation of 
sixty-seven million at war. A future importation of millions of forced laborers would affect a far 
larger number of Germans. The German people had accepted working side by side with 
approximately two million prisoners of war during World War I. Would they also accept 
working alongside millions of deported civilians? German authorities noted that the virtual 
enserfdom of hundreds of thousands of Slavic agricultural workers during 1914-18 had sparke
almost no public protest. While there were indications that the Belgian deportation program 
caused more discomfort to public sensibilities, it appeared that the German people w re ikely to 
accept the forced importation of foreign workers during future times of crisis.62 As World War I 
dragged on the German population increasingly came to accept as “normal” the use of foreigners 
as forced laborers. War demanded sacrifices from the German population, and so naturally the 
German people could expect other populations to join in the “normal” sacrifices which 
accompanied wartime. “Basically, this was simply because of the war: the German public’s 
threshold of tolerance for injustices in the civilian sphere had dropped rapidly in view of the 
evident state of emergency. … As the war expanded and intensified, the German public became
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more willing to accept coercive measures against the foreign [Polish civilian forced laborers] 
which might have triggered vehement protest at the beginning of the war.”63  
Following the First World War it seemed likely that the creation of a large p ogram of 
forced labor, especially one which drew most of its workers from Eastern Europe, would be 
accepted by the German public during future times of crisis. The launch of just such a program 
within days of the start of World War II supplies circumstantial evidence that this was the 
conclusion of German military and economic planners during the interwar years. By the end of 
1939 almost every prisoner of war in German hands was employed and already the nation had 
imported more foreign civilian workers than it had during the entirety of the First World War. 
The slave labor segment of the workforce in Germany only grew throughout the war. By 1944 
7.6 million foreign prisoners of war or civilians were working inside Germany.64 While 
historians debate to what degree the massive German usage of foreign forced labor by civilian 
deportees during the Second World War was planned versus an ad hoc response to manpower 
shortages,65 clearly many German leaders looked back on the 1916-17 program as something to 
be improved upon, not relegated as a failed project. Responding to problems which plagued them 
in 1916-17 the 1939 civilian deportation program was more organized, and on a much larger 
scale, from its inception. A wide variety of organizations, including the army, the SS and the 
interior ministry, worked together to plan and implement the 1939 program. The program’s labor 
procurement officials worked with German businesses and foreign collaborators to en ure 
workers would be efficiently procured and put to work. As the design of the 1939 program 
corrected several of the major shortcomings of the 1916-17 program, it appears that the later 
program evolved from the former. 
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Admittedly a historigraphic gap exists which would more directly connect the German 
prisoner of war and forced labor policies developed during 1914-18 and those put into practice in 
1939-40. Indeed, if the interwar years could be ignored then German POW/forced labor policies 
seem to have developed on a in a smooth consistent manner. Lessons learned in the First World 
War were applied immediately during the Second World War. Shortcomings of the First World 
War policies identified in the aftermath of the conflict were corrected in the later program. Of 
course historians cannot ignore the possibility that the similarities between h  program as it 
existed in 1918 and the new program which was implemented in 1939 are circumstantial; 
however, the high degree of continuity between the two programs does make a compelling 
circumstantial case that during the interwar years the German government (and perhaps military) 
embraced the 1914-18 program as profitable and planned to return to this usage of POWs and 
conscripted laborers in the next war.66 
 
Lack of Postwar Repercussions for Prisoner of War Abuses 
 Another lesson learned by the Germans from the war was that those individuals involved 
in the abuse of enemy prisoners of war and civilians had little reason to fear being held 
accountable for their behavior after the conclusion of hostilities. Throughout World Wa  I the 
Allied powers publicized their intention to hold enemy soldiers and leaders responsible for acts 
which violated “international law” and “customs of war.” In 1915 the British governm nt 
announced it planned to hold individuals responsible for “atrocities,” such as U-boat attacks on 
merchant ships, the execution of British nationals accused of espionage, and the abuse and 
murder of civilians and prisoners of war. The French government announced their plans to 
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prosecute those responsible for the deportation of French civilians for forced labor. Support for 
the prosecution of what came to be known as “war crimes” built throughout the conflict. A 1917 
French Ministry of Justice draft-plan to prosecute German war criminals before an international 
tribunal was embraced in 1918 by the French and British governments.  
When the Paris peace conference opened in January 1919, war crimes trials were placed 
high on the agenda.67 The German delegation had little negotiating room at this conference. 
Refusal to sign the final treaty meant a return to hostilities. The German General Staff had 
informed the government that the army was in no position to defend the nation, although this 
same admission was never made to the Reichstag. Much of the opposition to the treaty cam  
from a small but influential group who favored a resumption of hostilities, even though they 
understood the military position was hopeless. This group had adopted an apocalyptic outlook. 
They believed it would be better for the German Army to be absolutely destroyd, and for 
Germany to suffer foreign occupation after engaging in a “people’s war” of civilian resistance, to 
accepting peace terms which shamed Germany’s honor and restricted its ability to rebuild after 
hostilities. They pictured a scenario in which a stronger Germany, less compromised by weak-
willed and pessimistic leaders, would be reborn from the ashes of destruction. They believed that 
accepting a compromise peace would leave in place the same leadership and national mentality 
which had caused Germany to lose the war.68 While the new German republic never appeared to 
have seriously considered restarting the war in 1919, the public demonstrations and print 
campaign organized by treaty opponents may have made this unclear to the Allied delegations at 
the peace conference.69 Even though the Allied nations were in a commanding military position, 
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the aggressive posturing by German treaty opponents effected the peace talks as there was little 
appetite for further fighting. 
Rather than simply sign the treaty when it was presented, the German government 
focused their objections on four articles which came to be called the “war guilt cla ses.” Despite 
the name given to them, only one of the four articles, number 231 which required reparations 
payments, held the entire German nation responsible for the war. The other three “war guilt” 
articles required individual German citizens to stand trial for specific crminal accusations. 
Article number 228 required the German government to recognize the right of the Allies to bring 
persons accused of “having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war”before 
military tribunals. Article 229 specified the tribunals would be composed of members of the 
accusing nationality or nationalities. Article 230 required the German government to comply 
with requests for documents and information related to these prosecutions. 
When the Treaty of Versailles came into effect in 1919 the Germans began a long, nd 
eventually successful, campaign to avoid implementation of articles 228 through 231. While a 
substantial historiography has developed documenting the Weimer Republic’s succe sf l 
avoidance of reparations payments, less has been written about the German Foreign Office’s 
even greater success in protecting German citizens from being held responsible for war crimes. 
This campaign began on 5 November 1919 when the German Foreign Office called for the Allies 
to drop extradition demands and instead allow the Germans to try the accused war crimin ls 
before the Supreme Court in Leipzig. This request was denied, and in January 1920 a list of 853 
individuals was given to the German Foreign Office for extradition. Of the 853 individuals 
demanded, 53 were accused of killing captured soldiers, 151 of crimes in prisoner of war camps, 
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165 of deporting civilians and 15 of crimes against forced laborers.70 After crimes committed 
during the invasion of Belgium, crimes against civilian laborers (16% of total) and prisone s of 
war (14%) made up the next two largest categories of accusations. The extradition list did not 
focus on lower ranking individuals. Among those demanded for extradition were many of 
Germany’s highest ranking public figures including Generals Hindenburg, Bülow and 
Ludendorff; Crown Prince’s Wilhelm and Rupprecht; Admiral Tirpitz; and Chancellor Hollweg. 
The German Foreign Office published the full list of accused individuals on 5 February 1920. 
Nationalist political organizations, many of whom supported a resumption of hostilities, staged 
protests opposing the extraditions. The German government claimed that if it complied with 
articles 228, 229 and 230 the republic would collapse into anarchy and again proposed trying the 
accused in German courts. The British government appears to have been unaware that  the 
protestors represented only the extreme right-wing of German society, and that most Germans 
were either indifferent to, or in favor of, turning over the accused war criminals.71 In February, 
1917 the British independently announced they would accept the Leipzig alternative. Unwilling 
to proceed without British support at this point, the French government reluctantly agreed to 
allow 45 trials to proceed at Leipzig as test cases, while retaining their treaty right to extraditions 
should these trials prove unsatisfactory. France, Britain and Belgium sent del gations to observe 
but not participate in the proceedings. 
 During the period of time from the end of hostilities in November 1918, and the opening 
of the Leipzig trials twenty-nine months later, public demands for retribution agai st Germany 
declined in the Allied nations. This mood of reconciliation was stronger in Britain and the United 
States than in France and Belgium, perhaps because the former nations had not been ivad d or 
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occupied.72 Those who stressed postwar reconciliation argued that holding Germany responsible 
for the war, and individual Germans responsible for war crimes, was unproductive and unfair. 
These people saw the war itself as the real atrocity, not individual actions committed during it. 
They believed that all nations had their share of responsibility in starting nd prosecuting the 
war. Many rejected accounts of individual German atrocities as unreliable and likely created by 
the same propagandists who they believed were responsible for the “war mentality” which had 
manipulated public opinion throughout the conflict. The hope these individuals carried into the 
1920s was that if the true culprits of the war were exposed, such as profiteers, propagandists and 
power driven politicians, the people of the world would never again allow themselves to be 
duped into supporting another such pointless bloodletting.73 This point of view relativized even 
straight-forward crimes such as the abuse of prisoners and the deportation of civilian workers. 
The German complaint that the Leipzig trials were unfair as they held only Germans accountable 
for acts which were committed by individuals from all nations held some merit. Ctainly there 
were many credible examples of crimes committed against German prisoers by French, British 
and especially Russian military personnel. The erroneous belief that Germany had treated 
prisoners of war more or less in the same manner as France and Britain treated G rman prisoners 
became so widely accepted after 1918 that it was rarely challenged even in scholarly works until 
the last decade.74 By 1921 public opinion across Europe was divided as to the possibility of the 
trials accomplishing anything of much value. Most of the politically engaged public were 
conflicted over the topic and would just as soon have put the matters of war responsibility and 
atrocities behind them and instead focus on a more hopeful future. 
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Due to the shifting political environment Britain, Germany, France and Belgium all 
arrived at Leipzig hoping to accomplish different things. For Germany, the “policy was that of 
damage limitation, doing the minimum necessary to fill the peace terms and avoid sanctions 
while minimizing nationalist hostility.”75 The Germans wanted to frame the proceedings as 
inquiries into alleged unauthorized actions of a small number of under-officers. The trials would 
leave high-ranking leaders and overall war policies unexamined. As the Germans controlled the 
judicial proceedings, and since none of the forty-five “test cases” involved any officer higher 
ranking than a General of the reserves, the Leipzig trials were well-organized to realize these 
German goals. The British focused on the trials’ symbolic value rather than on them as actual 
criminal proceedings. Following the trials Sir Ernest Pollock, Solicitor-General of the British 
Mission at Leipzig, wrote that while he found the sentences given by the court “far too light” in 
terms of length of imprisonment; overall he was satisfied because of other intangibles. 
To the Germans a sentence of imprisonment upon an officer carries a special stigm , and 
imports a blot upon the service to which he belongs. No sentence could be adequate or 
expiate the outrages committed; no time will efface the memory of their sufferings from 
those who underwent them. If we sought vengeance, no system of trial or punishment 
would have satisfied our thirst for it. … The true object of a conviction and punishment is 
that it shall be a deterrent against the repetition of similar acts.76 
  
To accomplish this goal of forcing the Germans to confront their wartime behavior the 
British delegation accepted the German handling of the trials on good faith. They believed a 
respectful attitude and lack of interference would increase the chances that the German people 
would accept the verdicts as fair. The British reasoned that if the Germans interpreted the 
verdicts as the products of “victor’s justice” they would dismiss them and not examine their own 
national behavior during the war. For the French and Belgians, the trials were not symb lic 
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exercises. They expected the trials to be conducted impartially and the courts to impose 
sentences on convicted individuals commensurate with the crimes they were accused of 
committing. 
The Leipzig trials got underway on 23 May 1921. While the foreign observers described 
the court and judges as handling the proceedings with fairness and independence, the effort put
forth by the German prosecution team was recognized to be lukewarm. The lead prosecutor, Dr. 
Ludwig Ebermayer, was openly reluctant “to proceed against career officers and servicemen 
whom he considered to be the embodiment of patriotic duty.”77 The German government failed 
to arrest many of the men scheduled to be tried, or to produce much of the demanded 
documentation. German witnesses for the prosecution were attacked on character issues, while 
testimony by foreigners was written off as vengeful and deceitful. The Germans tried four cases 
brought by the British government first. The Germans recognized that the Bri ish were more 
accommodating than the French or Belgians and correctly predicted the British government 
would accept a less then vigorous prosecution effort and lenient sentencing. After the tone of the 
proceedings was set at these standards, later objections by the French and Belgi  delegations 
could be more easily dismissed as unreasonable. The British cases resulted in one acquittal and 
three convictions with none of the convictions carrying a prison sentence longer than ten months. 
All three of the convictions came in cases involving prisoner of war abuse. 
The most high profile case tried at Leipzig was brought by the French against General 
Kruska. Kruska commanded a prisoner of war camp at Cassel from September 1914 through July 
1915. Of the 18,000 prisoners under his care 7,218 fell seriously ill. By German records 1,280 
prisoners died at Cassel during Kruska’s ten-month command, the French believed the actual 
number of deaths was closer to three thousand. Kruska was charged with “intentional neglect of 
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the duties of [his] office designedly furthered the spread of the typhus epidemic.”78 The 
testimony of the primary French witness against Kruska was treated by the court “with a certain 
degree of caution,” because a German camp superintendent testified that the witness, ho was a 
former French prisoner of war, “was well known to his camp comrades as given to making 
fantastic complaints.” The written judgment released by the court after the t ial explained that all 
accusations against the accused were approached with skepticism as, “Kruska, as is well known, 
and as all who were associated with him in the work of the prisoners’ camp testify, is of a deeply 
religious character and a convinced Christian.”79 The court found the accused “completely free 
of blame. … a Camp Commandant must consider himself the father of the prisoners of war. The 
accused General Kruska, as the trial has revealed, came very near to realizing this ideal.”80 On 9 
July 1921 the French and Belgians withdrew their observers, the departure of which acil tated 
the rapid conclusion of the remaining cases. On 7 January 1922 the British, French and Belgian 
governments issued a joint condemnation, calling the trials “highly unsatisfactory.”81 
Even though the British delegation was not satisfied with the Leipzig trials, they refused 
to consider joining the French in renewing their extradition demands. Instead the British let the 
matter drop after issuing a second joint statement of condemnation with the French on 22 July 
1922.82 The French and Belgian governments proceeded with their extradition demands but, now 
lacking British support, these demands appeared even more based on vengeance than they had 
been three years earlier. The Germans did not comply with the French and Belgian d mands. 
Between 1922 and 1924 the French and Belgians tried and convicted over 1,200 Germans in 
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absentia for war crimes. Outside of these convictions making foreign travelinconvenient, the 
accused German war criminals faced no penalties. Even these convictions were set aside during 
the Franco-German reconciliation talks late in the decade.83  
The Germans learned during the war that prisoners of war could be productively 
employed if work and maintenance restrictions specified by the Geneva and Hague Conventions 
were ignored. At Leipzig they learned that it was unlikely that any German would be held 
accountable for abusing prisoners or civilian workers regardless as to how the next war nded. 
With a government in power in 1939 which repeatedly flaunted international agreements and 
derided the Enlightenment mentality on which the codes of wartime behavior were based, the 
massive program of forced labor implemented by the Nazis should have come as no surprise. 
 
Forced labor in Nazi Germany, 1939-40 
 Given the high rate of unemployment during much of the interwar period, and the openly 
anti-immigrant policies of the Nazi government, the topic of employing foreign workers did not 
demand much attention in Germany until labor shortages began to hamstring the economy during 
the build up to war in the late 1930s. Despite the relative lack of pre-war public discussion 
regarding the utilization of foreign workers in the event of war, the rapid implementation of 
prisoner of war and foreign civilian labor programs upon the outbreak of hostilities rev als that, 
unlike in 1914, Germany entered war in 1939 with at least partially formulated plans for the
immediate exploitation of foreign workers. 
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The Formation of Nazi Forced Labor Policies 
During the late 1930’s Germany placed larger and larger industrial orders for milita y 
equipment while at the same time conscripted larger and larger numbers of young men into its 
armed forces. By 1938 the nation was suffering from a significant manpower shortage. The 
absorption of Austria, Bohemia and Moravia added millions of additional workers to the national 
economy but not enough to solve the problem. Even though war was certain to exacerbate this 
labor shortage the Nazi government was reluctant to deal with the issue due to ideological 
conflicts within the party. One of the core values of the Nazi Party was racial pur ty. Importing 
millions of non-Aryan workers into Germany ran contrary to this value. From 1933 until 1939 
the Nazi government enacted policies which kept the number of foreign workers in the Reic  
low while predicting, in rather vague ways, that the manpower shortage was only a short-term 
problem which would be overcome in the near future through increased workplace efficiency. 
This non-solution left the Germany economy with a manpower shortage, but allowed the Nazis 
to avoid an internal debate which might have threatened party unity. Despite having a ma power 
shortfall of one million, Germany had only allowed 375,078 foreign workers into the Reich by 
mid-1939.84 The invasion of Poland in September 1939 made it much more difficult to leave this 
problem on the back burner. 
Pragmatists in the German labor planning offices took advantage of the outbreak of war 
to immediately expand foreign labor recruitment. Three days after the invasio , the first German 
labor recruitment office opened in occupied Polish territory. By October, one hundred an fifteen 
offices seeking civilian volunteers for agricultural work inside Germany were operating.85 
German economic planners viewed the expected influx of prisoners of war as anotherway to 
increase the size of their workforce. As early as January 1939, nine months before the invasion 
                                                
84 Herbert, 50-1. 
85 Herbert, 61. 
 51
of Poland, the Germany army was already making detailed plans for the constru tion of prisoner 
barracks near worksites.86 During the summer of 1939 Germany’s chief economic planner, 
Hermann Göring, dealt with the topic of exploiting prisoner of war labor inside Germany as a 
settled subject.87 Just prior to World War II, when faced with the certainty of manpower 
shortages during wartime, the Nazi government was operating under the hopeful assumption that 
the combination of forced labor by prisoners of war and voluntary recruitment of foreign workers 
would provide enough bodies to see Germany through what they expected would be a short 
war.88 
The influx of newly recruited Polish workers brought the internal ideological confi ts 
over the use of foreign manpower to a head within the Nazi party. Now that the war had started,
continuing forward with an undermanned economy was a much more problematic scenario for 
German planners. The shortage of workers diminished chances for Germany victory; however, at 
least in the estimation of much of the Nazi party faithful, the reason the war was launched in the 
first place was to maintain German racial ascendancy over its neighbors. Any victory which 
compromised the larger racial mission would be a hollow victory. If foreign labor was to be used 
fighting the war, Nazi racial dogma demanded a way be found to exploit this labor which did not 
bring into question German racial mastery. Nazi ideologies could accept Germany’s temporary 
need for foreign workers, but wanted to ensure that during their employment in Germany these 
workers remained controlled populations, and that they and the German people understood that 
the foreign workers were in Germany as servants, not partners. 
Historian Herbert Ulrich has dubbed the consensus which settled the internal Nazi deb te 
over the usage of foreign labor the “terror” compromise. This compromise allowed as many 
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foreign workers as needed to be brought into Germany; however, these workers were to be 
treated in such a way that there could be no doubt as to who was the master race and who were
their servants. This arrangement satisfied the technocrats who supported the mobilization of 
foreign labor for war production, while mollifying the hard-line Nazi party memb rship who 
found compromise on matters of racial mixing particularly offensive.89 Henrich Himmler, the 
man largely responsible for crafting the decrees which made up the “terror” compromise, 
explained to those responsible for carrying them out; “It would be better if [theforeign workers] 
were not here. We know that, but we need them. . . . There is no use indulging in theory.”90 
Foreign workers were segregated from German society. Poles were requir d to wear a special 
badge. They were forbidden from using public transportation, visiting public parks and 
swimming pools, attending the theater, entering restaurants, etc. Foreign workers lived in 
barracks and had an after-dark curfew. Catholic clergy agreed to hold separate services for 
foreign Catholics to prevent mixing. In at least one town foreigners were only allowed to shop on 
Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays from eight to ten in the morning so Germans did not have to 
wait for service.91 Unnecessary socializing between Germans and foreigners was forbidden an  
“interracial” sexual relations were punishable by death for the foreigner and imprisonment for 
the German. To insure that these decrees were publicized and enforced the government 
distributed leaflets in German and Polish to all incoming workers and all German e ployers. 
They also instructed local police chiefs to carry out exemplary arrests as quickly as possible.92 
After the ideological obstacles for the widespread introduction of foreign workers into 
Germany had been worked out by the “terror” compromise, the matter of controlling the amount 
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of economic disruption caused by these workers remained open. If millions of Polish workers 
were to be brought into the German economy German workers would almost certainly see their 
bargaining power compromised. Decrees had already been issued to pay foreign w rkers 
between fifty and eight-five percent what a German worker in a comparable job was paid. Nazi 
and labor leaders could not accept a program that might lead to the dismissal of German workers 
in favor of cheaper and more easily controlled foreigners. To prevent this occurrence the 
government imposed a “social compensation tax” on all foreign workers. German employ rs did 
not pay foreign workers directly; they employed them through government labor offices. The 
office charged the employer a fee which equalized the cost of employing forei n and German 
workers. Foreign workers received a portion of what their employer paid for their serv ces, the 
remainder, the “social compensation” portion of their salary, was retained by the labor office. 
The legal justification offered for this special tax was that foreign workers did not have to serve 
in the German military or pay charity and political dues so higher taxation was in order. 
Equalizing salary expenses paid by employers for foreign and German workers caused a cascade 
effect which greatly eroded the foreign workers’ already marginal living standards. Since 
German employers could not save money on foreign workers’ salaries they cut expens s in those 
areas still open to them-working conditions, food and housing. As workers were paid a salary 
rather than an hourly wage the number of hours foreigners were forced to work increased.93 
Nazi concerns that the German public might find harsh treatment of foreign workers 
objectionable appears to have had little substance. With approximately 700,000 Polish prisoners 
of war and civilians working throughout the nation in early 1940, facing pervasive 
discrimination, denied the ability to resign their employment or even leave their homes after 
dark, working 60+ hours a week for a salary designed to provide them with little more than that 
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which was necessary to go on working, the government encountered almost no protest on their 
behalf by German citizens. “It was evidently possible to impose substantially worse working 
condition on a group of foreign civilian workers without sparking large-scale protest in the 
German public. Indeed, such measures were apparently not perceived as being at all special or 
remarkable.”94 
The Germans were somewhat surprised by the small number of Poles volunteering for 
work in Germany. From September through December 1939 only 39,675 Poles were recruited.95 
The ongoing war prevented the release of German workers from military service. Just as had 
been the case in 1914, in 1939 the Germans found themselves engaged in a long war for which 
they were unprepared. By November the Germans had lost their delusions of filling their 
manpower needs with foreign volunteers and prisoners of war. On 16 November Göring ordered
labor recruiters “to conscript civilian Polish workers, in particular girls, on a large scale. Their 
utilization and, in particular, the wages they are paid, must be such as to place productive 
workers at the disposal of German firms as cheaply as possible.”96 Plans called for one to two 
million Polish workers to be “at the disposal” of German agriculture and industry in 1940. 
By early 1940 the situation in Germany was sufficiently known in Poland that no one 
believed the labor recruiters wage and condition promises. In January 1940 Germany set quotas 
for each Polish district and town and required mayors to supply lists of workers. Unemployd 
men began slipping off into the forests to avoid conscription. By April only 210,000 of the 
demanded 500,000 Polish workers had been brought into Germany. More blunt tactics followed. 
All men between fifteen and twenty-five years of age were ordered to report for compulsory 
labor service. Men were simply detained on city streets. Movie theaters and whole villages were 
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surrounded and conscripted en masse for deportation to Germany.97 The fate of the 294,393 
Polish prisoners of war largely coincided with the fate of their civilian countrymen. More than 
ninety percent of the prisoners of war were quickly put to work in agricultural jobs.98 In February 
1940 a “Führer decision” transformed these men from prisoners of war into civilian workers.99 
While probably little changed in their daily lives, this transformation placed all Polish workers in 
Germany under one administration and removed any potential complications which might arise 
from international conventions protecting the prisoners’ rights and preventing their employment 
in war related industries. 
 
Conclusion 
When Germany attacked west in May 1940 they already had already made much greater 
social and economic preparations for the exploitation of foreign labor than they had throughout 
the entirety of the First World War. In May 1940 there were already 1.2 million foreign workers 
in Germany, roughly evenly split between those who volunteered and those who were brought 
there by force. Almost all these foreigners were publicly discriminated against; forced to work 
grueling hours in substandard conditions; and, were paid little more than subsistence wages. 
Faced with this reality the German population accepted the situation and went about their daily 
lives. By the time the first French and British prisoners began arriving, “it was evident that the 
German population would offer no serious protest.”100 Before the Armistice was signed in July 
1940 French and British prisoners were already at work inside Germany. By October 1.2 million 
French and British prisoners took their place alongside the 700,000 Poles already working for the 
Reich. Given the evolution of German forced labor policy since 1915, the employment of the 
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incoming French prisoners of war as forced laborers was a given, and French expectations that 
the prisoners would be treated as per international standards seemed naïve in retrospect.
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Chapter Two: The Fall of France and Beginning of the Captivity 
 
The Collapse of the Third Republic 
France and Britain declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939 in response to the 
invasion of Poland. Of the five million men France mobilized, 2,776,000 served in combat army 
units and 2,224,000 served in non-combat army roles or in the navy or air force.1 From 
September 1939 until May 1940 the French and German militaries engaged only in limited 
actions. This period of relative inactivity known as the “phony war” (“drole de guerre” in 
French), came to an end on 10 May 1940 when the Germans invaded France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxemburg. 
 So rapid and overwhelming was the German victory over the Western Allies in May and 
June of 1940 that shock was the dominant initial reaction. Looked upon with hindsight military 
historians have little trouble deconstructing the reasons for the Allied defeat in M y 1940.2 The 
Allied high command, under French general Maurice Gamelin, executed a high risk defensiv  
maneuver as an immediate response to the German attack on 10 May. The mobile French 1st and 
7th Armies and the motorized British Expeditionary Force (BEF) were aggressively pushed north 
into western Belgium and the southern Netherlands in an effort to halt the German advance as 
distant as possible from economically vital areas in northern France. This maneuver played into 
the hands of the Germans who centered their attack further south than expected through the 
                                                
1 Robert Christophe, Les Flammes du Purgatoire, Histoire des Prisonniers de 1940, (Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 
1979), 11. 
2 Julian Jackson’s The Fall of France, The Nazi Invasion of 1940, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) provides 
a good summary of the now dominate view on the Allied defeat of 1940. The key works on the topic include Robert 
Doughty’s two works, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939,  (Hamden:  
Archon Books, 1985) and Breaking Point, Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940, (Hamden:  Archon Books, 1990); 
Ernest May’s Strange Victory, Hitler’s Conquest of France, (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000); and Eugina 
Kiesling’s Arming Against Hitler, France and the Limits of Military Planning, (Lawrence: University of Kansas 
Press, 1996). These works emphasis the strategic miscalculations made by the Allies in 1940 and the resulting 
military defeat. This wave of scholarship largely replaced, at least among the scholarly community if not among the 
general reading public, earlier interpretations of the defeat found in the works of Alistair Horne, Guy Chapman, 
William Shirer among others, which interpreted 1940 as the result of French moral and cultural shortcomings. 
 58
Ardennes region. A meticulously planned and forcefully executed attack by motorized and 
armored German units quickly pushed through the Belgian and French screening forces in the 
Ardennes and established bridgeheads across the Meuse River at Sedan, Dinant and Charleville. 
By 15 May the Germans had broken out of these bridgeheads and began a rapid advance laterlly 
across northern France towards the English Channel, which they reached two days later. 
Gamelin’s aggressive response to counter the German attack into the Low Countries with 
an Allied advance into central Belgium required the employment of most of the French army’s 
motorized and armored divisions. Gamelin stripped these units from the French mobile reserv
and committed them to advance north. The German breakout from the Meuse bridgeheads 
isolated these units in Belgium, away from the bulk of the French army. Allied efforts to 
organize an effective counterattack on the German corridor, now stretching aross the Franco-
Belgian border from the Ardennes to the English Channel, failed largely because the units most 
capable of executing this attack were ironically those units which Gamelin had stripped from the 
reserves and sent into the German trap.  
The daring German campaign plan and unexpectedly rapid advance of their independent 
armored units threw the Allied high command into confusion. A single coordinated counterattack 
by British and French units intended to break the encirclement broke down into a series of four 
limited and ineffective actions from 17 to 22 May. The British decision to withdraw their forces 
towards the port of Dunkirk on 22 May without coordinating the maneuver with French units 
amplified the disorder and ended any further counterattack possibilities. By May 27 effective 
resistance in the north had ceased with the exception of a perimeter around Dunkirk and a large 
pocket of French of soldiers in Lille. The Lille pocket formed when a gap opened in Allied lines 
between the withdrawing British forces and French forces still holding defensive positions. A 
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massive ad hoc withdrawal of Allied troops from Dunkirk succeeded in evacuating 198,000 
British and 139,000 French troops. On June 1st the remaining 35,000 French defenders in Lille 
surrendered, followed three days later by the 40,000 members of the French rear-gua d which 
held the Dunkirk parameter during the evacuation.  
This defeat destroyed, at least temporarily, nine of the ten BEF divisions, forced Belgium 
and the Netherlands to capitulate and destroyed many of the most powerful and mobile divisions 
in the French army. The French, now fighting alone and fielding a greatly diminished army, 
attempted to establish a new line of resistance along the Somme and Aisne rivers. On 7 June, 
after two days of intense combat, the Germans broke through this line and began advancing into 
the heart of France. Paris was abandoned on 10 June. Premier Paul Reynaud resigned on 16 June 
and was replaced by a new government under Marshal Philippe Pétain. The following day Pétain 
issued a public call for the fighting to end. An armistice was signed on 22 June and came into 
effect two days later. 
In total 1.85 million French soldiers were taken prisoner during this campaign. To put 
this number in perspective it represented 4% of the entire French population.3   Slightly over 
ninety-five percent of the prisoners were between 20 and 40 years of age - one in seven ofall 
French men fitting into this demographic group. Over half the prisoners were marri d; roughly 
forty percent had already started families .4 Practically no French family was left unaffected. 
 
The beginning of the captivity  
 Given the massive number of French men in captivity the prisoners were a topicof great 
concern across the nation. Throughout June and July of 1940 France was a nation made up of 
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millions of families desperately attempting to locate missing loved ones. Th  public wanted to 
know if missing soldiers were or were not in captivity. They wanted to know how the prisone s 
were being treated. Wives and family members sought information on the possibility of visiting 
prisoners held by the Germans. According to the Article 36 of the Geneva Conventions, whe  
soldiers are taken prisoner they are to be given the opportunity of sending home a pre-printed 
Red Cross postcard within seven days of their capture informing their family that they were a 
prisoner and if they were seriously injured. In practice this policy was rarely followed. Some 
French prisoners were encouraged by their German captors not to bother to write as they would 
likely be home before the postcard arrived.5 It was not uncommon for loved ones of servicemen 
to only learn that they were prisoners months after they had been declared missing from lists of 
prisoners of war published in newspapers.  
Based on newspaper coverage, the fate of the prisoners of war were one of the great 
preoccupations of the nation in the months following the defeat. This can hardly come as a 
surprise. Nearly everyone in France had a family member, a husband, a father, or a close friend 
behind barbed wire during the late summer of 1940. This wave of concern for the well-being of 
the prisoners and the public’s enormous desire to contact them overwhelmed thoughts about 
other aspects of the captivity that were to become significant during the coming years. In 1940 
the French public saw the prisoners as a uniform bloc of unfortunate men suffering more than 
most from a national disaster which was not of their making. 
While the French public had a homogenized view of the captives the prisoners 
themselves began to see themselves as belonging to different categories as earlier as their first 
weeks of confinement in the frontstalags in France and Belgium. While prisoners often sought 
out other captives with whom they shared pre-war ties, most notably regional ties, the new 
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categories which emerged were unique to the captivity. Historian François Boudot noted this 
distinctive prisoner of war society, which he dubbed the “civilization of the camps,” in a very 
early study published in 1955.6 One early dividing point among the prisoners involved the 
manner in which they became prisoners. Soldiers who had surrendered after combat were seen 
by many of their fellow prisoners as more deserving of respect than were those who had 
surrendered without resistance. Men who had been ordered to surrender by a commanding 
officer were seen as less responsible for their captivity than those who had surrendered of their 
own free will. Prisoners who turned themselves in when escape was still possible, and those who 
surrendered without offering resistance, were held in lower regard.  
Among the prisoners themselves, the manner in which an individual was captured 
declined in importance after the initial months of captivity. It was not until their lib ration in 
1945 that this method of categorizing prisoners regained its importance due to the French 
public’s reception of the returning prisoners and policies considered by the newly established 
French provisional government regarding their recognition as veterans.7 Thi  method of 
categorizing soldiers based upon their actions on the battlefield in 1940 will be referr d to as the 
“capture identity” method in this work. 
One aspect of the postwar debate regarding their eligibility for veteran status which many 
of the prisoners found particularly bewildering was that their honor, their loyalty to their 
homeland, was being judged, by-in-large, based upon what had happened during a few days in 
May or June of 1940, while their behavior during the subsequent five years in captivity was 
ignored. While the public discourse over recognition of the former prisoners as veterans focused 
on their service and capture in 1940, among the prisoners themselves, these matters had d clined 
                                                
6 François Boudot, “Aspects de l’histoire de la captivité,” L’Actualité de l’histoire, no. 10 (1955): 29. 
7 For more on this topic see the Epilogue of this work. 
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in importance as their captivity wore on. Within the “civilization of the camps” another method 
of categorization evolved which was more expansive than the “capture identity” method 
described above. Prisoners differentiated one another primarily based not on how they were 
captured, but on how they conducted themselves as a prisoner – on their mental approach to 
captivity. Some prisoners refused to accept their situation and fought against it, either through 
resistance activity or escape attempts. Other prisoners attempted to make the best of their fate 
and build as comfortable a life as possible in captivity. In his memoir “The Taxis of the Marne” 
ex-prisoner Jean Dutourd gave names to these mindsets. Men who more passively accepted 
captivity and placed their hopes of liberation on outside forces were dubbed the “optimists.” 
Optimists held onto hopes that the war would end soon, or that their government would arrange 
for their release, or that captivity would not be harsh. Those prisoners who more clearly 
understood that their captivity would be a harsh ordeal and that it would likely last until the end 
of the war, but who made little or no attempt to regain some control of their lives, Dutord dubbed 
the “pessimists.”8 While pessimists did not share the delusions of the optimists, both groups 
responded to captivity in a passive way. Prisoners who were unwilling to accept captivi y 
passively, those willing to run risks to escape or strike back at their jailers, b came known as 
resisters. This method of breaking into groups based upon prisoners’ approaches to captivi y will 
be referred to as the “captivity response identity” in this work.  
A prisoner’s “capture identity” was determined largely by events beyond his control, 
such as to which unit he was assigned or the orders he received from his commanding officers.
We should also bear in mind that even those decisions which were left to individual soldiers in 
1940 were often made by young men in an environment of confusion and fear. One shortcoming 
of the “capture identity” method of classification is that it placed a prisoner within a category 
                                                
8 Jean Dutourd, The Taxis of the Marne, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), 141-44. 
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which was determined by past events and decisions which could never be altered or undone. The 
“captivity response” method, on the other hand, allowed for individual growth and maturation. It 
recognized that a person’s actions in 1940 held meaning and consequences, but it also 
recognized that identity is a dynamic process, especially so for those part  of  person’s identity 
determined by their own actions and decisions. Prisoners who fought bravely during the war and 
made the greatest efforts to avoid capture would not necessarily become resisters in captivity. In 
fact, based on an examination of prisoner of war memoir literature, the opposite seems to have 
more often been the case.9 Granted this conclusion must be seen as very tentative given the 
issues of sample size and the problems associated with using memoir literature for historical 
studies.10 Based on examined POW memoirs, prisoners who engaged in combat and who resisted 
capture longer tended to become optimists once in captivity. The resisters tended to be prisoners 
who fell into captivity with less exciting stories about 1940. These memoirs allow us to make a 
closer examination of individual prisoners and the circumstances they faced in 1940, and help us 
understand the specific situations they faced at the time of their surrenders. Th se individualized 
accounts demonstrate that the circumstances of a soldier’s surrender in 1940 often proved to be a 
poor indicator of how he would conduct himself in captivity and allow us to examine some 
possible reasons why this might have been the case. I believe the prisoners’ quickly came to 
understand that how a soldier was taken prisoner in 1940 revealed less about their character t n 
did their subsequent attitude towards their captivity and this explains why they came to judge the 
                                                
9 For this work twelve book length prisoner memoirs as well as several dozen shorter témoignages were examined 
by the author. These sources were contextualized throug  the reading of secondary accounts, news paper accounts, 
and excerpts from prisoner correspondence held in the French national archives. 
10 See the introduction of this work for more on the benefits and problems associated with historians using memoirs 
in general, and some of the specific cautions which must be born in mind when using memoirs written by French 
men and women covering the World War II era.  
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honor of their fellow prisoners’ more by their responses to captivity than by how they had 
originally been taken prisoner. 
 The term “identity” can be a problematic one when used in historical scholarship.11 
“Identity” can be seen as something permanent and unchanging in a person, as their “self.” This 
work will use the term “identity” in a different sense, one referred to as a “soft” sense. “Soft 
identity” is something that is fluid, constructed and can be contested at times. A p rson’s “soft 
identity” can change over time, based upon events, and even based upon their immediate 
situation. Since a person’s “soft identity” is mutable, and since each person has multiple “soft 
identities” at any given time, it becomes a problematic analytic tool, especially if the author does 
not clarify how he or she is using it in their work. The most common understanding of what 
“identity” means in the social sciences, per Philip Gleason, was as “an artif ct of interaction 
between the individual and society – it is essentially a matter of being designated by a certain 
name, accepting the designation, internalizing the role requirements accompanying it, and 
behaving according to those prescriptions.”12 By using this less nuanced definition of “identity,” 
and by applying it only to situations related to a particular prisoner’s connectedness to certain 
categories which have been defined in the work, hopefully the term will not prove to be too 
problematic. For example: the terms “capture identity” and “captivity response identity” relate 
only to an individual’s connectedness to categories of people which have already been described 
in the work. As this work demonstrates, these designations often changed over time and were 
contested. Part of the French prisoners’ story are their struggles to control how they ere 
perceived by others, how they were categorized by official organizations, and ultimately, in 
                                                
11 For a good summary of some of the problems the term presents see Frederick Cooper and Roger Brubaker’s essay 
“Identity,” in, Colonialism in Question; Theory, Knowledge, History, (Berkley: University of California Press, 
2005), 59-90. 
12 Philip Gleason, “Identifying Identity: A Semantic History.” Journal of American History 69, no. 4 (1983), 918. 
 65
many cases, how they came to see their connectedness to, or separation from, other groups in 
postwar France. 
An examination of the 1940 campaign focusing on where, when and how French soldiers 
became prisoners also helps highlight shortcomings of the “capture identity” method of 
classification, and demonstrates why the “captivity response” method was more accepted by the 
prisoners’ since it recognized identity as dynamic rather than static. “Capture identity” fixed a 
prisoner in a category based on choices made during stressful moments of combat. The scenarios 
prisoners faced at the time of their capture were largely shaped by factorsout f their control, 
such as to which unit they were assigned or the orders they received from their commanding 
officers.  
Ultimately a prisoner’s membership in the group of optimists, pessimists or re isters was 
the culmination of a series of individual choices. A better understanding of the events of 1940, 
reconstructed by a closer examination of the campaign and individual accounts, help us
understand the settings in which these choices were made and, thus, will help us better 
understand the environment from which these different reactions to captivity emerged.  
 
The dynamics of prisoner taking in France in 1940 
A study of 1,801 prisoner questionnaires, the results of which are reproduced below, 
serves as a starting point in understanding the dynamics of the 1940 campaign from the 
prisoners’ perspective. The first chart breaks down the 1940 campaign into six chronological 
phases and provides the percentage of the total number of French prisoners taken during each of 
these phases. The second chart breaks the campaign into geographic regions and provides the 
percentage of French prisoners taken in each region. 
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Chronological breakdown of the prisoner taking13 
Prior to 10 May 1940 1% 
From 10 to 31 May (Note this percentage does not 
included the surrender in June of the Lille and 
Dunkirk pockets) 
15.5% 
From 1 to 15 June (Somme-Aisne battles from 5 to 
11 June. Lille surrender 1 June, Dunkirk 4 June.) 
25.7% 
From 16 to 20 June (Petain’s radio appeal for an 
armistice on 17 June ends most French resistance.) 
25.4% 
From 21 to 25 June. (Armistice comes into force 25 
June) 
4.1% 
After 25 June. 5.1% 
 
Geographical breakdown of the prisoner taking 
Belgium & the Netherlands 1.6% 
Nord 26.9% 
Vosges-Alsace-Belfort 27% 
Lorraine-Champagne-Ardennes (Fighting from 
both the May and Aisne-Somme battles in this 
region) 
13.7% 
Bourgogne- Franche-Comté (South of Paris) 9.3% 
Ouest (Overlap between the Aisne-Somme battles 
and the pursuit south of Paris) 
7.8% 
Centre (South of Paris) 5.6% 
Unknown 8.2% 
  
 The information contained in the above charts allows us break the 1940 campaign into 
four distinct phases of prisoner taking: (1) The Battle in the North; (2) The battl s long the 
                                                
13 Both charts based on the survey of 1,801 prisoners i cluded in (Durand, 43). 
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Somme and Aisne lines; (3) The encirclement of the French armies stationed along the eastern 
frontier; and finally, (4) The mopping up actions south of Paris. How a French soldier became a 
prisoner and how they experienced their first few days of captivity was largely determined based 
upon during which of the four phases of the campaign they fell into German hands. Placing 
French prisoners into these phases allows the broad generalizations about how French prisoners 
were captured which are drawn below, and how the prisoners taken in each of the phases were 
likely to experience the first days of their captivities. These generalizations are supported by 
accounts drawn from individual soldier’s memoirs. These individual accounts flesh out the 
generalizations and support their validity.  
Breaking up the campaign into these phases also reveals that roughly 60% of French 
soldiers taken prisoner (those taken in the later two phases) had significantly less control over the 
circumstances of their capture than did soldiers taken earlier in the campaign (during the first 
two phases). Luck or fate determined to which unit a French soldier was assigned and thus it also 
played a significant role in the circumstances of that soldier’s capture. The chances that an 
individual soldier would see combat or not was largely determined by the unit in which he 
served. The orders issued by a soldier’s commanding officer also played a large role, also outside 
his control, in how he was captured. Many French officers surrendered their whole units before 
opportunities for resistance or escape had been exhausted. Other officers ordered their men to 
resist as long as possible and escape when further resistance was impossible. Still other officers 
left decisions about surrender and escape up to small groups. Serving in a military unit does not 
rob an individual of free will, but decisions taken by soldiers are strongly influenced by orders 
received and the actions of their companions. There are many instances of individual sol iers 
disregarding orders to surrender and instead attempting escape and/or continuing to fight; 
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however, these must be seen as exceptional actions, not as expected behavior. While soldiers’ 
“capture identity” were not literally pre-determined by forces outside their control, the 
circumstances of their capture were strongly influenced by these forces. If a prisoner’s military 
service was determined to be honorable or dishonorable based upon the circumstances of their 
capture then in most cases this was a matter which was largely pre-determin d for most French 
soldiers.  
 
Phase One: Battle of the North 
The first large group of French soldiers was taken prisoner during the May battles in 
Belgium and Northern France. On 10 May the Germans attacked along a broad front stretching 
from the Southeast corner of the Netherlands through Belgium and Luxemburg and into 
Northern France. The Allies responded to this attack by rushing two French armies nd the 
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) north into Belgium to attempt to halt the German advance. 
This force was cut off by the German attack through the Ardennes region. The Allied high 
command attempted to organize a simultaneous counterattack from both the north and the south 
which they hoped would sever the German corridor and reestablish contact with the encircl d 
forces. A series of three French attacks from 17 to 22 May and a British attack on 21 May failed 
to break the German encirclement largely due to the paucity of resources that could be rganized 
and committed to these attacks and the inability of the Allied high command to coordinate them. 
When these attacks failed, Allied soldiers trapped in the north attempted to withdra o Dunkirk 
for evacuation. Those unable to reach Dunkirk were isolated and forced to surrender. The 
prisoner of war survey referred to above found that approximately 16% (~300,000) of prisoners 
were taken between May 10 and 31. French forces trapped in the Lille pocket continued to resist
until 1 June when the final 35,000 defenders surrendered. French forces also held the perimet r 
 69
around the channel city of Dunkirk during the Allied evacuation. On 4 June 40,000 French 
soldiers surrendered in the Dunkirk region one day after the last evacuation ship had left. Thus, 
from the attack on 10 May until the surrender of the forces covering the Dunkirk evacuation on 4 
June approximately 375,000 French soldiers were taken prisoner during this first phase of t e 
war, or roughly 20% of the final total. 
Soldiers captured during this initial phase of the campaign were likely to be attached to 
combat units and to be captured only after their unit took part in active resistance. This first 
group of prisoners were often encircled and thus would have had less opportunity to avoid 
capture than would soldiers taken in the more open operations that followed later in the 
campaign. 
Paul Fraisse (1911-1996), who would go on to become a famed psychiatric researcher at 
the Sorbonne and president of the International Union of Scientific Psychology, was a thirty year 
old conscripted sergeant assigned to an observation unit when the Germans attacked in 1940. 
Fraisse’s duties were of an administrative nature. His physical conditioning a d training were not 
up to infantry standards. His unit advanced north at the outbreak of hostilities. On 19 May, while 
in the Belgian town of Givry (roughly 10 km northwest of Bastogne), Fraisse wa informed of 
the Ardennes breakout and the encirclement. His unit withdrew to the southeast until 23 May
when they were halted near Lille. Cut off from further movement south or towards the channel, 
Fraisse’s unit prepared to take part in a counterattack planned for 26 May. After the r treat 
Fraisse described his unit as anxious but not in despair. The men waited for orders. Having not 
been directly defeated by a German force, and with the expectation of taking part in a 
counterattack, the men felt “assured of relief, and a fight”. Knowing action was planned the men 
felt until events played out further, “nothing [was] totally lost.” When the attack was canceled 
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and the men were instead ordered to attempt to escape toward the coast at nightfall the unit’s 
discipline and moral began to break down.14  
Unable to escape from the Lille pocket Fraisse took up a rifle and joined an infantry unit 
on 29 May. His administrative skills were no longer needed and he hoped to remain useful. The 
unit Fraisse joined held their position for seventeen hours under shelling and infantry attack 
before a messenger arrived and told them that the battalion commander had ordered a general 
surrender. The messenger was sent away until he could return with a written order, which he 
soon did. The men felt dejection but “we were too tired to suffer.” Before raising the white flag 
they destroyed their weapons and munitions and burnt their personal papers and staff 
automobiles. “Through this we retrieved a little of our dignity as soldiers by knowing that we left 
nothing useful for the enemy.” After the destruction Fraisse and the 20 or so men with him 
waited for the Germans to arrive. “We had nothing left to do, nothing more to say. The calm was 
agonizing.”15 
Following his surrender Fraisse was ordered to march to a temporary field internment 
camp, a frontstalag. This forced march was a common experience for all prisoners. Each 
prisoner’s account is unique in many ways, but all agree that these forced marches were brutal. 
The marches could last over a week, during which time the men were driven up to sixty
kilometers a day. Some soldiers describe receiving some bread and soup each day while on these 
marches; others describe going days without any food. Some accounts describe Germans beating 
men who were unable to keep up, while others record these men being forced to walk as far as 
they could go on their feet and then being transported by truck after exhaustion overcame them. 
Fraisse’s march was of the more mild variety. Given that he was taken priso er in northern 
                                                
14 Paul Fraisse, Écrits de captivité 1940-1943, (Paris:  Editions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme 1991), 33-35. 
15 Fraisse, 38. 
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France the distance between his point of capture and the frontstalag to which he was assigned 
was only eighty kilometers. Even though Fraisse’s march was relatively short compared to that 
of many other prisoners, and he did record that during the four days he was marched he was fed 
rice twice and soup once, physically he was not up to the task. Fraisse describes himself as 
among the “stragglers.” Late on the second day of the march a German soldier put h m in a car 
with other struggling men and drove him the last stage of that day’s march. Fraisse s w three 
French prisoners who had died during his march. He described other officers who, like himself, 
were not physically prepared for this introduction into captivity: 
“No we should not see it,” the soldiers whisper while passing in front of the old pot-
bellied officers with gray hair. Brave officers for training or administration, functionaries 
but not soldiers. They had collapsed in the ditches, no longer able to walk.”16   
 
On 2 June 1940 Fraisse arrived at the frontstalag in Enghiem, Belgium where his five 
years of captivity began. Fraisse had been assigned to a combat unit and performed his duties to 
the best of his ability. He had attempted to evade capture when it was possible and fought 
bravely after being trapped by German forces. He and his unit reluctantly surrendered when 
ordered to do so by a commanding officer. His decisions over the next several years would show 
Fraisse to be an “optimist” by Dutourd’s standards, and a supporter of the Vichy regime, but the 
first chapter of Fraisse’s life as a prisoner is would seemingly place him among the group of 
soldiers who had performed their duty with honor. 
Francis Ambriére, the author of “The Long Holiday,” perhaps the best known French 
prisoner of war memoir, was also captured in the Lille area. Unlike Fraisse, Ambriére’s account 
is that of a soldier who never engaged in combat and who quickly surrendered. After finding out 
his unit was cut off Ambriére’s commanding officer had to be talked out of surrendering the unit 
“with proper military formalities” to the first German soldiers encountered on 19 June. Ambriére 
                                                
16 Fraisse, 41-8. 
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and other soldiers discussed the possibility of individual escape should the unit be forced to 
surrender. Ambriére was told by the commanding officer that if he did attempt o avoid capture 
individually he would be disobeying orders and would be “denounced as a deserter and treated as 
such.” Two days later the commander disintegrated the unit by giving an “every man for 
himself” order. Ambriére was taken prisoner by German soldiers three hours later while trying to 
make his way south.17 Ambriére’s campaign had included no combat and only a last minute 
disorganized effort to avoid captivity. “Later, in prison, I met comrades who had been captured 
in the heat of battle. They, at least, had expended their energy and anger in action. Our u it fared 
otherwise.”18 Despite Ambriére’s almost passive march into captivity his activities ov r the next 
five years, including several dangerous escape attempts and involvement in Gaullist activities, 
clearly defined him as a resister. Ambriére’s behavior during his brief tim as a soldier stands in 
stark contrast to his later behavior in captivity. 
 
Phase Two: The battles along the Somme and Aisne lines 
 After resistance ended in the north the Germans redirected their advance into the heart of 
France on 5 June. General Weygand, who had replaced Gamelin on 16 May, attempted to 
construct a defensive line along the Somme and Aisne rivers. After the dramatic earlier defeat in 
the north little hope remained of stopping the next German attack. After two days of intense 
fighting the Somme defensive line broke west of Paris. Order and discipline began to breakdown 
in the French army and many soldiers joined the enormous southbound civilian exodus. From 
June 1st to 15th approximately 450,000 French soldiers were taken prisoner, the largest 
concentrations falling in the Nord and in the Lorraine-Champagne-Ardennes regions. Subtracting 
out the Lille and Dunkirk prisoners included in the total for the first phase of the campaign we 
                                                
17 Francis Ambriére, The Long Holiday, (Chicago: Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 1948), 10-14. 
18 Ambriére, 10. 
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are left with roughly 375,000 men taken prisoner during this second phase of the German 
invasion, or another 20% of the total number taken in the entire campaign.  
This period saw some of the most intense fighting of the campaign and so many of the 
prisoners taken during this time would have been actively engaged in combat. The fighting that 
followed the German advance into the northern plains of France was more open than had been 
the case in the earlier battles in the North. The lower density of soldiers to terain would have 
given defeated French units (and individual soldiers) more opportunity for retreat and voidance 
of capture. Throughout the middle of June there was hope that should the Germans break the 
Somme and Aisne lines a new line of defense could be established along the Loire River. 
Retreating French soldiers and fleeing refugees headed south with the hope that th  Loire offered 
safety.19 
 Gustave Folcher was a French soldier taken prisoner during this phase of the campaign.20  
An agricultural worker from southern France, Folcher was conscripted as an infantryman in 
1939. His unit was stationed in Champagne near what was to become the southern neck of the 
German Ardennes attack route. He and his unit fought several pitched battles with German 
forces from 15 May until 13 June when it was encircled and defeated in the town of Buisson 
located between Reims and Nancy. This battle occurred after the Germans had already t ken 
Paris. Folcher’s unit was attempting to withdraw south when it was cut off. When it b came clear 
that their position in Buisson was helpless the French commander ordered an evacuation of the 
town. Folcher, already badly wounded during a mortar attack, continued to demonstrate courg  
and a sense of duty by joining a group of soldiers who slipped through German lines during the 
night rather than surrender. His escape was brief as the next day his group was discovered and 
                                                
19 Diamond, 63-5. 
20 Folcher’s account is drawn from his memoir Marching to Captivity, The War Diaries of a French Peasant, 1939-
1945, (London: Brassey’s, 1996). 
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attacked. After a brief engagement in which he again saw companions killed Folcher surrendered 
at gunpoint in a cornfield. 
We lay down for a few minutes and I looked over the corn which was not very high at 
that place and saw some German soldiers, who rifle or machine pistol in hand, were 
advancing in formation as if hunting for hares in the corn. The situation was very critical. 
I quietly informed my colleague; they had seen us go into the corn, perhaps there were 
others. We had only the rifle of my colleague to defend ourselves with, it was very littl  
against five or six machine pistols and as many rifles; we only risked being killed, the 
best thing was to surrender… [A German soldier] came forward, coldly keeping us i  his 
line of fire. We raised our arms. My left arm was hurting me for my wound had once 
more opened and a slight trail of blood was running down my back. I lowered my left 
arm, which was an imprudent gesture which could have cost me my life, for the soldier
five paces away from me shouldered his rifle again and made as if to fire. I was not afraid 
however, for over the last few days we had become used to all kinds of emotions.21 
  
 Folcher was marched approximately twenty kilometers to an outdoor stadium in Saint-
Dizier where he was held for four days. While the march was a relatively short one the men were 
not fed until 21 June, by which time Folcher had been in captivity for seven days. “Taking pity 
on us [many civilians] threw a bit of bread, a cigarette, a bunch of radishes, a lettuce or a bit of 
fruit over the railings. Then you saw some terrible scenes. Even before the object had touched 
the ground 20, 30 or even 50 people immediately threw themselves on it pell-mell.”22 The men 
survived off what field rations they had left in their kits and the bits of food French civilians 
were able to throw to them despite German prohibition of contact between prisoners and 
civilians. Folcher did not receive medical attention or even a dressing for his pen wound. Not 
surprisingly, infection set in. On 22 June, his eighth day of captivity, Folcher was finally seen by 
a medic. He collapsed in the camp infirmary and was sent to a nearby hospital where he 
recovered his strength over the next few days. 
 Folcher saw significantly more combat than most French soldiers. For thirty days he and 
his unit remained often in contact with the enemy. He was involved in at least four engagements 
                                                
21 Folcher, 124-25. 
22 Folcher, 140. 
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and saw many comrades killed or badly wounded. During these engagements Folcher performed 
his duties bravely and conscientiously. Despite his own injury he did all he reasonably could to 
avoid capture. He would certainly qualify as a combattant prisoner by capture identity standards. 
As in the previous examples, Folcher’s conduct during the campaign did not prove to be a good 
indicator as to his behavior in captivity. As a prisoner of war, Folcher was an optimist. He spent 
five years working as a farm laborer in Saxony. He never engaged in resistance activity, nor 
attempted escape. Just as he had approached his job in the infantry, he was a conscientious 
worker in Germany. Folcher was well regarded by his masters and, in his small way, contributed 
to the German war economy for five years. 
 
Phase Three: Rolling up the East  
As the French defensive lines on the Somme and Aisne collapsed many units stationed 
along the Franco-German border found themselves encircled by enemy forces advancing south. 
Twenty-seven percent of all French prisoners of war were captured in the Vosgs-Al ace-Belfort 
region. Units stationed in these regions tended to be specialized fortification and defensive units 
and thus among the least mobile in the French army. Upon finding themselves cut-off officers in 
these units often arranged the full surrender of their commands after coming into contact with 
German units. Prisoners taken in this region would have been less likely to have seen combat,
and more likely to have been ordered to surrender en masse, than would soldiers taken in the first 
two phases of the campaign. 
Jean Malaquais (aka Wladimir Malacki) was born to a Jewish family in Poland in 1908. 
He was raised in an environment defined by economic and social instability. “I had the feeling 
that the end of the world was approaching in Poland, so I wanted to discover the life of othr 
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lands before it disappeared entirely.”23 Malaquais emigrated to France in 1926 where he 
struggled through life as an undocumented laborer. He became a Marxist of the Trotskyite wing 
and volunteered to fight as a member of the POUM militia during the Spanish Civil War, the 
same organization which George Orwell memorialized in his memoir “Homage to Catalonia.” 
After returning to France Malaquais gained fame as a writer for his 1939 novel Les Javanais 
which described life among immigrant mine workers in southern France.  
Despite not being a French citizen Malaquais was drafted in 1939 and served in an anti-
aircraft unit stationed in eastern France near the German frontier.24 Malaquais’ unit was 
responsible for several bulky and expensive anti-aircraft cannons and so, when the Grmans 
broke through French lines to the east of Paris and threatened to cut-off French forces along the 
Rhine frontier, his unit was unable to quickly withdraw. On 21 June Malaquais’ unit, along with 
several others, found itself completely encircled. Malaquais’ unit spent their last night of 
freedom in bacchanalian destruction.  
The unspeakable, the savage joy of destruction. They set fire to the tank trucks and the 
repair trucks, each unit of which is worth several million francs. They set fire to a pile of 
paper money, after noting the numbers of the bills. Then they tear to bits the account 
sheets, the individual identification papers, and the laboriously kept inventories of 
material. … Evening. What we cannot burn we smash with clubs. We fire volleys into the 
big tires, cut the inner tubes, pour out the lubricating oil, the edible oils, etc. etc. From all 
sides shots ring out; they are destroying the horses and cutting down the telegraph poles; 
and if a German wandered by this way – a small German, alone and not too hard to 
handle – I think they would roast him alive over a twig fire. Not a nut nor a bolt for the 
“Boches.”  Ah, but that makes us feel fine!25 
 
 What followed this night of destruction is interesting. Malaquias does not record an 
actual surrender of his unit. His commanding officer gathered the men, “He tells us to keep our 
self-respect, and asks if we have all got rid of our weapons.” Shortly thereafter M laquias and 
                                                
23 James Kirkup, “Obituary: Jean Malaquais,” The Independent, 6 January 1999. 
24 Malaquais’ account is drawn from his memoir, War Diary, (Garden City:  Double Day, Doran, 1944). 
25 Malaquais, 198-99. 
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the other men in the battery left the wooded area in which they had camped and joined a column 
of prisoners marching into captivity. “Thousands and thousands of men come down from all 
sides; it is as if the forest itself had been set in motion. For us, the war has completed its 
murderous cycle.”26 At first the men were practically unguarded. Malaquais saw German soldier  
from time to time standing on the side of the road. “Our ‘enemies’ stare at us curiously, with a 
hint of contempt, and from time to time one of them, as though repeating a password, shouts, Wo 
ist aber der Tommy!” (“Where are the British soldiers!”)27 
 Malaquais’ forced march was harsh. Over the next few days the number of guards 
increased as did a pattern of brutality. While the distance he traveled was relatively short 
(roughly eighty kilometers over thirteen days) the prisoners were forcd to march in ranks 
throughout the day and lay on the ground when not marching. Malaquais described several 
instances of prisoners being beaten by guards when they fell out of rank. German soldiers walk d 
among the men and stole personal items. The prisoners were not provided with food until the 
tenth day of their captivity, at which point they were given some soup and bread. Prior to this 
meal the men lived off their meager remaining field rations and, if lucky, on random bits of food 
thrown to them by civilians when guards were not present.  
Malaquais cut his march short on 5 July when he and another prisoner escaped by hiding 
in a ravine just short of the Franco-German border north of Strasbourg. The two men had made 
two earlier half-hearted escape attempts. In both cases they slipped away from the column of 
prisoners and found a hiding place; however, not knowing what to do once on their own and 
having no plan on how to navigate the hundreds of kilometers to freedom, they voluntarily 
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slipped back into the ranks and continued their slow march eastward. It was not until their third 
attempt that they accepted the full level of hardship required of escape and pushed on. 
 Malaquais’ actions prior to being taken prisoner would place him within the capture 
identity group which commanded the least respect among the other prisoners. Prior to surrender 
he did not participate in combat. His actual act of surrender was so passive that it did not even 
involve the presence of an enemy soldier. Malaquais simply joined a human flow of bodies 
marching into captivity without resistance. It was only after several days of marching that he 
began a mental process that would move him out of his initial passive acceptance of captivity 
and into active resistance. Malaquais’ abandoning of his first two escape attempts shows that this 
was a gradual process. At first he was only willing to risk resisting captivity provided doing so 
did not require too much risk and discomfort. A few days later he took the step of embracing 
resistance regardless as to risk and hardship. Malaquais’ story is that of a prisoner who moved 
from the passive resignation of an optimist to a resister in the span of less than two weeks. 
 
Phase Four: Mopping up after Paris 
 The prisoners taken during the initial battles in the North and along the Somme-Aisne 
line, together with those taken retreating from the Franco-German border, account for 
approximately 67% of the total number taken in 1940. Much of the remaining third were taken in 
areas south of Paris during the final two weeks of the campaign. This period of the cnflict, 
roughly from 13 to 25 June, was one of great confusion for French military personnel. Once it
was known that Paris had been declared an open city and taken without resistance the morale of 
the French military fell. Hopes pinned on the army making a renewed stand along the Loire 
quickly were dashed when the Germans crossed the river with little difficulty.28 Pétain’s speech 
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of 17 June increased the confusion. In this speech Pétain informed the French people that he had 
taken the reins of government and was calling for an “end to the fighting.” Many Fre ch soldiers 
believed this speech constituted a national surrender which would have made any further 
resistance on their part pointless. More accurately, Pétain was informing the French and German 
people that he was ready to enter into talks which would put an “end to the fighting.” The actual 
armistice was not signed until 22 June, and did not come into effect until 24 June. From the 17th 
until the 24th of June the war continued. The Germans continued to advance and take prisoner 
large numbers of confused and demoralized French soldiers. The number of French prisoners of 
war taken during this “gray” week (the bulk of the prisoners taken in eastern and central France) 
was roughly equal to the number taken during the five previous weeks combined. Had the Frenc  
soldiers more clearly understood that during this week they were expected to defend th mselves 
and take whatever steps possible to avoid capture the total number of men taken captive by 
German forces might have been significantly lower. Instead of resisting or avoiding capture 
many French units simply let themselves be disarmed and taken prisoner under the mistaken 
belief that the war had ended and they were expected to follow their government’s example and 
surrender. In these closing days German forces, wishing to avoid conflict when possible, would 
inform the French units they encountered that the war was over and, provided they surrendered 
without resistance, all would be proper and they would be heading home in a few days. 
 Jean Hélion’s story is perhaps typical of this phase of the campaign. Hélion (1904-1987), 
an influential abstract painter, abandoned a successful career in New York to return to his native 
France in 1940 to volunteer for military service. Hélion’s unit was stationed behind the Somme 
line in June 1940 and managed to withdraw behind the Loire after the German breakthrough.29 
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The unit made its first contact with German forces outside the town of Billy in the Auvergne on 
19 June. Billy fell very near the line in which France would be divided into German occupied 
and Vichy territory so Hélion stood a good chance of avoiding captivity provided he was not 
taken into custody before the armistice came into effect. Of course he could not have known 
about these details. When the Germans informed his commanding officer that the warwas over 
and, provided the French soldiers all cooperated, they would be on their way home in three days, 
he surrendered the unit.30 
 Hélion’s near escape from captivity, followed by his particularly unpleasant captivity, 
makes his story one full of regrets. During his first six days in captivity Hélion and his 
companions were forcibly marched from Billy to Orleans, a distance of 265 kilometers, an 
average of sixty-one kilometers (twenty-seven miles) per day. On this march Hélion was fed one 
meal of bread and barley soup. On the fourth day he and other men started to eat grass.31 On the 
fifth day, for reasons unclear to Hélion, the Germans forced the prisoners to run the final stage of 
that day’s distance. That evening Hélion saw several companions die of exhaustion. When later 
Hélion came to understand that most French prisoners had also been forced to march long 
distances without food or shelter in the first days after their capture he speculated the harshness 
of the marches were intentional to discourage escape attempts. The effort to keep up took “every 
atom of energy, . . . Day by day, I plodded through increasing darkness.”32 
 After a brief stay in a frontstalag Hélion was deported to Germany where he spent the fall 
and winter of 1940 working as a farm laborer on a large potato farm in Pomerania and 1941 in 
Stettin billeted with approximately 750 other French prisoners in a converted Briish banana 
cargo ship. During his first year in captivity Hélion followed a political trjectory which would 
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have placed him among the “resisters of the first hour” had he still been in France. According to 
him memoir he helped organize a resistance cell on the ship in 1941 and gathered and attempted 
to transmit intelligence to the Allies on ship cargo arrivals and rail usage. While we must rely on 
Hélion’s own account of his behavior in captivity, his sucsessful escape in January, 1942 and 
subsequent actions alone would have categorized him as belonging to the group that would 
eventually receive the most honor in postwar France.    
 Even though Hélion had made professional sacrifices in returning to France from New 
York and volunteering for armed service in 1940 he fell captive in a way seemingly lacking in 
honor. He engaged in no combat and his unit surrendered passively to the first German soldiers 
they encountered. Within a year of these events, Hélion clearly had established himself as a 
resister. He became a public symbol of the resistance as early as 1942 when his m mo r of 
captivity was published in the United States. Had Hélion’s war in fact ended outside Billy in 
June, 1940, he would have fallen into the most criticized group of prisoners in postwar France. 
Instead he fell into the most honored group, that of the early resisters. 
 Of all the prisoner stories highlighted in this chapter none entered captivity more 
passively than the man who coined the terms “optimist” and “pessimist” as they related to 
prisoners of war. In 1940 Jean Dutourd was an insecure nineteen year old young man wearing a 
uniform but far from transformed into a trained infantry solider.33 He was stationed in Brittany 
and, when the Germans overran the region, he and two other young soldiers along with a 
somewhat older sergeant, decided to avoid contact with German forces and try to steal a boat 
which they would use to sail south to safety. After eight days of wandering the Bri tany 
countryside, during which time they carefully avoided the enemy, the “boy scout” adventure (as 
Dutourd called it) had lost its appeal. The four men had run out of food and were tired of living 
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rough outdoors. The sergeant, feeling responsible for the safety of the young men, told them to
destroy their weapons and walked with them to a military barracks in the town of Auray where 
they voluntarily turned themselves in as prisoners of war on 25 June, one day after the armistice 
came into effect.34 Dutourd’s description of his state of mind at this time exemplifies the optimist 
point of view well:  
Haven and prison, Auray marked the end of our mean little epic. We hardly thought of 
prison: we told ourselves that they could not put a whole nation behind barbed wire, that 
since all France had been taken into custody it hardly mattered where we were, that it was 
better to rest at Auray than to tire ourselves out on the roads. We did not yet know that 
France was going to become one big cage.35 
 
A few – but they were very rare – expressed surprise that men who had had the chance of 
remaining free should come voluntarily to give themselves up. This attitude shocked 
[Sargent] Cepi and astonished the rest of us. As we saw it, it was they who were lucky: to 
be part of a proper unit, to have a roof over their heads, to get two regular meals a day, 
and to share a communal life. They did not know what misery it was to be a tamp without 
commander or objective. “We will go and report,” said Cepi. “After that we’ve nothig 
more to worry about.”36 
  
Dutourd would spend the next four days in this barracks with other French prisoners. 
Escape at this point would have been shockingly easy as Dutourd and his friends were given 
passes each day to go to town where they could purchase supplies, eat at restaurants and visit 
friends. Instead of taking one of these opportunities to escape Dutourd and his companions 
voluntarily returned to the barrack each night before the midnight curfew.37   
Dutourd’s time as a soldier was spent carefully avoiding contact with the enemy. H  
accepted captivity to a degree which, even at the time, surprised some of his fellow soldiers. So 
complete was his acceptance of captivity that not only did he turn himself in voluntarily on 25 
June, he repeated the process on each of the four following evenings. Dutourd appears to be a 
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perfect example of the dishonorable prisoner based upon the capture identity model. Rather than 
continue on his path of passive optimism Dutourd quickly began to look back on his early 
decisions with shame and regret. Two months after surrendering himself Dutourd jmped off a 
moving train which was transporting him into Germany for labor duty. Dutourd returned to Paris 
were he sought out the most actively engaged of the resistance movements, the communists, in 
order to restart his war story. During the 1950’s Dutourd emerged as one of France’s leading 
conservative commentators. His honest portrayal of his few months of military service in 1940 
lent credibility to the harsh criticism he offered up as to how far, in his opinion, his generation of 
French men and women had fallen short of the examples set by their ancestors. Hi ian John 
Cairns described his war memoirs as written with “a wild kind of splenetic anger . . .”38 He spent 
much of this life lashing out at his and his companions behavior in 1940. Dependent upon when 
his story is examined, Dutourd could be used as the embodiment of the optimist or the resister.
His story demonstrates the problem of attempting to place soldiers into static unchanging 
categories based upon their service in 1940. 
The accounts in this chapter represent the variety of experiences of French soldiers taken 
prisoner in 1940. Whether or not a soldier engaged in combat before becoming a prisoner was 
largely determined by which unit he was assigned, or which officer he served under. These 
factors played a role as important as any decision the soldier would make during the campaign. 
The prisoner of war survey found 45% of French prisoners of war became prisoners “after 
combat,” while 50% were taken “without combat.”39 Had this been the standard used to 
determine which soldiers had earned recognition as veterans, as was proposed following the ar, 
then only half the former prisoners of war would have qualified. This determination would have 
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been made based on the soldier’s actions during a few days during the summer of 1940, a time in
which his options were few and largely pre-determined. This method of categorization would 
have ignored the prisoner’s behavior over the next five years of captivity, a period when he was 
afforded time to consider his options before setting himself on any particular course of action. 
Upon their return to France in 1945, many prisoners were surprised to find their evaluations of 
their service were made giving more weight to decisions they had made during a time of chaos, 
misinformation and extreme stress rather than those reached after consideration and reflection. 
 
Life during the initial weeks of captivity: frontstalag or escape 
 The Germans held Allied prisoners of war in the frontstalags throughout the summer of 
1940.40 Across the board, soldiers’ memoirs describe living conditions in these temporary camps
in similar terms. Discipline was harsh. The men were fed sporadically, and the food was of very 
low quality. Little or no effort was made to provide the men with shelter or the means to 
construct their own living spaces. Prisoners often did not have access to medical care, nd when 
they did receive attention, it came from French medical personnel. Drawing from the memoirs 
already introduced in this chapter, a portrait of life in the frontstalags can be fleshed out. After 
being marched for nine days Francis Ambriére and his fellow prisoners hoped to finally receive 
regular meals once they reached their frontstalag in the town of Saaralbe on 1 July. Instead the 
men found the diet they had been receiving during the march, “a few biscuits and a little oleo or 
grease, with a quart of barley water on special occasions,” remained in place. By this time the 
starving prisoners were fixated on food. They spent their free time scavenging for wheat, clover 
and herbs or laying motionless to preserve their strength. “Fifty pairs of eyes followed my every 
move anxiously, when I distributed the broth at eleven o’clock and the bread and grease at six. 
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They trusted me, but they were like dogs seated under their master’s table, worri d about the size 
of the mouthful that would be thrown to them.”41 After being separated from his fellow prisoners 
for a few days while in the hospital Gustave Folcher found them weak and starving upon his 
return. “I found three of my mates from my section who I had some difficulty in recognizing, for 
if the stay in the hospital had really benefited me, they by contrast had got even worse. Their 
cheeks were gaunt, their eyes surrounded by dark shadows,…”42 Two weeks later, a month into 
their captivity, the food situation had not improved for Folcher and his companions. The mid-day 
meal consisted of one ladle of food per prisoner. “The food is immediately bolted down, but it is 
eaten only because we are so hungry, as it is worse than bad…  That was such a sad spectacle, 
masses of men stricken by hunger. I saw some men from my company, two in particular who 
were big eaters, tortured by the shortage of food to the point where one of them had a nervous 
breakdown one night, and we couldn’t restrain him.”43 A group of North African soldiers made 
soup from an unearthed bone. Hemlock was mistakenly mixed into the herbs that were added to 
the hot water. “Three died of poisoning while several others were taken off to hospital suffering 
atrociously.”44 Twenty eight days into his captivity Paul Fraisse recorded that his daily ration
still only consisted of a fifth of a loaf of bread and a bowl of soup.45 Those prisoners who came 
into contact with civilians begged for food, either while standing along camp fence lines or while 
outside in work teams. Civilians often defied the prohibition against giving food to the captives, 
an act of kindness deeply appreciated by the prisoners.46 
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 Given the harsh treatment and poor diet it is not surprising that within weeks epidemic 
disease began to break out in the crowded camps. Gustave Folcher recorded an outbreak of 
dysentery in his frontstalag roughly three or four weeks into the captivity.47 Jean Hélion 
remembered it took roughly the same amount of time for dysentery to break out in his camp. 
Hélion estimated that about one thousand of the 14,000 men held in his camp were infected.48 
Dysentery also broke out in Paul Fraisse’s camp after three weeks.49 
 Much of the misery of the frontstalags was a direct result of the lack of interest the 
Germans showed in administering the camps. The guards tended to maintain the camp’s 
perimeter but not involve themselves greatly with what happened inside. After his four days in 
the barracks at Auray, Jean Dutourd, along with thousands of other prisoners, was moved to a 
holding area set up around an old hanger. “We remained there just a month and a half, and 
nothing in the place was organized either then or later; the whole prison oozed improvisation, 
ignorance, inexperience, and misery.”50 The overcrowding and the lack of bedding in Dutourd’s 
camp brought on a confrontation which illustrated the divisions which already existed among the 
prisoners along capture-identity lines. A corporal in the Foreign Legion demanded Dutourd give 
up his mattress, “he held that mattresses belonged by right to bemedaled veterans, not to raw 
recruits.” Dutourd refused, the men fought, and Dutourd retained the mattress.51 The frontstalags 
were a lawless environment controlled by strong men inside and nervous guards on the outside. 
Within a few weeks Gustave Folcher was writing about a “camp mafia.”52 Under conditions like 
this the basic needs of many of the men went unmet. No mail came into some camps, and mail 
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placed in outgoing bags sat uncollected indefinitely.53 Dutourd remembered that in his camp 
medical care was only extended in crisis situations, that no building materials were provided to 
the men and that they fought with each other to establish claim over sheltered living areas. 
 Dutourd’s memoir contains a description of perhaps an extreme example of how little the 
German guards concerned themselves with the prisoners. A visibly uncomfortable Fench
general visited Dutourd’s frontstalag towards the end of July. He was escorted by several 
German officers who showed him outward signs of deference. The prisoners were assembled for 
the visit. The general walked briskly past their ranks saying “Any complaints?” without pausing 
for replies. His unwillingness to connect with the men was perhaps caused by shame, or perhaps 
it was a small rebellion against being compelled to perform a humiliating duty. The prisoners 
took the visit as a sign of their impending release. That evening, after being sealed inside the 
hanger, the men spent the night drinking, singing and playing bugles. “The situation was too 
much for the Germans; they did not even try to interrupt us. They merely lighted the camp to 
daylight intensity with the searchlights on the guard towers, telling themselves, no doubt, that 
without arms we could hardly be dangerous. In which respect they were wrong; for on this
memorable night of liberation revolvers, rifles, and even a Hotchkiss machine gun with its ribbon 
of bullets emerged from the straw of the hanger… Next day we could hardly understand why we 
had staged such a riot. We spent most of the day sleeping.”54 The only action that seemed sure to 
draw a forceful reaction from the guards was an escape attempt or rebellion. As is normally the 
case in prison settings where the guards are too few in number and untrained, extreme and 
immediate violence was the first response to challenges to the authority. Folcher remembers the 
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body of one soldier he described as an “Arab” who had been killed during an escape attempt was 
“left exposed for the whole day at the entrance to the camp, as an example.”55  
 The lack of order in the frontstalags caused the prisoners a great deal of stress and 
discomfort, but in other ways it worked to their advantage. Both Hélion and Dutourd record that 
wives and girlfriends of prisoners who were able to locate their partners could arrange short 
meetings.56 The Puy-de-Dôme newspaper La Montagne also reported on these meetings between 
prisoners and civilians at the frontstalag in Moulins.57 
 Another benefit of the lax German organization and control during the early months of 
the occupation was the ease by which many prisoners escaped. Of the 1,850,000 French 
prisoners captured during the campaign roughly one in eight (225,000) escaped during the initial 
weeks.58 Hélion wrote of a friend who escaped while being marched to a frontstalag by simply 
slipping out of ranks and mixing with a group of refugees.59 During the following weeks a 
number of prisoners escaped almost every day while outside the camp on work assignment .60 
French officers had even more opportunity to escape than did enlisted men as they were at times 
given day passes to leave camp without an escort.61 Marc Bloch, already a famed historian when 
he was recalled to duty in 1939, took advantage of the initial disorganization not to escape from 
captivity but to avoid it in the first place. On 18 June Bloch was billeted in the city of Caen, the 
capital of Basse-Normandie, when the Germans arrived. Rather than turn himself in or retreat 
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south Bloch simply changed into civilian clothes and checked into a hotel under his own name. 
Due to his age (54) he was not questioned. A few weeks later, when the trains began running 
again, Bloch returned to his home in Guéret, in the Vichy zone.62 This journey would not have 
been possible a few weeks later when the Germans established better control over he “line of 
demarcation” which divided occupied France from Vichy controlled territory.63 
 Henri Frenay was another officer who took advantage of the initial chaos of the 
occupation to avoid captivity. During the war Frenay became an important figure, irst in the 
resistance and later in the provisional government. He began organizing resistance activity as 
early as November 1940. One year later he helped found Combat, one of the more important 
resistance movements.64 His work in the resistance won him the trust of General De Gaulle who 
named him director of the Commissariat aux Prisonniers, Déportés et Réfugiés in November 
1943.65 From this post, and after September 1944 while serving as the first minister of the newly 
established Ministère des Prisonniers, Déportés et Réfugiés, Frenay headed the agencies 
responsible for the French prisoners and deportees in German captivity. When the Germans 
attacked in 1940 Frenay was still only a captain attached to the 43rd Army Corp in the Vosges 
region. As a staff officer Frenay saw no action during the campaign. His command surrendered 
as a unit on 25 June, one day after the armistice came into effect. Following the surrender Frenay 
and one other officer decided, on their own initiative, to attempt escape rather than join the 
eastward march of prisoners. That evening the two men slipped out of ranks and hid in thick 
bushes near the road. Over the next two weeks, with the aid of several civilians, the two m n 
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avoided capture and made their way on foot to the Vichy zone.66 While Frenay’s escape was not 
easy, it involved hundreds of kilometers of walking and two narrow escapes from German 
sentries, it serves as another example that French soldiers determined to avoi  captivity were 
often able to do so during the early months of the occupation. Frenay’s experience perhaps also 
helped shape a certain lack of compassion he was to display later for French prisoners who 
passively accepted their situations. 
 Why did not more French prisoners take advantage of these circumstances and escape 
during the summer of 1940? The main reason is that, at this point, most French prisoners simply 
saw no reason to accept the risks and hardships that came along with escape. Most risoners 
assumed the war would be over soon and that they would be free within days. This belief was fed 
by the German guards, most of whom probably also believed it to be true. As Dutourd 
remembered, “Being prisoners of recent date, we talked of demobilization and not of liberation. 
We were still using a prewar vocabulary.”67 The contact many prisoners had with loved ones and 
civilians during their time in the frontstalag only contributed to this temporary denial of their 
predicament. “[The] whole of the time we were in [the frontstalag in] Vannes we were never 
wholly cut off from free men… This hybrid life, … the constant relations we entertain d with the 
civilians outside, helped to soften us and to stamp out the last remnants of any will to escape.”68 
Some prisoners even looked upon a successful escape as of dubious value. They reasoned that 
escapees would have to either walk home or pay for their own passage. Dutourd remembers one 
soldier’s optimistic defense of prisoners who did attempt escape: “Why should tey beat it?  In a 
fortnight they’ll be demobbed and their journey home will be paid for.”69 Gustave Folcher later 
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recognized how possible escape was during these early weeks, but he decided against an attempt 
at the time because his home was, “a really long way away.”70 Even weeks later when he was 
being transported into Germany Folcher decided not to follow the example of several oth  
prisoners who took advantage of the evening and jumped off the slow moving train. Folcher was 
afraid of hurting himself (he knew some of the men had been killed by the jump) and he was also 
self-conscious of the deplorable state of his clothes and hygiene.71 Folcher had five years to 
consider these lost opportunities while working in Germany as a forced laborer. 
 Another factor that may have discouraged many prisoners from attempting escapes 
during these first weeks was their weakened condition. With many men exhausted, sick and 
starving they had trouble formulating plans beyond basic daily survival. Major Edmund Booth of 
the Royal Engineers was captured twice in France during the campaign. Booth escaped the first 
time, but allowed himself to be taken prisoner again a few days later, “although escape would 
have been easy.” Booth explained that “his exhaustion was so great that he could not find the 
determination to [evade capture again.] ‘When one reaches an advanced stage of exhaustion, 
planned thinking becomes almost impossible and all one wants is to stick with one’s friend and 
go on doing what everyone else is doing almost automatically.””72 
In the end most Allied prisoners of war adopted either the optimistic or the pessimistic 
mindset and accepted their captivity during these early weeks. Most certainly did ot understand 
that the window of opportunity for escape was slowly shutting with each passing day. As the 
weeks passed German security, both in the frontstalags and along the transit routes inside 
occupied France, became better organized. Increasingly in July and August prisoners were 
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loaded camp by camp into cattle cars and transported into the Reich. Once in Germay they were 
put to work as forced laborers replacing the young men serving in Hitler’s armed forc s. 
Separated from their native land the prisoner’s chances for escape were greatly diminished. 
It is perhaps safe to assume that those prisoners who took advantage of these early w eks 
to escape would have tended to be of the resister mindset. If that was the case then this early flow 
of resisters out of the prisoner population would have concentrated the proportions of optimists 
and pessimists among the one and a half million French prisoners who arrived in Germany 
during the late summer of 1940. At least in 1940 the optimists and pessimists seemed to 
outnumber the resisters in the “civilization of the camps.” 
Just as the prisoners remained optimistic throughout 1940 that they would soon be 
released, the same was true for the French public at large. By August most pris ners had been 
able to notify family members that they were alive and in captivity. Relieved to learn that their 
missing loved one was still alive, in most cases wives and families almost immed ately began 
making arrangements for their return home.73 Most information flowing from the government 
and newspapers encouraged the assumption that the prisoners would be home soon. Jean Hélion 
remembers the first batch of mail from France reaching prisoners in Germany in October, 1940. 
“The newspapers say that you will soon come back,” was among the common sentiments 
contained in these letters.74 French armistice negotiators were surprised to learn that the Germans 
were transporting prisoners from France into Germany after 25 July, and argued that this 
deportation was a violation of the armistice terms.75 Even after the prisoners had been relocated 
many French officials continued to make public and private statements which revealed their 
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assumption that the prisoners’ captivity would be a short one. Marshal Pétain’s visit to a prison 
camp on 27 October received prominent newspaper coverage. While addressing the prisoners 
Pétain advised them, “Once more, be patient. Your liberation will possibly be soon.”76 During a 
meeting with German ambassador Otto Abetz in Paris on 30 October 1940 Georges Scapini 
discussed not if the prisoners would be released, but when. Scapini admitted to Abetz that, given 
the high rate of unemployment in France, it might “not be possible, or even desirable” for all the 
prisoners to come home at once.77 Scapini was the highest ranking official in the Vichy 
government for matters related to the prisoners of war. That the highest officials in the Vichy 
government persisted in their belief that the Germans would release the prisoners this late in 
1940 speaks to a certain naivety about the nature of the war in which they were involved and 
how Germany planned to exploit all the resources, material as well as human, of the territories 
they had conquered. Much of the French optimism for a rapid release undoubtedly stemmed 
from their perspective that the war had ended on 24 June 1940. Britain was expected to quickly 
come to terms with Germany. The possibility that the war might drag on for years and that 
Germany would hold over a million prisoners in captivity for that long simply did not enter into 
the public discourse during the fall of 1940.  
 The deportation of the French prisoners of war into Germany and their employment as 
forced laborers should not have come as a surprise to the French people but it did. As covered in 
the preceding chapter, the action was consistent with German policy for the use of foreign 
prisoners of war and conscripted civilians as forced laborers inside Germany duri g times of 
war. 
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A Separate History. The treatment of colonial prisoners of war in 1940 
 The treatment of colonial prisoners of war by the Germans in 1940 is sufficiently 
different from the treatment of the white prisoners that their history must be look d upon as a 
unique topic. Colonial prisoners of war were much more likely to be killed while attempting to 
surrender, or after being disarmed, than were white prisoners. Colonial prisoners wer  also 
singled out for harsh treatment and violence during the initial weeks of their captivity. These 
factors alone require they be treated separately by historians. The divergence between the 
experience of white and non-white prisoners became even greater in August 1940 when the 
Germans transported white prisoners east for use as slave laborers while atthe same time leaving 
non-white prisoners in the frontstalags spread across occupied France, or, in some cases, singling 
out colonial prisoners from groups which had already been transported into Germany and 
returning them to France. In this case the Nazi quest for racial segregation took precedence over 
their need for manpower. 
 At the time of the German attack approximately 75,000 West African78 (collectively 
called Tirailleurs Sénégalais), 70,000 North African79 (Indigènes) and several thousand 
additional soldiers from Madagascar and French Indochina were deployed within France. These 
soldiers tended to be in combat rather than support units and thus were more likely than French 
units raised from the metropolitan population to see action. Colonial units were involved in many 
significant engagements during the campaign and gained a reputation as among the more 
effective in the French Army. This should not be surprising as these units were made up of 
professional soldiers while many of the units raised in France itself were populated by reservists. 
The experience of the Tirailleurs Sénégalais during 1940 bears out these generalizations. Of the 
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75,000 Tirailleurs in France in May 1940, 63,300 were in frontline units and approximately 
40,000 experienced combat. Approximately 10,000 Tirailleurs were killed in 1940.80  If one 
accepts the figure of 90,000 total military casualties suffered by all French military forces during 
the 1940 campaign, and divides that number by the total of 2,776,000 men in combat units, the 
overall casualty rate for the French combat troops in 1940 was approximately 3%.81 The isolated 
casualty rate for Tirailleurs combat troops was five times higher than the overall rate for French 
combat forces. 
 One cause for the elevated casualty rate among colonial soldiers was the refusal by some 
German units to accept surrender from non-white soldiers. Nazi conceptions of a racial hierarchy 
factored into prisoner treatment in 1940. White prisoners were treated more or less in accordance 
with Geneva Conventions standards in France in 1940. North Africans were treated less well 
than whites. Black prisoners received the harshest treatment and were often killed by German 
soldiers after they had surrendered.82 In 33 documented instances between 24 May and 25 June 
between 1,000 and 1,500 Tirailleur prisoners were murdered. If undocumented but credible 
instances are included this number rises to 3,000.83 These executions took place with the 
knowledge and approval of the German high command, if not under the outright order of an 
officer. In several instances in 1940 the Germans separated the French prisoners int  white and 
black groups shortly after they had surrendered. The blacks were taken to an area convenient for 
disposal, such as a ravine, and machine gunned to death. The Germans justified these massacr s 
by contending that non-white soldiers were “illegitimate combatants,” and thus not covered by 
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the Geneva Conventions; or, that the murders were in retaliation for war crimesallegedly 
committed by colonial soldiers.84 As historian Raffael Scheck concluded in his study of these 
massacres, “[The German army] dealt with the black Africans in a way that anticipated the 
horrors of the racialized warfare associated with the later German campaigns in the Balkans and 
the Soviet Union.”85 
 Colonial soldiers lucky enough to be taken prisoner and allowed to live faced a 
significantly harsher captivity than did their white companions. Colonial prisoner  were singled 
out for physical and psychological abuse during their forced march to the frontstalags. 
Lieutenant Taillefer-Grimaldi, a regimental physician, witnessed a group of three black prisoners 
being prodded forward during the march. German guards repeated poked the black men with 
their bayonets. When one finally jumped out of ranks he was shot immediately.86 J an 
Malaquais’ memoir contains similar accounts. One German soldier singled out a black prisoner. 
“Those fellows, the blacks, and the Jews – we’ll exterminate them to the last man. But the rest 
don’t need to be afraid…”87 A week later Malaquais saw a North African prisoner murdered. 
While he was squatting in a circle with other prisoners a German officer punched him in t e back 
of the neck, causing him to fall face forward to the ground. The officer pulled his side arm out to 
see if the man could be goaded into responding:  
[The prisoner] stood up, about faced, blind with anger, and made the first lunge at his 
aggressor:  two pale rose flames leaped out at the level of his eyes, stopped him dead in 
his tracks; and he went down in a heap. Without a word, walking slowly, the officer 
turned his back and went away, with a faint, sad smile on his face, with his revolver in his 
gloved hand.88 
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 German soldiers would seek out colonial prisoners to have their picture taken posing 
alongside them.89 Often these pictures were staged in a way which dehuminized the black 
prisoners by making them appear uncivilized. During his forced march Jean Hélion saw two 
Germans approach a group of starving prisoners: 
One carried a large bone, with about a pound of raw meat hanging from it. He threw it in 
the midst of a group of Moroccans, who fought desperately for it. One came out with the 
naked bone, and licked it. He had blood all over his face. The others were trying to 
swallow their strips of meat before it could be snatched away from them. The Germans 
used a whole roll of film on that scene. In an illustrated section of a German newspap r, I 
was to see later a picture that looked very much like it, with this title: “French prisoners 
eating…”  If the bone had fallen by me, I would have fought for it too!90 
 While few colonial prisoners were killed after arriving in prison camps their situation 
remained critical. Colonial prisoners were targeted by German guards for random acts of petty 
violence. As badly as the white prisoners were fed and housed, the situation among the clonial 
prisoners was markedly worse.91 The frontstalag at Le-Quesnoy-sur-Airaines only provided food 
to white prisoners. Had the white men not shared their meager rations with the colonial prisoners 
they would have received nothing.92 There are numerous reports in the French military archives 
of colonial prisoners being denied medical treatment and being forced to sleep without shelter, 
including during periods of heavy rainfall. While white prisoners suffered from these same 
depredations it would appear that these conditions occurred more commonly with colonial 
prisoners.93 This situation persisted through July and August. On 20 August Jean Hélion 
witnessed the arrival of 2,000 prisoners which he described as “Arabs” at his frontstalag. He 
remarked these men were “more famished than we had ever been… In spite of a chain of gu rds, 
they ran out towards us, asking for a bit of anything to eat. The sentries pursued them around the 
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buildings, and beat them hard with their guns, not only in the ribs, but on the head. I saw two 
broken skulls, at least.”94 
 Hélion learned later that these starving North African prisoners were returning to France 
from Germany where they had been held for the last month. Initially the Germans began to 
transport all French prisoners of war into Germany to use them as forced laborers. This policy 
was amended in August when it was decided that only white prisoners would be taken into 
Germany. Colonial prisoners would be left in frontstalags in occupied France. Those non-white 
prisoners who had already been transported into Germany were returned to France.95 This change 
was prompted by the Nazi wish to keep non-Aryan races outside German territory.96   
Ironically, the conditions of captivity for colonial prisoners improved in many ways 
following their segregation. With the camps less crowded all the men were able to find living 
quarters which offered at least some level of shelter from the elements. The reduced crowding 
also led to improvements in sanitation and diet. Epidemic diseases that had rampaged the camps 
through the fall and winter of 1940 were brought under control by the spring of 1941. Red Cross 
inspections in January and February of 1941 found that roughly one in four prisoners still held in 
the frontstalags were tubercular.97 A disaster was averted by a concerted effort of the French 
medical community to arrange for the transfer of sick prisoners either to hospitals or to camps 
located in warmer and dryer locations. The lack of adequate records prevents a full accounting of 
how many prisoners died from these outbreaks but the total was certainly substantial. A short-
lived German effort to recruit collaborators from among the colonial prisoner populati n also led 
to improvements in some of their living conditions. The Germans had hoped to recruit a cadre of 
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men who would be willing to work with them in undermining British (and, less explicitly, 
French) colonial control over their homelands. A small number of men responded, mostly of 
Tunisian and Algerian backgrounds. The appeal fell flat among the Moroccan prisoners and the
Germans never extended the effort to include prisoners from sub-Saharan Afric . In the end this 
German effort at winning the hearts and minds of the indigènes led to some improvements in 
living conditions among the North African prisoners and the formalization of a racial hierarchy 
within the camps which placed light skinned North Africans above Sub-Saharan Blcks and 
Asians.98 The camps also began to receive supplies and food from the Red Cross and Amitiés 
Africaines. By July 1941 conditions had improved to the point where a Red Cross mission 
declared that the housing, hygiene and food supplies within the camps were good.99 
Despite numerous efforts no historian has yet produced an entirely satisfactory 
accounting of how many colonial prisoners were held by Germany during the war and how many 
died in captivity. By necessity we must work with rough numbers in attempts to determine how 
many died in captivity. Georges Scapini, head of Vichy’s Service diplomatique des prisonniers 
de guerre (SDPG) estimated the number of colonial prisoners captured in 1940 to be about 
80,000.100 A German report from October 1941 estimated 68,550 colonial prisoners were still in 
the frontstalags. This total included 43,973 North Africans, 15,777 Tirailleurs, 3,888 
Madagascans, and 2,317 Indochinois.101 Through liberations and deaths this number was reduced 
to 41,962 by June 1942. During 1941 and 1942 15,800 colonial prisoners were freed by the 
Germans and approximately another 10,000 escaped.102 If we take Scapini’s estimate of 80,000 
colonial soldiers taken into captivity in 1940 and subtract the 15,800 freed and the estimated 
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10,000 escapes we arrive at a figure of 54,200. This is the number of colonial prisoners one 
would expect to find still in captivity in 1942. The difference between this figure and the one 
contained in the German report from that year is roughly 12,000, or 15% of the original total. 
How many of those missing 12,000 prisoners died in captivity remains an open question. Of the 
1,500,000 French prisoners taken into Germany in 1940, 24,600 died in captivity, a mortality 
rate of 1.5%. Historian Myron Echenberg estimated the mortality rate among Sub-Saharan 
soldiers taken prisoner in 1940 to be fifty percent.103 Echenberg’s figure would seem to be high, 
but certainly there are many reasons to believe the mortality rate among the colonial prisoners of 
war was much higher than among the white prisoners. 
 
Conclusion 
 The first chapter of the story of the French prisoners of war played out on the battlefields 
and in the frontstalags spread across France and Belgium. After the summer of 1940 the stage 
would shift east to the stalags and work kommandos of Germany. Even before the prisoners left 
France and Belgium behind it was clear that the story of their service and captivity could not 
related as a single common narrative. The individual soldiers entered the “civilization of the 
camps” differently, more based on where and when they were captured than on factors more 
under individual control. Prisoners quickly began to categorize themselves as belonging t  
different groups, often initially based on their battlefield experiences, but later more commonly 
upon their mentality towards captivity. German racial policies created a further division within 
the prisoners’ community by physically seperating white and colonial prisoners. Captured 
soldiers entered a new and complex social setting which they would have to learn how to 
navigate to make their existence more bearable.  
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There were many early signs that the French prisoners’ captivity would like y be a long 
and hard ordeal. The forced marches, starvation, humiliation and neglect which characterized 
most French prisoners’ introduction into captivity gave them an indication that life s a prisoner 
would be harsh and at times brutal. Poor staffing and general indifference on the part of thei  
German jailors resulted in the horrible living conditions and unpredictable outbursts of violence 
in the frontstalags. The deportation of prisoners into Germany for use as forced laborers gave a 
strong indication that they would not be returning home soon. The tightening of security in the 
camps, on the roads and at the demarcation line in France transformed escape from a difficult but 
often successful undertaking into a more dangerous and doubtful affair. Three times as any 
prisoners escaped during the first few weeks of captivity (225,000) than did during the 
subsequent five years (70,000).104 Those prisoners who most quickly lost their illusions about the 
captivity being a short and benign affair and who were willing to risk escape during this early 
period were often able to avoid long-term captivity. Those who came to understand their 
situation more slowly, or those unwilling or incapable of breaking free of their passive mentality 
were, in most cases, fated to spend the next years separated from their homeland and loved ones 
while laboring for benefit of their conquerors.
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Chapter 3: The Vichy Regime and its Prisoner of War Propaganda Campaign 
 
When Marshal Pétain, Pierre Laval and other leaders gained control over the French 
government in 1940, they inherited enormous economic, military and social problems. The two-
pronged solution they offered for the revival of France included a program of domestic moral 
renewal coupled with collaboration with Germany. This plan lacked any widespread public 
support among the French people. Their plan for a moral and spiritual remaking of France, the 
révolution nationale, was largely based on principles the French people had been rejecting for 
generations, both at the ballot box and in their life choices.1 Vichy’s plan for reestablishing 
France’s international position was based on entering into a collaborative relationship with Nazi 
Germany, a strategy that most French people found bewildering and difficult to accept. In short, 
the Vichy government was not representative of the character of the French population as a 
whole, and the program for recovery it instituted was based on a value system that was no in 
keeping with the hopes and beliefs of the bulk of its population. 
The French electorate in 1940 leaned toward the center-left, as it had throughout almost 
the whole of the Third Republic. Consistently, French voters elected parties that supported a 
secular republican form of government. While there was considerable support for rightwing 
parties and movements, these groups never commanded enough support to come to power 
through elections. Public support for groups who openly espoused replacing the republic with a 
conservative authoritarian government crested after the February 1934 Paris riots which had been 
organized by anti-parliamentarian groups.2 That these groups did not represent the majority 
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viewpoint in France was demonstrated by the political backlash the riots produced, a backlash 
which immediately resulted in a counter demonstration in support of the republic which dwarfe  
the earlier riots, and eventually in the 1936 election of a Popular Front government. While the 
French people were challenged to move either to the right or left during the tumultuous years of 
the depression, riots and the Popular Front government, by 1937 the political center had cl arly 
held. Historian Nathaniel Greene eloquently described France as passing through a political 
“fever” from 1934-1937, emerging from the crisis still committed to a “republican synthesis” 
that had made the nation among the most political stable in Europe since the late 19th century.3 
The shock of the defeat of 1940 allowed the opponents of the republic to accomplish 
what they had not found possible through the ballot box. Immediately after assuming power, the 
Vichy leaders abolished the republic and replaced it with an authoritarian government based on 
socially conservative and traditionally Catholic principles. From the very beginning the Vichy 
government set itself in opposition to the former republic, which had supported a culture of 
individual rights and liberties. Vichy was a paternalistic state stressing the values of obedience 
and duty. Many freedoms the French people had come to expect were quickly stripped away by
the new government such as the right to free political expression and assembly, the protection of 
religious and ethnic minorities, access to birth control and legal divorce, the removal of church 
control from publicly supported welfare and education programs, and the rights of women to 
work for wages and control their own property without a man’s approval. 
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Like most 20th-century Western authoritarian movements or governments, it is perhaps 
easier to define the nature of the Vichy state by what it was against rather than by what it stood 
for.4 At least initially the new state drew support from a fairly broad spectrum of constituencies, 
ranging from old line monarchists through modern social utopianists. Historian Phillipe Burrin 
has divided Vichy’s original supporters into three categories. Social conservativ s were the most 
recognized group. These men and women hoped to restructure French society around traditional 
Catholic and hierarchical values. Marshal Pétain’s mentality most closely matched this group. 
The Marshal publicly interpreted the defeat of 1940 as a form of divine retribution for the 
nation’s degeneracy during the Third Republic. After the armistice was signed, Pétain
foreshadowed the form of medicine he planned to offer the sick nation: “Our defeatis 
punishment for our moral failures. The mood of sensual pleasures destroyed what the spirit of 
sacrifice had built up.”5 A second group, the technocrats, saw the collapse of the Third Republic 
as an opportunity to introduce social and economic reforms that would allow France to break 
free of what they saw as a seventy-year long quagmire. The technocrats blamed the weak central 
government for France’s inability to keep up with its more dynamic neighbors, and believed that 
an authoritarian state such as Vichy could resolve this problem. The third group that rallied o 
Vichy included those to the far right of the ideological spectrum: hard-line nationalists, fascists 
and royalists.6 Outside of dissatisfaction with the efficiency of the Third Republic, and a 
rejection of communism, only the almost mythical figure of Marshal Pétain and his vague 
ideological statements held these groups together. 
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If one accepts the premise that a government’s values can best be understood by 
examining the programs it prioritized and enacted rather than by studying its deological sources 
and public rhetoric, then the values of the Vichy state can be understood by looking at the values 
of its governing agenda, the révolution nationale. Using the révolution nationale to define the 
regime rather than the other broad policy agenda most often associated with it, collaborationism, 
makes sense in that relatively few supporters of the Vichy regime embraced collaborationism on 
its own merits, while almost all did support at least some elements of the domestic program. 
Collaborationism was broadly accepted by Vichy supporters because it was believed that it 
would be through this program that the new regime would receive the autonomy necessary from 
Germany to implement the révolution nationale.7 The guiding principle of the révolution 
nationale was that individual liberalism was the root cause of most of France’s problems, and to
set the nation back on the right path French society had to be redirected towards what it 
supporters believed to be France’s pre-revolutionary source of strength, the “natural 
communities” of family, workplace, region and Catholicism.8 These “natural communities” were 
hierarchical, not democratic, and it was believed they would promote communal rather th n 
individual goals. Attacks on these communities, something the Vichy leadership believed the 
Third Republic had engaged in throughout its history, were attacks on France as a whole. The 
motto of the new French state was “Family, Homeland and Work” replacing the more liberal 
ideals contained in “Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.” Pétain preferred to use the term 
“renovation” rather than “revolution” when referring to this program.9 In a grand sense, he and 
his followers were attempting to turn back the clock in France in social and political matters to at 
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least 1871, if not to 1789. The Vichy state might be interpreted as the final attempt by the French 
right to undo the changes brought about by the revolution of a century and a half earlier. 
Vichy’s socially retrograde program was supported by an attempt to modernize the 
nation’s administration and economy by the new regime’s “technocratic” branch. This attempt 
was patterned after fascist modernization programs in Italy and Germany (while the révolution 
nationale seemed to draw its foreign inspiration from Salazar’s Portugal). These modernizers 
thought the catastrophe of 1940 offered an opportunity to sweep away the corruptions and 
inefficiencies that had entrenched themselves in France. The old ways, which had prevented 
France from responding to the dynamic challenges of the interwar years, would be replaced with 
a new corporatist model. This model would control class antagonism and excessive indiv dual 
profit-taking while promoting communal goals as defined by neutral administrators appointed by 
the state.10 The révolution nationale was intensely paternalistic. It made no allowances for 
dissension. Those who disagreed with the state were silenced immediately, eith r through 
censorship, intimidation or persecution. Those who could not be assimilated into the French 
nation as it was defined by the new leaders, due to their race, religion or ideology, had no place 
in the France being built by the révolution nationale. Independent of outside pressure from 
Germany, the Vichy state almost immediately enacted a series of persecutory measures against 
Jews, Communists, Free Masons, and any other group whose “foreignness” set it apart from the 
“natural” French community.11 
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How could a government espousing these principles and instituting these programs gain 
legitimacy and the support of the French people? When the French public came to understand the 
programs the Vichy government planned to pursue, in particular the policy of collaboration with 
Germany, they found the situation, in the words of Pierre Laborie, French historian of public 
opinion, “inconceivable.”  “In the opinion that the majority [of the French] reached [by the fall of 
1940], Vichy was perceived only as a temporary episode, a regime of circumstance, a strategy of 
wait and see…Common opinion found it hard to conceive that a new political and social order 
could be built in a stable way while the country was confronted with a situation of war. Thus, 
this logic of temporality and waiting, which initially aided in the rallying of people to Vichy, or, 
more accurately, to the image they had of Vichy, also contributed to its fragility nd explains 
reasons behind the contempt for it.”12 If the Vichy government was to maintain support beyond 
the period of crisis, it would need to win over the French people. Since it was unlikely this could 
be accomplished through shared values, it would have to be through demonstrated competence in 
governing the nation. 
Obviously, the new Vichy government would at some point have to deal with the 
fundamental question of its own legitimacy, especially if it continued to pursue policies that had 
little support among the populace. A vast historiography already exists which attempts to explain 
the sources from which the Vichy government drew its initial support and how it attempted to 
expand this support.13  One of these methods, the subject of this chapter, was the government’s 
exploitation of the concerns the French people had for the enormous number of young 
Frenchmen held in Germany as prisoners of war. 
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While the German removal of the prisoners of war represented a social and economic 
catastrophe to France, it also provided the Vichy government with a cause they could use to 
solidify and increase their base of support among the people. Regardless of what a person’s 
political or religious beliefs were, what their social or economic status was, hat region they 
lived in, everyone in France shared a common concern for the welfare and safe return of the 
prisoners. If a person were lucky enough not to have a direct family member in captivity, almost 
certainly he or she had friends or acquaintances, co-workers or neighbors, held in Germa y. An 
examination of French newspapers from the second half of 1940, as detailed below, reveals that, 
aside from stories about the continuing war and economic difficulties, no single issue received 
more coverage than that of the prisoners.14 The prisoners represented one of those rare political 
issues that crossed all class, ideological and regional lines. If the Vichy government could 
convince the French people that it represented the group most capable of ensuring the pisoners 
were well-treated by the Germans and most able to win their rapid release, the political benefits 
would be obvious. Even a French person inclined to disagree with the Vichy government on all 
issues affecting the nation might still find it worth supporting if it could demonstrate its 
competence in taking care of the prisoners. If acceptance of the Vichy government and its policy 
of collaboration with Germany ensured that the unfortunate young men of France were treated 
well and would soon be allowed to return home, then perhaps the French body politic, despite all 
its differences with the new government, might still conclude that Vichy repres nted a 
government worth supporting.  
As potentially beneficial as the prisoner of war issue was for Vichy, it also carried 
significant risks. If the French people were to compromise their values and support Vichy and 
                                                
14 For more on newspaper coverage of the prisoners of war, see also Yves Durand, La Captivité, Histoire des 
prisonniers de guerre français 1939-1945, 2e édition, (Paris: Édité par la Fédération Nationale des Combattants 
Prisonniers de Guerre et Combattants d’Algérie, Tunisie, Maroc, 1981), 521-25. 
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collaboration, they would naturally expect to receive concrete benefits in retur. A compromise 
as significant as accepting collaboration with Germany and an authoritarian government should 
produce a reward of the same magnitude. Freedom for the prisoners might rise to this level. If 
collaboration were truly to be a mutually beneficial policy, a policy worth entering into, the 
prisoner of war issue was an obvious test case. When the Vichy government publicly identified 
itself with the policy of collaboration, its fate became tied to the success or failure of this policy; 
and since no issue was more obviously tied to collaboration than that of the prisoners, to a large 
extent the legitimacy of the Vichy government would sink or swim based on what happened with 
the prisoners. Clearly, it was entirely up to the Germans how the prisoners were treated and when 
they would be released. By positioning itself as a group capable of working with the Germans, 
Vichy in effect put its fate in the Germans’ hands. The French people quickly came to 
understand that collaboration was a one-sided agreement and the Vichy gamble failed. The 
treatment and exploitation of the POWs provides an excellent case study of the imbalance of the 
Franco-German relationship. 
Vichy did not create the prisoner of war issue. The problem was of such a magnitude that 
any French government in 1940 would have had to deal with it. What is of historical interest is 
not that Vichy engaged the prisoner of war problem and afforded it prominence, rather it is how 
the regime used this issue to buy increased support from the French people and how, by 
misrepresenting the prisoners’ conditions of captivity and level of support for the regime, it laid 
the groundwork for many of the postwar struggles of the returning POWs. 
 
The Nature of Vichy Prisoner of War Propaganda 
The messages supplied by the Vichy government regarding their handling of the prisoner 
of war issue evolved during the first five months of occupation. Initially, the message conveyed 
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to the French people was that the government was diligently performing its dutie to ensure that 
the prisoners were well cared for and, as far as was reasonably possible, afford d their Geneva 
Convention rights. This message was supplemented time and again with the implication th t the 
prisoners would return home soon due to the efforts of the French leaders. Following Pétai ’s
meeting with Hitler at Montoire in late October of 1940 when it became clear that the Germans 
had no intention of releasing the prisoners any time soon,15 the message evolved. No longer were 
the prisoners presented as likely to return home soon. Instead, they were presented as living a 
simple but not entirely unpleasant life, spending their days pursuing cultural and educational 
activities which would lead to long-term self-improvement. The prisoners’ reasonably 
comfortable standard of living was presented as insured by the tireless work of the Vichy 
government and the self-sacrificing acts of the French people.  The government now described 
hopes for the rapid release of the prisoners as childish, and instructed the people that as long as 
they thought of Germany as the enemy and refused to commit themselves to collaboration it w s 
unreasonable to hope for a general release.16 
While the government’s attempt to shape opinion of what could be expected in terms of 
the release of the prisoners was evolving during 1940, a second message, this one of a mor 
consistent nature, also was disseminated. The French public was led to believe that the prisoners 
were united in their support of the Vichy leadership, and that they were anxious to return home 
so they could participate in the moral rebuilding of France along the lines of the révolution 
nationale. 
                                                
15 Robert Paxton, Vichy France, Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 74-
80. 
16 This and other aspects of the propaganda campaign will be referenced with specific examples later in the body of 
this chapter. 
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Neither the representation of the prisoners’ austere but comfortable lifestyle, nor their 
offering widespread support to the Vichy government, were accurate reflections of the reality of 
the captivity.17 Of this, the French population was largely unaware. Vichy was almost in 
complete control of how the prisoners were represented to the French people, as their own direct 
correspondence to home was limited to a handful of short letters and postcards each year, all of 
which were censored both by German then Vichy authorities. The prisoners had no real voice of 
their own.18 The handful of prisoners who gained early release in 1940 and 1941 to become 
public spokesmen for the prisoners were often chosen based on their pro-collaborationist 
views.19 Vichy’s censorship provided no outlet for liberated prisoners who wished to speak out 
against collaboration, or describe the harsher reality of the captivity, the opportunity to do so. 
The result of this managed flow of information and misrepresentation was that if a French citizen 
publicly spoke out against Vichy, he or she might well be seen as opposed to the shared will of 
the prisoners suffering in Germany - opposed to the hopes and dreams of those men who were 
making a far greater sacrifice for the country than anyone still enjoying the relative freedom of 
France. It would be a short leap to the position: “If you are for the prisoners, then you are for 
Vichy,” and conversely, “If you oppose Vichy, then you don’t care about the prisoners.” S en 
through the prism of Vichy’s prisoner of war propaganda, opposition to Vichy was disrepectful 
to the harshly won wisdom of the prisoner of war community, a shameful and self-indulgent 
attitude practiced only by those who were spared the worst sacrifices brought on by the defeat. 
Those who were truly making the greatest sacrifices for France, the young men suffering far 
                                                
17 See Chapters five, seven and eight. 
18 A very well done examination of Vichy’s efforts to p rtray the prisoners of war as supportive of their government 
is Sarah Fishman’s “Grand Delusions: The Unintended Consequences of Vichy France’s Prisoner of War 
Propaganda,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 26, No. 2, Apr. 1991, 229-254. 
19 See Sarah Fishman, We Will Wait, Wives of French Prisoners of War, 1940-1945, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1991), 93-100; and chapter eight of this work. 
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from home, were lined up in support of the Marshal. Vichy used this constructed image of the 
prisoners of war as a shield from public criticism. 
 
Puy-de-Dome, 1940 - A Case Study 
 The way Vichy prisoner of war propaganda was disseminated on the ground level can b  
demonstrated by examining one specific region of France in 1940, the department of Puy-de-
Dôme. In many ways Puy-de-Dôme provides an excellent platform for this exercise. As this 
department lay within the unoccupied region of France censorship was under the control of 
Vichy, not German, authorities. The town of Vichy itself lay just north of this department, about 
30 kilometers from Clermont-Ferrand, Puy-de-Dôme’s largest urban center. This prox mity 
makes it safe to assume that the government’s control of the press was as tight here as anywhere 
in unoccupied France and unaffected by communication difficulties. Throughout 1940 two 
newspapers were published in Clermont-Ferrand. While both newspapers were censord by the 
Vichy authorities, they did maintain different characters. Le Moniteur du Puy de Dome had long 
been owned by Pierre Laval, one of the key figures of the Vichy government. Laval, ser ing as 
Marshal Pétain’s Prime Minister through most of 1940 (and again from 1942-1945), was the 
architect of the policy of collaboration, remaining a strong and outspoken supporter of this 
Franco-German partnership throughout the war. In August of 1945, he was the most prominent 
Vichy official executed by the provisional French government for treason. Not surprisingly, Le 
Moniteur did not challenge the Vichy leadership’s messages. Clermont-Ferrand’s second 
newspaper, La Montagne, was owned by a stubbornly independent 70-year old former socialist 
deputy named Alexander Varenne. From 1906 to 1936 Varenne had represented the Puy-de-
Dôme in the Chamber of Deputies, served as governor general in Indochina and, during World 
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War I, in the Censorship Office.20 Not unexpectedly, the Vichy government found a man of this 
stature difficult to bring under control, and La Montagne clearly separated itself from Le 
Monitieur in its attempts to disseminate views independent from those of the Vichy leadership. 
In his study of life in the Puy-de-Dôme during World War II, John Sweets chronicled Varenne’s 
life-long struggles against organizations he felt were trying to control his freedom of speech and 
political association.21 Shortly after the formation of the Vichy state Varenne placed himself as a 
critic of what he perceived to be the “authoritarian drift” of the new government and, by August 
of 1940, had began to publicly and privately offer policy advice to Marshal Pétain and his 
ministers. Sweets has written of Varenne’s private correspondence with Pétain during the first 
few months of the Vichy regime, “It would be difficult to imagine a more fervent and eloquent 
testimonial to French republicanism, or a firmer defense of civil liberties and justice, than was 
contained in these letters.”22  The public side of Varenne’s crusade can be documented in the 
pages of the newspaper he owned. Unlike Le Monitieur, Le Montagne made no effort to conceal 
from its readership stories that had been censored. Wherever the censors’ red pencil had crossed 
through a passage or even a whole story, Le Montagne would indicate so by leaving a stark white 
empty space in its print version in the place the eliminated words had previously occupied. 
Varenne carried this practice so far that on 3 July 1940, suspended in the middle of an empty 
white box taking up the right side of Le Montagne’s front page where his editorial normally was 
found, sat the simple announcement: “Alexandre Varenne’s article was entirely censured.” 
 Thus, in the Puy-de-Dôme there existed two separate daily newspapers with clearly 
divergent biases. An examination of the way these two newspapers handled a series ofn ws 
topics related to the prisoners of war will be used below to construct a case study demonstrating 
                                                
20 Sweets, 137. 
21 Sweets, 137-151. 
22 Sweets, 138. 
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how elements of the Vichy prisoner of war propaganda campaign were disseminated in France in 
1940. Examples from Le Moniteur and direct government news releases exemplify the 
propaganda messages in more or less pure form, while those drawn from La Montagne bring to 
light the population’s frustrations with the government’s handling of the issue and concerns they 
had which were left unaddressed. 
 
Early Attempts to Quell Public Anxiety over the Prisoners’ Fate 
 Immediately following the German conquest, France existed in a state of chaos. Millions 
of refugees had fled south, throwing the entire nation into a state of confusion. Throughout June 
and July, the Puy-de-Dôme newspapers were filled with heartbreaking classified notices of 
family members attempting to locate missing loved ones, a task for which the government was 
able to provide little assistance given its own disrupted state. Throughout these first w eks, the 
anxiety and dread of those searching for news of unaccounted loved ones serving in the mil tary 
is one of the most common themes in newspaper coverage and postwar memoirs of what came to 
be known as “The Exodus.”23  It was not uncommon for loved ones of servicemen to learn that 
they were held prisoner months after they had been declared missing. Both La Montagne and La 
Moniteur did what they could to alleviate the suffering of these people as quickly as they could 
by publishing lists of men serving in locally raised military units who were known t be in 
captivity. The first of these lists appeared on 19 July, roughly a month after fighting had ceased. 
The lists, which appeared several times a week, contained only the prisoners’ name , the units 
                                                
23 The 1940 Exodus, and French civilian collective memory of the summer of 1940, has become a popular topic of 
scholarship over the last fifteen years. For an excellent short treatment of the Exodus see Julian Jackson, The Fall of 
France, The Nazi Invasion of 1940, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), 174-77. For more extensive accounts 
see Hanna Diamond, Fleeing Hitler, France 1940, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007); Nicole Ann 
Dombrowski, Beyond the Battlefield, The French Civilian Exodus of May-June 1940, (Unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation, New York University, 1995); Shannon Fogg, The Politics of Everyday Life in Vichy France, 
Foreigners, Undesirables, and Strangers, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Richard Vinen, The 
Unfree French, Life under the Occupation, (London: Allen Lane, 2006), 29-45. 
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they had been serving in, their hometowns, and in what camp they currently were held. One can 
easily imagine these lists being quickly passed from hand to hand, undoubtedly giving some 
peace of mind to distraught parents, wives and friends. 
 The new government began to demonstrate some control over the situation shortly after 
the above lists of prisoners were published. The Puy-de-Dôme newspapers began printing 
information released by the government of a practical nature, in an open effort to answer many 
of the common questions that were flooding their offices and could not be replied to individually. 
The public was instructed as to how they could write to a prisoner (only short letters directed to 
specific prisoners at known camps could be sent, and a reminder that the postal service was 
doing as well as it could, but was still in terrible shape), what could be sent to a prisner in a 
package (only 5 kgs, food, cigarettes and photographs, no printed material and no personal 
notes), and how a citizen could donate money for prisoner relief (gifts to the government agency 
or the French Red Cross). All mail concerning the prisoners could be sent free of postage. Seeing 
official notices of this nature in the newspapers almost on a daily basis gave the impression that 
the government was proactive, capable, and doing everything it could during a very difficult 
time. Vichy was instructing the people to be patient and trust that their official organizations 
were making progress. A notice printed 28 July 1940 included the assurance, “Authorities are 
doing everything possible to put an end to the suffering of the families.”24 
 One matter not addressed by these official releases were the conditions in which the 
prisoners were being held. A very early news story published in Varenne’s La Montagne on 13 
July addressed this topic. The story described a frontstalag in the town of Moulins. The prisoners 
held there, while not enjoying a comfortable life, were receiving plenty to eat thanks to donations 
from the local population. These prisoners were even allowed to see visitors who knew to come 
                                                
24 “La correspondance aux prisonniers de guerre”, Le Moniteur, 28 July 1940, 1. 
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and ask for them by name: “No barriers separate the detainees from their visitors [in the guarded 
visiting room]. Many women have brought their children. Each group can speak freely.”  25 This 
certainly was the type of story that would have been of great interest to many Puy-de-Dôme 
readers; however, the story was not duplicated in Laval’s paper. As the La Montagne story 
explained, “…so many rumors abound, so much alarming news has been spread, that all fears 
seemed justified. Here now is the first comfort.”  While it is possible that Le Moniteur’s decision 
not to print a story about these prisoners was due to the editors not finding it newsworthy, given 
the great level of anxiety about the prisoners at this time this is a difficult rationale to accept. 
Certainly, this story would have a generally calming effect on most people who were concerned 
about their missing loved ones. Perhaps the reason this particular story, or others about the living 
conditions and locations of prison camps near the Puy-de-Dôme, wer  not printed in Le Moniteur 
might be that some messages these stories gave out worked against the government’s desire that 
the French people simply place their trust in the new regime’s ability to manage the prisoner of 
war issue. The Montagne story encouraged people to act in ways that would undermine Vichy’s 
control of information by informing readers that if, instead of passively trusting in the 
government to take care of the situation, they proactively took matters into their own hands, they 
might find out if their loved ones were alive or dead, where they were being held, and might 
even be allowed to visit with them. Such a story might well result in more people leaving their 
homes in search of information, more direct communication between prisoners and the 
population, and less reliance on the direction of a paternalistic government. Le Moniteur’s 
decision not to print stories about these temporary prison camps indicates that, even as arly s 
                                                
25 “Grâce au dévouement des habitants les prisonniers français de Moulins ont pu améliorer leur sort”, La 
Montagne, 13 July 1940, 2. 
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July 1940, the new government may have considered control of information more important than 
providing their people peace of mind. 
 
The Silent Deportation 
 The most significant aspect of the prisoner of war issue from the French population’s 
point of view was their removal from France. By August 1940 over a million prisoners of war
had been deported into Germany. This move was a clear signal that the Germans had no 
intention of releasing the prisoners anytime in the near future. Amazingly, this million man 
deportation received no mention in either Puy-de-Dôme newspaper, something which can only 
be attributed to strict censorship. As shown below, news stories in the following months indicate 
that the people of the region were aware that the prisoners had been moved to Germany; 
however, this information must have come from sources other than the local press. That an event 
as significant as the systematic deportation of over a million prisoners of war during a few 
months was not reported can only be attributed to strict press censorship. Clearly, th  Vichy 
government wanted to limit public awareness about the deportation; however, as was 
demonstrated by the Puy-de-Dôme’s newspapers’ later acknowledgment of the deportation as a 
fait accompli in November 1940, events of this magnitude could not be kept quiet altogether. As 
to specifically why the Vichy government suppressed reporting on the deportation emains an 
open question. No documentations speaking toward motivation or intention for this specific area 
of censorship were uncovered during archival research for this project, nor, to the author’s 
knowledge, has such documentation been uncovered by other scholars. Given the government’s 
larger propaganda goals one explanation for this censorship is that reporting on the deportation 
was forbidden as it would undermine the regime’s propaganda message that it was effectively 
working with German authorities for the rapid release of all POWs. 
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 Despite the ongoing deportation, multiple examples of Vichy government assurances that 
the prisoners of war could expect to be freed quickly were printed in the Puy-de-Dôme 
newspapers throughout July-November 1940. Among these were the frequent news stories about 
small groups of men returning home, normally due to government action. For example, on 21 
July a story appeared in Le Moniteur about the government’s successful arrangements with 
German authorities for the furloughing of some prisoners of war who possessed skills 
indispensable for the maintenance of public order.26 The following week a story announcing the 
joyous repatriation of eighty-five injured prisoners, accompanied to their destination in Lyon by 
attentive French military and health workers, was prominently carried in both papers.27 Several 
stories and official government communiqués in early September informed the public that the 
government had been successful in its talks with German authorities and that the people could 
soon expect the return of more injured prisoners and more specialists.28 The pervasiveness of the 
government’s message that it was doing all it could to gain the release of the prison rs can also 
be demonstrated in the gentle rebuke it received in an editorial in Varenne’s Le Montagne. This 
editorial suggested that perhaps the government should place more priority on ensuring the 
prisoners were receiving mail and supplies, rather than focusing so intently on their liberation.29 
 The government’s desire to communicate its high level of concern for the prisoners is 
perhaps best exemplified by a news release on 19 September. In this release the public was 
assured that the fate of the prisoners was the “strongest preoccupation” of the government and it 
was “utilizing every possible measure” to alleviate their “physical and moral struggles.” The 
                                                
26 “La libération de certains prisonniers de guerre”, Le Moniteur, 15 August 1940, 1. 
27 “Le repatriement des grands blessés français” Le Moniteur, 23 August 1940, 1 and “Le premier convoi”, La 
Montagne, 24 August 1940, 1. 
28 “Liberation de certaines categories de prisonniers de guerre”, Le Moniteur, 15 September 1940, 2. “Mis en congé 
de captivité catégories de prisonniers de guerre”, La Montagne, 9 September 1940, 1. 
29 “Les prisonniers”, Le Montagne, 9 September 1940, 2. 
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article did not focus on if the prisoners would be liberated soon, but rather on steps the 
government was already taking to ensure the prisoners would experience few problems 
reintegrating into society upon their liberation. These steps included ensuring that the POWs 
would be able to return to their previous jobs, that they would be treated the same as all other
veterans in terms of benefits, and that their chances for promotion would in no way be hindered 
by their time in captivity. The prisoners and their families were assured that any fears they had of 
“being the object of a certain forgetting” were ill founded, and that any person living in France 
who attempted to profit from their absence would find no rewards in doing so.30 
 The cumulative effect of these messages was to leave in the public’s mind the impression 
that the Vichy government was successfully working with the Germans to secure the release of 
the prisoners, that these efforts had already resulted in some widely publicized successes, and 
that back home they were already occupying themselves with arrangements to sure the return 
would go smoothly. These positive indications were further reinforced by the total absence of 
messages in the newspapers examined that might moderate hopes of an imminent return. No 
indication was given of the Vichy leadership’s knowledge of the scale of the deportation and the 
recognition on their part that this, in all likelihood, meant the prisoners were in store for a 
lengthy captivity.31 
 
Refocusing the Propaganda from Liberation to Proper Care of the Prisoners 
 On 20 October Marshal Pétain and Pierre Laval met with Adolph Hitler for the first time 
at the rail junction town of Montoire. This meeting and the negotiations of the following weeks 
                                                
30 “Le gouvernement se préoccupe de l’avenir des prisonn ers de guerre à leur retour de captivité”, Le Moniteur, 20 
September 1940, 1. 
31 For the level of awareness within the Vichy leadership on German plans to use the prisoners as forced laborers see 
Raffael Scheck, “The Prisoner of War Question and the Beginnings of Collaboration: The Franco-German 
Agreement of 16 November 1940,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2010, 369. 
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dramatically impacted Vichy foreign and prisoner-of-war policy. Pétain c me to the meeting 
hoping to negotiate less onerous terms from the Germans in terms of the occupation and 
liberation of the prisoners. Hitler refused to come to any specific agreement with Pétain, but he 
made it understood that any concessions to France would only come as a result of activeFrench 
support of German war aims, including the defeat of Britain. Pétain, unwilling to fully meet 
Hitler’s demands, took the partial but politically disastrous step of announcing to the French 
people on 31 October that he had embraced the concept of collaboration as the official policy of 
the Vichy government.32  When Pétain issued this announcement, his minister of prisoner of war 
affairs, Georges Scapini, was in Germany negotiating the prisoner of war issue. Pétain’s public 
announcement of collaboration with Germany, but refusal to join them in their war with Britain, 
was seen as a half step in Berlin. At this same time, Scapini’s diplomatic mission ended in 
failure. This can hardly be seen as surprising. While to many in France the war was over, from 
the German perspective, until Britain came to terms, it remained an unfinished job. From the 
German point of view, therefore, releasing the French prisoners while the war raged on was 
nonsensical. By doing so they would be discarding a significant economic resource when it was 
most needed (a large captive labor force to replace the German men serving in the armed 
services), while simultaneously creating a much less stable occupation situation in France by 
flooding it with bitter, unemployed, militarily trained young men. Following the twin failures of 
Scapini and Pétain in making progress towards the prisoners’ release, by early November Vichy 
had to confront the fact that they were not coming home anytime soon, and this new reality 
would require a significant adjustment in their propaganda messages. 
                                                
32 Perhaps the best treatment of the diplomatic aspect  of the Montoire meeting remains Robert Paxton’s Vichy 
France, 74-80. 
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The reworked Vichy message emerged in full in a news release on 19 November 1940. 
The release, primarily presented in the form of a speech given by Scapini, dominated the front 
pages of both Puy-de-Dôme newspapers that day.33 Aside from the wording of the headlines, 
both Puy-de-Dôme newspapers carried Scapini’s full address in a prominent location without 
editorial comment, implying that censors had given little leeway in how the new situation would 
be presented. Paradoxically titled “The Prisoners Will Return to their Homes” in Le Moniteur 
and, more accurately, “The Situation of the Prisoners” in La Montagne, Scapini initially 
highlighted the positive. Talks with the Germans regarding the furloughing of prisne s with four 
or more children, or for the oldest brother of four or more minor children when the father was 
deceased or unable to work, had gone well. In this instance Scapini’s optimism was justified as 
eventually 18,731 men fitting into these categories were released.34 The remainder of Scapini’s 
address was of a less optimistic nature. Assuring the French people that he understood their 
personal anguish when it came to this issue, Scapini said he was going to clearly expl in the 
situation so that anyone with “good old patriotic sense can measure, judge and understand it.” 
Scapini found the sources of popular resentment understandable: letters were too slow and to  
few in number, there were too many restrictions placed on packages sent to prisoners, but 
primarily, “Why is he not free?” He exhorted: “My comrades!, Remember that there are close to 
two million prisoners and that we are beaten. Think of the gigantic material, moral, political and 
military problems that this poses…” He reminded his audience that the fact that Bri ain still 
pursued the war against Germany heavily influenced any prisoner settlement. Th  speaking 
more sternly, he said: “If the French still consider Germany as an advers ry, it is childish of them 
                                                
33 All quotes in this paragraph from “Des prisonniers français vont rentrer dans leurs foyers”, Le Moniteur, 19 
November 1940, 1. “La situation des prisonniers, Une importante déclaration à Berlin de M. Scapini”, La 
Montagne, 19 November 1940, 1. 
34 Durand, 324; and Chapter five of this work. 
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to ask for the liberation of the prisoners. On the other hand, how can one know if France has 
understood the harsh lesson that history has just given it? Within this incertitude, within this 
painful difficulty, I addressed myself to the generosity of Chancellor Hitler…. It is hard to ask 
with nothing to offer.” Scapini explained that all progress that had been made had come as a 
result of collaboration. For the first time the French people were being told by their gov rnment 
not to expect the rapid return of the prisoners, and that any longer range hopes for their return 
must be linked to collaboration. The reworked structure of the propaganda campaign was now in 
place. Return of the prisoners meant embracing collaboration → embracing collaboration meant 
support of Vichy → support of any group opposed to collaboration/Vichy meant dooming the 
prisoners to perpetual captivity. From July through October the French people had been told that
the government was owed their support due to its progress in negotiating a release for the 
prisoners. Now they were being told that collaboration must also be embraced on the prison rs’ 
behalf, and that hopes for liberation had always been unrealistic. The government was now owed 
their support based on its ability to make the prisoners’ captivity more bearable through its 
partnership with Nazi Germany, not on its ability to bring them home. 
 
The “Devotion and Fidelity” of the Prisoners 
 While the message of what the people could expect the government to do in terms of 
liberating the prisoners changed during the course of 1940, a second message remained 
consistent. Vichy propaganda informed the French people time and again that the prisoners of 
war remained steadfast in their devotion to Marshal Pétain and his government. Just as the 
prisoners’ living conditions were misrepresented by Vichy propaganda, so was their overall 
political disposition. Certainly there were many supporters of the Vichy government to be found 
among the captives in Germany in 1940 but, just as in occupied France, this level of support 
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quickly declined. The Vichy leadership had ample evidence of the low regard the prisoners had 
for the regime by late 1941.35 Despite this fact, Vichy propaganda continued to portray the 
prisoners as devoted followers throughout the conflict. For the Vichy regime to admit that the 
prisoners had developed no special sense of identification with the new government ad the
révolution nationale would be to admit that this ideologically and morally privileged group of 
people had not chosen to bestow the new government with the legitimacy their backing would 
provide. 
Initially, this vision of the prisoners supporting Vichy carried special weight with the 
French public. The French soldiers had witnessed the debacle of 1940 more intimately than had 
any other group of French citizens. In 1940, no group was paying a greater price for the collapse 
than were those soldiers held in Germany.36 These characteristics gave the French prisoners a 
seemingly higher moral position from which to address the causes of the defeat, and to 
recommend what measures should be put into place to correct whatever it was that had “gone 
wrong” in France and led to this unfortunate situation. Using this mindset, the Vichy government 
represented the prisoners as being well-informed of the tenets of the révolution nationale and 
united in their support for Pétain’s government. At least in 1940-41, many citizens would be 
naturally inclined to think that they had no place questioning the prisoners’ hard-earned wisdom; 
indeed, their opposition to the prisoners’ recommendations would be selfish and arrogant. 
 Newspaper stories depicting prisoners commonly represented them as responding 
patriotically and enthusiastically to Pétain and his leadership of France. The Vichy government 
provided the prisoners with framed photographs of the Marshal, and news stories depicting camp 
                                                
35 See Chapter five. 
36 During the war several groups in France would suffer much more harshly than the prisoners of war, principal 
among these the Jews and Communists. During the time period under examination here, August, 1940 through mid-
1941, the traumas of these groups were not yet evident to the French population. The hardships endured by the 
prisoners of war were of a more public and immediate nature. 
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life showed these portraits occupying a central place in the barracks.37 The small number of 
prisoners lucky enough to gain early release from captivity (almost always due to serious health 
issues which had made them a burden rather than an asset to their German captors) were 
described as attributing their release to the efforts of the government, and responding 
patriotically and enthusiastically to Pétain and other Vichy leaders. The Moniteur story about the 
arrival of a train of 500 seriously injured soldiers in Marseille on 20 November 1940, had the 
newly repatriated men shouting, “Vive la France!  Vive Pétain!” upon arrival.38 When newly 
repatriated soldiers did not display as much enthusiasm for the government as might have been 
hoped, the regime resorted to falsification.  One documented example of this involved a 
photograph of newly liberated prisoners waving from the windows of a train coach. When this 
photograph was reproduced the following month for a pamphlet, it had been doctored so that 
now the previously clean train coach bore the inscriptions “Vive Laval,” “Vive le Marechal.”39 
The Vichy depiction of the French prisoner of war community was greatly distorted from the 
reality of their lives. The prisoner of war community was represented as having learned from the 
disaster of 1940 that it was best for them to put aside all their previous class and ideological 
differences to unite behind the Marshal and his vision of a remade France. A Vichy pamphlet, 
assuming the voice of the prisoners, announced, “No more disagreements among us, only one 
word of order as we await our return: Obey and Serve.” The prisoners were depicted not only as 
united behind the government, but also, while in Germany, having successfully built a society 
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based on the values promoted by the révolution nationale, thus providing an example to the 
people back home. 40
 This representation of the prisoners was most fully realized in a Christmas themed news 
release. On 29 December Le Moniteur published an article made up of quotes from letters Pétain 
was said to have recently received from grateful prisoners of war. Pétain had arranged to have 
each prisoner receive a small care package on Christmas to help him celebrate his first holiday 
separated from his homeland. Included in this package was a framed portrait of Pétain or e ch 
prisoner.41 The first letter writer hopes to assure “the Marshal of France, head of the French state, 
of [his fellow prisoners’] respect and of their admiration and to swear to their great and venerable 
father devotion and fidelity.” This article continues that all the letters the Marshal received 
“testify,” as did the one above, to “the vibrant patriotism and the sincere loyalty f their authors.” 
A naval officer held in Nuremberg wrote: 
In the name of my fellow officers and in the name of our soldiers, I address to you my 
very intense and very respectful thanks for your Christmas shipment. It was doubly
festive for us because it came from France and because it came from you. In a way, it is 
all one, because France incarnates itself in you today and we know that our fate can not 
be in better hands. It is very pleasant for me, as the oldest of all the officers present in 
Nuremberg, to have assured you of this. I pray you accept, Monsieur le Marshal, the 
assurance of my deep and very respectful devotion. 
 
Vichy’s representation to the French people of the prisoners of war in full support of the 
government and the révolution nationale was supplemented with a second distorted image. The 
daily life of the prisoners was represented to the French people as being simple and austere, but 
not unduly so. The French were assured the prisoners were receiving enough to eat, were living 
in adequate if Spartan lodgings, and were being allowed to return home when their health was at 
risk. As historian Sarah Fishman summarized, “Readers in France were given the impression that 
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the prisoners were at an extended summer camp of sorts.”42 While at this camp the prisoners had 
to be coddled by government officials to use their time wisely. A Le Moniteur article from  
28 October 1940, described a visit to a prison camp by the executive secretary of the S.D.P.G. 
“to discover what could be done to help the prisoners use their free time in a profitable manner.” 
At the camp he found prisoners organizing university classes among themselves, forming an 
orchestra of forty musicians, even studying to be priests. He assured those back home in France 
that the prisoners were in good morale and their living conditions were improving. With a little 
encouragement from people like himself, he offered a confident appraisal that the prison rs 
would use their time profitably pursuing intellectual activities. 
The overall impression given by these and many other representations of the prisoners 
was that they were living a simple, but not entirely unpleasant, life. No indication was given that 
they were suffering from anything worse than boredom and a rather bland diet, situations which 
every French person could help relieve by either donating money to a relief fund to help fund the 
prisoners’ cultural pursuits, or by sending packages containing hard to obtain food items from 
which the prisoners could add variety to their meals. Vichy portrayed the prisoners as spending 
their enforced free time pursuing self-improvement programs or reflecting on their own and their 
nation’s shortcomings, shortcomings that had led to the decline of France and the defeat of 1940. 
The portraits of the Marshal hanging in places of honor, the warm assurances of fid lity and 
loyalty from the prisoners printed in papers, the enthusiastic pro-Vichy respons of the lucky few 
who had been liberated, indicated to the reading public that the conclusions the prisoners had 
reached in their meditations were that Vichy’s policy of révolution nationale was the proper 
course for a rebuilding France to follow. The French people were being instructed tha  the hard 
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won wisdom of the defeat of 1940 and the German exile had led the prisoners on a reflective 
journey which ended at Vichy’s doorstep. 
A separate article also published on 29 December described a short visit by Marshal 
Pétain to a prison camp.43 There he informed the prisoners of his pleasure at finding their 
material conditions “not impossible.”  He addressed the men as a group:  
You might believe that we do not think of you, do not fear, you are the subject of all our 
preoccupations. You are prisoners and you suffer, I know this. But I can say to you that I 
suffer with you. Your pain is the same as our pain. We do our best to comfort your 
families. Know courage and patience. Your psychological conditions of existence are 
very trying, I well realize this. Punishment is very severe, but don’t you think we deserve 
it!  Once more, be patient. Your liberation may not be long off. 
 
The prisoners’ reaction to this address was not recorded in the news release. 
 
Impact of the Propaganda Campaign on the Prisoners 
 Vichy propaganda had linked proper care of the prisoners in Germany with the hated 
policy of collaboration. Almost by necessity the Vichy government had to ensur , through 
censorship and propaganda, that the prisoners’ living conditions were positively depicte . If the 
actual conditions were widely known the French people would recognize that collaboration w s 
not delivering its promised reward. After the immediate crisis of 1940 had passed, lacking a solid 
base of support for its radical domestic agenda, the success of collaboration had become Vichy’s 
essential raison d’être. The reality of the prisoners’ harsh life in Germany had to be kept from 
the French people. Instead, the French people were led to believe that the prisoners were 
reasonably comfortable. As time passed this false depiction of the captivity roduced more 
resentment than satisfaction among the French population. Regardless as to who or what was to 
blame for the defeat of 1940, life had moved on in France. As this time passed, actions orignally 
undertaken supposedly to ensure the proper treatment of the captives in Germany came to look 
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more like a perpetual source of blackmail than a response to a temporary crisis. The prisoners’ 
continued welfare had been the supposed reward for a long line of compromises demanded of the 
French people – compromises to their national dignity, compromises to their sense of morality, 
and daily compromises to their standard of living. To be informed that the prisoners wer  leading 
lives which seemed more comfortable than those led by many in occupied France fed into a 
growing sense of disenchantment among the people at the whole affair. One reflection of this 
dynamic was the significant decline after early 1943 in the number of locally organized activities 
and charitable drives in France to benefit the prisoners. At this time prisoner aide organizers 
began complaining about declining public interest.44 
 The prisoners of war were directly linked to the national humiliation of 1940 based on 
their service. By 1941 they were associated with the shameful policy of collaboration. They were 
also believed to be strong supporters of the increasingly despised Vichy regime. With the 
introduction the following year of the Réleve and S.T.O., Vichy programs of lab r conscription 
for Germany allegedly created to speed the return of the POWs,45 many men and women in 
France must have been more than ready to wash their hands of the dilemma altogether by 1942. 
During the first eighteen months of the captivity Vichy propaganda had played a role in 
transforming the public image of the prisoners from the most unfortunate victims of a national 
debacle into a growing burden on a most unfortunate nation. 
  The prisoner of war propaganda campaign tells us much about the Vichy government’s 
weaknesses and insecurities. One should not conclude that the Vichy leadership did not care 
about the prisoners’ fate, as almost certainly Pétain and other leaders did act in a manner which 
demonstrated at least some level of responsibility and concern for them. However, these sinc re 
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feelings did not prevent these same men from falsifying the reality of theprisoners’ captivity and 
their collective mindset in service of their own political goals. Recognizing that perhaps it is 
unrealistic to expect a government to sacrifice its interests in pursuit of damaging honesty, one 
should still keep in mind the extent and seriousness of the Vichy campaign of misinformation. 
The welfare of the prisoners of war was not a minor issue; it was of immense importance 
throughout the nation, directly touching almost every French citizen’s life. Du  to the scale of 
the captivity and pervasiveness of abuse, covering up these realities required a considerable 
commitment of resources by an already badly stretched government. The systematic 
misrepresentation of the captivity was not a minor footnote in the Vichy leadership’s attempt to 
solidify its hold on France, it was a priority project. 
 Any analysis of the government’s propaganda campaign would be incomplete if the 
matter of its success were not addressed. Did the people believe what the government told them 
about the prisoners of war? Lacking quantitative polling information, historians are forced to rely 
on other methods to gauge what the French people believed about the captivity. One method of 
coming to grips with what people thought is to examine how they acted. Often groups of people 
will not leave behind reliable written documentation attesting to their beliefs and motivations. 
What they will leave behind is a record of their actions. If one accepts that, in most cases, people 
act in a manner consistent with what they believe, then a study of actions can be used to help 
construct an outline of their belief system.46 Did the French people believe what the Vichy 
propaganda told them about the prisoners? Based upon how the prisoners were treated upon their
return to France, I would argue that to a surprising degree, yes, the propaganda was accepted by 
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many as accurate. Postwar memoirs and the papers of advocacy groups working on behalf of the 
returning prisoners of war are replete with examples of recently liberated prisoners receiving a 
bewilderingly cold reception.47 The prisoners found most of the French people had absolutely no 
conception of how they had experienced captivity. Many however did share some common 
misconceptions. Examples abound of prisoners being informed by men and women who had 
spent the war in occupied France that the prisoners had nothing to complain about, because after 
all, they had been well cared for in captivity. Many in France treated the returne s with suspicion 
based on their belief that the returning wave of former prisoners would attempt o reintroduce 
elements of the révolution nationale once they were resettled in France. The prisoners were 
treated by much of the French population in a manner conforming to their representation i  the 
wartime propaganda rather than in accordance with the reality of their wartime experiences. The 
people’s fundamental misunderstandings about how the prisoners lived and what political
opinions they tended to hold had to come from somewhere. If not the Vichy propaganda 
campaign, then where? While it may be impossible for a historian to know with certainty how 
much the French people believed the Vichy prisoner of war propaganda to be accurate, we c n at 
least conclude that many in France at least acted as if they had accepted th  validity of the 
propaganda. 
 It may be impossible to determine to what extent the prisoner of war propaganda 
campaign actually increased public support for the regime, if at all. We can be certain, however, 
that whatever support it did produce proved insufficient. Vichy could only have been fully 
successful in its original goal of brokering an agreement for the rapid release of the prisoners by 
agreeing to join Germany in waging war on Britain. The good will that the releas  of the 
prisoners would have brought the government would have been more than offset by the political 
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cost of taking this hugely unpopular step. Faced with their inability to deliver the release of the 
prisoners, Vichy was forced to adjust its propaganda. Freedom for the prisoners, which the 
government had originally presented as a matter of course, was transformed into a reward that 
the people could only earn through their loyalty to the new government and its policy of 
collaboration. In its failed attempt to boost its own level of support, the Vichy government 
pursued a propaganda campaign that proved terribly destructive to the prisoners’ long-term 
wellbeing. 
 Understanding some of the ways the Vichy government used the prisoner of war issue to 
gain and/or maintain domestic political support, illuminates the origins of some of the widely 
held but distorted visions many French citizens had in 1945 regarding the reality of the cap ivity. 
When the French people compared the Vichy manufactured representation of the prison rs of 
war to that of the reality of their own lives during the occupation and resistance struggle it is easy 
to understand why many saw the prisoners as not due admiration or recognition for their wartime 
service. In particular, compared to members of the combattant resistance the prisoners’ level of 
sacrifice and devotion to republican values appeared meager. The Vichy campaign of inte tional 
distortion may not have produced the result the regime hoped for, but it did help shape the 
prisoners’ reception upon their return to France in 1945.  
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Chapter 4 – The Experience of Captivity, 1940-1942 
 
 For the vast majority of French prisoners of war life in the frontstalags was only a brief 
introduction to their overall captivity experience. From June through August 1940 most of the 
prisoners were transported into Germany where they would spend up to five years working as 
slave laborers. Unlike many other deported groups the Nazis had no genocidal plan to 
exterminate the French prisoners. Ninety-eight percent of the French prisoners of war (POWs) 
taken into Germany eventually returned to France alive. When the French POW mortality rate of 
less than two percent is compared to that of more brutalized groups of prisoners, such as the sixty 
percent rate of the Soviet POWs,1 or even the six percent mortality rate for disarmed Italian 
soldiers brought to Germany as forced laborers in 1943,2 it is clear that the French were among 
the better treated prisoners in German hands. Even though the French captivity was less harsh in 
a relative sense, one must keep in mind what a high bar Nazi brutality had set during these years. 
The “average” French captivity lasted five years, years defined by slave labor, separation from 
their homes and loved ones, poor living conditions, an unhealthy diet and daily humiliations. 
Lacking control over their own lives, the prisoners could do little more than struggle through 
what seemed like an endless succession of days. What many people may remember as the best 
years of their lives were forever lost to these captives.  
 This chapter will describe the first half of the French captivity, from 1940 throug  the 
end of 1942. During these years the French prisoners were integrated into the German wa  
economy, at first as a mass body of general laborers, and later as the vital indusrial workers 
which Germany needed to continue the war. During these years the mentality of the French 
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prisoners of war also went through an evolution. Through 1940 and 1941, most French prisoners 
remained optimistic that their trial would soon end, and they adopted a stoic attitude toward heir 
exile. By 1942 this stoic optimism had been replaced by bitterness and cynicism as the standard 
mentality of the French prisoners.  
 
Deportation into Germany 
 During the months following the armistice most French POWs were transported from 
frontstalags in France to Germany for use as forced laborers. By early 1941 the only large group 
of prisoners left in the frontstalags by the Germans was 200,000 colonial prisoners.3 This 
deportation is mistakenly described in some accounts as a concentrated event occurri g mainly 
during August, 1940. Robert Paxton wrote that the prisoners “began to be moved in early August 
from temporary encampments in France to German st lags.”4 Robert Gildea described the 
deportation as occurring only in response to the large number of prisoners escaping from the 
frontstalags.5 If the deportation had in fact taken place in this manner, as a single wave about a 
month after the armistice, then the decision to relocate the prisoners would appear to be n 
unplanned German response to an unexpectedly prolonged war. In actuality, prisoners were 
being deported into Germany as early as May, 1940. After being captured on 29 May near Lille, 
Paul Fraise was marched from a frontstalag in Belgium into Germany sometime during the week 
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before the armistice came into effect.6 Georges Hyvernaud was also captured as part of the Lille 
pocket. He remembers with irony that the train transporting him to a prison camp in Pomerania 
passed through Berlin on 14 June, the day German troops entered Paris.7 The pace of 
deportations increased in August, but since prisoners had been relocated to worksites inside 
Germany even before the fighting had ended, it would seem that this deportation was nota late-
emerging plan but rather, as German economic historian Ulrich Herbert concluded, an action the 
Germans had “planned well in advance.”8 The Germans evidently had standing plans to treat 
Western prisoners in the same manner as they had treated the Polish prisoners eght months 
earlier, deportation and forced labor. 
 Most prisoners were transported by rail, although some were marched on foot or towed 
into captivity on river barges.9 The prisoners received almost no warning of their relocation. 
They were simply marched to train stations and packed into cattle cars. Jean Hélion’s frontstalag 
was deported into Germany on 21 August. When ordered to form into groups of one hundred 
men and march to the train station, Hélion remembered the men were “naively sure that f edom 
had come.” Even after seeing a sign on a boxcar reading “Stolp y Pommern” some of the men 
stubbornly clung to their delusions, claiming they were sure they were simply being sent north to 
clear up demolition or south to help with the harvest before being sent home.10 Th  cattle cars 
were often overcrowded with fifty or more men.11 Hyvernaud described how he and the men in 
his car had to organize themselves to all face in one direction in order to have enough room for
                                                
6 Paul Fraisse, Écrits de captivité 1940-1943, (Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 1991), 52. 
7 Georges Hyvernaud, Lettres de Poméranie, 1940-1945. (Paris: Éditions Claire Paulhan, 2002), 19. 
8 Ulrich Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers; Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany Under the Third Reich, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 95. 
9 Robert Christophe, Les flammes du Purgatoire, Histoire des prisonniers de 1940, (Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 
1979), 38. 
10 Jean Hélion, They Shall Not Have Me.  The Capture, Forced Labor, and Escape of a French Prisoner of War, 
(New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1943), 92-94. 
11 Yves Durand, La Captivité, Histoire des prisonniers de guerre français 1939-1945. 2e ed. (Paris: Fédération 
Nationale des Combattants Prisonniers de Guerre et Combattants d’Algérie, Tunisie, Maroc, 1981), 62. 
 135
everyone to lie down.12 The train journeys normally lasted three or four days, during which time 
the men might be allowed a short break each day to disembark into an open field where they 
would relieve themselves and eat. Some prisoners were sealed inside their boxcar for the entire 
journey. Gustave Folcher’s journey lasted 75 hours, during which time no food or water was 
provided for the prisoners.13 Henri Laloux described his three days sealed in a sweltering cattle 
car, without food or water, simply as “a brutal time.”14 By the time the men disembarked at their 
destination they were starving, sick and filthy. Some German towns turned the arrival of these 
trainloads of French prisoners into veritable ceremonies. Many of the prisoners wrote of the 
humiliation they felt of being paraded in their broken down condition past German civilians. 
They remembered being taunted by children and noted the “great indifference” most Germans 
seemed to have to their suffering.15 
 Given the massive number of French men involved, and the widespread public interest in 
the prisoners, the lack of news coverage in France of their deportation to Germany can only 
reasonably be attributed to censorship. Given that many, if not most, French citizens exp cted 
the prisoners would be quickly released; their deportation would presumably be considered a 
newsworthy development. The two newspapers published in the unoccupied Puy-de-Dôme 
department in 1940 contained several stories most weeks regarding the prisoners. Surprisingly, 
none of these stories directly addressed the deportation. Despite this lack of newspap r reporting 
the French people were evidently aware of the deportation of their prisoners to Germany as, by 
                                                
12 Georges Hyvernaud, The Cattle Car. (Marlboro: Marlboro Press, 1997), 95-96. French boxcars were called “forty 
and eights” as they were designated by the army to be large enough to transport either forty men or eight horses. 
Gustave Folcher remembers there being 35 men in his boxcar (154); Hélion remembered being packed more tightly, 
55 in his car (93). 
13 Gustave Folcher, Marching to Captivity, The War Diaries of a French Peasant, 1939-1945, (London: Brassey’s, 
1996), 154. 
14 Henri Laloux, Avril 1945, Libéré ar l’armée rouge.  L’incroyable odyssée d’un prisonnier de guerre français K.G., 
(Paris: Editions Heimdal, 1997), 6. 
15 Durand, 64. 
 136
the end of August, news articles treated the topic as common knowledge. An article published on 
30 August in La Montagne informed readers that they could no longer send mail to prisoners 
using their frontstalag address. Mail would henceforth need to be addressed to the prisoners in 
their “permanent camps” – oflags and stalags designated by number.16 This information was 
repeated three weeks later with the explanation, “The number of prisoners [in the fron stalags] 
diminishes each day due to their continuing regrouping towards their permanent camps.”17 Le 
Moniteur, the newspaper owned by Pierre Laval, published a list of the stalags and oflags in 
Germany on 12 December, 1940, information which was repeated the following weeks in L  
Montagne. These were the first articles which directly addressed the whereabouts of the 
prisoners since the lists of individual inmates at various frontstalags had been published in June 
and July. News of the deportation worked against the Vichy government’s goal of assuring the 
French people that it was effectively protecting the prisoners and making progress towards their 
release. As noted earlier, their suppression of information on the deportation of the prison rs  
one more example of how, in their effort to control information, the Vichy government put their 
political goals in front of allowing useful information to flow to anxious citizens.  
 
Stalags vs. Oflags 
 All prisoners were assigned to a permanent camp upon arrival in Germany. Enlisted 
personnel and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), who made up over 98% of all French 
captives, were distributed across Germany in 63 stalags. The 29,000 captured French officers 
were held separately in 14 oflags. International law recognized differing standards of treatment 
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for officers and enlisted personal.18 One privilege afforded officers was that, unlike enlisted 
personnel, they could volunteer to work, but could not be required to do so. Non-commissioned 
officers could only be required to supervise working enlisted prisoners, unless they volunteered 
for work of a different nature.  The Germans respected these rules throughout the conflict;
although, beginning in 1942, they began to exert more pressure on officers and NCOs to 
volunteer for work. Few officers accepted this offer.  
Because of their separate housing and exemption from work the officers experienced 
captivity very differently than did the enlisted personnel. If the oflag experience was defined by 
boredom and frustration, Yves Durand, the most prominent historian of the French captivity, 
reminds us, “work was the dominant reality of captivity for the simple soldiers.”19  
A rich intellectual and cultural life grew in many oflags as the officers developed ways to 
pass the time as profitably as possible. During their captivity many officers took university-level 
courses taught by fellow prisoners, wrote books, staged theatrical and musical productions or 
participated in debate circles. The disproportionate amount of attention given after the war to 
accounts written by officers, as opposed to those authored by common soldiers, caused many 
people to develop a skewed vision of how most French prisoners spent their years in Germay. 
The vast majority of French prisoners had little opportunity or time to take classes, debate 
philosophy or stage plays. The standard workweek for a prisoner was fifty-six to sixty hours 
divided over six days, with additional Sunday hours once or twice a month.20 The twice-daily 
roll calls and required assemblies ate into the prisoners’ remaining time. What little free time the 
prisoners had remaining often had to be given over to daily chores such as cooking dinner and 
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mending clothes. Even had they been inclined to the type of pursuits common to oflag-life, most 
days the working prisoners would simply have had little energy or time for them. As enlisted 
personnel accounted for over 98% of all French prisoners this dissertation will focus almost 
entirely on the experience of these common soldiers. 
 
Introduction to Stalag-life 
 For most prisoners, arrival at a stalag actually brought welcome relief f om many of the 
hardships they had experienced during their first weeks of captivity. Unlike the camps in France, 
the German stalags normally contained wooden buildings with floors. After sleeping on dirt, 
often in the open air or in improvised tents, simply having a roof over their heads and a floor 
underneath their feet was a welcome change for the prisoners. While not plentiful or particularly 
appetizing, the meals at the stalags were at least served on a predictable schedule and provided 
the men with enough calories and nutrition to maintain their health. The stalags were also often 
the first location in which the Germans made serious efforts to impose order and discipline. Life 
in the frontstalags had been full of chaos for the prisoners. Provided the men did not attempt to 
escape from these temporary camps, the Germans more or less allowed them to manage their 
own affairs. In most cases the military hierarchical system fell apart mong the captives during 
this initial stage. The men had little idea when they would next be fed, when and where they 
would be able to sleep, and, without a functioning chain of command, no set way of maintaining 
internal order and solving disputes which arose among themselves. Once in the stalags the men 
were assigned to squads under a recognized leader and set sleeping quarters. The move from the 
frontstalags to the stalags resulted in less individual freedom but more order and comfort. After 
living rough for weeks followed by several days sealed inside a cattle car, many of the prisoners 
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remember their arrival at their stalag as the first time they could begin to relax since before the 
battlefield. 
 During their first few days in the stalags the prisoners were processed and made ready for 
work. The men bathed and had their clothes laundered, often the first time for either act vity in 
months. Their heads were shaved and their bodies disinfected. The prisoners then queued in front 
of tables full of paperwork to be processed into the growing army of slave laborers inside 
Germany. Each man had his name, address, description, stalag number and occupation recorded
on a card. They were then photographed in groups of five, each holding on his chest a 
chalkboard on which was recorded his prisoner number. These photographs were cut into 
sections so each prisoner would have an identification card with his picture attached. Most of this 
processing was done by other French and Belgian prisoners called functionaries. Rightly or not, 
functionaries were generally held in low regard by their fellow captives. They were seen as 
bootlicks, serving the Germans in exchange for extra food and preferential treatment. 
Functionaries were also often able to stay in the s alags on a permanent basis while the rest of 
the prisoners were shuffled around Germany from one worksite to another. Men captured early 
in the war and those who spoke German had more opportunity to find work as functionaries. 
These characteristics served only to confirm the suspicion most prisoners already held about 
their allegiance. 
 
From Stalags to Kommandos  
 The stalags were never intended to be the prisoners’ permanent holding areas. While all 
prisoners were assigned to a specific stalag, only a relatively small cadre of functionaries was 
permanently housed in them. The only other residents of the stalags were men unable to work 
and those who were in the process of being transferred from one worksite to another. After being 
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cleaned up and processed, more than 90% of all enlisted prisoners were assigned to satellite 
worksites called kommandos.21 This rapid and almost total employment of the French prisoners 
demonstrates how fully the concept of prisoners as economic assets to be fully exploited had 
been accepted in Germany. Kommandos varied in size from a single prisoner working on a 
family farm to several thousand assigned to a factory or mine. Guards and administrators, 
supplied by the German army, lived at the kommandos. Most of the Germans overseeing the 
kommandos were military reservists who were considered unfit for frontline military service. 
 The kommando a prisoner was assigned to, and the job given him, was more a matter of 
luck than logic. When asked their occupation, prisoners tended to claim one which they hoped 
would land them in a desirable job. The prisoners understood that agricultural and skilled craft 
work were among the best options open to them, and so they tended to identify themselves as 
coming from these occupations.22 For a prisoner to declare himself a white-collar or service 
worker was equivalent to declaring himself bereft of skills. In most cases the prisoners’ schemes 
proved to be wasted efforts as job assignments were given out haphazardly rather than based on a 
concerted effort to match up workers with suitable jobs.  
Gustave Folcher’s experience after arriving in Germany can serve as a relatively typical 
example of how the German distribution of prisoner manpower took place. 
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 Ten days after arriving at Stalag XI-A Folcher, and several hundred other prisoners were 
marched to a German army surplus warehouse.23 The most poorly dressed prisoners were given 
replacement clothes out of a stock of seized French uniforms. Some soldiers were given red 
pants dating from the early days of World War I. The men were told to gather all their 
belongings and be ready to be transported to their worksites. That afternoon, Folcher was one of 
roughly one thousand men gathered together in a courtyard just outside the stalag. A the men 
waited German civilians arrived in cars, trucks and tractors. These civilians registered at a table 
staffed by officers. Many of the arriving men were dressed in traditional forest-g een suits with 
feathered hats. Some carried batons. Folcher believed these civilians had dressed to impress each 
other. The German officers began calling out numbers and names of factories or towns. The 
soldiers counted off groups of prisoners and separated them from the larger mass of men. Each 
group was assigned one to three guards. The guards loaded their rifles in front of the prison rs. 
During this process no effort was made to match up specific prisoners to specific types of work. 
Finally the groups were marched towards one of the waiting civilian vehicles. “The distribution 
continued like that, a sort of modern slave market, twentieth century style.”24 Many other 
prisoners joined Folcher in describing this distribution process in the vocabulary of slavery. At 
some locations, under the eyes of armed guards, farmers would size up individual prisoners like 
livestock before making their selections.25 The prisoners had almost no control over their fates 
and small decisions, unrecognized or ignored by their captors, went a long way in determining 
how bearable the next several years of their lives would be. 
 Since the first days of his captivity Folcher had taken some comfort in being a part of a 
small group of prisoners from his home region in southwestern France. Talking with friends 
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from a similar background in a shared dialect allowed the men to briefly forgetthe barbed wire 
and escape to their lives before the war. They spoke about their homes, their families nd friends 
and recent events in their communities. When the prisoners were being distributed to the 
different kommandos Folcher was the second to last man counted off for one group. “The group 
was big enough when 25 had gone by, one of our mates, one alone was left behind, just one man 
from the Gard, from the Uzès area. We had been together from the beginning and abruptly, by a 
stroke of fate, we were separated.”26 
 Folcher and many other prisoners were loaded into two trailers pulled by a single tractor. 
It rained heavily and the men had no cover. Several stops were made over the next hours, at each 
of which a group of prisoners were removed from the trailers. Civilians gathered and stared at 
the prisoners at these stops. By nightfall Folcher’s group of twenty-five were th  last remaining 
passengers. The men were soaking wet and their teeth chattered in the cold breeze. Well after 
nightfall the numb men arrived at their destination, the small Saxon village of Sch rstedt. They 
were unloaded and taken to a dilapidated shed where they were each given a sandwich  told 
to sleep. Folcher wrote that when he entered the shed, he saw a few rough sleeping areas: “I take 
possession of one of them immediately because I guess that there won’t be enough for everyone 
and, my God, it’s still war and it’s the most resourceful people who get hold of things. My friend 
from Montpellier has a bed too. The others sort themselves out as best they can on the straw and 
the sacks, packed together like anchovies.”27 
 At five in the morning the men were woken and taken to the village square. There the 
Bauernführer (headman among the local farmers) supervised the distribution of the prisoners 
among a collection of local landowners. “He knew neither our ability nor our occupation. One 
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man, big and strong, who seemed like he ought to get through everything, counted for nothing i  
farming, not even knowing how to pick up a fork handle, while the next man, skinny and weak-
looking, could be an excellent worker.”28 Folcher and one of his mates were assigned to a 
middle-aged farmer. 
While the selection process Folcher went through was fairly typical for most French 
prisoners, the rest of his experience as a worker in Germany was not. From the poin  of his 
arrival in Schorstedt forward his life in captivity, while certainly not pleasant, was definitely 
more comfortable and stable than that of most of his fellow prisoners. He spent the next five 
years working on farms in this same village as a general laborer. He was treated relatively well 
by his bosses. In addition to the French prisoners of war, Schorstedt was home to forc d laborers 
from Poland, Italy and Serbia. The foreign slave laborers were not treated with brutality, nor 
were they accepted as equal members of the local community. The foreign workers were not 
allowed to enter businesses through the front door, to worship in church alongside Germans; 
however, provided they were back in their kommando each night before curfew, they were at 
liberty as to how they spent their non-working hours. While he described his diet during these 
years as “nauseatingly” monotonous, Folcher recognized that he was fortunate in th t he never 
suffered from true hunger.29 During the fall of 1940 Folcher settled into a life not unlike that of a 
convict on work release. 
Folcher’s story introduces several characteristics of the German handling of French 
prisoners, and can be used as a starting point for an examination of their life in kommandos. 
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Disorganization during the Distribution of French prisoners 
 The German distribution of French (and Belgian) prisoner labor was more dictated by 
speed than by efficiency. While the Germans made the minimal effort of asking each prisoner 
their occupation, outside of a few notable exceptions this information was not put to use. As
exemplified by Folcher’s experience, the Germans simply treated the prisone s as 
interchangeable workers and distributed them in body counts rather than based on skills. It was 
only at the kommando level that the prisoners might be sorted out and assigned to the most 
appropriate job available at that particular location. Despite the German labor ministry decree of 
10 July 1940 that the French prisoners were to be used “to a far greater extent” in industrial jobs, 
the only group of prisoners singled out for skill-appropriate deployment were miners, a g oup 
constituting only about two percent of the entire French prisoner population.30  
 Perhaps the war situation in the fall of 1940 explains the minimal effort the Germans put 
into efficiently distributing the prisoners. German plans for utilization of Western prisoners 
anticipated a long war which would produce a long-term stream of prisoners. The unexpectedly 
rapid Allied collapse produced a massive single wave of prisoners. German concerns about a 
labor shortage must have seemed solved with the arrival of over one and a half million additional 
prison laborers. So optimistic were the Germans following the victory in the West that Ruhr 
mining officials briefly shut down their recruitment of foreign civilian workers and expressed 
concern of a coming “inundation” of workers once the German miners were demobilized y the 
victorious armed forces.31 
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Fields of Employment 
 The prisoners understood that working on a farm, especially a small one, had many 
advantages over the other types of work to which they might be assigned.32 Rural farming 
communities were less impacted by food rationing than urban areas; thus, farm workers 
generally ate better than did most other workers. On small farms prisoners often ate at the same 
table as the German family. Working and eating alongside the same farming faly for years 
allowed prisoners lucky enough to be assigned to this type of work to develop friendships. Yves 
Durand found that French prisoners assigned to small farms were five times more likely to 
remain in contact with a German with whom he worked after the war than were prisoners 
assigned to industrial work.33 Farm work, by its nature, afforded the prisoners more 
independence than they would have enjoyed in factory settings. Provided they remained 
productive, prisoners on moderate-sized farms were often left unsupervised and unguared 
throughout the workday. Farm workers were less likely than industrial workers to suffer an 
injury on the job. Industrial workers were also much more threatened by Allied bombing raids. 
Prisoners working in factories were not even safe from these raids when they were not working, 
as their living quarters were customarily located close to their worksite. The impact bombing had 
on the foreign workers’ living quarters at the Krupp factories in Essen serve as oneexample of 
how important a factor this is to keep in mind. From March 1943 through the end of the war, 
Krupp had to replace twenty-two thousand beds damaged due to bombings.34 This meant that 
every sleeping area set aside for foreigners at Krupp had to be replaced twice over from 1943 
through 1945 to keep up with those being destroyed by bombing raids. Prisoners in small 
communities often had a period of “free time” after they finished their workday and before they 
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had to report back to their kommando living quarters. During this time the prisoners could mix 
fairly freely with German civilians and other foreign workers. These interactions broke up the 
monotony of life, brought in more news from the outside world, and provided the prisoners with 
opportunities to obtain food and other necessities through legal or black-market transactions. 
Prisoners working in urban areas were normally escorted in groups back and forth to their 
worksites and confined in their kommandos when not at work. Gustave Folcher benefited from 
all the above described advantages of rural life. 
Even though German economic planners had intended to eventually employ most French 
prisoners of war in industrial work, initially, the majority were sent to farms. At the end of 1940 
well over half of the French prisoners were employed in agricultural jobs.35 From 1941 through 
1943 this situation gradually changed as more and more French prisoners were transferred into 
industrial jobs. At the end of 1940 less than one in five French prisoners worked in industry.36 In 
November German economic planners reaffirmed their intention of employing Fre ch prisoners 
of war in industry with the goal of eventually having 75 to 80% working in this field.37 While the 
percentage of French workers employed in industrial work never reached this standard, the fact 
that it was set so high speaks to German intentions. 
One issue which complicated the transfer of more French prisoners into industrial jobs at 
this time was the Geneva Conventions’ prohibition against forcing prisoners to perform war-
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related work. This restriction precluded their employment in the German industries most in need 
of additional manpower. Throughout the first fifteen months of the war, the United States acted 
as the “protecting power” of the French prisoners in Germany. Any widespread viol tion of 
international law, such as a massive transfer of French prisoners into war-related jobs, would put 
the German military high command (the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht or O.K.W.), the 
organization directly responsible for maintaining the prisoners during their capt vity, into direct 
conflict with the United States Department of State. To avoid this conflict the O.K.W. favored 
leaving the prisoners in non-industrial jobs. To overcome the O.K.W.’s objections and facilitate 
the transfer of the French prisoners from agricultural to industrial jobs, the German government 
brokered an agreement with Pierre Laval in which the Vichy government would replace the 
United States as the “protecting power” of the French prisoners. Laval agreed that once the 
American inspectors were removed, the French government would allow the prisoners to b  
employed in industries doing war-related work in exchange for unspecified political 
considerations.38 By assuming the role of “protecting power” over its own prisoners, the Vichy 
government took direct control over a valuable political bargaining chip: the labor of over a 
million prisoners of war. Once the United States was removed from the equation, the German 
and French governments could directly negotiate matters related to the prisoners. As long as the 
United States had acted as their “protecting power,” the French prisoners wer , at l ast 
theoretically, protected by the established Geneva Conventions standards. Once Vichy r placed 
the United States, everything about the prisoners’ lives, from the way they wer housed and fed 
to the types of jobs they could be forced to perform, became open to bilateral negotiation 
between the German and Vichy governments. The power imbalance between the Vichy and 
German governments, and Vichy’s propensity to prioritize its political goals over the best 
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interest of the prisoners, insured that the prisoners would almost certainly suffer negative 
consequences as a result of this transformation. Before Laval accepted the transformation the 
French armistice delegation warned that, “If Germany has made this proposal it is beyond doubt 
that they see it as to their own advantage.”39 
In a recent article, historian Raffael Scheck effectively demonstrated how both the Vichy 
and German governments benefited from Vichy’s replacement of the United Stats as the 
prisoners’ protecting power.40 The Vichy government gained control over an important 
bargaining chip, the ability to negotiate directly with the Germans over how the prisoners could 
be utilized and treated. The French leadership also believed their new role would increase their 
legitimacy in the eyes of the French population. The Germans gained a more or less free hand in 
transferring large numbers of French prisoners into war-related industrial wo k without 
concerning themselves with international agreements prohibiting this usage. They were also 
freed of the annoyance of permitting ICRC and American officials to inspect th  prisoner camps 
periodically. This was a “win-win” agreement for the Nazi and Vichy governmnts. Scheck is 
considerably less convincing in a third element of his thesis, that the transfer of th  r le of 
protecting power to the Vichy government, “despite the dangers, represented a lesser evil for the 
French POWs.”41 Scheck argued that the United States would inevitably be removed as the 
protecting power when it went to war with Germany, and that the Vichy government, by 
proactively assuming the role in 1940, was able to prevent the prisoners of war from becoming 
“military internees” without any protecting power of any sort later in the war. Scheck also argued 
that the French government was able to win certain concessions from the Germans in their 
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treatment of the prisoners. Scheck acknowledged within the article that in their egotiations with 
the French regarding the prisoners, the Germans “did not agree to much that did not in some way 
work to their advantage or at least cost them nothing.”42 This led him to conclude, in apparent 
contradiction to the above statement, that it was “beyond the framework of [his] article to 
evaluate exactly how the agreement of 16 November 1940 affected the prisoners.”43 One must 
also bear in mind that Vichy initiated the transfer of protecting power to itself in November 
1940- a full thirteen months before Germany declared war on the United States. In November 
1940 an eventual conflict between the United States and Germany may have appeared likely, but 
it certainly was not an inevitability. The Vichy government was certainly under no immediate 
pressure to replace the United States as protecting power at the time of the negotiations. Vichy’s 
rapid assumption of protecting power appears more an opportunistic move for political gan than 
a proactive step taken with the prisoners’ welfare in mind. Scheck argued that, aside for reasons 
of state, “humanitarian considerations certainly played a role in the French consent to this 
agreement,….”44 Given that the agreement did not provide any meaningful humanitarian relief to 
the prisoners, but rather forced them to work in more dangerous settings in jobs which directly 
aided their jailors’ war efforts, and that it eliminated any protection they might have received 
from American and ICRC supervision of their captivity, if the Vichy government was motivated 
by humanitarian concerns in striking this agreement those concerns certainly held much lower 
priority than did political advantage. The agreement made sense in Berlin and Vichy, but did not 
in the stalags and kommandos of Germany. 
The Vichy government’s agreement to allow its prisoners to work in war-related 
industrial jobs removed the key political impediment to their transfer from agricultural to 
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industrial jobs. An economic impediment to this transfer remained. Germany had not 
demobilized following their victory in 1940 as many industrial leaders had expected, and the 
nation continued to suffer from a significant labor shortfall. In September, 1941 German 
industrial planners found the national economy still had a manpower shortage of 2.6 million.45 
While the shortfall was most pronounced in the field of industry, the agricultural sector was short 
half a million workers as well. Removing the French prisoners already working on the farms was 
difficult simply because there was no one to replace them. The Germans did manage to tr nsfer 
150,000 French prisoners from agriculture to industry during the winter of 1940/1941, but were 
only able to do so by deporting a final group of 150,000 French prisoners from frontstalags in 
France into Germany. These prisoners had been left behind during the initial period of 
deportations as they were needed as agricultural laborers in the newly occupied territories.46 
After the fall harvest they became available for other employment. Presumably, Germany 
expected the French to find some way to replace them on the farms in 1941. 
The German decision to use French prisoners primarily in industrial work was cert inly 
motivated by their specific manpower needs, but it was also a reflection of Nazi racial ideology. 
Until at least 1943, German economic policies were developed in a process in which the most 
economically efficient methods were often not pursued due to ideological objections. When the 
Polish prisoners of war were introduced into the German economy in late 1939, they were 
employed almost exclusively in agricultural jobs. The Nazi leadership believed Poles were 
unsuitable for skilled or industrial work and, thus, only usable on farms. The Germans believed 
that this influx of Polish agricultural workers would free up German workers who could then 
move into more advanced fields of work. Nazi racial theory held that the most advanced race 
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(the Aryans) should be employed in the most advanced work (modern industry), while the lesser 
races were properly employed in less advanced jobs. From the Nazi perspective, the employment 
of Slavs in industry while some Germans continued to do unskilled work was a racially offensive 
situation and a waste of part of the Reich’s economic potential. As would be the case in many 
Nazi era economic policy decisions, the skills and experience of individual workers was 
considered less important than their racial background in matters related to their employment. 
The Nazis considered Western Europeans to be racially superior to Poles and, thus, suitable for 
industrial employment. The arrival in 1941 of approximately 100,000 Yugoslav prisoners of war, 
whom the Germans considered racially equivalent to the Poles, allowed more French prisoners to 
be shifted to industry.47 A much larger wave of over three million Soviet prisoners of war 
captured during the second half of 1941 theoretically could have entirely solved Germany’s 
manpower shortage. Tragically for the Soviet soldiers taken prisoner in 1941, German planners 
did not foresee a long-term need for these men and women as workers, and implemented a policy 
of annihilating them in the frontstalags through starvation and disease rather than putting them to 
work. After suffering a series of military setbacks in late 1941, German leaders recognized their 
need for the labor of these prisoners and they altered their policy of genocide into one of forced 
labor exploitation. Even though the decision to bring Soviet prisoners into Germany as slave 
laborers was made in October 1941, so many had already died and those remaining alive were so 
physically wasted, that this latest wave of workers did not make an appreciable economic impact 
before April 1942. Of the 3,350,000 Soviet prisoners taken in 1941, two million had died by 
February 1942. So dire were the living conditions in the eastern frontstalags that only 5% of the 
remaining 1.4 million prisoners were classified as “deployable as workers” in March 1942. The 
Germans improved conditions in the eastern camps in an attempt to salvage as many Soviet 
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prisoners for slave labor as possible, a process they referred to as “fattening up.”48 Like the Poles 
and Yugoslavs, the Soviet workers were initially seen as only suitable for agricultural and 
unskilled employment. Their arrival allowed the Germans to push more French prisoners into 
industrial work during 1942. 
While Folcher’s initial assignment to agricultural work in 1940 was not uncommon, his 
remaining employed in the same small farming community for more than four years made him 
part of a fortunate minority. The experience of Jean Hélion was perhaps closer to that of most 
French prisoners. Like Folcher, Hélion was initially assigned to an agricultu al job.49 After a 
short stay in a stalag, Hélion and twenty-three other French and Belgian prisoners wer  sent to a 
large estate located near the present day Polish town of Borzęcin. There Hélion, a forty-year old 
impressionistic painter, dug potatoes, threshed rye, and performed general farm l bor. During the 
spring of 1941 he was transferred to a much larger kommando in the Baltic port of Stettin. In 
Stettin Hélion and 750 other prisoners were confined to the prison ship Nordenham, a converted 
British banana cargo boat. Each day the prisoners were broken into teams and escorte to various 
worksites. Typical jobs included loading and unloading ships, factory work, construction of 
bomb shelters, and railroad repair. The camaraderie of the large community of prisoners did not 
offset the many disadvantages of Hélion’s new setting. Almost all the spacein the ship was taken 
up by three-tier bunk beds. The damp environment in the ship’s hold proved to be an ideal 
breeding ground for lice and vermin. Wet shirts hung out would take three days to dry. The men 
had almost no privacy in these living conditions. Hélion’s diet decreased both in terms of 
quantity and quality. Rampant corruption in the camp administration made the men feel helpl ss 
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and insecure. Months after arriving in Stettin, Hélion observed that, while only a small nu ber 
of men in his kommando died during their captivity,: 
The prisoners are now accustomed to meager rations and hard work, but after a few ye rs 
of privations, they will bring home tired bodies, weak hearts, rheumatism and 
neurasthenia troubles that may considerably affect the length of their lives.50 
 
Vichy mail surveillance reports documented this transfer of French prisoners from 
agriculture to industry and established the negative consequences of these transfers. During 
September 1941 the reports recorded a downward trend in the number of work complaints in the 
prisoners’ letters. This was true in particular for the prisoners working in aricultural kommandos 
where the hard work of the harvest had just been completed.51 While the workload of the farm 
laborers was diminishing, prisoners working in industrial jobs, on road repair crews o  in forestry 
continued to regularly work twelve to fifteen hour days, often seven days a week.52 Just as life 
was apparently becoming more bearable on the farms, the reports record wide-sprea 
reassignments of French prisoners into factories.53 Ironically, these reports referred to the 
replacement of French prisoners on the farms by recently captured Slavic prisoners as the 
“relève,” the same name which would later be used by the Vichy government for their program 
of recruiting French civilians for work in Germany. This initial “relève” was wrapping up in 
March 1942, just weeks prior to the well promoted announcement of the domestic French 
program.  
It was during the winter of 1941/1942 that industrial work replaced agricultural work as 
the norm for French prisoners in Germany. A March censor report concluded, “The great r part 
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of our men now seems to be employed within an innumerable number of industrial 
kommandos.”54 The French prisoners “understood perfectly” the part they were playing in 
Germany’s war effort – as they were being transferred into industrial jobs they were “replacing 
the enormous number of [recently drafted German] civilians who were being sent dow  the 
broken pipe.”55 Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union had not gone according to plan and, to 
rectify the situation, it called more men into military service, increased it  demands on an already 
overstretched workforce and brought in more foreign workers. By the end of 1941 so many 
foreigners were working in German factories that one French prisoner joked in a letter, “We have 
found workers from all nations in Germany, save the Germans.”56 
Aside from agricultural and industrial work large numbers of French prisoners of war 
remained employed in forestry, infrastructure repair, excavation, fishing and skilled craftwork 
throughout the war. As time passed a significant number of French prisoners, in particular NCOs 
who had volunteered for work, were employed in supervisory or administrative jobs. While 
accounts of French prisoners of war working as horse breeders, or living with weal y German 
families while restoring their country chateaus, make for fascinating reading, one must keep in 
mind the standard French experience was one of hard, forced labor.57  
Mining was the most despised field of employment among the prisoners of war.58 The 
danger and rigor of the work made it very difficult to recruit domestic or foreign volunteers into 
the job; thus, mining was a logical field of employment for forced laborers. The war significantly 
increased demand for coal. In addition to the great need for trained miners in Germany, there was 
                                                
54 AN F9 2907. Commission de contrôle postal des prisonniers d  guerre. Rapport bi-mensuel, Nr. 48 (1-15 Mars 
1942), 16. 
55 AN F9 2907. Commission de contrôle postal des prisonniers d  guerre. Rapport bi-mensuel, Nr. 50 (1-15 Avril 
1942), 15. 
56 AN F9 2907. Commission de contrôle postal des prisonniers d  guerre. Rapport bi-mensuel, Nr. 42 (1-15 
Décembre 1941), 15. 
57 Durand, 99, 115-16. 
58 Herbert, 246. 
 155
also a significant shortage of unskilled and semi-skilled mine workers. Throughout the war 
German labor planners treated mining as the test case industry for the experim ntal employment 
of foreign workers. In 1939 mining was the first industry to be assigned Polish workers. Miners 
were the only occupational group the Germans made a significant effort to separate from the 
general mass of Western prisoners of war in 1940 for skills appropriate work assignments. In 
1941 mining became the first industrial field allowed to use Soviet prisoners and workers. Past 
productivity studies had shown that foreign mine workers, provided they were adequately fed, 
housed and supervised, could be nearly as productive as German workers. Studies in the Ruhr in 
1940 determined that French and Belgian workers and prisoners employed in mines were 
between eighty and one-hundred percent as productive as their free German counterparts.59 Even 
Polish workers with no prior mining experience were determined to be sixty to seventy percent 
as productive as German miners after a few months.60 By 1942 mining had become the preferred 
field of employment for foreign workers in Germany. The percentage of foreign workers in the 
Ruhr mines grew from sixteen in May, 1941 to almost fifty in December, 1943.61 
Foreign workers feared being assigned to mine work for good reason. Prisoners w uld 
often have to work extended shifts underground. The mines had a well deserved reputation as a 
brutal work environment. Once underground each small work team was dominated by a foremen. 
Even before the war these foremen had traditionally been allowed to discipline their men as they 
saw fit. Workplace violence was an established part of the mining culture even b fore the arrival 
of the forced laborers. The extreme methods taken by some foreigners to escape from mine work 
are an indication of the working conditions found in this field. Some foreign workers fled to 
wooded areas and attempted to live off stolen food for the remainder of the war. Self-mutilation 
                                                
59 Herbert, 113. 
60 Herbert, 88. 
61 Herbert, 239. 
 156
was not uncommon among foreign mine workers. Workers hoped that a crushed hand or severed 
fingers would lead to a reassignment.62 No other field of work inspired these forms of extreme 
passive resistance among the foreign workforce in Germany. While the number of Fr nch 
prisoners assigned to mine work at any given time remained relatively small, between twenty 
and twenty-five thousand,63 the high turnover rate meant that a much larger overall number had 
to spend part of their captivity in this field. 
 
The S.D.P.G. 
 The Vichy government created a new agency, the Service diplomatique des Prisonniers 
de guerre, or S.D.P.G., when it replaced the United States as the protecting power for the French 
prisoners of war. The S.D.P.G. was assigned so many conflicting roles that it was practically 
assured that it would not always act in the prisoners’ best interest. In addition to aking over from 
the American inspectors the role of monitoring prisoner living and work conditions to ensure 
they were in compliance with international law, the S.D.P.G. also represented France in 
negotiations related to the prisoners’ treatment and liberation. These two roles - inspector and 
negotiator – conflicted. When a neutral inspector from the United States discovered a violation in 
prisoner treatment, he or she could simply demand the Germans rectify the situation by 
complying with the standards set down in the Geneva Conventions. When the S.D.P.G. 
discovered a treatment violation, it became one of many issues to be discussed during wi e-
ranging negotiation sessions between the German and Vichy governments. German compliance 
with international law now came in exchange for French concessions. The S.D.P.G. was also 
tasked with acting on behalf of French workers in Germany and protecting the financial interests 
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of French citizens who owned real estate in Germany, Poland, Bohemia and Moravia. The 
German government could play the S.D.P.G.s interests off each other, such as pressuring it to 
overlook poor treatment of POWs by threatening the financial interests of French firms in 
Germany. The S.D.P.G. was also given the political mission of promoting loyalty to the Vichy 
government among the prisoners of war. To do this it distributed pro-Vichy propaganda among
the prisoners and assisted in the establishment of political groups know as Cercles Pétain. The 
S.D.P.G.’s political mission conflicted with its responsibility of ensuring that the Germans 
properly treated the prisoners. When the S.D.P.G. had to choose between the prisoners’ well 
being and the government’s political goals, they often favored the later. One exampl  of how the 
prisoners suffered due to this conflict of interest within the S.D.P.G. was the Vichy agreement to 
allow POWs to be transferred into war related industrial jobs.64 
 The choice of Georges Scapini to head the S.D.P.G. increased the likelihood that the 
agency would prioritize political goals over the prisoners’ well-being. Scapini was blinded 
during World War I while serving as a pilot. He remained active in socially conservative political 
groups during the interwar years. During the 1930’s he was among the directors of the Comité 
France-Allemagne, an association which promoted friendship and understanding between France 
and Germany. Scapini remained active in this organization after the Nazis took power in 
Germany. In 1938 he visited Berlin as the guest of Nazi Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. Before the 
war Scapini had also developed a good relationship with Otto Abetz, the German ambassador to 
occupied France, through his work on theComité France-Allemagne. As a National Assembly 
deputy Scapini voted full powers to Marshal Pétain in July, 1940.65 Scapini was one of the 
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leaders of the socially conservative wing of the Vichy leadership and a strong supporter of the 
National Revolution. Scapini may have looked like a good choice to head the S.D.P.G. given his 
connections in Germany and due to his being a disabled veteran, but his political leanings c used 
him to place the success of collaboration and the National Revolution above the welfareof the 
prisoners throughout his tenure. The irony of having a blind Germanophile as the man 
responsible for protecting them was not lost on the French prisoners of war. Jean Hélion joked in 
his memoir that the prisoners expected if Scapini was ever replaced as head of the S.D.P.G., “his 
successor will be deaf and dumb too.”66 
 The S.D.P.G. was limited to having no more than sixteen inspectors. These men, 
accompanied by German officers, were responsible for inspecting the thousands of oflags, 
stalags, kommandos and prisons across Germany. The inspectors always traveled in groups of 
two, which further reduced the number of sites they could visit. In a given month the S.D.P.G. 
might inspect five or ten oflags and a dozen or so stalags.67 They rarely visited the kommandos. 
Prisoners often went through the entire war without ever seeing an S.D.P.G. delegate. During 
their inspections the S.D.P.G. deputies remained in the company of German officers and only 
spoke with a small number of confidence men elected by the prisoners. The French prisoners of 
war held the S.D.P.G. in very low regard and judged the benefits they derived from this service 
to be insignificant.68 The prisoners quickly came to distrust any information supplied by the 
S.D.P.G. All in all, the S.D.P.G. probably did more harm than good for the prisoners’ morale due 
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to their pattern of spreading false news and raising hopes among the men that negotiions for 
their liberation were progressing well.69  
 
Pay and Discipline at Work 
French prisoners of war were paid for their work while in Germany; however, aft  
deductions, taxes and institutional theft, relatively little money actually made it to the prisoners. 
By way of example, a foreign worker assigned to a job which would pay a German worker a 
monthly salary of 150 Reichsmarks (RM) received a reduced salary of 84 RM. In order to 
equalize the cost of employing a foreign worker with that of a German the employer was 
assessed a surtax of 67.5 RM. The worker’s 84 RM salary would have 45 RM deducted to pay 
for room and board, leaving only 39 RM.70 Further deductions would then be made for 
compulsory labor-front donations and canteen purchases and clothing allowances. What money 
remained was then often issued to the prisoners in the form of camp coupons which could only 
be spent at the worksite or in the kommando canteen. Historian François de Lannoy found that an 
average French prisoner of war was paid 1.8 RM per day. From this total .80 RM was deducted 
for food, .20 for housing and .10 for camp fees, leaving each prisoner a daily net of .70 RMs for 
ten hours of work71 (very roughly equivalent to $14US today). It was also common for 
employers to withhold half or more of the prisoner’s pay as “savings.” This policy of forced 
savings was justified by the employers as a way of preventing the foreign workers from buying 
up scarce commodities needed by the German population, or from funneling their money 
illegally into the black market.  
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Jean Hélion’s work as a bookkeeper in his kommando allowed him to describe in detail 
the actual compensation French prisoners of war received for their labor. For a ten hour workday 
a French POW received a final take-home salary of between 70 and 150 pfennings, dependent 
upon the work assigned. To put this amount in perspective, a small bottle of reduced alcohol beer 
cost 30 pfennings. If a prisoner chose to save his earnings, he could send it to his family back in 
France once he had accumulated a sum of thirty or more RMs. The thriftiest prisoners managed 
to save this amount after three months. If all went well the families received money sent to them 
in five months.72 The 30 RMs these men managed to scrape together and send home a few times 
a year was a modest amount, but certainly helpful to any family struggling to get through the 
occupation. It equaled 600 Francs, or roughly what an unskilled laborer in France ear ed very 
two weeks.73 By extrapolation we can conclude that French prisoners of war working sixty-hour 
weeks in Germany actually received about one-sixth the take-home income they would have 
earned had they been working as a forty-hour a week general laborer in France. All the 
additional income their labor produced went to paying for their own captivity and feeding the 
German war economy. 
In their attempt to control almost all aspects of daily life, the Nazi government issued a 
seemingly countless number of regulations and dictates. Many of these orders contradi ted each 
other, or were practically impossible to implement. It was virtually impossible for anyone living 
in Germany not to engage daily in some form of “criminal” behavior. The workplace w s 
particularly bombarded by these rules and regulations. The Nazi government considered it a 
political crime for a worker not to do his or her utmost to contribute to society and support the 
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national goals. Any person working in Germany could be punished for refusing to work, 
“indiscipline” at the workplace or, simply for “loafing.” While workplace rules were often issued 
in a blanket fashion applying to all workers, prosecutions fell disproportionately on foreign 
workers.74 Even channeling the paperwork for the tens of thousands of workplace “crimes” 
which occurred each week through the German criminal justice system would have overwhelmed 
it. For this reason, work “crimes” committed by foreigners were handled almost exclusively by 
on-site security personnel. Typical punishments given to foreigners for work crimes included 
denying them food, forcing them to work additional shifts, fines, short-term imprisonment at the 
worksite, or, very commonly, physical beatings. French POWs charged with work crimes were 
treated in this same manner rather than through the military court system. 
 
A Restricted and Controlled Life 
 As the years dragged on the Germans and, to a degree, the Vichy government, attempted 
to treat the French prisoners more like foreign workers than war captives. The prisoners’ lives 
were restricted in so many ways that, no matter how long they remained in Grmany, they could 
never forget that they were prisoners not workers and, as such, had little control over their own 
fates. The French prisoners angrily rejected attempts by the Germans and their own government 
to re-categorize their status. Nowhere was this attitude made more obvious than in the prisoners’ 
widespread refusal of the 1943 German offer to allow them to voluntarily re-categorize 
themselves from prisoners of war to voluntary workers.75 Despite promises to those prisoners 
who accepted the transformation of higher pay, more freedom and the possibility of returning to 
France for a two week furlough, only a small percentage of the French captives accepted the 
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offer. The daily humiliations, restrictions and injustices which the French prisoner  lived with 
never let them forget that they were prisoners held against their will, not workers. 
Undoubtedly the most significant of these restrictions was the prisoners inability to move 
about freely. Most prisoners’ first wish was simply to return home. Once brought into Germany 
the majority of the prisoners spent the next five years separated from their loved ones. 
Restrictions on their movements went well beyond their inability to return to France. Most were 
confined in enclosed kommando compounds when not at work. Even those prisoners who could 
enjoy a few hours of relative freedom after they had finished their work had to report back to 
their kommando for a nightly curfew. The living spaces set aside for the vast majority of themen 
afforded little privacy. Some prisoners never adjusted to the constant presence of oth r men. In 
his memoir, Georges Hyvernaud described how over time this constant state of forced intimacy 
wore down the men’s dignity and sense of self-worth. The men had no place they could claim as 
their own. Their possessions were limited to what could be carried in a duffle bag. Hyvernaud 
described how, in time, even a prisoner’s thoughts no longer felt like his own: 
The whole business [of my lack of privacy and being forced to remain in the constant 
presence of the same group of men for years] enters me and takes up all the room inside. 
No way of protecting yourself. We lie exposed, open to all and sundry. We could just as 
well have Entrée libre written across our foreheads, the way it is on the door of those 
stores where whoever happens along has the right to fondle and paw any merchandise 
within reach. . . . And people will be found who claim that these years of captivity were a 
time spent in thoughtful self-scrutiny. This same time during which one is at the complete 
mercy of others. Condemned to others. . . Captives of captives – of others.76 
 
 The prisoners had too much contact with their fellow prisoners, and too little with their 
loved ones. Each prisoner was restricted to sending two letters and two postcards per month. All 
their correspondence had to be written on standard forms, twenty-five lines per letter, five on a 
postcard.  The prisoners were told that if their letter was not written on an official form, or if 
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their printing was small and difficult to read, that it would be destroyed by the German censors. 
The prisoners knew that everything they wrote might be read by both German and Vichy 
censors. They actually over-estimated the intrusiveness of the censors. A smaller portion of their 
correspondence was actually opened and read than they believed to be the case. Nevertheless, the 
amount they could write, the double line of censorship, as well as their desire to not burden their 
loved ones with additional worries, resulted in quite a bit of self censorship. At least some of the 
prisoners were informed of written regulations forbidding them from complaining about their 
treatment, or criticizing Germany in their letters. Only favorable politica  commentary could be 
included in their letters.77 Given the contents of the Vichy mail surveillance reports described 
below, if these regulations were widely promoted they were ignored by the prisoners often 
enough. 
Every letter or package a prisoner received from France was prized. The prisoners had a 
deep longing to make contact, in any way, with things French. Envelopes with French postmarks 
were studied with pleasant melancholy by the men on delivery days. Objects and letters sen  
from their homeland were passed among the men, each feeling pleasure at beingble to connect, 
even in this indirect way, with their homes. In his memoir Francis Ambrière describ d prisoners 
“devouring” the rare letters that arrived, reading and sharing their precous words with the other 
prisoners, “with no other purpose in mind than that of satisfying a blind need to maintain some 
contact with France.”78 Outside of letters the prisoners were limited to receiving one five-
kilogram package (colis) every two months; and two one-kilogram packages each month. No 
personal notes or information could be included in these packages. Food and small items of 
individual significance made up their contents. 
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 Sending mail from France to a prisoner was not a simple process. Incoming mail was 
subject to the same two layers of censorship as was the outgoing mail. Each letter a prisoner sent 
to France included a “reply” form. In most cases letters sent to prisoners had to be written on 
these reply forms. Each prisoner was also given a small allotment of colis stamps each month. 
These stamps had to be mailed home so they could be attached to the outside of the packages 
sent to them in Germany. Unstamped packages were liable to be confiscated by th  German 
authorities. If a prisoner lost his allotment of mail forms or c lis stamps, or if he simply did not 
receive them due to administrative incompetence, he was cut off not only from sending l tters to 
France but also of receiving incoming mail, until he received more forms the following month. 
Given that the transit time for letters and packages was two to five weeks, this mig t mean that a 
small oversight could cause a prisoner to be cut off from all contact with his family or months. 
Each year regular mail service for the prisoners was suspended from December 14th through the 
25th. Christmas was the time of year the prisoners felt the separation from their loved ones the 
most deeply, and so this mail suspension took away one of their few sources of joy when it as 
most needed. 
 Letters and packages from home were vital not only for the prisoners’ mental state, they 
were also vital for their physical health. As was the case in World War I, the diet the Germans 
allotted the prisoners of war was of insufficient quantity and nutritional value to sus ain an active 
adult. French POWs assigned to agricultural work normally received extra food beyond their 
official rations and remained well-fed throughout the conflict. French prisoner working in non-
agricultural fields had to rely on their German-supplied rations and food sent from home. Absent 
the food contained in the packages from home and from the Red Cross, most French prisoners 
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would have suffered from malnutrition.79 Red Cross packages, which generally came from the 
United States, normally contained a pack of cigarettes, a small package of coffee and a chocolate 
bar. Cigarettes were the currency of the prisoners’ black market economy. They could be 
exchanged with fellow prisoners for food or clothing items or, more commonly, with German 
guards and civilians for just about anything. Throughout the war Germany was cut off from its 
traditional sources of tobacco and thus cigarettes, especially those coming from the United 
States, soared in value. Chocolate and coffee were also very difficult to come by, so these items 
were frequently exchanged on the black market. Given the above situation one might expect the 
Germans to have frequently pilfered the packages sent by the Red Cross to the prisoners. 
Apparently this was not the case. The Germans recognized that an unacceptably high rate of theft 
might result in either the French or the Red Cross reducing the amount of aid sent to th  
prisoners. The packages not only indirectly supplied the German people with rare commodities; 
they also reduced the amount of food which needed to be set aside to maintain the health of the 
prison laborers. In the case of packages sent to the prisoners, German self-interest controlled the 
level of theft until the final months of the war. Of course, instances of theft which came to the 
attention of the prisoners or the authorities produced outrage and calls for greate scru iny.80 
Given internal correspondence between the S.D.P.G. and the Ministry of Justice and national rail 
service, it appears the S.D.P.G. believed that most of the violation of the prisoners’ mail was 
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occurring before the packages left France, and thus, presumably, the perpetrators were French 
citizens.81 
 
Living Among the Germans, 1940-1942 
 The Nazi government’s desire to control all contact between Germans and foreigners was 
an undertaking completely beyond its limited resources. With millions of foreigners living in 
Germany for years, working side by side with Germans, it was inevitable that individual 
relationships would develop. This was as true in the case of the French prisoners in Germa y as 
it was for any other group. Describing relations between French prisoners and the German 
population in blanket statements is not helpful. Each French prisoner developed a unique set of 
relationships with German people. The story of Franco-German relationships during the cap ivity 
is made up of hundreds of thousands of individual experiences which contradict as often as they 
conform to one another. Even seemingly safe generalized assumptions about these relationships, 
such as the years of daily contact causing prejudice to diminish, often do not stand up to scr tiny.
In his post-war survey of former French POWs, Yves Durand found that nearly as many 
prisoners remembered becoming more hostile towards the German people during their cap ivity 
(31%) as became more favorably inclined towards them (34%).82 For every French man who 
returned from Germany with memories of humane treatment and positive relationships was 
another bearing mental and physical scars that would never fully heal. Some French prisoners 
remember their time in Germany as an exciting adventure, others as a time of misery and toil. It 
is as accurate to say that French prisoners were treated by the German popul tion with kindness 
as it is to say they were treated with contempt. 
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Throughout the war the German government did what it could to prevent interpersonal 
relationships from developing between Germans and foreigners. When foreign workers and 
prisoners began to pour into Germany in 1939, the Nazi government attempted to prohibit any 
contact between these foreign people and the German population except for absolutely essential 
workplace interactions.83 The German experience in controlling contacts between German 
citizens and Polish workers and prisoners during 1939 and 1940 was mixed. Reports from the 
Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the Nazi intelligence service, urged that Poles be hous d in segregated 
camps and employed in separate work gangs to keep them apart from the German people. Where 
these policies were not practiced, in particular in rural areas where the Poles more freely mixed 
with Germans, the SD believed the amount of social mixing occurring to be unacceptably high.84 
Treating the Poles according to the SD recommendations would have destroyed their conomic 
value. The accepted point of view during the first year of the war was that the economic benefits 
of foreign labor trumped the race-mixing fears of the more hard-line Nazi ideologues. After all, 
with Germany still at war with France and Britain, some degree of ideologica  flexibility could 
be expected in pursuit of victory. The victory in the West unsettled this compromise situation. If 
the German authorities had not been able to adequately segregate a few hundred thousan Polish 
workers and prisoners from the German population, they certainly would be no more capabl of 
segregating the millions of incoming Western prisoners. The SD assumed that social mixing 
between Germans and the incoming Western prisoners would be harder to control than had bee
the case with the Poles given that the German people were less prejudiced towards Western 
Europeans than they were towards Eastern Europeans. Making the situation even more 
worrisome from the hard-liners’ point of view, the already accepted policy of employing 
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Western Europeans alongside Germans in industrial settings rather than in segregated work 
gangs would make the policing of social interactions at the workplace very difficult. The 
demands put forward by party hard-liners, those members who believed the war was being 
fought to protect and further Nazi social revolutionary goals, were more difficult or the party 
pragmatists to put off after June, 1940. Now that Germany faced no direct military threat, these 
true-believers argued that Germany should focus on building a racially pure society by expelling 
foreigners rather than expanding their presence inside Germany. German economic planners 
believed the foreign workers were still of great value to the nation, especially as long as eight 
million men remained mobilized in the armed services. In order to placate the true believers the 
German leadership re-emphasized the race-mixing prohibitions of the terror compromise85 while 
moving forward with the integration of the Western prisoners into the workforce. As had been 
the case when the Polish prisoners were brought into the Reich as slave laborers, the Nazi
leadership attempted to resolve an internal ideological debate on the use of foreign workers by 
assuring opponents of the policy that while the foreign workers were in Germany, they would be 
carefully supervised and always treated in a manner which reaffirmed their inferiority to the 
German race. This reinforced the message that any admission by the Nazis reg rding Germany’s 
dependence on foreign workers did not also entail an admission of the human worth of those 
same workers. 
 No aspect of the French prisoners’ lives received more attention from the German 
authorities than their sex lives. Beyond the political considerations described above, this 
veritable obsession was driven by the Nazis’ fixation on racial purity and their rather extreme 
patriarchal viewpoint that the virtue of the German nation, as personified by German women, 
had to be protected against not only foreign attack but also internal depravity. The French
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prisoners of war were seen as particularly menacing in this regard. In Germany, “the sex appeal 
of French men had apparently an almost mythic dimension.”86 This was undoubtedly threatening 
to the Nazi leadership. With so many young German men away from home serving in the army, 
the government’s perceived responsibility to protect German women and police their sexual 
activity would have seemed even more compelling. So fixated did the Nazi government become 
on this issue of sexual control that by 1942 it replaced internal political dissent as the primary 
focus of the internal security service, the Gestapo. In 1940 roughly one quarter of all sentences 
for “political crimes” in Germany involved “prohibited contact with foreigners and prisoners of 
war.” By the summer of 1942 eighty percent of all Gestapo arrests fell underthis heading. An 
August 1942 report by the S.D.P.G. found that of 1,197 French prisoners tried for “political 
crimes,” 915 (77%) of them were charged with improper contact with German women, and a 
further 61 (5%) with rape. Only 116 French POWs were tried for assaults, 10% of the total, and 
espionage was not even included as a category.87 In Gestapo investigations any contact between 
a German woman and a foreign male was assumed to have involved a sexual act until prove 
otherwise.88 Slavic men found guilty of engaging in sexual intercourse with a German woman 
were executed. Western prisoners of war were sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. French 
prisoners convicted of “political crimes” served their sentences in the military prison at 
Graudenz. Conditions at Graudenz were exceptionally harsh. Prisoners were fed very little, 
forced to perform hard labor for twelve hours a day, and were forbidden from reading, writing or 
talking with one another while at work. French prisoners considered a sentence of mor than one 
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year to be equivalent to a death sentence.89 German women found guilty of sexual contact with a 
foreigner could be sentenced to public humiliations, such as having their heads shaved, and 
imprisonment of several months in a labor re-education camp. 
 Intercourse was not the only prohibited form of contact which might result in an arrest. 
Practically any unnecessary contact between a German woman and a foreign man might lead to 
an arrest. Below are some cases documented by the S.D.P.G.: 
Lucien Bureaux (Stalag V/C): Condemned on 22.4.42 to 4 months in prison for having 
been embraced on his birthday by a female factory coworker. 
 
Guerbert et Quarez (Stalag XI/B): Condemned on 2.12.42 to 18 months in prison for 
having embraced ten times a woman and a young German girl, and for admitting to 
having only a single kiss. 
 
Maurice Luisier (Stalag XI/A): Condemned on 10.12.42 to a year in prison for having 
exchanged four or five letters with a German female factory co-worker and for having 
spoken with her one time in the canteen. 
 
Alfred Ortega (Stalag XI/B): Condemned on 25.2.42 to one year and two months in 
prison for having several times, on the street, spoken with a young German servantgirl 
and for one time taking a walk with her. 
 
Jean Vernet (Stalag VI/G): Condemned on 28.3.42 to one year and six months in prison 
for having approached two female German co-workers, and for having accepted some 
butter from them, and for having hugged them and for giving them each a kiss on the 
cheek.90 
 
 These case studies were drawn from a larger document prepared by the S.D.P.G. and sent
to the German government in June, 1943 in an attempt to have the rules regarding contact 
between French prisoners of war and German women revised. The S.D.P.G. argued that th  
German prosecution of French prisoners for “prohibited contact” with German women was 
contrary to international law based on articles 45 and 46 of the Geneva Conventions. Article 45 
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held that prisoners of war were covered by the legal regulations and orders enforced in the army 
of the detaining power, i.e., Germany. Article 46 held that prisoners of war could not be 
prosecuted for offenses which were not also enforced by the detaining power against its own 
soldiers. The S.D.P.G. argued that since there was no law or order prohibiting German soldiers
from having personal relationships, including sexual ones, with foreign women, unless the 
woman in question was married to another German soldier, that it was thus illegal to prosecute 
French soldiers for engaging in this activity.91  
 The effort the S.D.P.G. put forth in defending the right of French prisoners to have 
relationships with German women is interesting in that it highlights the double standard the 
Vichy government applied to matters of sex and gender. Throughout 1941 and 1942 the S.D.P.G. 
urged the Vichy government, in very strong terms, to make the prosecution of unfaithfl w ves 
of POWs a priority.92 In February, 1942 the S.D.P.G. recommended the Vichy government 
expedite prosecutions of prisoners’ wives charged with adultery and to make exampl s of the 
guilty with harsh sentences.93 In a report sent directly to Marshal Pétain, Ambassador Scapini 
pointed out how much damage news of these affairs did to the prisoners’ morale, including 
causing several to commit suicide. After urging the government to increase its sanctions against 
unfaithful wives and of the men who had seduced them, Scapini added, “In all cases, it is 
indispensable that the current punishments for these crimes be applied with maximu  
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severity.”94 A follow-up report from June, 1942 expressed considerable frustration that the above 
recommendations had not been acted upon immediately, and blamed several additional suicdes 
on the government’s inaction. Throughout 1942 and 1943 two of the S.D.P.G.’s diplomatic 
priorities were attempting to expand the freedom of French prisoners to develop relationships 
with German women, while at the same time lobbying the government in Vichy to step up its 
prosecution of the prisoners’ adulterous wives. 
 
Conclusion 
 From 1940 through 1942, the material realities of the French prisoners’ captivity were 
established. As the value of the prisoners’ labor to the German economy increased, their chances 
for liberation prior to the end of hostilities decreased. The economic and, to a lesser degree, the 
political value of the prisoners encouraged the Germans to maintain them moderately well. 
Unlike Slavic POWs, French prisoners generally did not suffer from starvation, mass violence or 
epidemic disease outbreaks. While most French prisoners maintained, at least at a minimal level, 
their physical well-being through the first two years of captivity, as will be seen in the following 
chapter, the same cannot be said about their mental well-being.
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Chapter 5 - The French Prisoners’ State of Mind 
 
Historical descriptions of the French captivity focus primarily on the materialistic aspects 
of the prisoners’ lives in Germany, and understandably so, as this information can be presented 
in a fairly straight-forward manner. We know that the prisoners generally lived in small or 
moderate sized kommandos pread across Germany. We know they performed a wide variety of 
work, at first predominantly of an agricultural nature, later mostly in industrial ettings. We 
know that the men worked very long hours and the pay they received amounted to very little. We 
know that, while the men were not starved, the diet provided by the Germans would not have 
been sufficient to maintain their health had it not been supplemented by packages sent from 
home or the Red Cross. We know that their lives were restricted in many ways, most notably by 
their inability to return to, or even fully communicate with, their loved ones. These aspects of 
their captivity are somewhat quantifiable. They lend themselves to comparisons with “normal” 
life. 
Harder to get at are aspects of the prisoners’ state of mind. What matters preoccu i d the 
prisoners’ thoughts while they were in captivity? What was their opinion of the Vichy 
government? Did they support the national revolution? Did they support collaboration? What 
were their greatest collective hopes and fears? What was the state of their morale? We know that 
the Vichy leadership found these important questions as they conducted extensive surveillance 
on the prisoners to find answers to them. One way the government collected information on the 
prisoners’ state of mind was by reading their mail. Every fifteen days Vichy mail censors 
compiled a report drawn from the contents of seven to eleven thousand letters which either w nt 
to, or came from, the prison camps in Germany. In total about three percent of the prison rs’ 
mail was examined for these reports. This surveillance program, which may have been in 
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operation even before the armistice was signed, continued until the Vichy government was 
evacuated from France in 1944. The program’s reports are very helpful in allowing us to 
understand much of the prisoners’ collective mentality during their captivity. Even though the 
reports were produced by an agency with an obvious pro-Vichy bias, much of the information 
contained in them remains trustworthy. The reports were confidential and inteed to be seen 
only by a small group of government officials. They were marked as distributed to only seven 
recipients.1 As one of the core purposes of these reports was to determine the prisoners’ actual 
thoughts and opinions, misrepresentation in them would have been counterproductive. The 
conclusions reached in these reports also speak to the effort made by their authors to accurately 
reflect the prisoners’ opinions. Indeed, the reports must have been depressing reading for Vichy 
leaders. Throughout 1941 and 1942 these reports documented the abject failure of one 
government effort after another, and the growing disdain the prisoners had for everything 
associated with the Vichy state, save Marshal Pétain.  
Vichy POW mail surveillance reports came in two forms. The reports produced through 
1943 were long prose forms of forty to fifty pages length which contained a generalized 
summary of findings divided under standardized topic headings, such as the prisoners’ 
“employment of time,” or their thoughts on “Franco-German relations (Collaboration)”. The 
authors supported their generalized conclusions with specific quotes or examples drawn from the 
correspondence. A shorter form, normally of about ten pages, was produced monthly from 
December 1943 onward. These shorter reports drew on a larger number of letters. They 
documented how often specific topics were referenced in letters, and how often the rference 
was of a positive or negative nature. The shorter reports contained only a small numberof 
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specific quotations or examples, and so were mostly quantitative in nature. For example, in 
December 1943 only fourteen of over eighty-one thousand letters examined contained direct 
statements of opinion on Pierre Laval. Of these fourteen references, twelvecontained sentiments 
of distrust, and two expressed confidence.2 An almost complete run of these reports covering 
September 1941 through July 1944 are preserved in the French national archives, the earlier 
reports could not be located. 
The two core questions the POW surveillance program was attempting to answer were 
interrelated: 1) How were the prisoners being treated; and, 2) What was their state of morale. The 
men compiling these reports seem to have defined positive morale as having hope for a b tter 
future and confidence in the Vichy government. Bad morale was defined by the lack of hope 
and/or rejection of the Vichy government. Apparently, in the estimation of the officials 
producing these reports, “optimistic” prisoners, those who passively endured and had faith that 
somehow, through means beyond their control, things would work out well in the end, were 
considered to possess good morale. “Pessimistic” pr soners, those who had no faith in Vichy’s 
ability to take care of them, had poor morale. “Resistant” prisoners, men who attempted to take 
control over their own fate, were also considered to have bad morale. Frames of mind one might 
assume to be pro-French or hopeful, such as desiring an Axis defeat, happiness for Soviet r 
British victories, hatred for Germans and lack of enthusiasm for work, were seen by the Vichy 
officials producing these reports as either value-neutral or negative ways of thinking. By the 
above standards, attempted escape was perhaps the only way a prisoner might atte pt o pro-
actively control his own life which would not produce a negative judgment.  
After the Vichy government recognized that the general liberation of the prisone s was 
most likely an unobtainable goal as long as the war continued, their efforts to main ain support 
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among the prisoners focused on improving their living conditions in Germany, assuring them 
that the National Revolution’s reforms were helping France to quickly recover fr m the disaster 
and, finally, that the French people had not forgotten about their exiled countrymen. Even had 
the Vichy government been successful in all three of these areas, their hope to sustain the 
prisoners’ morale (or, more specifically, in keeping them hopeful and supportive of the 
government) was doomed to failure. A clear message contained in the surveillance reports was 
that the one thing the Vichy government could not provide to the prisoners, their liberation, was 
the only thing that really mattered to them. No improvements to their lives in captivity, and no 
reforms made to France in their absence, mattered to them a fraction as much as did t eir 
freedom to return home. A report from December, 1942 summed up the situation in plain 
language. The report found that month’s correspondence had been almost completely ber ft of 
political commentary and concluded, “the themes of the National Revolution leave the great 
majority [of the prisoners] indifferent.” The prisoners had no interest in events or developments 
except those which might relate to their liberation. In the words of one prisoner: “Aft  28 
months of captivity, we have come to accept that nothing is important unless it can be trded for 
our freedom.”3 
The prisoners’ morale, at least as defined by the standards described above, was not
always as grim as it was in late 1942. Judging by the reports from the last months of 1941, 
“optimism” may still have reigned as the majority mind-set eighteen months into captivity. The 
men frequently complained about their harsh working conditions, their long absence from home, 
their poor diets, etc., but hope for liberation remained widespread and this seems to have been 
enough to carry most from day to day. Even as late as January 1942 the overall morale of the 
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prisoners was described as “all in all, satisfactory.”4 Surveillance reports from late 
1941frequently alluded to the prisoners’ growing impatience and the difficulty they had in 
reconciling the concept of Franco-German rapprochement with their treatment; nevertheless, the 
authors maintained that most prisoners continued to see collaboration as a logical policy. To 
exemplify the prisoners’ growing disillusionment, a quote from a letter written by an inmate in 
Stalag I/B was included in a September 1941 surveillance report: “One more winter ill mean 
disaster for collaboration.”5 This prisoner had correctly sized up the situation. Over the next 
several months morale went into steep decline. By April the surveillance report’s estimation of 
the prisoners’ morale was almost entirely negative. 
It truly seems that in some camps the weariness and lassitude cannot get much worse. For 
example, a former chief of a kommando in Stalag VII/B was so discouraged of being able 
to rebuild the morale of the men under his charge that he asked to be relieved of his 
duties. ‘I thought I would be able to change the mentality in the camp a bit. Nothing can 
transform it even a little. I thought I could get them to understand the voice of common 
sense, but the result has just been more negativity. After two years of captivity, we are all 
bitter and nothing can awaken the young people.’ 
 
[A priest at Stalag III/D wrote]: “The great majority of us prisoners a e inert. We no 
longer react like we did at the beginning. Based on my impressions from talking with 
others it is the same in other kommandos. This inertia, this indifference, it is the lot of a 
great number of prisoners. In this morose life, we just settle in, we try to get by as best we 
can. We just go brain dead.”6 
 
 By July the report simply stated, “We believe that their spirit is broken. They no longer 
have the strength to be passionate for or against anyone, for or against any thing. . . . Never have 
we seen so few words of hope in the outbound mail.”7 
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 The length of their captivity and their transfer to industrial jobs undoubtedly contributed 
to the collapse of morale among the prisoners; however, probably the factor which carried the 
most weight was their loss of faith in the Vichy government’s ability to win their liberation 
through collaboration. 
 
 
The Prisoners’ View of Collaboration 
 Until the spring of 1942 the Vichy policy of Franco-German collaboration seems to have 
maintained a fair level of support among the prisoners in Germany. The Vichy leadership wanted 
the prisoners to fully embrace collaboration as the foundation of a new and hopeful future in 
which Germany and France would set aside past differences and work together in building a new 
Europe. To their frustration, this remained a distinctly minority point of view among the 
prisoners. What appears to have been a more common mindset, perhaps even the point of view of 
a majority of the prisoners until the winter of 1941/1942, was that collaboration was a 
humiliating and odious policy, but that it was probably also a necessary price that France would 
have to pay to buy their freedom. This point of view appears to have been even more widely 
shared by those in France writing letters to prisoners in Germany. A Septemb r 1941 
surveillance report stated, “Partisans of collaboration have never been more numerous than today 
among the correspondents to the prisoners of war [in Germany.]”8 
 The support collaboration received from the prisoners and their families was a soft 
support. Collaboration was not embraced as a desirable program on its own merits. Most who 
supported it only did so based on their belief that the policy would lead to the return of the 
prisoners. By the winter of 1941/42, the prisoners and their families increasingly came to 
recognize that collaboration was a one-sided agreement in Germany’s favor. Their perc ption 
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was that the Vichy government had made concession after concession; embraced a policy of 
Franco-German rapprochement with sincere good will, only to be stone-walled time and again by 
the stubborn victors. Their support for collaboration was tied to results, and collaboration ws 
not producing results. The growing frustration and declining patience of the prisoners and their 
families is found throughout the correspondence of late 1941 and early 1942. A man from Lyon 
very articulately described the conditional nature of his support for collaboration in a September 
1941 letter written to a prisoner: 
There is nothing to do but enter into collaboration in order to get the prisoners out of their
captivity. If collaboration is properly understood as the primordial condition for the 
prisoners’ liberation, it is equally obvious to the public at large that this liberation 
represents the logical and necessary outcome of the policy; a policy which I must say 
current public sentiment finds somewhat offensive. The Germans have shown that they 
fail to understand the state of public opinion in France by delaying the return of the 
prisoners, a return which has been so patiently awaited until now. They risk discouraging 
even the most sincere partisans of rapprochement.9 
 
A letter written to a prisoner by his wife shortly after she spent her second Christmas 
alone expressed this same frustration in more emotional terms: “Your painful existence tears up 
my heart. My poor captive. I want to come to you – why all these boundaries, all this barbed 
wire? Is collaboration not enough?”10 A prisoner’s wife from Villeurbanne showed more anger 
in her letter: “Nothing surprises me now, not after seeing you behind barbed wire for twenty 
months. And still they have found no solution for your return. This truly was not worth climbing 
into bed with collaboration.”11 
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Throughout 1942, support for collaboration declined among the families of the prisoners. 
The support that was described as “nearly unanimous” in September 1941 was characterized as 
“divided” by April 1942.12  
 The prisoners’ letters from this period indicate that the exiles in Germany became 
frustrated with collaboration more quickly than did their loved ones back in France. A letter 
written by a prisoner in Stalag XVII/A in January 1942 reflected their waning patience: 
Who is collaboration serving? After we received the newspapers today, I believe we ar  
very likely to be prisoners for life. I do not understand what our “hosts” mean by 
collaboration. I’ve been here eighteen months working for them. I don’t know what more 
they want. We’ve had enough of this sales pitch.13 
 
The breaking point in the prisoners’ faith in collaboration was reached sometime during 
the winter. Spring found the process of disillusionment complete. By April 1942, surveillanc  
left no doubt as to what the prisoners thought of collaboration: 
What the prisoners were expecting to come from rapprochement between the two 
peoples, we have known well enough, it was their liberation - a liberation which seemed 
so close last summer, and again during the early winter. The prisoners had no doubt that 
they were going to be allowed to return to their homes in great numbers. But now, with 
the bulk of them still in Germany, more than a million men have lost all hope of returning 
for a long time. Their disappointment is intense and arouses anger that many of the 
unfortunate men do not bother to conceal. . . Liberation, reconciliation, the reconstruction 
of Europe on the basis of mutual understanding and respect between the victors and the 
vanquished, a respect for each others rights and legitimate interests, this was the idea the 
prisoners clung to despite everything for so long. Today this dream is fading. . . All the 
letters reflect sentiments, often in very strong terms, which beyond any doubt are shared 
by the vast majority of the prisoners. In the words of one prisoner from Stalag IV/E: ‘We 
were to become friends with our jailors if we just collaborated. There was no question 
about it. Outside of a few cranks, 90% of the prisoners in Germany now oppose 
collaboration.’ This is the same percentage estimated by an inmate at Stalag XIII/A 
regarding the strength of his companion’s opinion on rapprochement, “Ninety percent of 
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my comrades cannot consider a power that has held us prisoner for so many years as a 
friend.’14 
 
 It is worth noting that the prisoners’ support for collaboration had collapsed by thefirs  
months of 1942, well before the announcement of Vichy’s most ambitious attempt to jump-start 
a Franco-German partnership, the Relève. The Relève allowed one prisoner of war to return to 
France for every three skilled French workers who volunteered to work in Germany. While the 
prisoners initially greeted the Relève program with some enthusiasm, nothing in the surveillance 
reports from the last six months of 1942 indicated a widespread renewal of support for 
collaboration as a whole.15 The prisoners gave collaboration a year and a half of qualified 
support. By early 1942 they had given up on the policy and, as the Vichy government would 
discover during the summer of 1942, more was needed than fresh promises and new schemes to 
win them back. By the time the Relève was announced most prisoners were already cynics when 
it came to promises from Vichy regarding their release and it seems most never expected the 
Relève to deliver on its promises and thus were not surprised when it failed to do so. 
 Just as the prisoners’ support for collaboration was conditional based on its ability to win 
their liberation, so was their support of the Vichy government as a whole. All that the prisoners 
truly cared about was their freedom, and the Vichy government had promoted collaboration as 
the method by which this freedom would be won. The prisoners had swallowed their pride, put 
aside their principles, and supported the program. Now, after a year and a half of humiliation 
they saw they were no closer to returning home then they had been when they first agreed to 
work alongside the Germans. Not surprisingly, the disappointment and shame they felt quickly 
transformed into anger. With increasing frequency prisoners attacked the Vichy government in 
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pointed terms. “Our current leaders are made to make us suffer,” wrote one prisoner in January 
1942. “Not one of them is worth the rope from which to hang them.”16 A prisoner in Stalag V/A 
vented this same combination of self-pity and anger in a July 1942 letter: 
If instead of having been made prisoners we had all been killed in June 1940, France 
would have moved on just the same, and our deaths wouldn’t have bothered these 
gentlemen, the current leaders of our country. In our opinion, these men care very little 
about us. . . The poor soldiers were betrayed by the corruption of 1939 and now we suffer 
in exile. But all of those responsible will pay when we return. Pay hard for our suffe ing, 
and it will be very expensive.17 
 
 Exacting revenge on men still in France who had taken advantage of the captivity for 
personal advancement was a common enough theme in the prisoners’ letters. One prisoner’s 
attack on Vichy’s blueprint for national renovation took on a personal tone when he wrote that 
the French back home shouldn’t expect the prisoners, once they finally did return home, to 
simply roll up their sleeves and join in the rebuilding out of a sense of patriotism. “Maybe we 
will have different ideals. Slowly, we will take our time to take our shots.”18 
 As they saw more promises go unfilled, and more hopes dashed, the prisoners developed 
a very cynical view of the Vichy government. Some prisoners came to believe that all alk of 
liberation was nonsense because, after all, Germany still clearly needed them as workers.19 A 
prisoner’s wife in Nice wrote to her husband that she found prisoners who still had faith in 
collaboration as “singularly naïve” for, “One would have to be naïve to continue to believe after 
all the promises that have been made to you for so long, and with not one of them realized.”20 A 
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surveillance report in November 1942 concluded that the majority of the prisoners in Germany 
believed that the government had given up trying to win their freedom and was now contentto 
do no more than assure them that it remained concerned about their situation. This same report 
pointed out the special dislike the prisoners had for Pierre Laval. “They do not spare him 
disparaging reflections. Some [prisoners] bitterly reproached the “deal” he made with Germany 
and think they were “sold out.” The criticism goes so far as to accuse the Chief of Government 
of having lied to the prisoners for his own political ends. Others simply think that Laval w s 
“played” by the Germans.21 
 Expressions of the prisoners’ anger were not limited to the government. Increasi gly, the 
captives lashed out at all French men and women who had avoided captivity. Many priso ers 
saw themselves as the patriots of France. They had been abandoned to a life in exile, a d France 
was being run by the cowards and shirkers who had not even tried to defend it in 1940. A 
prisoner in Stalag II/A wrote: “We are the sacrifices, the convicts. And our only crime was to 
stay at our posts.”22 One prisoner from Stalag X/C wrote in January 1942: “The mentality that 
we prisoners have here is not at all like it is described by some journalists. When we g t back, 
France will know how we really feel. For seventeen months we have rotted here. And still we 
can’t weep for joy [on returning home]. We’ve been jerked around for seventeen months. I am 
not under any illusions. But one day, we will come home, although I know many French prefer 
us to stay in captivity.”23 In November 1942 a surveillance report noted that “a certain number” 
of prisoners were taking a perverse joy in the deportation of French workers to Germany, and 
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that these prisoners hoped the government would use “coercive measures” to ensure privileg d 
members of society were finally forced to answer the call of “duty.”24 
 It is impossible to say with any statistical accuracy what the degree of support was among 
the prisoners for the Vichy government and collaboration in 1940 and 1941. What emerges from 
the surveillance reports is that, while the support the prisoners gave the government in 1940 and 
1941 may have been widespread, it was also shallow. As had been the case with the French 
population back home, the Vichy government had staked its legitimacy with the prisoners on the 
success of collaboration. When collaboration failed, the government had no plan B on which to 
fall back. Collaboration’s failure discredited the government. Disillusioned prisoners thought 
they had been misled into supporting a shameful policy, and an angry backlash against this 
perceived deception dominated their correspondence throughout 1942. The passive “optimistic” 
mentality of 1941 was replaced by an equally passive “pessimism” as the majority state of mind 
in 1942. 
 
Prisoners’ Response to Propaganda 
 One key theme of the Vichy government’s prisoner of war propaganda campaign was the 
claim that, in a spiritual sense, captivity would do the prisoners some good. The propaganda 
conveyed the message that the defeat in 1940 had been caused by the moral and spiritual 
weakness of France. The prisoners could use their time in captivity to reflect on their own, and 
their nation’s, shortcomings. Presumably these musings would lead the prisoners to support the 
National Revolution. In fact, throughout 1941 and 1942 Vichy propaganda claimed that the 
prisoners overwhelmingly supported the government and its reform program. In this discourse, 
the captivity represented both a punishment and an opportunity. It was the price the French had 
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to pay for their past weaknesses, and it also gave the prisoners an opportunity to spiritually 
purify themselves. After undergoing this purification the prisoners could return to France and 
serve as the shock troops of the National Revolution. Given how often Marshal Pétain returned 
to the theme of the captivity as both punishment and method of purification in his public 
statements, it was central to his personal vision for the path France should follow in its ques  for 
national renewal.25 
 Another key Vichy propaganda theme was to assure the French people that the 
government effectively protected the prisoners while they were in Germany. Unless properly 
balanced, these two themes in the government’s representation of the captivity might seen 
contradictory. On the one hand, the government had to convey the message that the prisoners’ 
life in Germany was austere - that their punishment was commensurate with heir past crimes. 
On the other hand, they also had to convince the people that the prisoners’ living conditions were 
not so harsh that they might be considered cruel or unreasonable. The government was largely 
successful in this balancing act, at least with its domestic audience in France. Most of the people 
in France writing to the prisoners seemed to believe that their life in Germany was simple and 
hard, but no more so than a defeated soldier should expect. The prisoners in Germany universally 
reacted with anger and exasperation to how they were portrayed in the French media. “W  look 
like idiots in our newspapers. Especially in that ignoble Paris-Soir!” wrote one prisone  in 
January 1942.26 In April 1942 surveillance reported that the prisoners found newspaper stories 
about their life in captivity so ridiculous that they had become the subject of bitter humor. Stories 
from newspapers published in occupied France which described the good living conditions the 
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prisoners enjoyed in Germany provoked in them “the greatest indignation.”27 The Vichy-
sponsored documentary about the captivity named “Prisoners” produced a “deplorable 
impression” across the camps in Germany. One inmate of Stalag XIII/A described the 
humiliation and rage this film produced among the exiles: 
I understand that a film called “Prisoners” is currently showing across France, and that at 
each showing it is warmly applauded by the audience. And why wouldn’t it be? People 
hurry to the zoo to see their favorite animals. And they take up a collection for the animal
trainer. Just because this film uses human material, the quality of the spectacle loses 
nothing. On the contrary, the show is all the better when the audience sees their advanced 
compatriots in the arena.28 
 
 Far from seeing their captivity as a time for spiritual purification, the prisoners saw it as a 
pointless hardship. In response to a newspaper story from La Gerbe entitled, “Prison Camp: A 
School of Spirituality,” an inmate of Stalag III/B wrote home: “Who are theykidding? Us or 
you? . . . I believe the Marshal is mistaken when he says that we will become great r and 
stronger through this trial. It is nice to want to see us as supermen. And without a doubt that is 
how he wants us to see ourselves. But, in truth, we are just men. Unhappy men.”29 By July 1942 
chaplains working among the prisoners found fewer men seeking solace in religion. The report 
continued: “[The chaplains] no longer expect that the captivity can make unhappy men better 
than they were. On the contrary, as one of them put it, ‘the captivity has become a disaster, a 
physical and moral disaster.’”30 
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Fear of Being Forgotten 
The greatest fear of the French prisoners of war was that they had been forgotten by their 
countrymen. This fear surfaced so often in the prisoners’ correspondence that the surveillance 
report authors described it as a “veritable obsession.”31 Separated from their loved ones for so 
long, limited to only a handful of letters and postcards each month, the prisoners felt helpless to 
manage their affairs and to hold together the lives they had built before the war. They worried 
about losing the affection of their wives, powerless to hold their families together during their 
long absence. They resented the “shirkers” back home who took over their jobs while they 
remained in Germany. Since most of the prisoners adopted the passive attitude of relying on 
outside intervention to secure their release, fears that their liberation was no longer a top priority 
in France caused feelings of hopeless abandonment. France was moving forward, their families 
were moving forward, their jobs were getting done, and all the time they were trapped thousands 
of miles away. Perhaps reflecting their own sense of helplessness, the prison rs frequently 
expressed concerns about being scorned by the French population back home alongside their 
fears of being forgotten. Many prisoners felt that, not only were they useless to their families as 
long as they remained in captivity, but that they were actually a burden. This confluence of 
anger, fear, self-pity and self-loathing produced an almost hysterical tone in many letters. 
The prisoners’ fear of being forgotten was not entirely groundless. By 1942 the 
government had changed its focus from efforts to win the prisoners’ global release to one of 
negotiating releases for specific groups. Letters from family members in France and former 
prisoners who had been repatriated often confirmed the fears of the exiles. One example of these 
sentiments came from a letter sent to a prisoner in July 1942: “The prisoners intere t only those 
of us who have a loved one over there. As far as what other French people think about the whole 
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matter, well, it is better to not talk about them! It is sickening that there can be so much 
selfishness. If it were up to them it would be a long time before you would return among us.”32 A 
letter describing the government officials working on the prisoners’ behalf written by a 
repatriated prisoner to his companions left behind in Germany provided no hope: “[The 
bureaucrats] are the ones who spent the war sitting in a chair. They have no idea what it is like to 
spend so many months far from their loved ones.”33 This letter was not an isolated instance of 
negative reports coming back to the prisoners from their repatriated comrades. In January 1942, 
the surveillance reports noted that many repatriates described their welcome back in France as 
“cold.” One repatriate wrote to a friend still in Germany that most French people “had absolutely 
no comprehension” of the “suffering of the prisoners,” and that he was “scandalized to s e that 
already the same old selfish attitudes had returned” to their homeland. Another repatriat  
described his poor treatment by civil servants - “Nothing has changed. The indiff rence for the 
prisoners is total.”34 Another prisoner received a letter warning him not to expect too much from 
the population at large when he did finally return. “Don’t expect anyone to thank you for the two 
years you spent behind barbed wire for them.”35 A letter from a prisoner in Stalag V/B gives an 
indication of how widespread this mentality had become by early 1942: “I believe that France 
has forgotten us. It is a general belief among all the prisoners here.”36 
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Conclusion - Cafard 
If one word were used to describe the mentality of the French prisoners of war in 1942, 
“cafard” would be a good choice. Translated literally into English cafard means cockroach. To 
the French, cafard was the despondency, the overwhelming sense of hopelessness and 
depression which infected the minds of soldiers who had stopped thinking about the future. In 
modern American terminology, cafard might be referred to as combat stress reaction, or post 
traumatic stress disorder, or perhaps in a non-military setting, as clinical depression. Virtually 
every surveillance report on the state of the prisoners’ morale in 1942 remarked on th  spreading 
epidemic of cafard. A prisoner from Stalag II/E described his cafard in July, 1942: “We watch 
with horror as the days, months, the years, carry away our desires, hopes, our youth, in a raging 
torrent. Yet nothing can be done except to keep on waiting.” An inmate of Stalag IV/C tried to 
prepare his wife for what she would see when he finally returned to her: “We have to resign 
ourselves to lowering our heads like we are animals. You will see when I return what this type of 
life does to a man.”37 As winter arrived in 1942, and the men faced the knowledge that they 
would be spending a third Christmas separated from their families, the surveillance report 
described the majority state of mind as “lassitude, disgust and indifference.”38 
As long as hope remained for their liberation, most of the men fought off cafard. When 
that hope left their minds cafard made a home in the vacuum. During the second half of their 
captivity the prisoners turned to hatred of the Germans, hope for an Allied victory and, in 
growing numbers, to forms of resistance open to them, to give their days some sense of purpose. 
Christmas 1942 was probably the nadir of the captivity, at least from a psychologial 
perspective.
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Chapter Six - The Relève and the STO. 
 
 From 1940 until 1942 the Vichy government attempted to foster a collaborative 
relationship with Nazi Germany. The Vichy leadership and their defenders claimed this 
policy was a reluctant but realistic response to the national disaster of defeat and 
occupation. France had no means to resist German exploitation and repression. The 
Vichy government claimed that by acting as a middleman between the Nazi Reich and 
the French people they could both satisfy German demands and shield the French people 
from the more brutal form of direct occupation suffered by many other conquered 
nations. Having French institutions carry out German dictates would benefit the occupiers 
as it would be more economical than direct administration and presumably would 
produce less resistance. Collaboration would be beneficial to the French people becaus
the state could negotiate with the occupiers to moderate their demands and encourage 
predictable and restrained behavior. As long as the Vichy government could convince the 
Germans that French institutions existed that could maintain stability in France and 
reliably meet German economic and material demands the French could retain a large 
degree of autonomy. Both the French and Germans would profit from this arrangement.  
 The Vichy leadership’s claim to have been the “shield” of the French people 
during the occupation was the basis of their post-war defense. As the Allies liberated 
France Pétain was forced to accompany the Axis forces into Germany. Before leaving 
French soil he declared: 
For more than four years, resolved to remain in your midst, I tried every day to 
serve the permanent interests of France. Loyally, but without compromise, I had 
only one goal: to protect you from the worst … If I could not be your sword, I 
tried to be your shield. Sometimes my words or acts must have surprised you. 
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Know that they hurt me more than you yourselves realized. But … I held off from 
you some certain dangers; there were others, alas, which I could not spare you.1 
 
 During his 1945 treason trial Pétain echoed this defense. “I used my power as a 
shield to protect the French people … Every day, a dagger at my throat, I struggled 
against the enemy’s demands.”2  
 Pétain’s shield and sword analogy describes a form of collaboration that shares
little similarity to Vichy’s actual interactions with the Germans. In practice Pétain and his 
associates did not make the welfare of the French people their first priority; they valued 
retention of power and the enactment of their ideological programs more than what they 
saw as the temporary discomfort of the French people. Consequently the French 
population benefited little from Vichy-Nazi negotiations.  
Even if one accepts Pétain’s claim to have attempted to shield France from 
excessive German demands, he and the Vichy regime proved remarkably inept in th  
effort. While France was not subjected to the same level of systematic violence fou d in 
the East, it was the most economically exploited nation.3 France was compelled to pay to 
Germany monthly occupation costs that consumed 49% of the government’s total budget 
over the course of the war.4 The monthly “occupation” bill overstated the actual German 
military expenditures by a factor of approximately five, leaving a huge srplus that 
Germany used, along with money extracted through other financial mechanisms, to 
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harness the French economy to the war effort.5 By 1943 roughly half of France’s 
productive capacity was used for German purposes. At the same time more than half of 
all employed French citizens worked in service of German economic purposes.6 By the 
autumn of 1943 many German economic planners, among them Albert Speer, believed 
that the degree of exploitation in France had reached such a level that it was not 
sustainable long term and that any increase risked collapsing the entire French economy.7 
German exploitation of France was not held in check by the Vichy shield, it was held in 
check by German fears that they might kill their “golden goose.” Such was the dearth of 
agricultural goods in France during the occupation that many, if not most, French citizens 
suffered from malnutrition despite the purchase of food being their single larest 
expense.8 Simply in terms of caloric intake, the French ate less than did every other 
occupied nation in Western Europe.9 Even if one measures the average French person’s 
diet based on official ration allotments, and few ever managed to locate and purchase all 
the goods to which they were theoretically entitled, the average daily caloric intake of 
adults dropped from over 3,100 to under 1,500 between 1938 and 1943.10  Citizens of 
nations under direct German occupation that lacked collaborationist “shields,” such as 
Belgium and the Netherlands, found the years 1940 through 1944 more bearable than did 
the French. While collaboration may have benefited the Germans, and perhaps, at least 
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initially, the Vichy government, it almost certainly caused the average French citizen 
more harm than good. In his landmark study of France during the occupation historian 
Philippe Burrin concludes that after Hitler rebuffed the Vichy leadership’s ambitious 
proposals for a more equal partnership between France and Germany in the “new 
European order,” the Vichy State became little more than “a shield for the Germans on 
French soil, and above all a shield for its leaders.”11 
 The story of one specific program intimately related to the prisoners of war in 
Germany, the Relève, provides an excellent case study of how the Vichy government’s 
focus on its own power and political goals defined the policy of collaboration more truly 
than did any effort to shield the French people. 
 
The Structure of the Relève 
 By mid-1942 the main commodity France held that Germany needed was 
manpower-specifically, skilled manpower. With so many of its young men enlist d in the 
armed forces, Germany was starved for industrial workers. At this same time much of 
French industry had been shut down and the nation’s industrial workforce was 
experiencing a high rate of unemployment. German requisitioning of French workers was 
a foregone conclusion. Germany had already forcibly conscripted workers throughout 
Europe and undoubtedly would do the same in France. When Fritz Sauckel, the German 
commissioner-general for labor allocation, presented a demand for 350,000 French 
workers to Prime Minister Laval in May of 1942, labor deportation was already a settled 
issue. All that remained for Vichy to negotiate were the details. Laval did negotiate two 
concessions. First, the Germans agreed to reduce the requisition to 250,000 workers. The 
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second concession was a politically ingenious plan developed by Laval called the Relèv . 
Under this plan the Germans agreed to free one French prisoner of war for every thre  
French skilled workers who came to Germany. Laval argued that by linking the labor 
program to the return of the prisoners of war, and by appealing to the French workers’ 
patriotic and material desires, enough bodies could be found on a voluntary basis to fill 
German demands. Ultimately, neither of these concessions benefited the French people. 
 Laval had not really been able to limit the German appetite for French laborers. 
The initial German demand for 250,000 French workers had been simply their opening 
offer. Every six months Sauckel returned with a new demand for hundreds of thousands 
of additional workers. Under the terms of the Relève, convincing workers to voluntarily 
work in the nation that was occupying their homeland become a Vichy responsibility. 
The Relève saved the Germans the trouble of recruiting, or simply rounding up, the 
desired workers.  
 The second part of the Relève, the three-to-one exchange of workers for prisoners, 
worked equally in Germany’s favor. Under terms of the agreement, the Germans were 
given the freedom to identify 80% of those prisoners who would be allowed to return to 
France.12  By and large, the Germans returned prisoners who were sickly, crippled or 
nonproductive. In captivity, these prisoners represented a drain on the German economy. 
The Relève transferred this burden to an already desperately poor France. Prisoners who 
openly supported fascist organizations constituted a second identifiable group of 
prisoners picked for release by the Germans. These men desired to return to France to 
                                                
12 Archives Nationales (hereafter AN) F9 2191, Folder “Relève, Divers 1941-1944.”  Correspondence 
between Corporation Nationale de la Press Français (Zone Occupée) and SDPG Minister Scapini, 9 Avril 
and 30 Avril 1943, and correspondence between Directeur du Musée National d’Histoire Naturelle and 
Minister Scapini, 21 Mai 1943. 
 195
help bring about a fascist revolution. Many scorned the Vichy government and hoped, 
with German backing, to replace it with a more ideologically pure state.13 From the 
German perspective, these men were valuable in that they represented a political
alternative which could be used to threaten the Vichy leadership. While the threat seemed 
real to many in the Vichy leadership it was one the Germans never seriously c n idered 
employing. The Germans understood that the fascist groups had no organic political 
power in France, as they lacked a significant domestic following. It was much easier for 
the Germans to continue working through the Vichy government, provided it remained 
compliant, than to deal with the inevitable rise in resistance that would accompany the 
imposition of a more openly pro-German fascist government.14  The fascist groups were 
little more than negotiating pawns in the larger German game of maximizing exploitation 
while minimizing investment. 
 It quickly became clear to both the French people and the Vichy leadership that 
little if any benefit would come from the Relève exchange agreement. Vichy had to bear 
the administrative costs and public scorn of providing Germany with laborers, and in 
return the French were receiving dependents and agitators whom the Germans were all to 
happy to return to France. Despite the one-sidedness of the agreement, the Vichy 
leadership continued to support it, as they believed it provided the regime with a raison 
d’être from the German perspective. The Vichy leadership understood that Germany 
would allow them to continue to exercise power in France only as long as they remained 
useful. To Germany, a French-run labor procurement program such as the Relève was 
preferable to committing their own resources to round up workers. 
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Selling the Relève to the French People 
 The administration of the Relève demonstrates not only the general ineptitude of 
Vichy administration but also its penchant for deception. The French government 
engaged in a highly deceptive propaganda campaign in an effort to recruit the promised 
workers for Germany. At the same time, Vichy proved either incapable or unwilling to 
ensure that the French laborers it encouraged to leave for Germany would receive proper 
treatment once inside the Reich. Instead it attempted to conceal the true living and 
working conditions in Germany so as not to depress recruitment. 
 The Relève was not the first labor recruitment agreement the Vichy government 
had entered into with Nazi Germany. Prior to the summer of 1942, the Vichy government 
had cooperated with German efforts to recruit French volunteers for work in Germany. In 
exchange for allowing the Germans to recruit workers with its blessing in both the 
occupied and unoccupied zones, Vichy had been allowed to monitor the workers while 
they were in Germany.15 The Germans had found this directly administered program 
unsatisfactory. It had not produced enough volunteers to satisfy demands, and the 
workers who had volunteered tended to be unskilled. It was this program that the Relèv
was intended to supplement.16 The surveillance information Vichy acquired while 
working with the Germans in this initial labor recruitment plan gave them a good 
understanding of the distressing living and working conditions of their citizens in 
Germany. 
An April 1942 French report entitled “On the situation of French workers in 
Germany” detailed the difficult life of the workers; however, the report focused as much 
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attention on Germany’s dissatisfaction with the quality of workers they recruited in 
France as on their miserable living conditions. Of the 157,000 workers who had crossed 
into Germany by that time, only 13,000 were considered by the Germans to be 
“qualified.” The French report describes their citizens working in Germany: 
 …the rest are not great, in particular the women. Among them you find a 
lot of wives of prisoners who come to work in Germany in hope of seeing their 
husbands. Some arrive and try to escape. A lot of women are without defined 
occupations, attracted by the advertising, and arrive there with the firm intention 
of working as little as possible and earning a living as a prostitute. Among wmen 
lacking specialized skills, the majority receives starvation wages and their basic 
needs push them into prostitution as well.17 
 
 What makes this document significant is that it is a French report focused 
primarily on the level of German satisfaction with its foreign workforce rather than on the 
welfare of those workers. The report details many ways in which French citizens were 
being mistreated and misled by their German employers. One cause of unhappiness 
among French workers was that they were shunned by German society. Germans had 
come to consider French laborers as “cheaters, pimps, prostitutes, etc.” due to the large 
number of undesirable recruits who arrived in the early wave.18  As the above excerpt 
makes clear, the French government was aware that many French female workers in 
Germany had already been reduced to poverty and prostitution. Despite this knowledge, 
the government continued to encourage workers to volunteer for work in Germany, 
ensuring them that they would find high-paying jobs and comfortable living conditions 
there. 
 The Relève was announced to the population with great fanfare in June of 1942. 
The people were told that by volunteering for work in Germany they would enjoy more 
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income and a better standard of living, all the while doing their patriotic duty by 
liberating long-suffering prisoners of war who had already fulfilled their wartime 
obligations. The government news agency produced newsreels promoting the Relève that 
were shown in theaters in both the occupied and Vichy zones.19 Lack of information and 
misinformation combined and caused much confusion among the French people 
regarding the specific terms of the Relève. Many workers, perhaps most, did not 
understand that the one-year contract they signed could be unilaterally renewed by th ir
German employers. The wages they were promised were reduced by up to 70% through 
German and Vichy payroll deductions.  Upon arrival in Germany many workers were 
reclassified by their employers and paid a lower rate. French workers in Germany were 
denied legal rights. They were not permitted to resign or travel without permission. They 
often lived in communal settings that afforded little privacy. Their shelter and food were 
often insufficient and their work week was either 60 or 64 hours.20 
 Perhaps the biggest misunderstanding of the Relève program regarded the actual 
prisoner exchange. Some workers believed that they could specify which prisoner they 
were replacing. Many relatives of prisoners volunteered for the Relève in th mistaken 
belief that they were selflessly exchanging a year of labor in Germany for the freedom of 
a specific loved one. One way this false belief was spread was through an unsigned and 
undated article that appeared in numerous newspapers throughout Western France titled 
“The Relief of the Prisoners-Finally on the Agenda.” This article informed readers that 
those workers who volunteered “can request the liberation of designated prisoners by 
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writing directly to Minister Scapini.”21 Some workers where given official and stamped 
work contracts from German-staffed recruitment offices that included a notation 
identifying the specific prisoner they were volunteering to free.22 When these workers 
learned later that the person they believed they had freed remained in captivity, their 
complaints were directed not to the Germans but to the Vichy government, which was 
supposedly administering the program. This pattern of deception was addressed in a July 
1942 memo written by Scapini’s deputy in Paris, Jean Desbons, to the German embassy 
in Paris.  Desbons encouraged the German ambassador to instruct his recruiters to halt 
this practice-not because it was false, but rather because when more French people found 
out about the deception it would become harder to find enough volunteers to fill the 
quotas.23 While it is unclear where the newspaper article which spread the false hope that 
workers might free specific prisoners had originated, there are many exampl s of 
materials produced by the Vichy government that contain clearly deceptive descriptions 
of conditions in Germany. The government also instructed regional officials to void 
disclosing the full terms of the agreement to the French people.24 
 For the 20% of prisoners of war it could select for release, the Vichy government 
decided early that it would give priority to those prisoners who were heads of households 
having at least three children. Only after all these prisoners were free would it then begin 
to look into other cases. Apparently this policy was largely followed; however, rumors of 
official corruption abounded. The symbol of this corruption were the rumored trains full 
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of young men from privileged families and germanophile prisoners coming home instead 
of those seen as more deserving.  
Gustave Folcher, an agricultural worker from southwest France, wrote of how the 
Relève played out among the prisoners as a public relations disaster for the Vichy regime. 
The program was initially welcomed by the prisoners with enthusiasm; however, when 
they learned the rough details of the exchange agreement and then witnessed the manner 
in which it was administered, their excitement turned to cynicism. Folcher relates how 
sick and “deserving” prisoners were not among the lucky few picked to return to France. 
Rather, celebrities and “sons of privilege” were the first to be released: 
One can add to this list film stars and actors, some friends of important doctors 
who manage to get their sons returned home as healthcare workers while real 
nurses wait behind barbed wire. Those were practically the only winners from the 
Relève. Who would it have helped had they returned fathers or ordinary peasants? 
France may be dying from hunger but it seems to have more need of leisure men 
filling movie theaters.25 
 Folcher’s disgust at the corruption behind the selection process by which 
prisoners were freed was widely shared. Vichy postal censor reports drawn from the 
correspondence prisoners sent home revealed that many of the imprisoned believe 
“position” determined who was selected for repatriation. Prisoners who “had more 
possibilities to work the system” were more likely to win their release. “It is not useless, 
according to some correspondents, to display some political sense, above all to talk in 
favor of collaboration.”26 By May of 1943 many prisoners held the “deep view” that the 
entire project was deceptive-a “bluff” or a “brain washing” by the Vichy governm nt.27 
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Political motivations behind Vichy support of the Relève 
 The story of Vichy’s role in the deportation of French workers cannot be reduced 
simply to the inevitable bowing of the weak to the demands of the strong. The story is 
more complex than the Vichy leadership’s claims that they were making the best of a bad 
situation. At least in the case of Prime Minister Laval, designated by the government to 
be the chief negotiator with the Germans in this matter, Vichy’s participation had a strong 
component of complicity. Beyond offering a rationale for continued French sovereignty, 
the Relève bought the Vichy leadership political capital with the Germans. 
 Laval’s conception of the war and France’s role in it were plainly stated in a letter 
he wrote to German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in May 1942. In it Laval described the 
German-Soviet conflict as a “gigantic struggle” against bolshevism, a struggle within 
which he knew France was ready and willing to play a supporting role. 
For this greatest battle in history, Germany has mobilized the youngest and most 
active elements of her population and is therefore short of manpower. I am aware 
of these needs and am prepared to place my support at your disposal. I therefore 
desire that Frenchmen will, in as large number as possible, take the place in your 
factories of those who go to the eastern front. The Frenchman is attached to his 
native soil, but I know he would be prepared to leave it for a purpose whose 
national and historical importance has been made clear to him.28 
 
 Laval did not hold his political cards close to his chest when announcing the 
Relève to the French people on 22 June 1942. He informed the public that they could 
“not remain passive and indifferent in the face of the huge sacrifices Germany is making 
to construct a Europe in which we must assume our place.” To the French workers 
volunteering for labor, he said “It is for the freedom of the prisoners that you will go to 
                                                
28 As quoted in Goeffrey Warner, Pierre Laval and the eclipse of France (New York: Macmillan Company, 
1968), 299. 
 202
work in Germany! It is for our country that you will go in large numbers! It is in order 
that France may find her place in the new Europe that you will respond to my appeal!” 29 
The French State had not constructed a labor deportation agreement primarily focused on 
minimizing exploitation of French citizens. Rather, Laval understood that labor 
deportation was unavoidable and worked within this reality to further one of the key 
political goals of the Vichy leadership: French collaboration with Germany in the 
construction of a new multi-polar authoritarian Europe that would exterminate the 
Marxist virus. With this shared ideological mission, it is little wonder that Nazi Germany 
found minimal resistance in principle from the Vichy government to its ever-increasing 
human-trafficking demands. Vichy resistance to German demands addresse the cale 
and timing of deportation, and who would administer the program, not the basic 
questions of morality. 
 Laval was not unique in preferring a German to an Allied victory. Evidence that 
ideological sentiments similar to Laval’s found wide acceptance within the Vichy 
government is found in the public and private statements of the two other most prominent 
figures in the government, Marshal Henri-Philippe Pétain and Admiral Jean-François 
Darlan.  
As early as 1936 Pétain made know his preference for a French alliance with Nazi 
Germany over a continued alliance with Britain. In a conversation with the Italian 
ambassador in Paris during the diplomatic crisis caused by the Italian invasion of 
Ethiopia, Pétain praised Mussolini and referred to Britain as France’s “mo t implacable 
enemy.”  Pétain described Germany as a “hereditary” enemy of France, but said that if he 
had to choose between a French alliance with Britain or Germany, he would prefer 
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Germany.30 Nothing that had happened between 1936 and 1942 seemed to cause Pétain to 
change this preference. In a public interview with the periodical Europaïsche Revue in 
October 1942, just weeks prior to the German occupation of southern France, Pétain 
restated his position. He told the interviewer that he hoped Germany would restorefull 
sovereignty to France so the country could act as Europe’s western barrier. He said that 
“for his own part,” he would gladly go to war with the British should they attempt to land 
in France.31 
In the broadcast during which he announced the Relève, Laval told the French 
people, “I desire the victory of Germany, for without it, bolshevism would tomorrow 
install itself everywhere.” At the time this statement shocked many French citizens, and 
in 1945 it was introduced as damning evidence during Laval’s treason trial. It did not 
have the same effect on Admiral Darlan. In addition to retaining the naval ministry post 
he had held since 1937, Jean-François Darlan held the ministries of foreign affairs and 
information in the Vichy government from February 1941 until April 1942.  In February 
1941 Pétain identified Darlan as his dauphin, his heir apparent. After the Relève speech 
Darlan wrote Laval a congratulatory note describing it as “moving and courageous.”32 
This sentiment was consistent with positions Darlan took in negotiations with the 
Germans. In these talks he advocated a final peace settlement between the two nations to 
allow Germany a free hand in the east and allow France to focus on defending her 
colonial interests from British and American encroachment.33 In November 1941 Darlan 
successfully demanded the removal of General Maxime Weygand from command of the 
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French Army in North Africa due to his reluctance to aid the German military effort 
against the British. In a letter to Pétain Darlan plainly stated his decision to remove 
Weygand was motivated by his desire to “draw France closer to her conqueror . . . I have
chosen the path of integrating France into the European bloc.”34 During his 1945 trial 
Laval attempted to minimize his individual responsibility for the content of his Relève 
speech by claiming it had been approved by Marshal Pétain prior to broadcast. Pétain did 
agree that he had vetted the speech but claimed he had instructed Laval to not include he 
passage referring to German victory. With regard to the specific topic of the Relève, 
apparently Pétain did not object to passages encouraging French workers to volun eer for 
labor in Germany based on political and patriotic reasons, only to those passages that 
directly stated that the goal to which these workers would contribute would be German 
victory. If we accept Pétain’s claim to have approved the contents of Laval’s speech 
minus the direct reference to German victory, then we can conclude that he offered his 
full public support to a program that would contribute to German victory but believed it 
inadvisable to publicly admit that such a victory was in fact the desired outcome.  
 Laval’s speech and the reactions to it demonstrate that all segments of the Vichy 
support base – the social revolutionaries (Pétain), authoritarians (Laval), technocrats 
(Darlan) and the fascists – were in agreement on the concept of bartering French workers 
to the Germans in exchange for political currency. That these workers would play a
supporting role in an ideological conflict embraced by the Vichy leadership made the 
transaction that much more appealing. The Vichy government was not attempting to 
protect French workers; they were attempting to convince them that working in support 
of the German war effort was good for France because it liberated prisoners, a d good for 
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humanity because it supported the Nazi effort to eradicate communism. The intention of 
the Vichy program was not to minimize the number of French workers sent to Germany, 
it was the opposite. 
 
The Relève and the urban-rural divide in wartime France 
 Many supporters of the National Revolution initially welcomed the Relève on 
ideological grounds. They saw it as a program that would help purify French society. 
Much of the rhetoric of the National Revolution focused on old values believed by its 
adherents to be found in la françe profonde, - the “deep France” of small rural towns and 
traditional ways of life. Supporters of the National Revolution correlated the decadence 
of the modern state with the urban and cosmopolitan, while believing the “true” France 
was preserved in the values and lifestyle of the simple, self-reliant peasant.35 The 
segment of the French population the Germans were most interested in, urban industrial 
workers, was the same group that the French State saw as the most socially undesirable, 
the group most prone to disloyalty and selfish demands, perhaps a group already lost to 
the temptations of modernity. Urban workers were seen as vulnerable to communism, 
short on patriotism and lacking respect for the traditional pillars upon which Vichy hoped 
to rebuild French society. Shipping off large numbers of urban workers in exchange for 
aged veterans and rural family men was seen as a positive transaction by ma y adherents 
of the National Revolution. Pétain told Pastor Marc Boegner, the representativ  of the 
Protestant community in Vichy’s Conseil national, that “one of the good effects of the 
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workers’ departure [to Germany] will be to weaken communism, which is ‘all the rage’
in France.”36 
 Rural resentment against urban workers was a theme that found common 
expression in the initial wave of Relève propaganda. The same July 1942 newspaper 
article which incorrectly claimed that Relève volunteers could designate a sp cific 
prisoner for release asserted that the program would remedy the problem of the “same 
people” always having “to pay the debt of the entire nation.” The Relève would allow 
workers (i.e. urban wage laborers, not agricultural workers) to “generously give of their 
freedom” to aid the “agriculturalist prisoners.” “Finally the French will retrieve their 
sense of community,” through these sacrifices of industrial workers.37 
 The Vichy government legitimized the town vs. country interpretation of the 
Relève in their own propaganda. Léon Marchal, Vichy France’s counselor in 
Washington, D.C. until he broke with the regime in early 1942, described much of the 
Relève promotion as advancing an image of a martyr farmer in German captivity who 
could only be saved if selfish city dwellers finally assumed their fair share of the national 
burden.38 Marchal saw this as an ill-conceived effort by the Vichy government to divide 
the French population and thereby bolster its support base among one of its core 
constituencies, rural farmers, at the expense of the country’s urban citizens. 
 The Relève as a social balancing tool favoring the rural over the urban was an 
idea that did not only exist in the offices of Vichy officials. Throughout France this same 
social interpretation was expressed in terms linking it to age-old town vs. country 
debates. The 1939 military draft hit rural areas harder due to exemptions extended to 
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industrial workers needed for military production. Much of the French people thus 
assumed the prisoner of war population in Germany was consequently disproportionately 
made up of peasants. Although this belief was widely held, at least by 1943 it apparently 
was not accurate. A census of the prisoners in German in that year found that 31% of 
them came from the agricultural sector, while within France itself 36% of the population 
fell into that category. Thus, in reality, peasants were likely an under-represented group 
among the captives in Germany.39 Nevertheless rural resentment growing from the 
popular perception resulted in the Relève’s receiving a somewhat different rec p ion at 
first in the countryside than it did in urban areas. Some saw the Relève as an opportunity 
to finally make urban workers shoulder their fair share of the national burden. The Relève 
would draw mainly from the urban work force, sending “city shirkers” to Germany while 
allowing “more responsible” rural farmers to return home and contribute to relieving a 
growing food crisis. This understanding of the situation did not last past 1942, however, 
as it did not correspond with reality. The most common beneficiaries of the Relève were 
the sickly and unproductive, not agricultural workers; and the food shortage in France 
was not the result of the large number of rural prisoners of war but rather of German 
requisitions. The Relève did not bring home the expected wave of rural workers, and life 
in the French countryside did not improve after the program was implemented.  
 If the Vichy government hoped the Relève would solidify its rural support base,
they badly miscalculated the political landscape. Officials living in rural areas informed 
the leaders in Vichy that the program was not received any better in these regions than it 
was across the country. “Vichy officials expected any opposition to the Relève to be 
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urban based. But the tenor of prefectoral reports suggests that the antagonism they had 
encountered to the Relève constituted a surprisingly widespread rebuke for the 
government in both town and country, a final collapse in the credibility of the already 
unpopular Laval, and a worrying decline in the public estimation of Pétain.”40 British and 
resistance propaganda labeled the Relève “slave trading,” and this characterization stuck. 
The prefect of Marseille informed the Vichy government two months into their pro-
Relève propaganda campaign that it was based on a “total misreading of French 
psychology.”41 
 
From the Relève to the S.T.O. 
 Despite Vichy’s promotion of the Relève, recruitment was slow, and it soon 
became clear that additional measures would need to be taken to meet German demands. 
Laval’s acknowledgment that Vichy could not satisfy those demands through v luntary 
enlistment did not necessarily mean that he was also willing to concede that direct 
German involvement was needed. What Vichy could not convince the French people to 
do willingly Laval still hoped to convince the Germans it could accomplish through force. 
Rejection of the Relève demonstrated the French people’s rejection of Vichy’s 
ideological values, but Laval still hoped to retain as much direct Vichy sovereignty over 
the French citizenry and territory as possible within the German-dominated “New 
European Order.”  
In September 1942 Vichy required all French males between 18 and 50 years of 
age and all unmarried females from 21 to 35 to register with the government to carry ut 
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work deemed “useful in the superior interest of the nation.” No mention was made at the 
time that this work might take place in Germany.42 This list was used in February 1943 to 
conscript males born between 1920 and 1922 for compulsory work in Germany. By 
March the government had deported enough of its citizens to fill the second demand for 
250,000 workers. Fritz Sauckel quickly demanded a further 270,000 workers to be 
delivered by June, followed by another 500,000 before the end of the year. In this final 
group women were to be included for the first time.43 Resistance grew with each wave of 
deportation. Laval attempted to make Sauckel understand that his demands were 
unreasonable. During a meeting on 6 August 1943 Sauckel told Laval he would not make 
any concessions. Sauckel left with Laval’s assurance that the Vichy state would help in 
conscripting the half-million workers in the second half of 1943, but Sauckel had lost 
faith in Laval’s ability to deliver on his promises.44 Sauckel reported to Berlin that he no 
longer believed Laval to be useful.45 
Vichy made enormous efforts to sell the Relève. The government widely 
publicized the return of prisoners freed due to the program. Newspapers were obligated to 
publish stories and photographs of returning prisoners. In one well-documented incident, 
a photograph of a train car full of returning prisoners was retouched. Pro-Vichy messages 
were added to the side of the car to make it appear that the prisoners themselves had 
painted them to thank the government for their liberation.46 Vichy also produced a series 
of short newsreels and promotional films on work in Germany in 1942 and 1943, and a 
full-length documentary titled “French Workers” in 1944. This film showed the high 
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living standards of workers in Germany and that the French workers and prisoners had 
formed a “fraternal community” with German workers as they worked side by side to 
“save civilization.”47 The government distributed over a million promotional pamphlets 
and posters extolling the high wages, good working conditions and sense of purpose 
experienced by French workers in Germany.48 Pétain, Laval and many other Vichy 
leaders made personal appeals to the French people in support of the program. 
Despite the intense promotion of the program and the fanfare associated with each 
return of liberated prisoners, recruitment remained meager. Over five months into the 
initial six-month drive, only 17,000 skilled workers had come forward.49 In August the 
Vichy government consented to localized forcible conscription of skilled workers in the 
occupied zone, provided these roundups were kept quiet.50 When the willing could not be 
found, workers were forced to “volunteer” for the Relève and were escorted to departur  
sites under armed guard. These roundups happened anywhere from at work sites to movie 
houses. Buildings were surrounded and everyone inside conscripted. Not surprisingly, the 
French population resisted these roundups whenever possible. On 6 January 1943 a large 
crowd stormed the train station in Montluçon, overwhelmed the guards and freed the 
workers who were to be deported that day.51 
The French people had not responded to the Relève as the Vichy leadership had 
hoped, and the government struggled to meet even the initial German demand of 250,000 
workers. When the second demand arrived in January 1943 for a further 250,000 
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workers, the government knew it could not be met through Relève recruitment. On 16 
February 1943, nine months after its introduction, the Relève was abandoned as failed 
experiment and replaced with an openly acknowledged program of compulsory labor 
named the Service du Travail Obligatoire (S.T.O.). Like the Relève, the S.T.O. was a 
French-administered program. By the time the French government implemented the 
S.T.O., “it was widely believed in France that labor conditions for foreigners in Germany 
were abysmal and that the chances of returning alive from such service were slim.”52 
Ultimately the main legacy of the Relève and the S.T.O. was an acceleration of the 
erosion of domestic support for the Vichy government. 
Implementation of the S.T.O. ended any possibility of credence for Vichy claims 
to be acting as the shield of the French people. The S.T.O. transformed the indiffere ce 
or tolerance most French citizens had for the regime in 1942 to outright hostility in 
1943.53 The number of French workers departing for Germany declined sharply in the 
months after the initial S.T.O. draft. This decline was not caused by the lackluster Vichy 
commitment to the deportation programs; rather it was due to the unprecedented level of 
civilian resistance. During the first three months of 1943, the period when the S.T.O. 
came into effect, 250,000 French workers departed for Germany. This level of departur s 
was never again reached. During the next four months (April through July 1943) Vichy 
was only able to deliver 141,000 additional workers. Deportations continued for eleven 
more months (until April 1944) but only an additional 50,000 French workers could be 
compelled to report for work in Germany.54 Vichy proved unable to enforce its S.T.O. 
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draft, and German lacked the manpower to implement their own deportation program 
before the Liberation of 1944. 
Fugitives from S.T.O. drafts swelled the ranks of the militant resistance groups 
throughout the last two years of the occupation. Initially S.T.O. fugitives were wary of 
trusting rural communities, many of them believing what the Vichy governmnt wanted 
to be true, that the countryside remained solidly in support of the regime. The winter of 
1942-43 had been the final breaking point between the Vichy regime and what support it 
still had among the French population. The combination of the labor conscriptions, the 
worsening economic conditions within France, the deportation of Jews and other minority 
groups and, finally, the direct German occupation of southern France, all within a few 
months’ time, drove all but the most committed followers away from Vichy and toward 
passive or active resistance.55 S.T.O. fugitives found a temporary accepting home in the 
same rural French communities Vichy had once expected would form the regime’s 
political support base. 
Anti-fascists and resisters from Eastern Europe, from Spain, from Alsace, from 
Lille, and Paris, as well as from the southern conurbations, were hidden almost as 
readily as those from the immediate vicinity. In early 1943 the most that many 
peasant farmers demanded from those on the run was a readiness to work.56 
 
 The labor conscription campaigns transformed the political environment of rural 
France in early 1943 into a region hostile to Vichy administration. The government had 
attempted to promote the Relève to the rural population as a method of shifting the 
burden of defeat more onto the shoulders of urban workers. Paradoxically, when urban 
French workers attempted to evade labor conscription, they found refugee in the maquis 
groups of the countryside. Vichy had expected la françe profonde to be the center of their 
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support base. Instead, that area became the incubator of the militant resistanc movement. 
The introduction of forced conscription sent large numbers of young men and women 
into the ranks of the resistance, transforming a small but committed force, mostly
concentrated in cities, into a mass national movement that would take much of France 
effectively out of governmental control during the following year. 
 
The Prisoners of War Respond to the Relève 
The utter failure of the Relève is further amplified when it is examined from the 
perspective of those it was supposedly intended to benefit - the prisoners of war. Instead 
of being welcomed as selfless saviors, as Vichy propaganda assured them they would be, 
the Relève volunteers were greeted with open scorn. 
 French prisoner of war Paul Fraisse describes in his memoir how the arriving 
workers were seen as lackeys of the Germans.  They were resented because it w s 
believed they were taking up many of the easier jobs, thus pushing the prisoners into 
more demanding work. Fraisse explains that the prisoners were confused as to what had 
motivated these workers to volunteer for work in Germany. This situation was made even 
more contentious when a rumor spread among the prisoners that the workers were 
supplied with brothels.57 
 Vichy could have predicted the poor reception the workers received from the 
prisoners. Postal censor reports from as early as September 1941, nine months before the 
Relève was implemented, document that those prisoners who worked side by side with 
“free compatriots” were “understandably jealous of them. [The prisoners of war] do not 
hide their resentment against them and some are surprised that the French government 
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has allowed such an injustice.”58 This attitude was confirmed the following month in a 
second report, which compiled pointed comments about the workers taken from various 
letters sent home by prisoners. 
“This is the worst insult possible!” exclaims one. 
“ It is shameful to see this.” 
“They are ashamed of us.” 
“They are not the cream.”59 
 
 These postal censor reports provided clear evidence that the prisoners almost 
universally continued to hold the workers in low regard well into 1943. An April 1943 
report summed up the majority opinion: 
Recently taken government measures, such as the S.T.O., are considered [by the 
prisoners] as “acceptance of demands made by the occupiers” and, as such, are 
judged with severity. The prisoners are especially outraged when these measures 
are presented to the public as efforts to improve [the prisoners’] lot, when in fact 
they are only intended to benefit “the victor.” 
The S.T.O. is the object of much hostility from prisoners who watch the arrival of 
young people “with emotion.” A few letters express the idea that [the S.T.O.] will 
“be good for a lot of them”; on the other hand, most correspondents make no 
secret how much this “deportation” saddens them and deplore the “useless 
sacrifice” of this “new exodus.”60 
 
 Despite the fact that most of the workers had not come to Germany of their own 
free will, the prisoners of war seemed slow to grasp this, or slow to accept it. Perhaps this 
was due to Vichy propaganda which portrayed the program as voluntary. However, even 
if the prisoners believed the workers had come to Germany voluntarily, one might still 
expect warm relations to have existed between the two groups. After all, one of the 
reasons French workers were supposedly volunteering for work in Germany was to allow 
the prisoners to return home. Rather than see the workers as selflessly volunteering a y ar 
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or more of their lives to speed their liberation, the prisoners instead saw them as traitor  
and collaborators. In a July 1942 letter one prisoner described how he and many of his 
comrades saw the workers: “Those who are here are the garbage of our country.”61 
While the postal censors report a growing sense of shared suffering between the 
prisoners and the workers through 1943, relations between the two groups remained 
stressed. A May 1943 report summarized the situation succinctly: “Certain priso ers . . . 
have little sympathy for the French civilians who work in Germany. Clashes between 
them are frequent.”62 This hostility went both ways, with many of the workers returning 
the prisoners’ scorn. 
The rapport between French workers and prisoners is still tense. “There is a pit” 
dug by the differences between their material conditions and certain differences of 
opinion. The mentality of the newcomers is “increasingly” negative towards the 
prisoners because they believe that they were brought to Germany “because of 
them.”  Also the behavior of the workers, especially that of the women, many of 
whom display easy morals, raises general indignation among the prisoners.63 
 
 The prisoners found especially hurtful remarks made by workers that indicated to 
them that the French population back home had little idea what their living conditions in 
Germany were like. An April 1943 censor report held that an opinion commonly 
expressed by French workers was that the captivity “would do the prisoners some go d.” 
The prisoners found this point of view offensive and feared that it was common back in 
France. Prisoners more sympathetically viewed those workers who complained that they 
had been brought to Germany by force.64 
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 As time passed the hostility between the prisoners and the workers decreased. The 
prisoners came to see the workers as fellow “unfortunate victims” of a single lar e 
“organized deportation.”65 In the final year of captivity a fraternity born of shared misery 
overcame the divisions that had separated the workers and prisoners. An October 1943 
report concluded, “relations are improving between the French workers in Germany and 
the prisoners of war. The latter, forgetting their past grievances, now more often see their 
compatriots as ‘companions in misery.’”66 That phrase, “companions in misery,” is 
particularly poignant when one recognizes its inclusion in a governmental censor rport 
at the same time when Vichy was encouraging French men and women in print, speech 
and film to volunteer by stressing the high wages and comfortable working conditions in 
Germany. By June 1944 Vichy mail censors recorded that relations between prisoners 
and workers had become the least commonly brought-up topic of the forty they tracked. 
Only five of 47,554 letters sent by prisoners to France included an opinionated statement 
regarding the workers, four of which were negative.67 
 If the Vichy leadership hoped the Relève would, at minimum, buy the regime 
increased support among the prisoners, they were disappointed even in this regard. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Relève and S.T.O. stand out as powerful examples of what values and goals 
the Vichy government prioritized and what means they were willing to use to achieve 
their ends. The Relève was sold to the French population as a patriotic program that 
would bring volunteers financial rewards while also helping free loved compatriots held 
in foreign captivity. In reality the British and resistance propaganda describ d it more 
                                                
65 AN F9 2907. Synthèse des renseignement, Avril, 1943, 12. 
66 AN F9 2907. Synthèse des renseignement, October, 1943, 12. 
67 AN F9 2907. Rapport statistique Mensuel, Juin 1944, Stalags, 5. 
 217
accurately. The Vichy regime played a willing role in a modern version of the slav  trade. 
In return for aiding in the forcible deportation of hundreds of thousands of its citizens, th  
regime hoped to prove its value to Nazi Germany and thus maintain sovereignty over the 
French people. In the end they failed in all regards. Their return instead was the di credit 
of their ideals and the scorn of their people.
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Chapter 7: The Experience of Captivity 1943-1945 
 
 During the second half of the captivity the prisoners in Germany demonstrated 
almost no support for the Vichy government. They either ignored government programs 
and propaganda, or regarded them with open cynicism. The men saw the government not 
as an institution capable of addressing their concerns. Rather, they saw it delivering 
nothing more than shameful concessions and empty promises. Despite their lack of faith 
in the government, the morale of the men actually improved during 1943 and remained 
relatively high throughout the last years of the war. The POWs’ ability to maintain 
relatively good morale is even more surprising given that their living and working 
conditions gradually declined during these years. This chapter argues that the m in 
reason the prisoners were able to maintain their spirits is that they had an inside view of 
the collapse of the Third Reich and came to believe that a German defeat was near at 
hand as early as the spring of 1943. As Hitler’s empire crumbled, the prisoners’ lives 
became less comfortable and less predictable, but they accepted the growing chaos 
around them with a stoic optimism. Throughout the war the prisoners had been fixated on 
their return, and they regarded the disintegration occurring all around them as a sign of 
the approaching end. 
   
The Prisoners’ State of Mind from 1943 forward 
 An examination of the rising and falling morale of the French prisoners during 
their captivity produced a surprising result. One might expect the morale of th prisoners 
to wear down over time - to slowly decline with each passing month. This was not the 
case. The mail surveillance reports show that the men’s morale did indeed follow a 
pattern of decline from the time they were brought into Germany until the end of 1942; 
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however, during the spring of 1943, morale rather suddenly improved. This improvement 
was not an isolated spike. Morale remained at a fairly high level from early 1943 onward. 
The reason for the slow decline in morale up to 1942, and the reversal of this trend in 
early 1943, becomes clear when extraneous factors are stripped away from the tpic. 
Throughout the war the prisoners’ morale was almost exclusively tied to their hopes of 
liberation. The Vichy government kept abreast of the prisoners’ morale through mail and 
on-site surveillance reports. These reports did not simply track the prisoners’ mind et, 
they also tracked their views on several topics which the Vichy leadership apparently 
expected would significantly shape the POWs’ morale. The specific opinions tracked in 
these reports revealed those areas on which the Vichy leadership believed the prison rs 
would be evaluating the regime’s performance. The reports kept abreast of the men’s 
opinions on collaboration and the reforms being introduced in France as well as the 
prisoners’ recognition of the relatively mild conditions of their captivity. Themen’s 
views on the government’s efforts to care for their loved ones back in France were also 
recorded. It was not until 1944 that the Vichy surveillance officials acknowledged that for 
years they had been making their task of tracking the men’s morale and understanding 
what factors contributed to rises and declines by taking into consideration all the bove 
topics. They came to understand that the prisoners’ morale was almost entirely tied to one 
subject- their hopes for liberation. Nothing the government did in France, or for the 
prisoners, mattered to them a fraction as much as did their freedom. Rises and declines in 
the men’s morale could almost entirely be explained by rises and declines in how close 
they believed their liberation to be. 
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 The morale of the POWs hit its nadir during the winter of 1942/1943.1 In the 
spring the men began to shake off their cafard and regain a more hopeful mentality. This 
rise in morale was not tied to any improvement in their treatment; indeed, throughout the 
next sixteen months the POWs’ standard of living declined gradually before diving
sharply starting in May of 1944. Morale had improved during 1943 because of the 
prisoners’ growing conviction that the war was finally nearing its conclusion. Better still, 
the prisoners believed that Germany was now losing the war. That the French prisoners 
overwhelmingly embraced a belief in German defeat at such an early date is surpri ing as 
the war would continue for over two more years. Historian Ulrich Herbert, who relied 
largely on German security reports which spoke to the opinions of foreign workers and 
prisoners inside Germany during the war, wrote that he believed few foreigne s expected 
the Axis to be defeated until well into 1944.2 The archival documentation of French POW 
correspondence on this topic clearly contradicts Herbert’s conclusion- the French 
captives expected the war to end with an Allied victory from early 1943 onward. 
 With hindsight, historians recognize that the winter of 1942/1943 was the turning 
point of World War II. The French prisoners inside the Reich, who were able to remain 
roughly informed about the progress of the war through their interactions with German 
civilians, were heartened first by the Anglo-American landings in North Africa in 
November 1942, and then later by the German defeat at Stalingrad. During their first year 
of captivity the prisoners clung to the belief that since the war between France and 
Germany had ended their liberation was near at hand. As this delusion faded, new hope 
                                                
1 See Chapter six. 
2 Ulrich Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers; Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany Under the Third Reich, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 351. It is worth noting that Herbert appears to have 
formed this impression through his examination of archival German security documentation rather than 
through an examination of documentation approaching the topic from the captives’ points of view. 
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arose in 1941 that, through concessions and collaboration, the Vichy government could 
negotiate their release. By late 1942 the prisoners had lost faith in the Vichy government 
and saw collaboration as a one way street only benefiting the Germans. The sense of 
hopelessness which accompanied this recognition resulted in the cafardepidemic 
described in chapter five. With hopes of liberation through German goodwill and 
collaboration all but dead, the prisoners came to accept that their captivity would last 
until the end of the war. German defeats in North Africa and the Soviet Union made this 
eventuality suddenly seem much closer than it had just a few months earlier. Historian 
Yves Durand noted that the standard Anglophobic and anti-communist propaganda 
served to the prisoners following these German defeats could not obscure or minimize 
their implications. The twin defeats were “widely hailed as one of the first signs that 
Germany was weakening. . . everyone knew it marked the turning point of the war.”3 The 
German government announced the surrender of the Sixth Army in Stalingrad on 3 
February 1943 followed by three days of national mourning. Working alongside the 
Germans, the prisoners were well aware of the wave of doubt which swept through the 
nation following this announcement. Prior to this defeat most Germans appear to have 
believed that victory was inevitable and probably achievable without great sacrifices on 
the part of the common people. The prisoners noted a new mood of anxiety and 
resignation arose after the announcement. Faltering German self-confidence aside, the 
prisoners’ embrace of the expectation that Germany would be defeated still came 
surprisingly early. Prior to the spring of 1943 Germany had suffered no significant 
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defeats, and even after Stalingrad and the Allied African invasion Axis armies still 
occupied almost all of Europe west of Moscow and much of North Africa.4 
 Rising morale among the French prisoners was first noted in a Vichy prisoner of 
war mail surveillance report in February, 1943. The report described the prisoners’ 
mindset: “Optimism remains the dominant state of spirit . . .  They expect things to wrap 
up quickly now. (italics added)” The report noted the prisoners simply did not discuss 
political events and ideas which the Vichy government expected to be of importance to 
them. “The only opinion which seems to be openly held by a majority of the prisoners of 
war is open satisfaction for the troubles which the Germans face. . . . Many letters convey 
that the general state of the captives is confidence and optimism and barely concealed 
hope that an Axis defeat is near.”5 These same findings were repeated in the next monthly 
report: “Morale is rising within most of the camps. The majority of the captives hink that 
‘the end approaches’ and this perspective raises all their spirits.”6 
From this point forward the prisoners’ state of morale and their expectation that 
the war would soon end become essentially a single topic. Morale rose and fell based 
upon the latest news from the battlefronts, with optimism riding out these fluctuations to 
remain the dominant mentality of the prisoners from early 1943 forward. The September, 
1943 surveillance report concluded: “Morale is good, or very good, in most camps. 
Optimism dominates. The volunteer medical workers, ‘best placed to judge,’ declare that 
the men are showing the most beautiful energy.”7 
                                                
4 For more on the significant drop in morale across Germany during the spring of 1943 see Ian Kershaw, 
The Hitler Myth, Image and Reality in the Third Reich, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 189-99. 
5 AN F9 2907. Rapport Statistique Mensuel du mois de Février, 1943, 10-12. 
6 AN F9 2907. Rapport Statistique Mensuel du mois de Mars, 1943, 10. 
7 AN F9 2907. Rapport Statistique Mensuel du mois de Septembr , 1943, 10. 
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Morale did suffer widespread but temporary dips during the last two winters of 
captivity. Spirits dropped notably in December 1943 when the men realized they would 
be spending a fourth Christmas separated from their homes. The surveillance report that 
month described their disposition as similar to previous winters, but unlike those earlier 
reports the prisoners were depicted as only disappointed, not in despair: 
The final defeat of Germany is not in doubt, but they find that the war drags 
forward slowly. The slowing down of operations in Italy has caused 
disillusionment and provokes impatience. Morale is down, but optimism has not 
disappeared, and most men have postponed their hopes of liberation until the 
spring of 1944. The prospect of passing another winter behind the barbed wire has 
caused discouragement and many prisoners of war are tired, embittered and 
bewildered.8 
 
This dip in morale was relatively short lived. By January the overall state of th  
prisoners’ morale was once more described as “fairly good.”9 In July, 1944 the report’s 
authors acknowledged the obvious trend. “On the whole, the prisoners of war have good 
or bad morale based only on their belief, or lack of belief, that their liberation is near.”10 
There appears to have been another dip in morale during the winter of 1944/1945; 
however, as surveillance reports were no longer compiled after August, 1944, we are 
forced to use anecdotal evidence to construct an understanding of the prisoners’ overall 
state of mind during the final eight months of captivity.11 A temporary drop in morale at 
this point in the war would not be surprising. The men’s spirits tended to drop during the 
holiday season each year. Also, by late 1944 the prisoners’ living conditions had greatly 
deteriorated. As discussed later in this chapter, they were receiving less food from official 
sources than they had at any previous point in their captivity. Finally, the prisoners’ 
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hopes to be back home by Christmas 1944 had recently been dashed when the Allied and 
Soviet offenses stalled near the German borders in October and November of 1944.  
The Vichy government’s recognition in 1944 that the prisoners’ morale had 
ultimately been tied almost exclusively to their liberation all along was also a recognition 
of the futility of their own efforts to retain these men’s support over the last four years. 
After recognizing late in 1940 that they would most likely not be able to negotiate a 
general liberation of the prisoners, the Vichy leadership attempted to maintain the men’s 
hopes, and by extension their loyalty, by arranging for selective liberations nd 
improvements in their living and working conditions.12 The leadership attempted to 
maintain the prisoners’ support by assuring them that the government was taking care of
their families, preparing France for their return and leading the nation towards a more 
hopeful future. In 1944 the surveillance report authors acknowledged that the prisoners 
either did not put much value in these efforts, or that they simply did not believe that the 
government was actually doing the things it claimed. From the prisoners’ perspective, 
Vichy had proven itself capable of providing shameful collaboration, corrupt 
administration and undelivered promises, but not the one thing that really mattered to 
them: their freedom. The prisoners had given Vichy more than two years to negotiate 
their liberation, they had accepted collaboration as a price to be paid for their freedom, 
and still they felt no closer to returning home than they had two years earlier. Their hopes 
from here forward would be placed in Allied victory, not in the actions of their own 
government.  
The POWs nearly universal acceptance of German defeat occurred before such an 
outcome appeared likely given the military situation. If their expectation of aAllied 
                                                
12 See Chapter three. 
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victory was not based on a rational evaluation of the current war situation, then what was 
the foundation of this belief? Perhaps the prisoners’ rapid acceptance of an Axis defeat 
can be explained on psychological rather than rational grounds. The men needed to 
believe that someone was effectively working for their liberation. The Vichy government 
had effectively forfeited this position during 1941 and 1942. As they could no longer 
harbor expectations that Vichy would win their freedom, the prisoners had to find some 
new depository for their hopes. Their disillusionment with Vichy’s schemes created a 
void inside them, a void which was filled by faith in Allied victory. Even though, on an 
objective level, Allied victory must have seemed far from a certain outcome in th spring 
of 1943, the men readily invested their hopes in this result because they had nothing to 
lose. Most of the prisoners faced a stark choice in 1943- either to place their hopes in 
Allied victory or surrender themselves to cafard. Seen in this light, the almost immediate 
and universal embrace in early 1943 of faith in an Allied victory says more about how 
little faith the French prisoners retained for the Vichy regime and its discredited promises 
than on their objective evaluation of the military situation. In the spring of 1943 the men 
showed themselves more willing to place their hopes in the long-shot chance of Allied 
victory rather than in their own government’s continuing schemes.  
This transfer of the prisoners’ focus away from Vichy diplomatic efforts n their 
behalf and towards Allied military efforts was the concluding chapter in the story of the 
regime’s attempt to build and maintain support among the captives. From the spring of 
1943 forward these efforts were a lost cause. Increasingly Vichy competed with the 
Anglo-American and their “Free French” allies for the loyalty of the French people. 
Vichy’s hostility towards the Western Allies, most dramatically exemplified by its 
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ordering of French soldiers in North Africa to oppose the British and American landings, 
virtually forced the prisoners to choose between the two alternatives. The Vicy 
government’s hostility towards the Western Allies made it possible for a person to 
reconcile his or her support for the Allied war against Germany along with loyalty to 
Pétain’s regime only through the most complex of mental gymnastics. Vichy’s failures, 
coupled with the Allied victories over their German jailors, inevitably shifted th  French 
prisoners’ support away from Vichy and toward the Allies. Hope had become the sole 
province of resistance. 
 
The “Transformation”  
The topic of the “Transformation,” the Vichy and German attempt to convince 
prisoners to voluntarily transform themselves from military captives into civilian 
workers, provides an example of how the prisoners’ growing sense of optimism led to 
more defiance on their part. The prisoners’ negative response to this program also 
demonstrated the low amount of confidence they retained for the Vichy government.   
In January 1943 Pierre Laval proposed “transforming” 250,000 French prisoners 
of war in Germany into “free laborers” in exchange for a reduction in the number of 
French civilian workers which France would need to send to Germany to fulfill Sauckel’s 
latest labor demands. “Transformed” prisoners were promised higher pay and more 
freedom in exchange for voluntarily giving up their military status and remaining n 
Germany as civilian workers.13 
                                                
13 For more on the Transformation see Yves Durand, La Captivité: Histoire des prisonniers de guerre 
français 1939-1945. 2e ed. (Paris: Fédération Nationale des Combattants Prisonniers de Guerre et 
Combattants d’Algérie, Tunisie, Maroc, 1981), 331-34, 458-61. 
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The transformation scheme was an attractive idea to both the French and German 
governments. From the French perspective, each prisoner of war transformed would 
theoretically mean one less French civilian worker who would have to be sent to 
Germany. This view of the transformation as a zero sum exchange would have been 
accurate only if Germany’s appetite for French workers was finite. This, of course, was 
not the case. In reality, all the transformation scheme was likely to produce was a 
temporary slowing down of the pace of civilian labor deportations. Even though 
transforming French prisoners of war into civilian workers would produce no more 
foreign workers in Germany, the scheme remained attractive to the Nazi government 
from an administrative standpoint. “Free workers” required no military guards. The firms 
employing foreigners were required to provide their own security. Thus, the 
transformation of 250,000 French prisoners would free up tens of thousands of German 
military personnel for other duties.14 Civilian workers were also not covered by the 
Geneva Conventions, thus re-categorizing the French prisoners would allow the Germans 
to finally put to rest any lingering questions regarding their compliance with international 
standards in their treatment. The transformed prisoners would also no longer receive Red 
Cross inspections, eliminating still more administrative hassles.  
French prisoners who were transformed into “free workers” were treated 
essentially the same as S.T.O. or Relève workers. The transformed prisoners stopped 
wearing their uniforms, moved from their kommandos into the foreign worker living 
quarters, and received the same pay as foreign civilian volunteers. At least on paper, 
foreign volunteers were paid more than prisoners, so transformation appeared to have 
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financial advantages. Transformation also appeared to have many social advantages s 
well. “Free workers” often had more ability to do such things as shop, attend movies, go 
for walks, and attend church services, during non-working hours than did prisoners. 
Prisoners were also told that if they volunteered they would be granted a fifteen-day 
leave. This leave would allow them to return to France and enjoy perhaps a week with 
their families before returning to Germany to finish out their work contracts. Given these 
enticements, both the German and Vichy governments expected the 250,000 
transformation slots would be claimed by volunteers quickly. Once those slots were filled 
the process could then be repeated. By progressively transforming most of the prison rs 
into free workers, the problems caused by the international legal standards regulating 
their treatment would largely fade away as their numbers diminished through this method 
of voluntary demobilization. 
The overwhelmingly negative response of the French prisoners to the 
transformation caught both the German and Vichy authorities by surprise. Vichy reports 
from April 1943 estimated that only 12 to 15 percent of the prisoners would volunteer to 
be transformed.15 As there were roughly a million eligible French prisoners in Germany, 
this rate of voluntary transformation would need to be doubled if all the 250,000 slots 
were to be filled. The estimations proved to be accurate. When recruitment lagged the 
Germans began to apply coercive pressure, including threatening those who refused to 
accept transformation with reassignment to mining jobs. When this coercion also proved 
ineffective, many full kommandos were simply transformed as groups against the 
prisoners’ will. Even with these measures the goal of 250,000 transformations was never 
                                                
15 AN F9 2191. Folder : Relève, divers 1941-44. “Opinion des prisonniers de guerre sur la transformation de 
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reached. By June 1944, after a year and a half, only 221,443 French prisoners had been 
transformed into free workers.16 From the German perspective, apparently the benefits of 
transformation did not outweigh the perceived consequences of continuing to violate 
international law by transforming larger numbers of prisoners against their will. 
As details of the transformation scheme became better known to the families of 
prisoners back in France, most developed unfavorable opinions. The families feared that 
transformation might delay the eventual liberation of their prisoners, cause them to be 
reassigned to more dangerous worksites, or make them ineligible for colis shipments.17 
By February 1944 families were counseling prisoners against transformation by a five to 
one margin in their correspondence.18 The rejection of the scheme by the prisoners’ 
families is particularly noteworthy given that the program would theoretically enable 
prisoners to return home for a visit after a three year absence and enable them to send 
more money back to their families from Germany. 
Vichy surveillance personnel attributed the prisoners’ rejection of the 
transformation to two causes. The primary reason was that the concept of giving up their
military status in exchange for money and benefits offended the prisoners’ personal 
dignity. The second reason was that the prisoners simply did not believe they would 
receive the promised benefits. 
After over two years of undelivered promises and deception, the prisoners greeted 
the transformation scheme with cynicism. Comments drawn from prisoners’ letters l ft 
little doubt as to how little trust remained for the Vichy government: “It’s nothing but a 
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scam.” “It is the latest tall tale” to keep us “amused in 1943.” “I won’t fall for this sales 
pitch. I am not ripe for the trick.”19 The most attractive benefit of transformation was the 
furlough. The prisoners’ skepticism regarding this benefit proved to be warranted. The 
prisoners were suspicious of this promise immediately due to the transformation contracts 
not specifying exactly when a furlough could be taken. A lucky few hundred prisoners 
received permission to return to France almost immediately after signing their work 
contracts. When up to two-thirds of these first groups failed to return to their worksites in 
August 1943 the German government gave employers the power to void the furlough 
section of contracts if either the workers’ labor was needed or if there was fear that they 
might not return to Germany at the end of their vacation. Since these conditions applied
to virtually every French worker in Germany, the Nazi government effectively reneged 
on the furlough clause in the vast majority of all transformation contracts.20 
Even stronger than the French prisoners’ skepticism that they would ever receive 
the promised benefits was their widespread conviction that the entire scheme was beneath
their dignity. “Are we prisoners of war or slaves passed from hand to hand?” wrote one 
captive in April, 1943.21 Another described why he and his companions refused to be 
transformed, “Soldiers first. We have been soldiers for the last two years, and we will
remain so until the end.”22 Another explained why he had turned down the offer, “I prefer 
to remain a prisoner so I can hold my head high later.”23 
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French prisoner Gustave Folcher’s account of the transformation brings out the 
surreal qualities of the scheme well. Folcher wrote that after being captured in battle and 
watched over by armed guards for 40 months, he found it hard to believe that suddenly 
the prisoners were being asked to sign contracts to voluntarily work and live alongside 
their jailers as if the past three years had not happened. One day Folcher and his 
companions were gathered together and brought in front of a group of German officersto 
sign their work contracts. The officers informed the men of the advantages of the 
transformation and of the great favor Germany was according them, and reminded them 
that they must prove themselves worthy of this favor through their work after signing 
their contracts. The men were then called forward to sign. Only five of the twenty-five 
stepped forward. “The [German] officers can’t get over it. They seem to be saying, 
What? You are refusing the freedom that’s on offer, we’ve never seen anything like it!” 
Folcher and the other men who had refused to sign were then led back to their barracks 
by an armed sentry who told them how bitterly they would come to regret refusing this 
favor.24 
Surveillance reports record that those French prisoners who did agree to be 
transformed were “relentlessly criticized” by their fellow captives for becoming “servants 
of the enemy.” Some transformed prisoners became victims of “regrettable incid nts” at 
the hands of their fellow captives.25 Criticism often came from loved ones back home as 
well. Upon learning that her husband was considering signing a transformation contract 
an officer’s wife strongly advised him against doing so, for honorable as well as practical 
reasons: 
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You cause me pain, because I thought you were a French man first. Do not accept 
being turned into a free laborer. I would never accept that from you. You are an 
officer, you fought valiantly and now you are going to work for them! No, no and 
no! Do you hear me! Refuse your place and remain in camp as a French soldier – 
proud of his title and his honor. A free worker is debased. Stay a prisoner, it is 
honorable. Don’t you know that if you give up your military status as a prisoner 
of war I will not receive support payments? Will that make you happy?26 
 
 By the time the transformation was introduced, most French prisoners expected 
that they were in their last year of captivity. Hardships are endurable if there is hope that 
they only need be suffered for a relatively short period of time. The material benefits and 
the prospect of returning home to see their loved ones would have been much more 
tempting for the prisoners if they saw no prospect of liberation in the near future. That the 
prisoners’ sense that the war would soon be over had fortified their resolve was 
demonstrated by their rejection of this scheme. 
 
Deteriorating Conditions in Germany 
 Throughout the last half of the captivity the living conditions of the French 
prisoners in Germany declined. At first the erosion was steady. As the food stocks in 
Germany diminished and imports from decimated occupied areas declined, the prison rs’ 
diet suffered. Allied bombing and material shortages reduced the prisoners’ housing. The 
permanent camps were not maintained. Not much thought was given to long-term upkeep 
when buildings were constructed in stalags, oflags and kommandos. During the war many 
become dilapidated and infested.27 Work demands on the prisoners steadily increased as 
Germany demanded more productivity from fewer and fewer workers. The prisoners 
were increasingly directly employed by the German military performing tasks which 
were forbidden by international law such as constructing anti-tank defenses, digging 
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trenches and disposing of corpses.28 The gradual rate of decline appears to have sharply 
increased in the spring of 1944. Shortly before this time the Germans stopped liberating 
sick and injured prisoners. No French prisoners were returned after the Allied landings in 
June 1944. What this meant is that during the time period when the French prisoners were 
at high risk of contracting disease due to poor diet, housing and sanitation, their 
opportunity to return to France to regain their health closed. 
 Ultimately the prisoners’ declining living conditions were tied to the declining 
fortunes of Germany in the war. With too few resources to meet their own military and 
civilian needs, the care of POWs was simply a low priority for the German government. 
 One specific way this reduction in resources can be measured is the rapid decline 
in the prisoners’ mail and colis service from May 1944 forward. Prisoner Henri Laloux 
remembered that starting in the fall of 1944, “The colis from our families became rare 
and meager (sadly, for good cause) and they were often pilfered (and not only by the 
Germans!)” From this point forward Laloux and his companions had to carefully 
conserve what little supplemental food they obtained from the Red Cross and the black 
market until the end of the war.29 The Vichy mail surveillance program had tracked the 
functioning of this service throughout the war. Prior to May 1944 the number of 
complaints about slow mail service and/or pilfered colis remained small, occurring in less 
than one percent of all correspondence. This trend dramatically changed in May 1944 
when the number of complaints increased over ten-fold, and remained high through the 
final three months covered by the reports. In May 1944 complaints from prisoners’ 
families regarding slow mail service from Germany also became an issue for the first 
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time in the war.30 As this breakdown in the prisoners’ mail service began months prior to 
D-Day, it is unlikely that it was caused by the chaos brought to the French infrastructure 
by Operation Pointblank, the intensified bombing campaign which preceded the cross-
channel invasion. A probable cause for the breakdown was the German shifting of rail-
stock away from non-essential tasks, such as POW mail, towards meeting the desperate 
needs of the crumbling situation in the East.31 In 1944 German usage accounted for 57% 
of an already drastically reduced French freight rail service.32 There simply was not 
enough rail traffic in France to meet the nation’s basic needs while also meeting th  
demands placed on it by the Germans. 
 The reduction in mail service was not simply an inconvenience for the French 
prisoners. By 1944 they were more dependent than ever on the food supplements 
received from the Red Cross and family colis. After the cross-channel invasion all family 
and Vichy colis shipments from France were halted. This source of nourishment was not 
replaced until early 1945 when the German government agreed to allow the new French 
government and other nations, notably the United States, to send humanitarian aid 
packages to the prisoners.33 With food supplement packages arriving inconsistently, if at 
all, the prisoners were forced to find other means of supplementing their insufficient 
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rations. Lucky prisoners could barter on the black market. The less fortunate had to steal 
or forage to obtain enough to eat. They took opportunities to pocket extra food while at 
work or on their way to or from the worksite. Agricultural prisoners or those who had 
access to open areas could often find some additional food by spending their free time 
looking for edible plants or rooting through refuse. The breakdown of the mail service 
forced the prisoners to either resort to means such as the above to add to their diet, 
engage in risky criminal activity, such as theft or black marketeering, or go hungry.  
 Based on how often the prisoners brought up the subject of food in their 
correspondence, we can correlate a growing preoccupation with having enough to eat on 
their part with the breakdown of the mail service. Sufficient nutrition, always a concern 
for the prisoners in Germany, became a much more frequently mentioned topic in their 
correspondence starting in May 1944. In April 1944 less than one percent of the 
prisoners’ letters contained substantial comments about their diets. In May comments 
about food increased five-fold, and remained at this level through the final two monthly 
reports. Even though comments about food in these letters were twice as often reassuring 
as negative, the sudden jump in how often food was mentioned is evidence that the 
prisoners were thinking about food more often. With their rations already reduced and 
less arriving from overseas, the prisoners were tightening their belts during these months. 
Knowing that their families back in France were also struggling with the same problems 
would presumably have made the prisoners loath to complain in their letters about their 
own insufficient diet. Just the same, people write about what is on their minds, and 
starting in May 1944 five times as many prisoners were writing about food. While most 
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prisoners did their best not to cause their loved ones additional worries, their obsession 
still found its way into their letters.34 
 As was true for every person inside Germany, Allied bombing put the prisoners at 
risk and adversely affected their living conditions during the last two years of the war. 
POWs were often used to construct and repair German bomb shelters, although they were 
forbidden to use these shelters themselves in most instances. Prisoners and foreig  
workers were typically left inside their barracks, or only allowed to take shelter in slit 
trenches, during bombing raids. Among those prisoners most exposed to bombings, such 
as those working in large factories or transportation hubs, the frequent bombings became 
a depressing obsession which left them with rattled nerves and inadequate sleep. In some
cases the International Red Cross intervened on the prisoners’ behalf to pressure the 
Germans to at least allow the captives to leave their barracks during raids and take shelter 
in trenches. In violation of international law, the Germans often exposed POWs to danger
by forcing them to clear rubble and fight fires during raids, or by placing anti-aircraft 
batteries within the prisoners’ living compounds.35 A postwar study of the city of Essen 
concluded that foreign workers and prisoners of war were nearly twice as likely to be 
killed by Allied bombs as were Germans.36  
 The Vichy government kept track of the prisoners’ views on Allied bombing raids 
throughout the war. Judging by these reports, the government expected the bombings 
would turn the prisoners against the “Anglo-Americans,” the group with whom Vichy 
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71,807 (4.2%) with favorable comments outweighing complaints 634-295. 
35 Durand, 464. 
36 Herbert, 317. 
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leaders thought they were competing for the prisoners’ hearts and minds. Despite s eing 
the horrid effects of the bombings first-hand, and often being in harm’s way, the 
surveillance showed that most French prisoners accepted these attacks as a necess ry part 
of war. Allied bombing was one of the more frequently mentioned topics in prisoners’ 
letters. By July 1944 more than one in ten of the prisoners’ letters brought up the topic of 
bombing attacks.37 Censors classified the vast majority of these remarks as of a neutral 
nature. Rather then condemn the bombardments, the censors noted that many of the 
prisoners took satisfaction in the damage it inflicted and that they expected the campaign 
would hasten the end of the war. A surveillance report from September 1943 explained 
that French prisoners in heavily targeted areas believed the Germans were “terrifi d” by 
the attacks, and showing signs of being greatly worn down. The report noted these 
prisoners were pleased to see the German people finally being reduced to the point of 
joining them in calling for an end to the war.38 Even regarding Allied bombing of targets 
in France, the prisoners were of divided opinion. They were concerned about the damage
caused by these bombings, and worried about the safety of their loved ones, but outright 
condemnations of the attacks were rare.39 
 Another aspect of the prisoners’ life which took a significant turn for the worse 
during the final year of the war was their treatment by the German people. As the 
German people became more and more aware that they were likely to lose the war, t ir 
treatment of foreigners inside the Reich became more brutal. The violence dire t  at 
                                                
37 AN F9 2907. Rapport Statistique Mensuel du mois de Juillet, 1944, Ex. No. V. Until May, 1944 most 
references to bombings in the prisoners’ letters refer d to attacks on targets in Germany. That month 2.8% 
of all letters made reference to bombing attacks on Germany, while 2.1% made reference to attacks on 
targets in France. In July, 1944 2.8% of all letters made reference to attacks on Germany and 10.0% made
reference to attacks on France. 
38 AN F9 2907. Rapport Statistique Mensuel du mois de Septembr , 1943, 9. 
39 See for example AN F9 2907. Rapport Statistique Mensuel du mois de Janvier, 1944, 11. See also 
Durand, 466. 
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foreigners in the final year was less organized than the earlier systematic abuse POWs 
had suffered at the hands of guards or security personnel. Just as had happened in the 
closing months of World War I, prisoners and foreign deportees in Germany were 
subjected to irrational, in some cases even hysterical, outbursts of violence.40 Until this 
point violence inflicted on foreigners by Germans normally could be rationalized as 
connected in some way to productivity or control issues. Increasingly in 1944 and 1945 
the violence inflicted on foreigners was driven by fear or anger and served emotional 
needs more than concrete war goals. Late in the war German civilians often joined guards 
and security officers in physically attacking foreigners. Unable to defend th mselves 
against the advancing Red Army and Allied bombers, Germans directed their rage against
an available target – foreign captives. In many cases foreigners suspected of minor 
crimes, such as stealing food, were assaulted by civilian vigilante mobs. Even the 
minimal legal protections covering foreigners were invalidated in September 1944 by a 
decree which authorized German security personnel of even the lowest rank to kill any
foreigner believed to be guilty of looting. Many civilian vigilantes took this decre  as 
applying to them as well as to uniformed security personnel and treated it as a carte
blanche to commit unlimited violence on any foreigner suspected of any crime. From the 
fall of 1944 forward there were increasing instances of the German people serving out 
“street justice” to foreigners who they blamed for the destruction of their country and the 
approaching calamity. At the same time as the level of anti-foreigner violnce in 
Germany was escalating, insufficient rations, lack of housing and increased work 
demands drove more and more captives into committing desperate actions. To live, the 
captives often had to obtain food and shelter illegally, and these illegal acts brought on 
                                                
40 See Chapter two. 
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more violence. A deadly cycle of criminality and retribution played out as the war limped 
to its conclusion. Order was breaking down and mere survival was becoming the only 
goal for many deportees. In the fall of 1944 thousands of foreigners abandoned their jobs 
and collected in the seemingly safer rural areas to wait out the final act of the war. With 
Allied and Soviet armies rapidly advancing in the fall of 1944 many foreigners i 
Germany assumed the end was very near. When the two fronts stabilized in late 1944 
near the pre-war German borders, those foreigners who had abandoned their jobs found 
they had to fend for themselves not for a few weeks as they had expected, but for up to 
eight months. The German authorities, overwhelmed as their nation crumbled around 
them, could not cope with this movement, and groups of fugitive foreigners established 
themselves in the countryside and in abandoned urban areas. Systematic institutional 
abuse had driven the foreigners into fending for themselves by any means possible, and 
these acts of self preservation only inspired more unrestrained violent responses fr m 
panicked Germans. The German people, who had been predisposed to expect “improper” 
behavior from foreigners throughout the war, saw this rise in escapes and thefts as late 
validation of their prejudices. The foreigners’ criminality was used as justification for 
even further escalations in the employment of violence to reassert some control over a 
situation which was rapidly falling into chaos. The bulk of this violence was directed at 
Slavs and Italians, but no foreigner in Germany was immune.41 The confluence of these 
                                                
41 Herbert, 359-70. Scholarship on the treatment of foreign workers and prisoners inside Germany during 
the war tends to focus on the abysmal treatment of eastern victims while giving considerably less attention 
to westerners. When western workers and prisoners ar  addressed it is often to compare their treatment 
favorably with that of their eastern companions. 
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many factors took their toll on the French captives. Of all French POWs who died in 
captivity, half lost their lives between August 1944 and May 1945.42 
 By 1944 the Vichy government had become all but irrelevant to the prisoners, and 
judging by the government’s behavior during the second half of the captivity, the 
prisoners as actual people with real needs had also become an irrelevant topic to the 
government. As conditions deteriorated around them the prisoners must have recognized 
that they were an abandoned people. Had the Western Allies or the Free French initiated 
a serious program at this time to organize a resistance movement among the prison rs in 
Germany, the situation indicates they may well have found a larger number of volunteers 
than would have been true earlier in the war. The prisoners were attempting to navigate  
desperate situation in a virtual political vacuum. As will be demonstrated in the following 
chapter, no concerted effort was made from the outside to fill this leadership vacuum. 
Left to their own devices, the POWs continued on as individuals or as parts of small 
groups, doing what they could to survive the endkampf by wit, luck or quiet action. 
Unlike their countrymen in France during these same months, the prisoners’ thoughts 
were not focused on collective action or larger political questions. The captives had hope, 
but lacking leadership and organization their optimism took a passive form. While the 
resistance struggle was exploding inside France and the future shape of their nation was 
the topic of hot debate, the prisoners focused on simpler goals – staying alive, returning 
home and seeing their loved ones again.
                                                
42 Gascar, 276. 
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Chapter 8: The Politics of Resistance and Repatriation 
 Even though the French prisoners of war were cut off from their homeland for 
five years, in many ways their political evolution mirrored that of their countrymen living 
under German occupation. Like their countrymen in France, the POWs quickly moved 
from initial acceptance of the Vichy regime to disillusionment. By late 1942, like the bulk 
of the French population, the dominant political mentality of the prisoners in Germany 
was one of indirect resistance to the government and its policies. Despite their r ject on 
of the Vichy regime, the government continued to represent the prisoners in their 
propaganda as loyal followers of Pétain and the National Revolution. Given the 
prisoners’ relatively passive acceptance of their captivity, as describd in the closing 
section of the previous chapter, this representation of the prisoners’ mindset might have 
seemed plausible to the French people. Indeed, upon their return to France, the prisoners 
were often welcomed back in a manner which indicated much of the French population 
had accepted the propaganda as accurate. As the Vichy leadership itself was well aware, 
or at least should have been based on its own surveillance program, the prisoners 
supported neither the regime nor its policies. Even though there was relatively litle active 
resistance among the prisoners in Germany, as was true of the overall French population, 
the prisoners almost uniformly viewed the Vichy regime with hostility or indifference by 
late 1942. 
 
Resistance and the Prisoners of War  
Among the prisoners in Germany there was no organized combattant resistance 
activity. In fact, among the French POWs, there was no organized resistance activity of 
any kind until the final months of the war. This reality is at odds with much of the 
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prisoners’ memoir literature which frequently stressed the prisoners’ involvement in the 
resistance. By and large the activities these memoirs describe were of a passive and 
indirect nature and often had such limited effect that the Germans did not recognize them 
as resistance at all. The prisoners’ tendency to exaggerate the prevalenc  and impact of 
resistance work in their memoirs perhaps reflected a desire on their part to justify their 
relatively passive acceptance of captivity when it was unfavorably compared to the 
combattant resistance found inside France itself. This comparison was problematic, as the 
situations faced by the prisoners and the civilian resisters were quite differnt. Further, 
objectively the prisoners had no real cause to defend their level of resistance activity vis-
à-vis the overall French resistance, as in most ways the indirect resistance offered by the 
POWs was similar to the resistance the Germans encountered in France throughout most 
of the occupation. “Survivor Guilt” may have also motivated former prisoners (as well as 
labor deportees) to exaggerate the level of resistance found among themselves inside 
Germany. When these groups became more aware of how many political and racial 
deportees had died in captivity, and how much worse these groups were treated than the
prisoners of war, many may have attempted to present justifications for their own 
survival. This is a common psychological reaction, and one that has been widely 
documented among post-WWII camp survivors. Exaggerations to their resistance activity 
might have been attempts by some returnees to demonstrate that they had “earned”their 
survival, perhaps even done at a subconscious level.1 
While there was some combattant resistance activity in France and almost none 
among the prisoners in Germany, one must keep in mind that even in France only a small 
                                                
1 See for example François Cochet, Les exclus de la victoire: Histoire des prisonniers de guerre, déportés 
et S.T.O. (1945-1985), (Paris: S.P.M., 1992), 191-94. 
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minority of resisters could claim to have engaged in this most direct form of opposition. 
Combattant resistance is resistance of a direct nature which involves actions which could, 
in a concrete way, contribute to the defeat of the Axis powers. Indirect resistance is of a 
more passive nature. It involves such activities as the refusal to support enemy goals, the 
distribution of banned information, the bringing together of individuals opposed to the 
enemy, etc. Indirect resistance can be thought of as one of the “weapons of the weak,” 
which, while it does not concretely contribute to the enemy’s defeat, may help undermine 
its powerbase or hamper its functioning on a social and/or economic level. Indirect 
resistance may also contribute to the formation of a movement which can eventually 
engage in direct combattant activities. Overwhelmingly, in both France and Germany, 
resistance was of an indirect nature. 
While there was no combatant resistance movement active among the French 
prisoners of war in Germany, until late 1944, there was an active culture of resistance 
among the prisoners throughout the war. Lacking arms, organization and the means to 
communicate with Allied forces outside the Reich, French prisoners channeled th ir urge 
to resist into activities intended to frustrate German and/or Vichy designs or i to building 
up a movement capable of future collective action. The prisoners considered this 
widespread collective and individual dissonant activity as resistance; however, since 
these activities did not involve direct confrontation with German forces, and since 
ultimately they did not hasten the war’s end, they cannot be considered combattant acts. 
Some of the more common forms of non-combattant resistance activity in which the 
prisoners engaged included the distribution of banned information, sabotaging or 
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hampering work productivity and escape. Black market commerce was also considered a 
form of resistance by some prisoners. 
Were the prisoners proper in calling actions of indirect opposition resistance? The 
answer to this question lies in how broadly one defines resistance. A liberal definition of 
resistance includes all acts done in defiance of German and/or Vichy authority. A more 
restrictive definition insists that the defiant acts must be intentionally conne ted to the 
larger political struggle against German and/or Vichy authority. The first definition 
argues that all defiance is resistance, while the second argues that defiance is only 
resistance when it has a political motivation. A third and even more restricted definition 
defines resistance solely as those acts taken against the German and Vichy forces which 
conceivably could have hastened their military defeat. Under this third definition, only 
combattant actions would qualify as resistance.2  
 If one uses the first and most expansive of the above definitions of resistance, 
then almost every prisoner of war participated in resistance activity on a daily basis 
throughout the captivity. Under this definition activities such as black market commerce 
and non-work related conversations between prisoners and civilians would qualify as 
resistance activity, as both were acts of defiance against German and Vichy rules. Per 
German dictates, prisoners were not allowed to conduct any private commerce with 
German civilians, and were to talk with German civilians only about essential work 
matters. Granted, these rules were not practically enforceable, but they did r main 
officially in effect throughout the conflict, and prisoners and civilians were sporadically 
prosecuted for transgressing them. Almost every French prisoner, and for that matter 
                                                
2 For examinations of different definitions of resistance, see for example, Julian Jackson, France, The Dark 
Years, 1940-1944, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 387-88; and John F. Sweets, Choices in Vichy 
France: The French Under Nazi Occupation, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 224. 
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almost every German civilian who had regular contact with French prisoners, engaged in 
at least some banned commerce and/or social mixing every day, be it through a prisoner 
trading a few cigarettes to a co-worker or through the two of them chatting during a work 
break. Since part of the reason for categorizing individuals as resisters is o allow persons 
to be singled out for laudable behavior, as was certainly true in the French case, then the 
use of the first definition makes little sense as it encompasses “normative” behavior of 
both French prisoners and German civilians. 
The example of defining black market commerce as resistance activity, 
admittedly a most extreme stance, but one that was nonetheless invoked following the 
war by some prisoners and workers, helps demonstrate why the first definition is 
problematic. Almost all prisoners and German civilians had some dealings with the black 
market. While the black market subverted German laws and undermined authority, in 
almost all cases prisoners engaged in it for personal, not political, reasons. The German 
and Vichy governments certainly disapproved of the prisoners’ black market activity, but 
seem to have considered it as petty criminality or poor discipline, not resistance.3 If one 
accepts the ideal that what distinguishes resistance from other forms of disonance is a 
political motivation, can self-centered behavior performed in service of individual needs 
be considered resistance? I suggest memoirs and histories which include activaties such 
as the black market and social mixing as examples of resistance reveal more bout the 
prisoners’ great desire to justify their behavior than they do about the actual extent of 
                                                
3 See Durand, 369 and Herbert, 326. Durand and Herbert do not entirely agree with one another on this 
topic. Durand’s list of French POW resistance activities includes “preparation for the Liberation” and 
“liaisons with exterior resistance.” I have left liaisons off the list as, until very late in the captivity, no 
organized method existed to facilitate these communications or to put any information which was passed 
along to use. Herbert included black market commerce and evading German work demands as resistance 
activity, two items left off Durand’s list.  
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resistance practiced in Germany. I believe it was the prisoners’ desire to present 
themselves as patriots that resulted in behaviors such as these being presented as 
resistance. 
 If one uses the second definition of resistance supplied above, opposition 
consciously linked to a larger political struggle, then the percentage of French prisoners 
engaged in the resistance would drop, but most would still likely qualify as having 
participated in it on a fairly regular basis. Prisoners were only allowed to possess printed 
material approved by German officials, and were forbidden to listen to unapproved radio 
broadcasts. Few prisoners wrote or printed banned information or possessed contraband 
radios, but almost every prisoner read or listened to banned information when given the 
opportunity to do so. Further, they actively sought to share this information with their 
companions. Likewise, few prisoners actually committed sabotage, but most pris ners, at 
least when they remembered to do so, went about their work in a half-hearted fashion, 
purposely accomplishing as little as they thought possible while at the same time 
avoiding punishment. These activities were not organized or directed, they were simply 
normal behaviors for most French prisoners. As these activities were intentio al acts of 
opposition to authority and were motivated, at least in part, by political considerations, 
even mundane examples of these activities would fall under the second definition of 
resistance. As prisoners had very little opportunity to engage in direct conflict with 
German and Vichy forces in ways which might conceivably hasten the Axis defeat, 
indirect opposition was the only form of resistance open to them most of the time. 
Performing resistance activity which met the third definition, direct confrontation, would 
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have been suicidal and, given their lack of weapons, most likely ineffective, for French 
prisoners in Germany. 
 Perhaps the prisoners’ postwar exaggeration of their resistance’s impactwas an 
unnecessary response to exaggerations often made by French civilians on the same topic. 
At least in regards to the matter of direct versus indirect resistance activity, the practices 
of resistance among the prisoners in Germany and the civilians in France mirrored each 
other until mid-1944. Only a very small number of French men and women were actively 
engaged in combatant resistance movements prior to the Allied debarkment. Most French 
citizens were opposed to the Vichy regime and its policy of collaboration by mid-1941, if 
not sooner.4 They increasingly showed their opposition by indirectly subverting Vichy 
and German authority. French citizens resisted by refusing to participate in collaborative 
or repressive programs or by ignoring and/or transgressing laws they saw as unjust. A 
French person saw him or herself as part of the resistance based upon his or her active 
refusal to support the Vichy regime and the Germans, not necessarily based upon his or 
her membership in a specific organization or by acts of direct confrontation. By 1943 
indirect resistance became so commonplace that, even though only a relatively small 
number of persons directly engaged German and/or Vichy forces, France as a whole has 
been described by historians as dominated by the social and political “phenomenon” of 
resistance.5 Much like France, indirect opposition to authority was the primary form of 
resistance among the prisoners in Germany. Indeed, the prisoners in Germany were 
actually dissuaded from engaging in direct resistance by the Allied military command. 
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Dwight Eisenhower, the supreme commander of Allied forces, discouraged combattant 
resistance activity inside Germany throughout the war. He believed the cost in prisoners’ 
lives would outweigh any military benefits these activities would bring. In a radio speech 
in September 1944, Eisenhower encouraged foreigners in Germany to boycott their jobs 
but not allow “the Gestapo to provoke you into unorganized action.”6 The French 
prisoners had no weapons and were under extensive surveillance by a brutal regime. 
Under these circumstances French prisoners recognized the futility of direct confrontation 
and looked instead for opportunities for indirect opposition. Thus, at least until 1944, the 
nature of resistance among the prisoners and the French civilians was actually quite 
similar. Perhaps the main difference between the resistance among the POWs in 
Germany and the civilians in France was the existence in the latter of a small cadre of 
active combatants.  
The almost complete absence of c mbattant resistance activity among the 
prisoners is confirmed by Vichy and German surveillance reports. Throughout the war 
Vichy mail censors carefully tracked the political dispositions of the prisoners. In the 
spring of 1943 the three most widespread political opinions among the prisoners were: 1) 
an almost complete lack of confidence in the Vichy government; 2) a deep distrust in all 
Vichy leaders outside of Marshal Pétain (who seemed to maintain a fair amount of 
prestige among the prisoners even as late as 1944); and, 3) a hatred of Germany. The 
censors tracked the number of positive references in the prisoners’ correspondence to 
leftist and resistance movements which were actively opposed to the Vichy government. 
They referred to these references as examples of “anti-national sentiments.” The reports 
found almost no expression of these sentiments or, in other words, almost no evidence of 
                                                
6 Herbert, 356-57. 
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organized opposition to the Vichy government. A March 1943 report simply concluded, 
“There is no open opposition” among the prisoners.7 The April 1943 report repeated this 
conclusion: “Activity of elements hostile to the government, followers of the former 
political parties, is not directly detectable.” These reports are very frank in how hostile 
the prisoners’ opinion had become towards the government in a general sense, and how 
conducive the environment had become for “revolutionary propaganda,” but despite 
looking for organized resistance, the censors found the prisoners had not seized on any 
movement through which they were collectively channeling their discontent.8 In the 
spring of 1943 the overall political mood of the prisoners seems to have been similar to 
the overall mood found in France at the same time- an overwhelming rejection of the 
Vichy government and the policy of Franco-German rapprochement by the people. Ther  
was, however, very little actual resistance activity. If the prisoners w e engaging in 
resistance activity, they were doing so as individuals or as parts of small, informal 
groups. There may have been an atmosphere of resistance among the prisoners in 
Germany, but there appears to have been no active resistance movement. 
 Eliminating resistance activity by foreigners in Germany was one of the highest 
priorities of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RHSA), the Reich security main office. 
Guarding against the growth of an organized resistance movement among foreigners 
inside the Reich was a German security obsession throughout the war. With six million
foreigners inside Germany, many of whom were young men with prior military 
experience, this was an understandable concern. The RHSA was charged with surveying 
the foreign workers and prisoners inside the Reich and investigated allegations of 
                                                
7 AN F9 2907. Rapport Statistique Mensuel du mois de Mars, 1943, 9. 
8 AN F9 2907. Rapport Statistique Mensuel du mois de Avril, 1943, 10. 
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organized resistance activity by prisoners of war. In the fall of 1943, German industrial 
leaders alleged that the French workers and prisoners had organized a vast “go slow” 
campaign to sabotage productivity. When the RHSA investigated this allegation they 
found no evidence of any organized campaign. Historian Ulrich Herbert speculated that 
the entire affair was likely invented by factory managers to excuse their failure to meet 
productivity goals.9 Several small and one moderate-sized resistance organizations were 
discovered and broken by the RHSA; however, perhaps the most salient fact to emerge 
from all these investigations, in regards to the topic of organized combatant resistance 
activity, is that not a single weapon was discovered in any prisoner of war resistance 
group until after the spring of 1944.10  
 In 1943 both the RHSA and the Vichy surveillance office concluded there was no 
evidence of an organized resistance movement among the French prisoners. No evidence 
came to light during the research for this project which indicated that this finding was 
revised later in the war. Thus, as far as the agencies charged with policing the prisoners 
were concerned, there was no organized resistance movement to be found in Germany. 
 Based on the above evidence we can conclude that acts of organized combattant 
resistance among the prisoners in Germany were extremely rare. This lack of a 
combattant resistance movement among the French prisoners is easy to understand given 
the circumstances. Split up as they were into kommandos the French prisoners had little 
ability to organize. Until the final year of their captivity Allied forces made little effort to 
communicate with the prisoners and, thus, unlike the resistance inside France itself, 
outside assistance did not foster organized resistance among the French in Germa y as it 
                                                
9 Herbert, 330, 336. 
10 Herbert, 326-52. 
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had among the resisters within France itself. Almost by definition combattant activity 
must be organized. Unorganized combattant acts would almost certainly be ineffectual 
and hard to distinguish from simply criminality. Thus, since the POW resistance was 
unorganized, it almost had to be indirect. A combattant resistance movement would have 
required a level of organization which simply did not exist in Germany prior to 1944.
 Despite their predicament there were at least two forms of resistance open to 
prisoners before late-1944 which were of an active, if not exactly combattant, nature - 
escape and sabotage. French prisoners engaged in both these activities often enough 
when they judged the benefits of the acts to outweigh the risks. Escape and sabotage were 
clearly acts of resistance directed against the Germans. Some sources cha acterize escape 
as an act of resistance also directed at Vichy authority.11 The French government, in 
keeping with the spirit of collaboration, directed the prisoners not to attempt escape. 
Many POWs, probably correctly, believed this order was only issued for political 
purposes and was never intended to be taken seriously. The treatment of prisoners who 
successfully escaped and made their way back to France reinforced this point of view. 
The Vichy government treated escapees with honor rather than arresting and extraditing 
them back to Germany. Internal Vichy reports refer to prisoners who attempted escape as 
“freedom loving,” and treated the large number of prisoners willing to run this risk, 
despite “draconian” punishments, in positive terms.12  
 The case of Henri Descombes provides an example of how the Vichy government 
treated escapees. Descombes escaped in 1943 and made his way back to his wife and 
                                                
11 See for example D’Hoop, Jean-Marie, “Note sur les evasions.” Guerres mondiales et conflits 
contemporains, no. 25 (1957): 75. 
12 AN F9 2907. Commission de contrôle postal des prisonniers d  guerre. Rapport bi-mensuel, Nr. 44 (1-15 
Janvier 1942), 19. 
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family in the department of Saône-et-Loire. Upon his return he presented himself to th  
French authorities and told them he was an escaped prisoner. The authorities told him
that from their perspective he was simply a French soldier presenting himself for 
demobilization. While the government officials let Descombes go about his life, he feared 
he would be denounced to the Germans who now operated freely in his region after their 
occupation of the southern zone. Six months later a German officer, a soldier and a 
“civil” came to take him back into custody. When they found he was not at home they 
arrested his mother and a man he employed and told his neighbors that these two 
hostages would either be executed or deported if Descombes did not turn himself in 
within twenty-four hours. Descombes surrendered and was sent back to Germany where 
he spent the remainder of the war working in a disciplinary kommando alongside other 
recaptured prisoners. He was certain that he had been denounced by a French informant 
for a reward.13 At least in regards to escape, Vichy did appear to have played a “double 
game” with the Germans; making public statements condemning escapes while at t e 
same time quietly treating escapees in a favorable manner. 
 Escape was a common enough activity that it can safely be assumed it was a 
regular topic of conversation, if not active planning, for most prisoners throughout their 
captivity. This is borne out not only by how often it was mentioned in the prisoners’ 
memoirs, but also by the large number of men who either escaped or attempted to do so 
during the war. Practically all prisoner memoirs recount stories about how full 
kommandos upported individuals or small groups preparing for an escape. Before a man 
attempted an escape his companions would pool their resources to help him acquire a 
stock of non-perishable food, civilian clothes and German marks. Jean Hélion wrote of 
                                                
13 Les KG parlent, (Paris: Éditions Denoël, 1965), 140-51. 
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how escape attempts felt like communal efforts: “A man preparing an escape i  t boo in 
the camp. He is a sort of saint, and symbolizes the hopes of the others. Doing anything to 
ruin his chances is a crime against the whole camp.”14 In much the same way, each 
successful escape was greeted as a group triumph. Recaptured escapees h red stories of 
their successes and failures after returning to camp, thus helping plan the next attempt. In 
this way each unsuccessful escape was the start of the next, potentially successful, 
attempt.15 Even after being recaptured some prisoners remembered the euphoria they felt 
while on the run. Even though they failed to get back to France these men felt as if they 
had, if only briefly, retaken control over their own lives while they were free. Th y knew 
their attempt had caused their captors much inconvenience through such things as 
generating extra paper and administrative work and forcing the Germans to conduct 
additional patrols along rail and road lines. Escapes also embarrassed camp guards and 
administrators. Even after recapture escapees would feel they had provided a useful 
service and that, even if only for a few days, they had retaken their post alongside the 
other fighting men.16 
 Of the French prisoners taken into Germany, over seventy thousand managed to 
escape back to France. This equaled nearly five percent of all men deported. The most 
active year was 1943 when thirty-three thousand men successfully escaped.17 Th  large 
                                                
14 Jean Hélion, They Shall Not Have Me. The Capture, Forced Labor, and Escape of a French Prisoner of 
War, (New York:  E. P. Dutton & Co., 1943), 351. 
15 On prisoners sharing information about escape attempts see for example Hélion, 408. 
16 See for example Francis Ambriére, The Long Holiday, (Chicago: Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 1948), 142-
43. 
17 D’Hoop, Jean-Marie, “Note sur les evasions,” Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, no. 25 
(1957): 66-77. According to a 1955 Ministère des Anciens Combattants s udy the rate of escapes per year: 
1941 – 16,000 (1% of the total number of prisoners in Germany at that time); 1942 – 19,000 (1.5%); 1943 – 
33,000 (2.9%); and, 1944 – 3,000 (0.3%). No numbers w re provided for 1940 or 1945. This study only 
covered those prisoners who had been taken into Germany, not those who escaped from camps within 
 254
number of escapes and the amount of work prisoners in Germany put into escape projects 
must have had a significant impact on the overall culture of resistance among the 
prisoners. Perhaps the steady flow of 1,500 to 2,000 monthly escapes hampered the 
development of a resistance movement in Germany by draining the camps of the men 
most likely to become active resisters. Those prisoners who ran the risks associated with 
escape would presumably be the same men who would likely have formed the leadership 
cadre of a combatant movement had one emerged in Germany. Perhaps the opportunity 
for escape is one reason a more active resistance movement did not form in Germany. 
The prisoners most inclined to take direct action often chose to escape and join the 
resistance movement in France rather than remain and attempt to develop such a 
movement in Germany. Or perhaps the large number of successful escapes nurtured, 
rather than drained, the resistance in Germany by providing the captives with inspiration 
and hope. 
 Unfortunately resistance and escape tend to be overemphasized topics in French 
prisoner of war memoir literature and under-represented topics in the more scholarly 
works. These topics are romanticized in memoirs. Resistance and escape are 
paradoxically depicted as serious undertakings motivated by deep moral convictions on 
the one hand, and almost as a game played between the prisoners and guards on the other. 
Memoirs also tend to depict the prisoners’ resistance activities as having a greater impact 
on the Allied war effort than was the reality. Prisoners might collect potentially useful 
information while in Germany, but in almost all cases prior to late 1944, they had no way 
of getting this information to Allied forces. Informal resistance cells provided the 
                                                                                                                                                 
France or from internment in Switzerland. Roughly a qu rter of a million prisoners escaped from 
frontstalags in France during the war, most during the weeks following the armistice. 
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prisoners with a sense of solidarity, but none were called into action until the final days 
of the war.18 As these fairly direct forms of resistance have not been shown to have 
hampered the German war effort in any significant way, they were probably of more 
benefit in keeping up the prisoners’ morale than in contributing to victory in any tangible 
sense. Two of the more widely read memoirs, both of which are used in this work to 
describe other aspects of the captivity, Francis Ambriere’s “The LongH liday” 
(originally published in French in 1946) and Jean Hélion’s “They Shall Not Have Me,” 
(1943) are particularly good examples of this tendency to romanticize. Similarities nd 
differences between how the prisoners of war and the French population came to 
understand the concept of resistance and the role of individual responsibility during the 
war, and what effect the culture of resistance had on the prisoners’ labor productivity, 
remain areas open to significantly more historical research than has yet been conducted. 
Undoubtedly a better understanding of the impact the culture of escape had on the men in 
Germany will be a key aspect of coming to grips with this topic.  
 Another form of more direct resistance open to the prisoners was sabotage. 
Judging by memoir literature it was not uncommon for prisoners to commit small acts of 
sabotage on the job. These memoirs would recount how French workers would purposely 
break equipment to slow or temporarily shut down worksites. Some prisoners considered 
intentionally reducing their productivity on the worksite as a form of sabotage. While
sabotage was certainly a reality among the prisoners in Germany, one should keep in 
mind that, just as was true for most resistance related topics, the memoir literature 
exaggerated its impact. The French prisoners going about their duties at a slow pace and 
taking an indifferent attitude as to the quality of their work is a common theme in the 
                                                
18 See Chapter nine. 
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memoir literature; however, these efforts apparently rarely rose to th  level that German 
foremen and supervisors found them unacceptable. The German government considered 
arbeitsbummelei (loafing on the job) a political crime, and Albert Speer encouraged 
factory managers to punish lazy workers with fines or reduced rations “rapidly” and 
“expeditiously” for maximum pedagogical effect. These penalties were applied most 
often to foreign workers. At Krupp, 10 to 15% of foreign workers received loafing 
penalties each month.19 The high rate of loafing penalties given out at Krupp aside, in 
general the Germans considered the French prisoners to be good workers. Many German 
firms preferred French prisoner laborers over foreign volunteers, and believed th m to be 
the most productive of all foreign workers in Germany, perhaps even as productive as the 
German civilians they worked alongside.20 
 A large organized resistance movement did finally arise among the French 
prisoners in Germany in 1944 when it was organized from the outside. Liberated 
prisoners of war and escapees, with the administrative support of the Free French 
government in exile, set up an umbrella resistance movement in March 1944 called the 
Mouvement de Résistance des Prisonniers de Guerre et Déportés (MRPGD). The 
MRPGD was the first resistance organization which attempted to develop ties with 
prisoner of war and deportee resistance cells inside Germany. The movement the 
MRPGD helped organize in Germany, called the Front Intérieur Allemand (FIA), only 
became fully active in November 1944. It focused its efforts on gathering information 
from within Germany and conveying it to the Free French forces, supporting escape 
attempts and laying the groundwork for the French prisoners to take collective action 
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when called upon to do so by Allied forces.21 In the end this call never came, although 
some FIA groups did perform useful work as guides, police and guards during the final 
days of the war. 
 While the French prisoners in Germany were prevented from partaking in the 
combatant resistance movement which came to strength in France in 1943 and 1944, they 
probably partook in the social “phenomenon” of resistance as much as did their 
compatriots back in France. The lack of military resistance activity in Germany did cause 
at least one important distinction to arise in how the prisoners and the French population 
at large came to understand the socio-political meaning of “resistance” to th  French 
people. The combatant resistance came to symbolize the highest level of patriotism and 
self-sacrifice to most people in France. Lacking such examples, the prisoners in Germany 
were largely unaware of the emergence of this group, a group which supplanted a role in 
French society which had traditionally been filled by soldiers like themselve . When the 
prisoners returned to France they discovered the role of fighting patriot was no longer 
accorded to soldiers by default, it had been claimed by the resistance while they were in 
captivity. Patriotism was now not only associated with national service, it was now also 
linked to adhering to the “correct” anti-collaboration (and by extension, anti-Vichy) 
political position and pro-actively advancing that cause. Much more so than had been the 
case in 1940, by 1944 patriotism was inescapably entangled with politics. 
 
The Politics of the Repatriated 
 Cut off from their homeland and Allied support, the French prisoners in Germany 
did not take part in the combattant resistance movement until very late in the war. 
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Prisoners who had managed to return to France, either through one of the various 
liberation programs or via escape, did not suffer from this same isolation. Starting in 
1943 groups made up of former prisoners of war organized into resistance groups. While 
these groups were slow to join the larger Gaullist movement, the community of former 
prisoners made up an active element of the resistance in France during the last two years 
of the occupation. 
 Former POWs who had spent at least some time in Germany made up a 
substantial population group in France from 1941 forward. During the war over half a 
million deported prisoners returned to France through a variety of means. More than a 
third of those repatriated (183,381) were freed due to injury or poor health, as was 
required by international law. From the German perspective caring for these unproductive 
men was an economic drain which they were happy to pass on to the French state. The 
second largest group of 90,747 was made up of men liberated as part of the Relèv . Many 
of these repatriates were also sickly and perhaps would have been repatriated even had 
they not been selected by the Germans for inclusion on the Relève lists. Vichy diplomatic 
negotiations with Germany won the release of two other sizable groups, 59,359 veterans 
of the First World War and 18,731 fathers with five or more children. Somewhat more 
than 50,000 prisoners who possessed skills and/or training which the Germans deemed 
essential to the proper functioning of the French government and economy were also 
released. Included in this group were public administrators (17,751), selected farmers 
(18,127), railroad employees (1,710) and roughly 15,000 other specialists. All told 
approximately 475,000 prisoners were repatriated through official channels. To this total 
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we can add the seventy-plus thousand prisoners who made their own way home as 
escapees.22 
 The Vichy government expected the returning prisoners of war to be among the 
regime’s staunchest supporters. The French military was a politically conservative body, 
and so the Vichy leadership assumed that most of the returning prisoners were likely to 
ideologically lean in their direction. As detailed in Chapter three, the government had 
attempted to cultivate political support among the prisoners while they were in Germany 
by distributing information promoting the National Revolution and through the Cercles 
Pétain. Beyond their assumed favorable political inclination the Vichy leaders expectd 
the returning prisoners would feel a debt of gratitude towards the government for 
facilitating their liberation. The regime’s leaders also assumed that most soldiers who had 
fought in 1940 would be critical of the former republic after seeing first-hand the isaster 
for which it was widely blamed. Finally, recognition must have been expected for the 
concrete actions the Vichy government had taken on behalf of the returning prisoners and 
their families.23 In 1941 the Commissariat Général au reclassement des Prisonniers de 
Guerre Rapatriés et aux Familles de Prisonniers (CGPGR) was set up specifically to 
assist returning prisoners. The following year the CGPGR began to establish Maisons du 
Prisonniers and Centres d’Entraide (CEA) across occupied and unoccupied France. The 
Maisons du Prisonnier provided assistance to men readjusting to life in France following 
their return. The CEAs, staffed mostly by former prisoners, gave repatriates an 
organization (and at times a paid position) through which they could work for the benefit 
of their compatriots still in captivity and their families in France. At the tim  of liberation 
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there were 151 Maisons du Prisonners and over 2,500 CEAs operating in France. The 
worth of these organizations was validated in 1944 when the newly installed French 
provisional government took over their operation with minimal purging of staff and 
administration and incorporated them into the newly formed Ministère des Prisonniers 
Déportés et des Réfugiés (MPDR).24  
 The Vichy leadership’s expectations that the repatriates would strongly support 
the regime were not fulfilled. The government continued to conduct mail surveillance on 
the repatriates after their return home. The importance Vichy officials plced on these 
men’s political views was demonstrated by their being given their own heading in their 
monthly surveillance reports, separating their views from those of the prisoners still in 
Germany and from the rest of the population of France. These reports revealed that the
repatriates had a very negative impression of the state of their country and consi ered the 
government ineffective. An April 1943 report stated that the repatriates’ collective 
mindset was “strongly pessimistic” about the state of the nation.25 This finding was 
repeated in September 1943. The later report explained that the repatriates saw France as 
“wracked with political divisions, corruption and selfishness.”26 During the seven months 
in which the government quantified its surveillance findings, negative or pessimistic 
opinions among the repatriates outweighed positive comments by a ratio of 
approximately five to one.27 The most commonly highlighted complaint in these reports 
were the poor living conditions in France, a problem which realistically the Vichy 
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government could not be expected to remedy given the circumstances. Two other oft-
cited complaints of the repatriates, the lack of interest shown in the prisoners’ fat  by the 
government and the public at large and the divisive political climate, were criticism 
directly related to the government’s competence and values.  
 As detailed in Chapter five, the repatriates were disturbed to find most people in 
France did not consider the liberation of the prisoners a top priority. The repatriates 
believed this attitude extended to the government. As early as January 1942 surveillance 
reports noted the repatriates’ frustration with the indifferent treatment they rec ived from 
civil servants.28 In a March 1944 letter one repatriated prisoner described his impression 
of the Maisons du Prisonnier: “They are worthless, a joke. A lot of offices and typists - 
the type who don’t give a shit. The result – absolutely nothing gets done!”29 This may be 
an extreme example of the repatriates’ dissatisfaction, but it was not an isolated ne. The 
repatriates’ correspondence contained many complaints about how they were treat d by 
the government, and almost no expressions of gratitude. Largely because of how they 
were run, the government aid programs perhaps became more a source of division than 
unity between the regime and the returnees. Administrative indifference was only the 
initial source of the returnees’ frustration. Starting in 1943 Vichy POW aid programs 
began to function as ideological indoctrination centers, further antagonizing the former 
captives who had to deal with them. 
 The Vichy government bears a great deal of responsibility for the politically 
divisive atmosphere the repatriates found upon their return. As demonstrated in Chapter 
three, the socially conservative and authoritarian tenets of the National Revolution never 
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had support from the majority of the French people, yet the government began pushing 
through legislation and reform based on these values while the nation was still in shock 
from the defeat of 1940. Much of the government’s decision making and planning was 
ideologically informed, and the paternal authoritarian ideology it was drawing upon was 
one rejected by the population at large. In the summer and fall of 1940 the French people 
simply had too many concerns to devote close attention to much of the government’s 
politically motivated doings. When life returned to a more normal pace the population 
began to push back against Vichy’s program of retrograde social engineering, first 
through dissent and later through open opposition. Time and again the Vichy leadership 
unnecessarily brought the government into conflict with the people by pursuing its 
ideological goals. Rather than simply trying to manage the disaster and help the French 
people get through the occupation, the Vichy leaders did not see their role as that of a 
caretaker, they saw their rise to power as an opportunity to remake France alo g 
traditionally conservative lines. For Pétain, Laval, Darlan and many other leading figures 
in the government crisis meant opportunity rather than danger. The two most obvious 
examples of this attempt to rule contrary to the values of most French people were 
Vichy’s embrace of collaboration and its enforcement of discriminatory legislation, 
particularly its persecution of Jews and leftists. In a similar manner the Vic y 
government alienated much of the repatriate community in January 1943 by injecting its 
divisive ideological views into the public aid programs set up to serve prisoners and their 
families. 
 Throughout the first half of the war the POW aid programs were run with little 
controversy. Maurice Pinot, a reserve officer, was freed from his captivity in a German 
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oflag to run the CGPGR when it was created. Pinot was a loyal follower of Marshal 
Pétain and a supporter of the Vichy government. He was not, however, an ideologue. 
Pinot strove to keep the CGPGR “autonomous” from political influences to have it 
function effectively for all repatriates, regardless as to their political opinions. In January, 
1943 Laval removed Pinot and replaced him with Andé Masson, an outspoken advocate 
of collaboration who had already published numerous newspaper articles and books on 
the subject. The official reason given for the move was that Masson had just recently 
been liberated and so would be more in touch with the mood of the captives and 
conditions in Germany. Pinot correctly believed this was an effort to politicize he 
CGPGR and he refused to resign, forcing Laval to fire him. The replacement of Pi ot 
with Masson set off a minor political firestorm. The prisoners in Germany greeted the 
announcement that Masson would replace Pinot with almost universal criticism. They 
were unhappy that a notorious collaborator had been placed at the head of the 
organization upon which many of their families relied to navigate government 
bureaucracy.30 At least one group protest was sent to the Mission Scapini. Back in France 
the entire upper administrations of the CGPGR, CEAs and the Maisons du Prisonnier 
resigned as a group in protest. Once in power Masson begin using the CGPGR and the 
various agencies it oversaw to promote collaboration and the National Revolution. The 
CGPGR also attempted to coerce repatriates and prisoners’ families into joining a pro-
Vichy political movement called the Mouvement “Prisonniers.” The repatriates and the 
prisoners’ families rejected Masson’s efforts by refusing to join and by ignoring meetings 
and calls to action. Many prisoners in Germany were offended by Masson’s focus on 
politics instead of the CGPGR’s mission of providing social assistance to the repatriates 
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and their families.31 Masson’s tenure as head of the CGPGR ended in failure after one 
year. Laval’s attempt to use the CGPGR to mobilize more support for the regime out of 
the repatriates and the prisoners’ families had failed and the prisoners had been driv n 
away from an organization which, had it been administered apolitically and competently, 
had great potential to bond an important segment of the population to the regime, if only 
on the basis of its effective administration of assistance for needy former p isoners and 
their families.32 
 The attempt to politicize the CGPGR not only drove the prisoners away from 
government agencies, it actually was the catalyst for the creation of a new resistance 
movement. After being forced out of the CGPGR, Pinot and several of his close 
associates began working in opposition to the Vichy government. Perhaps the most 
outspoken of the former CGPGR administrators who helped form this new movement 
was François Mitterrand. In 1943 Mitterrand dramatically interrupted a speech Masson 
was delivering to a group of recently repatriated prisoners in Paris by denouncing him 
and his political misuse of the agency. Initially the POW resistance movement formed by 
the CGPGR exiles went by the name “Pinot-Mitterrand group.” Later, when it joined the 
larger Gaullist movement, it changed its name to the Movement National des Prisonniers 
de Guerre et Déportés (MNPGD). This case study of the regime’s mishandling of the 
repatriate community demonstrates how its political heavy-handedness contributed to the 
divisive atmosphere in France and how its attempts to govern ideologically transformed 
potential supporters into resistance organizers. 
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 Perhaps part of the Vichy leadership’s mishandling of the repatriates can be 
attributed to their mistaken expectations as to what political mentality the prisoners 
would hold. Where the Vichy leadership had expected to find the ranks of the repatriated 
POWs full of socially conservative young men indoctrinated into the tenets of the
National Revolution, they instead found a bitter and cynical lot. During their time in 
Germany the repatriates had not been energized into enacting the program of the National 
Revolution. Instead they had been soured to any political appeal. While the former 
republic was held in low regard by most captives, they quickly came to see the Vichy 
regime as guilty of the same incompetence, corruption and elitism which they believed 
had tarnished the former government. Many prisoners held the former republic 
responsible for the disaster of 1940, but this belief led them away from putting their faith 
in politicians as a whole, not into embracing the next crop. The new regime’s first yea  in 
power did nothing to encourage the prisoners to put their trust in the men who now made 
their home in Vichy, but who had, by and large, spent the pre-war years performing 
similar duties in Paris for a government they now loudly condemned. Prisoners tended to 
see the small number of their compatriots who participated in the Cercles Pétain as 
bootlicks and opportunists, not as men of conviction.33 Cynicism continued to have a 
hold on even those men who managed to return to France. They saw the lack of unity, the 
material shortcoming, the rampant corruption and abuses of power, and concluded that 
the new government had given them no reason to think it an improvement over the 
former republic.  
                                                
33 Durand, 334-45. See for example AN F9 2907. Synthèse des renseignements. Avril, 1943, 10, which 
describes the activity of the Mouvements Pétain i  Germany as slow, perhaps even idle, and to be 
producing almost no enthusiasm. The few adherents are referred to as being “unpopular” with the other 
prisoners. 
 266
 The returning prisoners’ rejection of the Vichy regime and its policies stand out as 
a particularly poignant example of the regime’s almost complete failure to win anything 
more than temporary acceptance from the French people. For the reasons explaied 
above, of all segments of the population, the Vichy leadership seemed justified in 
expecting the repatriated prisoners of war to be among its most likely supporters. Given 
that the regime failed to win long-term support from even this group indicates just how 
little support Vichy maintained among the French people after its initial period in power. 
Considering the hand it was dealt and the course of the war, the Vichy government would 
have been hard pressed to have retained wide public support even had it governed in a 
less divisive manner. The new state had few resources to rebuild the nation, and had to 
govern under the unfavorable terms of the occupation. The Vichy leadership’s decision to 
govern France based upon their unpopular ideological views transformed a difficult job 
into a hopeless one. Even actions the regime did take which one might expect it to have 
received some recognition for from the prisoners, such as the setting up the Maisons du 
Prisonniers and CEAs, came to be seen for their shortcomings and politically 
compromised nature as much as for the services they did provide. It is not surprising that 
in trying to navigate the realities of the occupation the Vichy government could n t help 
but pale when compared to pre-war life in France. The growing resistance movement, as 
yet unburdened by the responsibilities of power, looked more and more attractive with 
each passing month as the Vichy government demonstrated time and again its 
shortcomings and alienation from the French people. 
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Vichy deception regarding the prisoners during last two years 
 During the last two years of the war the Vichy government could find very little 
support among the French prisoners in Germany, or among those who had returned to 
France. During this same time the government’s stewardship of the prisoners’ welfare 
came more and more into question as their living conditions declined. Yet despite the 
lack of support it received from the prisoners and its inability to shield them from a 
worsening situation in Germany, the regime’s propaganda campaign continued to 
consciously misinform the French population that the POWs remained supportive of the 
government and that the men were living under very tolerable conditions in Germany. 
Notable examples of this falsified depiction of the prisoners’ lives can be found in film, 
print and public exposition. 
 By early 1943 the Vichy government’s own surveillance reports were very clear 
that the regime’s programs and reform plans had become irrelevant topics to the prison rs 
in Germany. Nevertheless, the government continued to portray the prisoners in Germany 
as almost universally in support of the regime and the National Revolution. In April 1943 
Marshal Pétain returned to a theme he had been promoting since 1940, that France could 
be revived only by returning to its traditional values. He tied this message specifically to 
the prisoners’ situation by shaming the French people for not acting more like the r 
brothers, fathers and sons in German prison camps where, he claimed, the proper attitud  
was on display. He explained, “Our prisoners set us the example. In the camps, they 
meditate, they work: far from partisan passions and struggles of influence, they prepare 
what, tomorrow, will be France’s sole chance for salvation.”34 A profile of the prisoners’ 
life in Germany published in the popular magazine L’illustration in July 1943 focused on 
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cultural and athletic pastimes, giving the reader an impression that the prisoners in 
Germany were, in Sarah Fishman’s words, “at an extended summer camp of sorts.” An 
exposition in Lille in the fall of 1943 informed the French people that the prisoners had 
put aside all class, regional and political differences and united behind one motto, “Obey 
and Serve.” The prisoners’ unity and devotion to the National Revolution was again 
stressed in an exposition in Reims the following year.35 The Vichy government’s 
traveling exhibition on the prisoners’ life in Germany was named l’âme des camps (“The 
Soul of the Camps”). This exhibition stressed the moral renewal the prisoners wer 
supposedly undergoing while in captivity. After seeing the exhibition, one former 
prisoner wrote: 
Our captivity, the suffering of millions of comrades who have experienced and 
continue to experience hunger, beating, painful separation, forced labour, 
bombing and threats became a joyful fresco of an operetta captivity full of 
spectacle and literary conferences; a world apart, a happy world, without 
complications, a perfect opportunity for meditation.36 
 
 If one believed the government’s propaganda, the prisoners had spent their years 
in captivity preparing themselves to serve as the vanguard of the National Revolution 
upon their return to France. Closer to the truth, the prisoners were almost universally 
hostile or indifferent to the National Revolution and desired nothing more than to return 
to a quiet private life in France so they could try to make up for the lost years they had 
spent in Germany. 
 The Vichy government produced two feature-length documentaries in 1943 to 
encourage more French citizens to volunteer for work in Germany. Both films were 
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widely distributed and one of them, Travailleurs de France, was still being shown in 
French theaters as late as June 1944.37 These films depicted working conditions in 
Germany as very comfortable and claimed a strong fraternal bond existed between 
French workers, prisoners of war and their German co-workers. By 1944 the 
government’s own surveillance program had clearly established the fantastical na ure of 
this depiction of life in Germany. Still, there were worker quotas to be met, and the 
regime had never demonstrated qualms about deceiving the public in service of state 
aims, and so the practice continued. 
 The government’s continued depiction of the prisoners as well-cared for served to 
calm public anxiety. The French people were encouraged to believe the regimewas 
performing its duty of protecting the prisoners while they were in Germany. Presenting 
the prisoners as supporters of the government allowed the regime to claim increased 
legitimacy. This campaign of misinformation paved the way for the cool reception many 
of the prisoners received upon their return to France in 1945, as will be chronicled in the 
following chapter.
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Chapter 9: Liberation and Return 
 
 The final months of captivity were among the harshest of the war from the 
prisoners’ perspective. They remembered the shock of their arrival in Germany and the 
chaos of the last months as two brutal bookends to their long ordeal. As the Reich 
crumbled around them the prisoners’ rations were cut and their mail service and other 
links to their homeland were disrupted. In the face of Allied and Soviet advances the 
prisoners were driven out of their barracks and onto roads already choked with civilian 
refugees. Throughout the spring of 1945 enormous ranks of slave laborers and prisoners 
of war were marched towards central Germany. More than ever the POWs were expos d 
to air attacks and the unregulated violence of panicked guards and vengeful civilians. The 
prisoners welcomed the first sighting of Allied soldiers with tremendous emotion, not 
only because their arrival meant an end to their long captivity, but also because it meant 
an end to the immediate apocalyptic situation of the closing months of Hitler’s thousand 
year Reich. For many the liberation arrived too late. Of the roughly 24,000 French 
prisoners of war who died in German captivity, half were lost during the Endkampf.1  
 Despite their hopes, liberation did not mean an immediate end to their ordeal for 
most of the prisoners. The men often had to wait several weeks before they were 
transported back to France- a frustrating period dubbed the “semi-captivity” by historian 
François de Lannoy.2 During this period the men were no longer prisoners, yet nor could 
they consider their captivity at an end. Prisoners reacted to this waiting period in a 
number of ways. Some volunteered to act as security personnel and help restore order to 
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Germany. Others just kept a low profile and waited for transportation to be arranged. Still 
others took matters into their own hands and started walking west. For those who waited 
to be transported the duration of their wait varied based upon location, luck and 
opportunity. Some prisoners were home in their living rooms the same week of their 
liberation. Less fortunate comrades had to wait a month or longer before they set foot 
back in France. Between the violence, chaos and frustrating delays, the prisoners’ final 
months in Germany were among the most memorable of the war. The excitement of these 
months was a final unwelcome trial for the vast majority of the POWs, men who wanted 
nothing more than to safely return to a more quiet life. 
 Many of the prisoners found their actual homecoming to be a confusing and 
disappointing experience. After an absence of five years the men expected to be 
welcomed as their fathers had been in 1918. Instead they found themselves warmly 
received, but treated more as refugees than as honored veterans. This surprisng reception 
was caused by a number of factors, among them the dire economic conditions in France 
in 1945, the perception among much of the population that the prisoners did not deserve 
recognition for their wartime service, and finally and perhaps most importantly, because 
singling out the returning prisoners for recognition might have threatened the fragil
sense of unity which had been constructed since the liberation based on the discourse of 
“shared sacrifice.” 
 
The Final Months of Captivity 
 The factors which had been wearing down the prisoners’ living conditions since 
1942 were greatly exacerbated from the autumn of 1944 forward by the collapsing 
German situation. The German army suffered its most complete defeat of the war in 
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June-August of 1944 when the Red Army destroyed Army Group Center and drove to 
near the 1940 frontier in central Poland. Just as this operation was concluding the 
Western Allies broke out of their Norman beachhead and liberated most of France and 
the Low Countries. These two defeats decimated what remained of the German army and 
denied the Reich the resources it had been plundering from previously occupied 
territories. Just as had been the case during the last year of the Great War, Germany, now 
forced to rely on a diminished pool of human and economic resources, cut further into the 
already insufficient resources allotted to the care of prisoners of war and deportees.3 Just 
as had been the case in 1918 the increasing German neglect of 1945 transformed the 
marginal conditions of life endured by most captives into truly desperate situations. 
 Greatly adding to the prisoners’ and deportees’ troubles were a series of barely 
organized relocations forced upon them during the last year of the war. As the Soviet and 
Allied armies advanced to the German borders the Reich relocated its captives towards 
the center of the country to prevent their liberation. As historian Pierre Gascar put it, the 
Germans wanted to hold on to their “human livestock” for as long as possible, thinking 
they could be put back to work in factories or constructing fortifications. Even if they 
could not be used as workers any longer the captives remained valuable as hostages.4 
These relocations came in two large waves. The first evacuations from the east started in 
the summer of 1944 as the Red Army broke into East Prussia, the Baltic States and 
central Poland. Sizable German populations had lived in these regions before the war, 
and more had migrated into them as part of the Reich’s ethnic cleansing and resettlem nt 
programs. Prisoners and labor deportees who had been brought to these settlements to 
                                                
3 See chapter two. 
4 Gascar, 288. 
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provide cheap labor now had to be relocated. The pace of evacuation greatly sped up in 
January-February 1945, at times just a few days ahead of the Red Army. The POWs 
marched alongside long columns of German civilian refugees, a sight that reminded 
many French soldiers of scenes they had seen in their own homeland in 1940. These 
marches were trying on the prisoners, many of whom were less than fully healthy after 
years of poor nutrition, poor housing and almost no health care. Forced onto the roads, 
often in freezing temperatures, driven at times hundreds of kilometers without evening 
shelters or regular meals, the weakened men were hard-pressed to simply stay alive.5 
More direct threats added to these hardships. Marching prisoners were exposed to air 
attacks. At least in some instances, French or Red Cross flags were parachuted to 
columns of prisoners and workers when Allied aircraft identified them as such. The men 
could hold up these flags when they were threatened with air attack.6 That these flags 
were either not commonly distributed, or not effective, was evidenced by how many 
prisoners reported after the war that their columns had been harassed.7 The prisoners 
were also subjected to assault by guards and civilians during these marches.  
 Upon their arrival in their new holding areas inside Germany the prisoners oft n 
found the housing to be even more crowded and dilapidated than their previous barracks. 
As more and more prisoners of war, deportees and German refugees concentrated into 
central Germany, all relying on the region’s already overstretched resources, housing and 
supply problems only grew. An ICRC report from October 1944 described the living 
                                                
5 For more on these evacuations see François de Lannoy, La Libération des Camps: Un million de 
prisonniers de guerre français, Mai 1945, (Bayeux: Editions Heimdal, 1995), 84-91. 
6 Durand, 474. 
7 de Lannoy, 91. After studying POW témoignages from this period de Lannoy stresses how fear of air 
attack was among the most common topics. He writes that the prisoners saw Allied air attack as “a consta t 
source of danger” as long as they were on the road. G scar records that 180 French men were killed in East
Prussia during just two air raids during these January evacuations (290). 
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conditions some of the earliest of the evacuated prisoners faced once they arrived at their 
new living quarters near Münster. The men were housed in unlighted and unheated 
basements without beds or water. Many were infested with lice and already ill. The report 
concluded, “It is difficult to imagine living conditions worse than those imposed on these 
prisoners.”8 Prisoners would often have to repeat this forced march during the spring of 
1945 when Allied and Soviet troops resumed their advance. 
 The example of the men assigned to Stalag 369 serves as an example of how 
French POWs living in the eastern frontiers of the Reich experienced these marches. 
Stalag 369 was located just outside of Krakow in south-central Poland. The POWs were 
evacuated on 6 August 1944 and temporarily relocated to Stalag VIII-C outside of Sagan. 
The Germans again drove the men on to the road on 8 February 1945 after another Soviet 
advance, eventually marching 1,118 POWs all the way to Stalag XVIII-C in Markt-
Pongau in western Austria. This would have been a march of approximately 850 
kilometers provided no detours were taken and only main roads were used, both highly 
unlikely occurrences. The men were probably marched over a thousand kilometers in 
stages. The final group marched at least 526 kilometers over a 28 day period, or about 12 
miles per day. The prisoners were poorly fed during this march and often had to sleep out 
of doors despite the freezing temperature. On 7 March 1945, 967 of the men arrived at 
their new home, 151 fewer than had set out. Another group of roughly 2,000 POWs left 
the same Krakow region two weeks before the above group and were marched to Kassel 
(approximately 620 kilometers along the most efficient route) over a period of 46 days. 
                                                
8 Copy of report in Yves Durand, La Captivité: Histoire des prisonniers de guerre français 1939-1945. 2e 
ed. (Paris: Fédération Nationale des Combattants Prisonniers de Guerre et Combattants d’Algérie, Tunisie, 
Maroc, 1981), 472. 
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The column was attacked by American aircraft near Weimar and 117 of the prisoners 
were killed, 34 of whom were French.9 
 A second large wave of evacuations moved prisoners held in western Germany 
eastward. As this wave occurred a bit later than the eastern evacuations, during March 
and April of 1945, prisoners on these marches suffered less from the cold. They also were 
generally marched shorter distances over roads less packed with fleeing refugees. By the 
end of March about a quarter of all former prison camp sites were in Allied or Soviet
hands; however the vast majority of prisoners and deportees remained under German
control. By this point most prisoners were no longer working, they were simply left 
confined in neglected camps or were being marched from one destination to another.10 A  
this time, as in so many others during the captivity, POWs assigned to rural areas were in 
much better situations than their compatriots in urban areas. Rural prisoners were less 
likely to be forcibly relocated, subjected to air attacks or caught in a combat zone han 
were prisoners working in industrial or transit centers.11 
 Lloyd Martin Jones, an American prisoner of war captured on 19 December  1944 
during the German Ardennes offensive, experienced the last months of the war in much 
the same way as did the French prisoners held in western Germany. He remembered 
April and May 1945 as a chaotic and deadly time when his life, along with those of his 
fellow captives, felt very cheap. Jones spent the last thirty-five days of his captivity on 
the road, marching from one temporary destination to another. His weight dropped from 
about 155 to 125 pounds. Jones and the other prisoners were fed sporadically, so when 
                                                
9 Based on témoignages reproduced in de Lannoy, 84-5.
10 de Lannoy, 89-91. 
11 On the contrast between the relatively peaceful and stable life in rural areas compared to urban areas or 
areas being overrun by Soviet forces see for example Gascar, 282-87. 
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possible they stole potatoes and bread. The guards knew the prisoners were stealing food, 
but there were too few of them to control the large number of desperate men under their 
watch. Some of the men in Jones’ column were killed during an Allied air raid on 15 
April while they were waiting to cross the Danube River. As badly as he was treated 
Jones remained aware that the Germans treated the western prisoners better than he other 
captives. It was only during the last ten days of his captivity that he believed most 
Germans came to accept that all hope was lost for Germany. Jones believed that his 
guards had been ordered to kill all the prisoners before allowing them to be liberated, and 
was also aware of the large number of prisoners dying on these marches, and so he wa  
enormously relieved when his column was liberated by American soldiers on 2 May in 
the town of Gars-am-Inn, fifty miles east of Munich. The liberating soldiers immediately 
fed the starving prisoners as much food as they could eat. Jones, who had not suffered 
from digestive problems throughout his captivity, finally fell ill at this point from over-
eating this sudden abundance of rich food. Seven days later he was airlifted to a POW 
recovery camp in La Harve were he was disinfected and fed six small meals a day until 
he was well enough to sail back to New York a few weeks later.12 
 
Liberation  
 Prisoners were liberated during April and May of 1945 in three main ways. Many 
simply waited in the camps into which they had been concentrated during the spring for 
the arrival of Allied or Soviet troops. In most cases the German guards simply 
disappeared as enemy troops neared these camps, leaving the men to govern themslves. 
In a few cases the prisoners overwhelmed the guards and held them captive until their 
                                                
12 Lloyd Martin Jones, interview by author, Lawrence, KS, 2007. 
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liberators arrived. In his radio address of 5 September 1944 General Eisenhower had 
instructed the prisoners not to allow themselves to be provoked into ill-advised action by 
their German captors and to do no more than escape into the countryside and wait for the 
arrival of Allied troops.13 While a fair number of Slavic prisoners and deportees did 
escape and attempt to wait out the war as fugitives most French prisoners remained with 
their kommandos until Allied or Soviet troops arrived. A second common way prisoners 
were liberated was while they were trudging down a road or living rough alongside a 
route during their final forced march. A third way was through the prisoners’ own 
initiative. Many POWs and foreign deportees took advantage of the chaos of the final 
weeks of the war to slip away from their guards and to try to make their own way back 
home. Relatively few French prisoners and labor deportees took this third option until 
they knew their liberation was imminent. The harsher conditions endured by Slavic 
captives drove more men and women from this group to choose a life as a fugitive earlier 
in the war. Groups of foreigners started forming across Germany as early as mid-1944. At 
first these “foreign gangs,” as the Germans referred to them, tended to establish 
themselves in a defensive location, such as an isolated farmhouse or in an abandoned 
building, and wait for the arrival of Allied or Soviet troops. These gangs fed and 
equipped themselves through theft and violent seizures. That these groups began forming 
as early as 1944 gives evidence that many of the prisoners expected the war to nd that 
year and that German security forces had started to lose control over some areas well 
before the arrival of Allied soldiers. The Germans relied increasingly on paramilitary 
groups, often made up of Hitler Youth, to control these gangs. The battles fought between 
                                                
13 Ulrich Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany Under the Third Reich. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 357.
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these groups and ad-hoc German security groups made up a veritable war within the war 
during the last year of the conflict. While the foreign gangs did not have ties to outside 
resistance movements or military commands, at times they were as well-arm d and 
organized as the German forces facing them. These gangs were particularly active in 
Cologne, Essen and the Ruhr valley.14 As the German military position collapsed in the 
spring of 1945 these gangs became more common. Unlike the earlier gangs, the later ones 
tended to be migratory, slowly making their way either East or West, hoping to free 
themselves rather than wait for their liberators. French prisoners and deportees only made 
up a small percentage of these groups’ membership, most being Slavs. The biggest 
impact the “foreign gangs” had on the French captivity experience was that it further 
contributed to the chaos and violence of their last year in Germany. 
 Gustov Folcher’s description of his last weeks of captivity brings out the chaos of 
the situation. Folcher was fortunate to be assigned to a rural area and never actually had 
to leave the village in which he had been assigned as a farm laborer in 1940. On 12 April 
he went out to sort potatoes and could hear machinegun fire in the distance. The roads 
were full of German soldiers retreating in disarray. The German civilians were in shock, 
but most were staying at home instead of taking to the roads. By this point all but the 
most delusional had realized there was nowhere left to retreat and understood it was 
probably best to stay as far away from the roadways and columns of troops as possible. 
That evening order broke down in Folcher’s town. Organized gangs of looters, mostly 
made up of Germans but also including some foreign ex-captives, broke into storage 
areas and carted away food, arms and equipment. Folcher and the other French prisoners
claimed new coats, pants, tunics and boots out of an abandoned German army depot. The 
                                                
14 Herbert, 351-54, 364-70. 
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town was draped in white flags and the fleeing German soldiers made no effort to prevent 
the looting. The following day American and French soldiers arrived and Folcher’s 
liberation became official. A French officer armed the French and Belgian POWs and 
ordered them to place the town under martial law until regular troops arrived. For five 
days Folcher and sixty other POWs were responsible for maintaining order over 
approximately 30,000 German civilians. They ordered the German civilians to turn in 
their arms and began taking SS soldiers prisoner. After a few days the ex-POWs had over 
thirty SS soldiers confined in a barn. Folcher recorded that some of the Polish and 
Ukrainian deportees had began to “settle scores” with German civilians. The Germans 
complained about this situation to the French prisoners, “convinced that it is we who 
ought to protect them.” The irony of his former captors now coming to him expecting 
protection was not lost on Folcher. Did they expect him and his companions to just forget 
about the last five years? At first Folcher and his companions turned a blind eye towards 
the situation, focusing instead on the many German soldiers still wandering the area. He 
wrote, “the Boche are only getting what they deserve.” After a few days the French 
prisoners put an end to this period of violence and drunkenness by disarming the Polish 
and Ukrainian deportees. Five days after the arrival of the first Allied troops Folcher and 
his companions were relieved by regular French soldiers and allowed to begin making 
arrangements for their voyage back to France.15 
 The dynamic Folcher described of German civilians looking towards western 
European prisoners of war for protection in the last days of the war is repeated in several
other accounts. As early as 1943 the SD was aware of a growing sense of anxiety among 
                                                
15 Gustave Folcher, Marching to Captivity, The War Diaries of a French Peasant, 1939-1945, (London: 
Brassey’s, 1996), 224-244.  
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the population, especially among women, about how civilians would be treated should 
Germany be occupied. German authorities noted that this anxiety contributed to the 
breakdown of the social barriers they had attempted to construct between German 
civilians and foreign detainees. This growing German anxiety in regards to their foreign 
captives contributed to two very different dynamics. On the one hand, the level of 
violence directed at foreigners by German civilians increased during these months, 
presumably an attempt to maintain discipline through fear. Historian Ulrich Herbert 
described the season of primitive violence between German civilians and their form
captives as “the last act of this drama, the awful outcome of German foreign labor policy 
under National Socialism.”16 On the other hand, many other Germans adopted a different 
tactic and attempted to improve their relationships with foreigners as insurance against 
retribution and/or prosecution.17 Pierre Gascar wrote that many prisoners noticed the 
more friendly and helpful attitude German civilians had towards French POWs as the end 
approached. French prisoners were suddenly fed better, offered hiding places from 
particularly brutal German guards, excused from work, etc. He leaves the question open 
as to whether these acts were motivated by charity, by calculation, or if they were true 
expressions of anti-Nazi feelings which had previously been repressed.18 In particular 
German civilians feared retribution by Slavic prisoners. As these men and women had 
been treated inhumanely for years their concern was understandable. German racial 
prejudice further contributed to this particular anxiety. Germans had long been 
predisposed to think of Slavs as semi-barbaric people, a prejudice that became an open 
part of German national identity during the Nazi era. Within this mindset uncivilized 
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violent behavior by sub-human Slavs and other lesser races was only to be expected. As 
in many ways, Nazi racial prejudice became a self-fulfilling prophecy by promoting 
barbaric responses from people who had been treated barbarically for six year. It w s 
lost on many Germans that perhaps their own inhuman treatment of their captives might 
have been responsible for the violent retribution these same people took upon them when 
they were finally free to act. For many Germans 1945 only confirmed in their minds that 
the Nazi Reich had been the great defender of civilization, not its destroyer. Fearful 
German civilians turned to their western captives, men they saw as more civilized, for 
protection. The Germans must also have been aware that the western prisoners would 
have less cause for vengeance than the Slavs as they had been treated more humanely. 
Folcher’s reaction to retributive violence seems to have been typical of most French 
prisoners of war; they found this period of violence upsetting and cruel, but they also saw 
it as understandable and perhaps justified.19 
 
                                                
19 For other examples of French views of retributive violence see Cochet, 53; de Lannoy, 108-11; (Louis 
Pelletier in) Les KG parlent, 88-9; and Henri Laloux, Avril 1945, Libéré par l’armée rouge, (Paris: Editions 
Heimdal), 41-5. 
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Le Grand Retour 
 
“Marshal, here we are!”  (France au la Combat, June 7th, 1945, p 6.) 
 The troubles faced by the French prisoners did not end with their first sight of 
Allied or Soviet troops. Like Folcher, many French prisoners were put back to use by
their liberators, acting as laborers, security guards, guides, interpreters, tc. One group of 
French prisoners of war took advantage of the German retreat in the east and escape  in 
December 1944. They served out the reminder of the war as a volunteer unit in the Red 
Army.20 Most liberated prisoners were happy to do their part in these ways, but only for a 
short while. Once the situation around their site of liberation appeared to be under control 
the freed men and women simply wanted to get back home to their loved ones as soon as 
possible. One of the ex-captives’ great frustrations during this time period was the 
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mismanagement of their repatriation by the French armed services and the newly created 
Ministère des prisonniers, déportés et réfugiés (M.P.D.R.). The M.P.D.R. had developed 
an unworkably complex repatriation plan which confused and delayed the return of 
hundreds of thousands of French men and women. The two core flaws of the M.P.D.R. 
plan were its unrealistic attempt to force a huge body of frightened and desperat  m n 
and women to act in a rational and organized manner, and its inflexibility in responding 
to unexpected developments. To better understand why a plan so flawed in these 
fundamental ways was adopted it is necessary to first understand the personality of the 
man charged with heading the M.P.D.R. and organizing the repatriation effort, former 
resistance leader Henri Frenay. 
 
Henri Frenay: A Personal Profile 
 From the prisoners’ perspective the key official in the French provisional 
government was Henri Frenay, the head of the M.P.D.R from November 1943 through 
November 1945. Frenay was a man of great qualities, but also of significant 
shortcomings. His post at the M.P.D.R. did not allow him to use his better qualities to 
their best effect and exacerbated his faults. 
 Frenay was a resister of the first hour and one of the heroes of the internal 
resistance. He was from a traditionally conservative Lyonnais family nd, like his father, 
a career military officer. He described himself as belonging “unconsciu ly to the 
traditional French right, with its poverty, patriotism and paternalism.”21 Perhaps in 
keeping with military expectations, the Frenay family practiced a type of conservatism 
defined by patriotism and tradition rather than active involvement in politics. Henri and 
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his parents remained largely aloof from politics, even during the heated interwar years.22 
Henri enlisted as a nineteen year old in 1924, attended Saint-Cyr and rose through the 
ranks quickly. When war broke out Captain Frenay was a staff officer in the Vosges 
region. After avoiding capture in June 1940, Frenay made his way on foot to the free 
zone. Once in Vichy territory Frenay reported for duty and accepted a posting with the 
Armistice Army. On his own initiative he immediately began secretly organizing an anti-
German movement in Lyon. The movement he founded, eventually to be called Combat, 
became one of the largest and best organized of the resistance groups. Frenay 
demonstrated great personal courage and self-sacrifice in building and holding this 
organization together, in the process of which he sacrificed his military career, estranged 
himself from his family and saw many of his friends captured and killed. 
 Even though Frenay was among the first resisters, he stubbornly clung to a pro-
Pétain mindset much longer than did most of his fellow resisters. Patriotism, not a hatred 
of fascism, drove Frenay into resistance activity. Frenay believed the different resistance 
movements needed a remote authority figure, unaligned to any specific political 
movement, to rally and unify behind. He quickly identified Charles De Gaulle as the best 
man to fill this role. Even though Frenay promoted unity behind De Gaulle as early as 
1941, it took him a surprisingly long time to set aside his entrenched political sensibilitie  
and to fully break off his attachments to Marshal Pétain and the larger Pétainist mind et 
defined by traditionally conservative social values, nationalism and a distrust of leftist 
politics and social change. Frenay dedicated his first resistance manifesto to Pétain and 
wrote in his memoir that he saw himself as a Pétainist until at least the laer part of 1941. 
Like many Pétainists Frenay remained in denial for years that the Marshal’s government 
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actually did support collaboration with Germany. It was not until September 1942 that he 
finally came to accept that Pétain was not secretly supportive of the resistance and 
playing a “double game” with the Germans.23 One must keep in mind that by this time 
Frenay had already been living as a fugitive from Vichy authorities for many months and 
had already seen many of his companions taken away and tortured by Vichy security 
personnel. Frenay’s long work in the underground resistance caused him to accept that 
even some communists were patriots. While his reflexive distrust of communists never 
died, after seeing the sacrifices made by many communist resistance members, he did 
slowly come to respect and trust many i dividual leftists. By 1942 Frenay supported 
allowing individuals from across the political spectrum to serve in positions of authority 
provided they had proven their loyalty to France. That Frenay moved away from 
Pétanism and toward the center/left political coalition being constructed in the Gaullist 
camp perhaps says less about his evolving political disposition as it does about his 
willingness to subordinate politics to patriotism when the two became incompatible. For 
approximately a year Frenay found a way inside himself to both work for De Gaulle and 
remain a supporter of Pétain. His emerging toleration of differing political v ewpoints 
was driven by his recognition that love of patrie was not the sole province of the right. 
 As the Gestapo closed in on Frenay he was air-lifted out of occupied France in 
June 1943 and transported to Britain. Frenay initially expected to quickly return to 
France, but instead he accepted De Gaulle’s request that he remain in London and assume 
a post on the Free French organized Comité Français de la Libération Nationale (CFLN) 
as a representative of the internal resistance. 
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 Frenay’s work with Combat had shown he excelled at organization but struggled 
while working with partners whose opinions differed from his own. Throughout 1941-
1943 Frenay frequently clashed with other leading resistance figures such as Emmanuel 
d’Astier and Jean Moulin. Frenay became convinced that his disagreements with d’Astier 
and Moulin were not based on honest differences of opinion over the best way to conduct 
the resistance struggle but rather that these other leaders were “crypto-Communists” 
playing a role in a secret plot to take over the resistance, this despite the fact that neither 
d’Aster or Moulin were communists.24 Throughout his life Frenay seemed to see 
individuals with whom he worked as either “with him,” and working in the best interest 
of France, or “up to something,” and working against the common good. While Frenay 
came to accept persons from all political backgrounds as potential partners in the 
resistance struggle, he never fully put aside his distrust of leftists, in particular of 
communists. An example of his lingering weariness of leftists was his immediate hostile 
reaction towards the Front National upon learning of the existence of this Communist 
resistance movement. Throughout his memoir Frenay referred to communists working 
within other resistance organizations not as volunteers, but as “infiltrators.”25 Frenay was 
quick to attribute disagreements with colleagues as driven by hidden political agendas 
rather than simply by differences of opinion. His distrust of anyone who challenged his 
opinions bordered on paranoia. 
 Given Frenay’s background in the army, his habit of issuing orders rather than 
working for group consensus, and his penchant for direct action, one might be tempted to 
describe him as having a military mindset, but this would not be exactly accurate. Those 
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with a military mindset are used to working within a hierarchical organization in which 
orders are passed down and enacted without discussion. Frenay’s mindset was more that 
of a patron. When he passed down orders he expected them to be obeyed, but he was not 
in the habit of following orders himself. Throughout his military career his superior 
officers consistently noted an independence and rebelliousness in Frenay’s evaluations. 
His 1931 evaluation, which was on the whole very positive, described Frenay as “full of 
self righteousness and very arrogant,” and having a “very well developed spirit of 
criticism towards his superiors.” Three years later General Lafforgue described Frenay as 
“a bit tricky to handle.”26 Frenay’s excellent qualities, his enthusiasm, his hard work, and 
his commanding charisma, drove his career forward throughout the interwar years. All 
the while his superiors seemed to expect that with time he would grow out of his 
willfulness. 
 Frenay’s behavior in 1940-41 reveals that in his mid-thirties he was no more 
compliant than he had been earlier in his career. In 1940, when ordered by General 
Lescanne to surrender along with the rest of his unit, Frenay disobeyed and escaped on 
his own initiative. A few months later, when ordered by his superiors within the 
Armistice Army to cease his resistance activities, Frenay again disregarded his 
instructions and continued to secretly lead Combat. When he was finally directly 
confronted about his resistance work and forced to choose between following orders from 
his military superiors and continuing his activities, he chose Combat over the army and 
resigned his commission. Frenay continued this pattern of stubbornly independent 
behavior into his work with the resistance and the Free French. In 1943 rather than work 
through Jean Moulin to obtain money for Combat from a collective fund, Frenay 
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bypassed De Gaulle’s official representative and engaged in unilateral negotiations with 
the Americans for direct outside funding. That same year Frenay attempted to undermine 
an order to cede his direct control over Combat’s paramilitary groups to General 
Delestraint after De Gaulle appointed Delestraint overall commander of all the internal 
resistance military units.27 When Frenay was called to account for his continued 
interference in military matters he initially refused to back down. He violently argued 
with Jean Moulin and cursed General Delestraint in what Moulin described as 
“inadmissible language” before finally giving way.28 
 Nowhere was Frenay’s stubborn independence in the face of superior authority 
more clearly displayed than in his direct dealings with Charles De Gaulle. Frenay was 
one of the first internal resistance leaders to recognize De Gaulle as France’s national 
leader, however this recognition did not stop him from butting heads with De Gaulle and 
his representatives. The two men quarreled over their differing political visions for the 
future of France during their early meetings. De Gaulle planned to return a republican 
form of government to France, while Frenay argued for a government which would 
refashion French political institutions based upon the political aspirations of the 
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resistance movements. Frenay wrote that when the two men reached an impasse in one of 
their political conversations De Gaulle said that in the end he would have his way, even if 
it came down to his simply issuing an order for the reestablishment of a republic. Frenay 
continued to push. He replied to De Gaulle, “We are resisters, free to think and do as we 
choose. Our freedom of choice is an inalienable right. It is up to us to decide whether, in 
the political domain, we shall carry out your orders or not.” Using Frenay’s om de 
guerre, De Gaulle responded, “Well then, ‘Charvet,’ it seems France must choose 
between you and me.”29 
 Frenay moved from the world of combattant resistance towards that of politics 
reluctantly and, perhaps surprisingly, under the insistence of De Gaulle. After the Allied 
occupation of North Africa and the transfer of the Free French government to Algiers, 
French officials began planning in earnest for the work they would face upon their reurn 
to Metropolitan France. A Consultative Assembly composed of 84 representatives was 
created in November1943. This Assembly advised De Gaulle and began to transform the 
Free French movement into a more democratic movement which the United States and 
other Allied nations could more readily recognize as the legitimate representative of the 
French nation. De Gaulle tapped Frenay to become the first commissaire of the 
M.P.D.R.,30 the organization responsible for all matters related to French prisoners, 
deportees and refugees. The M.P.D.R. would replace the S.D.P.G. as soon as the 
provisional French government was established in France. For the last nine months of the 
war the M.P.D.R. was responsible for sending supplies to French nationals inside 
Germany, negotiating with the German government on their behalf, and for making 
                                                
29 Frenay, 217-18. 
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For clarity’s sake I will refer to the organization as the M.P.D.R. throughout this work. 
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preparations for the exiles’ return and reintegration into French society. In his memoir 
Frenay wrote that he was reluctant to accept the posting. He preferred to return to France 
and continue his clandestine resistance work. When De Gaulle insisted that he could do 
much more for French national interests heading the M.P.D.R. than he could hope to 
accomplish as a well-known fugitive back in France, Frenay accepted the post.31 
 In the end Frenay was a man gifted with great leadership skills, courage and 
dedication, but he was not mentally flexible, and he was not willing to gracefully accept 
orders or collective decisions with which he disagreed. When overruled Frenay would 
eventually give way in service of unity and the greater goal, but he stepped down with 
great reluctance. Frenay seemed to see these disagreements as tests of will rather than 
open exchanges, and when he did not have his way he accepted the decisions as only 
temporary setbacks rather than as final resolutions. Due to his slow break with Péta nism 
and his open dislike of republicanism it is understandable why many Free French and 
resistance leaders distrusted Frenay during the war years. Throughout his tenure as head 
of the M.P.D.R. Frenay was both one of the most respected national leaders and very 
much an outsider. Historian François Cochet goes so far as to speculate that De Gaulle 
pushed Frenay into heading the M.P.D.R. because he saw him as a rival, and believed 
that heading the M.P.D.R. was a job in which Frenay was almost certain to perform badly 
and thus damage his political future.32 Regardless as to why he was chosen to head the 
M.P.D.R., Frenay proved to be a poor choice for the position. 
 
                                                
31 Frenay, 305-7. 
32 François Cochet. Les exclus de la victoire, Histoire des prisonniers de guerre, déportés et S.T.O. (1945-
1985). (Paris: S.P.M., 1992), 131. 
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Frenay as head of the M.P.D.R. 
 Nearly thirty years after agreeing to head the M.P.D.R. Frenay reaffirmed that it 
was a role for which he, “felt no inclination. We were still at war. It was inconceivable 
that a soldier like me should not serve at the front.”33 Frenay was not only a reluctant 
administrator; his temperament made him a particularly poor choice for the specific 
M.P.D.R. post. In modern parlance, Frenay could probably be described with some 
accuracy as a “control freak.” One of his greatest strengths was his ability to organize 
men and women behind a common effort, but he had an almost obsessive need for 
structure and organization. When he faced a task which did not lend itself to structure and 
order, such as heading the M.P.D.R. during the repatriation phase, his greatest strength
became also his greatest weakness. While setting up the different branches of Combat in 
1942 Frenay admitted “I’ve been accused of taking a freakish delight in organizational 
charts, and I suppose there’s some truth in that charge.”34 His attempts to impose order 
and structure to the task facing the M.P.D.R. in 1944-45 were doomed to fail, and his 
reluctance to modify plans as conditions demanded limited his effectiveness in the post.  
 Frenay headed a commission, later a full ministry, which faced an enormous task 
of uncertain dimensions and for which it was provided with extremely limited resources. 
To organize, repatriate, process and care for approximately two million French prisoners 
and deportees in Germany the M.P.D.R. had to quickly assemble a staff limited to 8,450 
civilians complimented by the temporary assignment of a variable number of men and 
women from the French armed services between 1,300 and 11,000.35 It was a job best 
suited to an adaptable and creative leader, characteristics which Frenay lacked. The 
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35 Ministère des prisonniers, déportés et réfugiés. Bilan d’un effort. (Paris: Éditions du Rond-Point, 1945), 
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M.P.D.R. had to be capable of responding to rapidly changing and unexpected situations. 
No one even knew with any certainty how many prisoners, deportees and refugees there 
were outside France. When Frenay accepted the job he could only estimate the number of 
French nationals held in Germany within a margin of error of a few hundred thousand. 
None knew when these exiles would be capable of returning to France, or if they would 
return in stages or in one massive wave. No one knew how the war would develop and 
thus, no one knew if the repatriation would occur in a structured, organized manner, or 
amidst chaos. Given the information available there was no way a detailed plan for the 
prisoners’ return could be developed. 36 Nevertheless, under Frenay, the M.P.D.R. 
developed a complex plan to process the returning French men and women, a plan which 
almost immediately proved unworkable when confronted with the first wave of returne s. 
 
A Poorly Conceived Repatriation Plan 
 The M.P.D.R. plan which Frenay put into action was based on a Vichy plan 
developed in 194137 and refined in London during the spring of 1944. During the London 
meetings repatriation officials openly acknowledged that there were too many variables 
and unknowns to develop a firm plan,38 yet paradoxically went ahead and delivered a 
complex and inflexible plan. 
 One of the key problems with the plan was its mistaken assumption that the 
prisoners and deportees would be liberated from large camps. The Americans requested 
that the French prisoners be kept confined in these camps, even after they were liberated, 
                                                
36 Frenay, 339-40. See also Cochet, 90. For estimations on labor deportees see AN F9 3168. Ministère des 
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pour les travailleurs déportés et leurs familles,” 13 Nov 1944. 
37 Cochet, 90. 
38 Cochet, 73. 
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in order to keep roadways clear for military operations. The French officials apparently 
found this non-problematic.39 Neither the French nor the American officials seemed to 
have understood that most prisoners and deportees were spread out across the country in 
kommandos or would be held in open areas at the time of their liberation. The plan 
envisioned that after the prison camps were liberated the prisoners would remain inside 
them for an undetermined amount of time while being deloused, categorized and 
processed. When rail transport was arranged by the M.D.P.R. the liberated men and 
women would be transported for further processing to one of 73 administrative assembly-
line welcome centers which were to be set up along the French border.40 The M.D.P.R. 
also unrealistically envisioned being able to repatriate prisoners in categories. Those 
prisoners which belonged to categories most essential to French national needs wer to be 
liberated first, while less essential groups would be brought home as circumstances 
permitted. This was an unnecessary and unworkable part of the plan. The French feared 
the food supply would be a primary concern in post-liberation France and thus wanted 
agricultural workers returned first.41 Apparently no serious thought was given to the 
practical impossibility of detaining hundreds of thousands of French men and women in 
German camps while attempting to categorize them for a systematic repatriation. All the 
prisoners and deportees were desperate to return home as soon as possible, and any 
attempt to prioritize certain groups based on occupational information volunteered by the 
liberated men and women themselves would be a monumental task doomed to flounder in 
the sea of misinformation provided by the huge numbers of prisoners who would 
undoubtedly represent themselves as belonging to the highest prioritized groups. Almo t 
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needless to say, this plan fell apart on first contact with reality. In the end th re is no 
evidence that the prisoners or deportees were returned to France in any order other than 
that determined by luck and/or convenience. 
 Rather than being liberated from large camps where they could be housed most 
prisoners were liberated in small groups or while on the road. Even if these liberated men 
and women had been willing to remain in Germany while awaiting processing, in most 
cases there simply were no camps in which to hold them. Those prisoners who did have a 
home base of sorts had no inclination to remain there for one day longer than was 
absolutely necessary. After waiting for five years, many of the men and women did not 
wait for the M.P.D.R. to process and organize them and instead simply began making 
their way towards France by any means possible, often on foot. The M.P.D.R. planners 
had not taken into account the prisoners’ overwhelming desire to get back home, and 
their understandable fear of remaining in a situation as violent and unstable as the one
surrounding them in Germany in April and May of 1945. 
 When prisoners and deportees did arrive at frontier welcome stations, either on 
M.P.D.R. transport trains or on foot, they went through an assembly line processing 
which occurred per the ministry’s postwar report “in an orderly fashion with a rigorously 
fixed rhythm.”42 They were questioned to ensure that criminals, German fugitives and/or 
collaborators had not infiltrated among them. They were given a medical exam to ensure 
they were not bringing epidemic disease back into France. At this time the POWs were 
demobilized. Each prisoner was allowed to exchange 100 marks for French currency. 
Any amount held over that amount could not be exchanged. Finally, each returnee was 
given a train ticket back to their home village or city and a packet of food to hold them 
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over until they arrived at their destination. Frenay envisioned each returning deportee or 
prisoner to only require approximately seventy minutes of care before they could either 
be handed a 3rd class train ticket back home or directed to one of the short term lodgings 
(Maisons du Prisonnier) set up across the nation.43 On paper this process looked logical; 
each step served an important purpose. In practice it proved to be a slow and inefficient 
experience. The men and women had little patience for delays, processing and 
formalities, no matter how necessary they might have seemed to the planners in Paris.
The POWs were surprised to be demobilized, and the amount of money each was given 
quickly seemed rather meager for five years of service. Finally, as describ d below, the 
medical exams revealed that contagious diseases were less prevalent than the M.P.D.R. 
had feared, but that a large percentage of returnees suffered from stubborn illnesses for 
which the ministry was unprepared. Historian François Cochet study of the organization 
of the M.P.D.R. concluded that the welcome centers fell, “midway between a joke and a 
tragedy.”44 
 Another flaw in the M.P.D.R. plan was that it had envisioned the liberated men 
and women arriving at the French border in a steady and organized manner in scheduled 
groups. The war ended more suddenly than expected, and when the prisoners’ and 
deportees’ migration towards France became a spontaneous undertaking, the welcome 
centers were overwhelmed. In April 1945 313,000 prisoners and deportees arrived at the 
French border. This number grew to 900,000 the following month. Rather than arrive in a 
predictable steady rate the weekly intake at the welcome centers went from about 15,000 
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in early April to over 200,000 by mid-May.45 For those prisoners who acted more like the 
plan envisioned and waited for M.P.D.R. transportation, the ministry’s arrangements 
proved to be very poorly organized. On average French prisoners liberated by Allied 
forces had to wait 17 days before arriving at one of the welcome centers. Prisoners 
liberated by the Red Army and turned over to French officials for rail transport back 
home had to wait an average of 38 days to return home. The most unfortunate were those 
who were liberated by the Red Army and marched east for return via sea. These men and 
women had to wait an average of 116 days from their liberation before they once more 
set foot on French soil.46 Given these delays, those who walked home, hitched rides with 
Allied forces or, in some rare cases, had friends or relatives drive to Germany to pick 
them up in automobiles,47 reached France much more quickly than did those who acted as 
ordered by French officials. 
 The American armed forces helped thousands of French prisoners and deportees 
to overcome these transportation delays by allowing French nationals to board westbound 
trains and trucks when space was available and by organizing an airlift operatin. An 
average of 8,000 French men and women were flown to Paris daily during this operation. 
These returnees, along with those arriving on rail transportation not arranged by the 
M.P.D.R., unexpectedly made the capital the primary arrival point for repatriates ather 
than any of the border welcome centers. Despite Frenay’s later claims in his memoir that 
he had long argued for aerial repatriation against stubborn American resistance,48 the 
M.P.D.R., had made no preparations for the possibility of an airlift and did not have a 
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welcome center constructed in Paris until seventeen days after the repatriat s began 
arriving.49 This resulted in groups of men and women arriving daily in Paris with no 
French officials or family members to greet them for weeks. There was perhaps no more 
powerful image of M.P.D.R. failures than seeing thousands of weak, hungry and 
confused returnees, still dressed in prison rags, simply getting off trains and wandering 
into the streets of Paris. Any protest by M.P.D.R. officials that these men and women 
would have been properly welcomed and cared for if they simply had stayed in Germany 
and followed the ministry’s plan could not excuse this situation, especially given the poor 
functioning of the ministry’s own transportation arrangements. 
 Despite expecting the returning prisoners to be in even worse health then they in 
fact were, the M.P.D.R. plan failed to make preparations for the large percentage of 
returning prisoners who would need more than a few good meals and a bit of rest to 
regain their mental and/or physical health. Approximately one in five liberated prisoners 
needed more extensive medical care than the repatriation stations were prepa d to 
provide. Prisoners needing longer term care were simply sent back to their home 
departments, passing the problem on to the Maisons du prisonnier. In May 1945 the 
provisional government partially responded to the problem of prisoners suffering from 
long-term ailments by granting them nine months of state sponsored health care. As part 
of the same legislation each returnee was to be given two follow-up medical exams
intended to detect deficiencies stemming from their captivity; however, credits for these 
exams were never allotted and the program was stillborn.50 
                                                
49 Lewin, 63 and de Lannoy, 115. 
50 Lewin, 68-70. 
 298
 The prisoners also were surprised to find that the military benefits they rec ived 
upon their demobilization much smaller than expected. The combination of their 
demobilization bonus and compensation for five years of military service resulted in an 
average award of ten to twelve-thousand francs.51 Even in the best of circumstances this 
provided for only four or five months’ living expenses. Since the prisoners were 
demobilized immediately upon their liberation, France had, in effect, dumped nearly a 
million additional unemployed men into an already struggling economy. The prisoners 
were expected to readjust to civilian life and find gainful employment to provide for 
themselves and their families before their small financial cushion was exhausted.52 
 The apparent incompetence of the M.P.D.R. became a topic of newspaper 
coverage in early May 1944. Journalist Janet Flanner wrote that the newspaper Franc-
Tireur “had the disagreeable courage to say what thousands of prisoners’ families know 
is the truth- that the Ministry of Prisoners and Deportees functions, as it has functioned 
from the start, with inefficiency and confusion. Many prisoners have arrived without 
being met by officials, or even by their unnotified families, at the railway stations; the 
Ministry has not provided trucks, or even ambulances, for transportation . . .”53 
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The seated man asks the former POW, “Are you a nudist 
enthusiast?”   
“Not exactly, but I can’t clothe myself with my 
repatriation bonus.” (La France au Combat, July 5, 1945, 
p. 5.) 
     Even some simple and easily 
foreseeable problems caught the 
M.P.D.R. by surprise. One example of 
this was the ministry’s failure to 
stockpile new clothing, which resulted in 
the returnees having to redress in their 
prison uniforms after being processed 
and examined in the welcome stations. 
While still dressed in these reminders of 
their captivity, the prisoners had to 
complete the final leg of what Frenay had somehow envisioned as a seamless transition 
back into civilian life. The government’s slow reaction to this oversight caused the 
problem to take on a public nature and become a symbol of the perceived unsympathetic 
nature of the M.P.D.R. As late as May 30th, by which time over 1.2 million returnees had 
been processed, the arrival of 70,000 donated suits from the American Red Cross for the 
returning deportees and prisoners was still a newsworthy item.54 The ability of the public 
to grasp this issue earlier than Frenay’s ministry was illustrated in the newspaper 
coverage of the situation during the summer of 1945. An appeal for donations of used 
clothing, reproduced below, showed a striped prison uniform being held out by a gaunt 
arm, and read: “They have only this suit. Help us offer them the clothes of a free man.”  
This donation will help assure that their “return to France is also, without delay, their 
return to life.”      
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Above, “Don’t  you have another design?”  (La France au 
Combat, June 21, 1945, 6.) 
 
 
 
 
Left, (Franc Tireur, 5/29/45, 2.)   
 
 The sight of returning deportees and prisoners of war wearing tattered prison
uniforms was apparently not uncommon in Paris during the spring of 1945. Combat drew 
on this situation in June of 1945 by publishing a cartoon of a sickly man dressed in a 
numbered prison uniform walking with his son. As they pass a wealthy couple trying to 
ignore them the boy asks his father, “Father, how can I tell the difference betw en the 
zeros and the heroes?” as both words sound identical in spoken French. The father, 
replies, “I’d have to say by the serial numbers.” The father’s reply transformed his 
tattered appearance into a symbol of heroism, not a point of shame and inferiority, when 
in the company of his better off neighbors. 
 301
 
(La France au Combat, June, 28, 1945, p. 6.) 
 
 The M.P.D.R.’s failure to acquire replacement clothing for the returning prisoners 
and deportees was a universally understandable issue which engaged the public with the 
complex problems growing out of the government’s poorly administered reintegration 
program on a basic level. Such an obvious oversight seemed to point to either 
incompetence or a lack of comprehension among the ministry’s personnel about the 
sensitive nature of helping victims rebuild their dignity. 
 Criticism of the M.P.D.R’s repatriation effort was not restricted to newspaper 
editorials; it also came from members of the provisional government and later from the 
Mouvement national des prisonniers de guerre des déportés (M.N.P.G.D.), a formally 
clandestine resistance organization made up of former POWs that after the liberation took 
on the role of representing former prisoners and deportees. Frenay responded to these 
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critiques, as was his habit, as if they were insincere personal attacks by his political 
enemies. In March 1945, before these criticisms found much traction in the French p ss, 
Frenay characterized early criticism of his ministry as insincere and unjustified in an 
address to the Provisional Consultative Assembly. Responding to questions about the 
administration and spending of the M.P.D.R.  Frenay declared; “…it is not for demagogy 
that we fought, but for democracy.” He referred to accusations that his ministry’s poor 
relationship with the M.N.P.G.D. was due to his lack of respect for the group as slander. 
He assured the Assembly that preparations had been taken to properly care for the 
returning prisoners and deportees (most likely to his later regret, he emphasized the good 
work his ministry had done in stockpiling clothing) and dismissed complaints against the 
ministry as trifles exploited by those with “motives easy to discern.”55   
 On 18 May 1945, the first of what would eventually be many demonstrations 
against the administration of the M.P.D.R. occurred when four to five hundred liberated 
prisoners marched in Paris to protest what they saw as an inefficient and inflexible 
ministry56 that was reacting too slowly to a growing threat of epidemic disease among 
prisoners still waiting in Germany for medicine and transportation back to France.57 Four 
days later several more protests were conducted throughout the city. Despite Frenay’s 
tacit acknowledgement of the real nature of the prisoners’ complaints in his public appeal 
for charitable donations on May 26th,58 his reaction to a 5,000 person march on 2 June 
failed to positively address the protestors’ complaints. Frenay explained that the 
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M.N.P.G. organizers of the demonstration were preventing him from speaking directly to 
the former prisoners, and thus preventing them from understanding that his ministry wa  
doing everything within its ability to help them. Frenay reminded the French people that 
the prisoners of war were only one group of citizens, and that they must recognize that all 
of France was suffering and be mindful of the government’s limited means.59 Again in 
this instance Frenay treated criticism of his own and his ministry’s performance as 
personal and politically motivated. He saw the M.N.P.G. as a puppet organization of the 
Communist Party and, thus, all criticism from this group as invalid and insincere. To a 
degree Frenay’s point of view is understandable. Many of the more virulent attacks came 
from Communists and that party’s newspaper, l’Humanité. However, criticism was also 
coming from sources independent of the communists, and these criticisms were bringing 
to light real problems in the operation of the M.P.D.R. 
 
Deconstructing a flawed repatriation 
 Frenay’s plan for the repatriation involved a highly organized and rapid transition 
of liberated individuals from captivity to civilian life, with no allowance made for special 
recognition or long-term government support. Frenay’s vision of the repatriation did not 
envision any desire on the part of the returnees to express individual desires or goals, to 
seek recognition for their sacrifice, or to advocate in an organized fashion for public 
assistance. Frenay seems to have envisioned his ministry efficiently processing a wave of 
weakened but not seriously ill French citizens, grateful to be home, and desiring nothing 
more than to quickly disappear back into the fabric of society.60 When the liberated 
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POWs did organize public protests to advocate for recognition, benefits and a more 
effective ministry working on their behalf, Frenay interpreted their manifestation as a 
conspiratorial plot orchestrated by his political enemies designed to embarrass him rather 
than as an expression of the unique grievances and needs of this group and his response 
to the protest was equal parts hostile and dismissive.61 The M.N.P.G. marches of the 
summer of 1945 were the opening act for what would eventually become a long political 
lobbying effort by former POWs and deportees to undo some of the disappointments of 
their homecoming by winning increased benefits and late recognition. 
 Moving from the more simplistic to the more complex, the reasons behind the 
flaws in the homecoming can be explained on three levels. Frenay’s shortcomings as 
head of the M.P.D.R. explain some of the most obvious problems of the prisoners’ and 
deportees’ homecoming. By skill-set and temperament, he was not well suited to his job.
The economic conditions of France in the liberation era also help explain some of the 
shortcomings of the homecoming. France had very few resources in 1944 and 1945, and 
the nation’s needs were great. The third and most complex element necessary to 
understanding the homecoming’s shortcomings is an understanding of the position within 
the Gaullist myth and the reconstruction of the French national community of the 
returning prisoners and deportees. After the trauma of the war, occupation and the Vichy 
era, De Gaulle and the provisional government’s prioritization of national unity stymied 
attempts by the returning prisoners and deportees to have their unique needs addressed. 
Each of these causes will be addressed below. 
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Frenay as a cause of the flawed homecoming 
 The similarities between Frenay’s personality and the M.P.D.R. repatriation plan 
are too aligned to ignore. It is almost as if the ministry’s plan was an administrative 
manifestation of Henri Frenay himself. Like Frenay, the plan expected its subjects to 
follow directions without question. When the prisoners and deportees deviated from these 
directions, like Frenay, the plan lacked the flexibility to adapt to the unexpected 
appearance of human agency. The M.P.D.R. administration, like Frenay, responded to 
unexpected developments with frustration rather than creative action. Perhaps most 
importantly, the M.P.D.R. plan treated the returning prisoners and deportees as subjects 
to be processed as efficiently as possible rather than as physically and mentally 
traumatized humans in need of more than seventy minutes of bureaucratic attention. 
 Beyond his overseeing of the development and implementation of the flawed 
repatriation plan itself, Frenay’s personality also made him ill-equipped to perform many 
daily aspects of his job. His lack of ability to work well with partners handicapped his 
effectiveness. The ministry had to coordinate its efforts with organizations fr m other 
nations- it could not simply dictate events. Frenay’s initial reaction to the “outside 
interference” of the United States airlifting French prisoners and deportes out of 
Germany is an example of how this trait limited his effectiveness. Even though this 
operation returned tens of thousands of men and women, many in poor health, to France 
weeks earlier than would have been possible had they relied upon M.D.P.R. transport, 
Frenay initially attempted to delay the start of the airlift and direct the aircraft toward 
landing strips near welcome centers, which if they existed at all would presumably be in 
rough shape, rather than Paris.62 Ultimately Frenay’s attempts to control the parameters 
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of the airlift were moot as it was presented to him by S.H.A.E.F. as a fait accompli. 
Frenay’s initial resistance and his ministry’s slow reaction to the airlift ca l into question 
his later claims to have always been a strong supporter of the program. Perhaps Frenay’s 
reluctant response to the airlift was caused by its implementation having bypassed his 
careful planned procedures, or perhaps his pride was injured because the airlift 
dramatized the enormous gap between French and American means. Frenay was ver
aware he headed an under-staffed and under-funded agency while American resources 
seemed limitless. Regardless as to the reasons behind it, the M.P.D.R.’s sluggi h response 
to this unexpected source of assistance resulted in tens of thousands of confused and 
haggard ex-captives arriving in Paris with no one present to greet them for weeks.  
 Frenay’s distrust of people who did not share his political mindset also 
handicapped his performance. He was only comfortable working within a strict hierarc y 
in which his orders were passed down and acted upon. As a service ministry within the 
government the M.P.D.R. inevitably worked with politicians of all persuasions, men and 
women who could not be expected to simply put their political inclinations aside and 
follow orders. In his haste to staff the ministry Frenay wrote that he “decided to use any 
Vichy official I could find who had not acted in a blameworthy way.”63 The resulting 
high prevalence of former Vichy officials working for the M.D.P.R., coupled with 
Frenay’s hostility toward leftists, seemed to justify his critics who saw him as a 
reactionary authoritarian. Frenay treated other state employees who had their own ideas 
about how the repatriation should be organized as enemies rather than men and women 
with the prisoners’ and deportees’ best interest in mind. Notable among these clash s 
were Frenay’s hostile and suspicious attitude towards one of the early organize s of the 
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former prisoners, François Mitterrand. Frenay immediately dismissed Mitterrand’s work 
with the M.N.P.G.D. as no more than a stepping stone the ambitious young man was 
using to advance his own political career.64 As he had while working in the Resistance 
and with the Free French, Frenay interpreted differences of opinion regarding his 
administration of the organization as plotting and political gamesmanship rather than as 
valid criticisms. When it became almost immediately clear that the ministry’s repatriation 
plan was not executable, rather than simply scrap the plan and reallocate his resources, 
Frenay initially attempted to master the situation and force the repatriation to conform to 
his plan rather than change his plan to conform with reality. Later he fought against, 
rather than worked with, federations representing former prisoners of war during the 
readaptation phase despite the very real problems these organizations had brought to 
light.65 
 Another aspect of Frenay’s personality which made him ill-suited to head the 
M.P.D.R. was the low regard which he held for many of the people his agency had been 
created to serve. Like many members of the internal resistance, Frenay was suspicious of 
French men and women who had volunteered to work in Germany or who had allowed 
themselves to be deported rather than escape and join the maquis. He was also 
judgmental towards soldiers who had been taken prisoner and who had remained in 
Germany rather than escape. After all, he had managed to avoid captivity and deportation 
himself through his courage and willingness to take risks as a soldier. Frenay’s somewhat 
contemptuous attitude towards the prisoners is easily recognized in his memoir. He 
incorrectly described the prisoners as having, for the most part, been “seized in their 
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barracks,” and then “led like sheep” to Germany where they spent the next years 
“vegetating” in prison camps.66 As head of the M.P.D.R. he was responsible for working 
on the behalf of these prisoners, still he looked down upon his constituents. He described 
the workers, prisoners and deportees as having a “claim on our compassion, however 
unequally they had served the nation,” and later admitted, “It was tempting to mete out 
praise and blame” toward his constituents.67 This attitude may explain Frenay’s dismissal 
of efforts by federations representing former prisoners arguing for increased benefits and 
recognition for their constituents, a duty that one might expect the head of the M.P.D.R. 
to be performing himself.68 
 In total, Frenay appears to have been a very poor choice to head the M.P.D.R. He 
defended his ministry’s, and by extension his own, performance with an aloofness which 
appeared arrogant to many. Frenay refused to accept responsibility for the obvious 
shortcomings of his agency. When confronted with a problem Frenay would deny it if 
possible, and when denial was no longer an option, he blamed the existence of the 
problem, or the perception that the problem existed, on leftist political maneuverings 
against him. In 1945 the M.D.P.R. published a public report entitled Bi an d’un effort 
which defended the ministry’s performance under Frenay by comparing how many more 
prisoners and deportees it had liberated compared to the 1918 homecoming, and how 
much more quickly it was able to accomplish this task. The public release of the report 
suggests that Frenay and the ministry were using it as a way of responding to the low 
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public perception of the ministry’s performance. The tone of the report leaves the 
impression that Frenay left his post as head of the M.P.D.R. relatively unburdened with 
regrets or self-examination.69  
 
Limited resources as a cause of the flawed homecoming 
 Throughout the second half of 1944 and 1945 France struggled through a period 
of intense deprivation, in many ways even greater than that of the German occupation.70 
In 1944 French industrial output was only 38% what it had been in 1938. In 1945 the 
franc’s value was reduced to one-sixth its pre-war level. The national railroad network 
was in an abysmal state with less than half serviceable. The rail and road networks were 
not the only things in need of repair in 1945- 460,000 buildings had been destroyed and 
another 1.9 million were damaged, leaving over a million citizens homeless. In 1946 the 
French ministry of reconstruction estimated that the cost of simply repairing the material 
damages of the war would cost the nation the equivalent of between two and three years 
of its total gross national product. In total World War II inflicted considerably more 
material damage to France than the First World War. Food was also in dramatically short 
supply. In 1945 the wheat harvest was approximately half the pre-war average, causing 
bread, the staple of the nation’s diet, to be strictly rationed. In 1945 the French 
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government determined that after the deprivations of the occupation and the postwar 
fourteen year old French boys and girls were seven to eleven centimeters shorter and 
seven to nine kilograms lighter than the same age group had been in 1935. Coal 
production had fallen from 156,000 tons in 1938 to 67,000 in 1944, which allowed only 
for a few hours of electricity per day in Paris and a coal ration so low that only one room 
could be heated in most homes. Journalist Janet Flanner wrote in December of 1944, 
“Except for the first winter after the defeat, this is the most uncomfortable wint r of the 
war.”71 
 
The rare sight of a working chimney in 
Paris during the first winter after liberation 
causes these pedestrians to confuse it with a 
German rocket attack. (La France Au 
Combat, January 11, 1945, p .8.) 
 
 Further stretching the nation’s limited resources was the expense of construti g a 
new army so France could play its desired role in the final defeat of Germany and 
maintain control over its empire. De Gaulle not only accepted these burdens, he 
demanded them, and there is little evidence that the French population would have 
preferred him to do otherwise. When U.S. military planners attempted to funnel French 
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mobilization efforts into the formation of 175 battalion-sized light infantry units suitable 
only for garrison, internal security and mop up work, De Gaulle insisted instead on the 
development of a modern force of 25 additional combat ready divisions in 1945 to 
complement the eleven already in action.72 Simply put, the government had decided that 
restoring France’s position as a European and global power would take precedence over 
the material needs of her civilians. This was expressed not only through the prioritizat n 
of scarce resources, but also in the expressed displeasure of the government and the 
people when France was treated as a junior partner by the British, Americans and Soviets, 
such as by not being invited to the Yalta conference or initially not being assigned an 
occupation zone in Germany. The government’s message in response to these slights was 
that France had an essential role to play in the future of Europe, and was willing to do 
what was necessary to assume its fair burden despite its diminished state. 
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“One can never make a stable construction without the fourth pillar!” (La France au Combat, February 2,
1945, p. 1.)  France represented as being foolishly left on the sidelines while the post-war settlement is 
worked out by the “Big Three.”  
 
 Frustration caused by deprivation was a dominant theme in the French popular 
press during the post-liberation months. While the scarcity of food, fuel, consumer and 
luxury goods during the occupation could be blamed upon the Germans, its persistence 
into the liberation era came as a depressing surprise to the population. As late as 1949
nearly half of French citizens continued to rank “satisfaction of basic daily needs” as their 
primary daily concern, three times higher than the next ranked item.73 
  Given the accumulation of deprivations and burdens described above, the French 
people had little energy left after dealing with their own individual hardships to spare in 
the form of compassion for the prisoners and deportees during the immediate postwar 
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years. There is a limit to the number of social problems a person can focus upon at any 
given time, and the French people had reached that limit. In modern psychiatric 
terminology, the French people had reached the point of “compassion fatigue” by 1945.74
The government had few resources available to deal with the nation’s immediate needs, 
much less additional funds to help the returning captives reestablish themselves at their 
own pace. Added to this was the emerging official discourse of “shared sacrifice” 
described below which discouraged the airing of individual grievances. In 1945 deportees 
and prisoners returned to a country certainly relieved to have them home, but also one 
perhaps not capable or willing to extend them privileged status or benefits based upon 
their wartime sacrifices.75 
 
“Shared Sacrifice” as a cause for the flawed homecoming 
 Despite the liberation, most of France was hardly in a celebratory mood in 1945. 
Beyond the economic problems and physical devastation from the war and occupation, 
France’s social and political foundation appeared fragile. The people were struggling to 
find an acceptable narrative encompassing the defeat, occupation and liberation with 
which to come to terms with their recent past and from which to form an adjusted 
national identity which could unify the nation and provide it with a vision of a hopeful 
future.76 This process was complicated by two waves of retributive violence which swept
the nation. The first coincided with the liberation of most of the national territory in the 
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summer of 1944; the second was sparked by the repatriation of victims and suspected 
collaborators from the crumbling German Reich the following spring. Roughly ten 
thousand summary executions were carried out during this era,77 and several times more 
that number of acts of orchestrated humiliation and violence were committed as 
communities purged themselves of compromised individuals.78 Most French citizens 
were left unconvinced that justice had been restored to their nation due to the chaotic and 
uneven nature of this purge.79 France was split between those who desired a deep purge 
of collaborators and fundamental change, and those who simply desired a return to 
normalcy. The first hints of the post-war political divisions that would define the 4th 
Republic’s short history took shape even before the end of the war. 
 In a conscious effort to provide the French people with a pathway to move past 
the internal divisions brought so dramatically into the open during the war years and 
being acted out in the purge violence, De Gaulle and the newly formed French provincial 
government promoted the view that during the occupation French citizens had 
overwhelmingly remained true to the nation’s republican heritage. The Gaullist vision (or 
“myth” depending upon your interpretation of its validity) acknowledged the existence of 
only a small number of traitors making common cause with the German occupiers. It wa  
this small group of collaborators who had formed the illegitimate Vichy regim , while the 
remainder of the French population, always resisters at heart, suffered through the 
occupation. This way of remembering their recent past allowed the French people to see 
themselves as a nation of resisters/victims, soiled only by a small number of 
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collaborators/criminals.80 This simplified but not entirely inaccurate vision of the war 
years helped France recover quickly in an emotional sense. However, since from this 
perspective all of France had sacrificed and suffered, there was not much room for 
individual groups to identify themselves as deserving elevated recognition for their 
wartime experiences. When transformed into government policy, this view of shared 
sacrifice also made the efforts of any particular group which sought individual 
compensation for wartime sacrifices appear invalid. Since all of France had suffered, and 
since the government representing the damaged nation had few resources to spare, the 
narrative of shared sacrifice made the decision to refuse the extension of public benefits 
to specific groups logical. 
 It was into this highly charged and stressed environment that the French prisoners 
returned, along with three other groups who had also been in German captivity; 300,000 
S.T.O. and volunteer workers; 37,025 men and women freed from prison camps to which 
they had been sent for suspected resistance activity; and, finally, 2,500 Jews, all that 
remained of the 75,721 taken during the occupation.81 Each of these groups had found 
their way into captivity and experienced the war in different terms. Despite the fact that 
these groups were so disparate, the French government preferred to deal with them as if 
they were one cohesive block. This decision was most concretely expressed with the 
formation of a single ministry, Ministère des prisonniers, déportés et réfugiés, to 
administer to the needs of all captive groups. A commonly reprinted M.P.D.R. poster 
from the era shows three returnees supporting each other as they walk out of a destroye  
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background and towards a more brightly lit horizon. Each group of returnees is 
represented in the poster, a worker with a suitcase, a camp inmate of undetermined 
nature, and a prisoner of war. The caption: “They are united. Do not divide them.” 
  
(Reprinted from Durand, La Captivité, p 514.) 
 This meshing together of the different groups promoted viewing all the returnees 
as belonging to one large group of unfortunates. There was no precedent in French 
history for dealing with the aftermath of a massive deportation program. There were 
however several recent examples of the nation responding to large waves of refugees. In 
this way, France responding to the Grand Retour on the model of a refugee crisis made 
sense. Refugees were due compassion, short term assistance, but were not necessarily 
entitled to elevated national status or long-term public assistance. This form of response 
might appear an appropriate homecoming for the political and racial deportees as w ll as 
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the workers, but it conflicted with how soldiers had traditionally been welcomed home. 
During the last two years of their captivity a communal bond had developed between the 
prisoners of war, the deportees and the workers. They were brought together by their 
shared nationality, common suffering and a willingness to rely upon each other during 
their journeys back to France. As this was a unity which Historian François Cochet 
described as one made through “ugliness and closeness to death,”82 it was not necessarily 
a unity which would endure after the trauma had passed. What the prisoners, workers and 
deportees shared in common was an experience of suffering, and this common experience 
would only continue to unite them so long as they continued to recognize the captivity as 
central the central focus of their lives. The prisoners expected to embrace a new form of 
identity, that of honored veterans, upon their return to France, and thus quickly shed their 
bonds with the workers. Upon their return to France the prisoners were surprised to find 
the French government treated them in a very similar manner to the returning workers. 
Shared sacrifice dictated that the returning prisoners of war were to be treat d just as the 
rest of their countrymen, as unfortunate victims of a long ordeal. The prisoners must have 
wondered when their military service was stripped of its recognition- when vet rans 
became refugees.83  
 While each of these groups expected acknowledgement by their countrymen 
commensurate with their unique sacrifices, they instead found a nation too marginalized 
by its own political, social and economic trauma to afford them the compassion and 
recognition for which they looked. These groups found themselves treated in a manner
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consistent with the officially articulated vision of shared sacrifice. The only distinction 
between individual French wartime experiences given weight in this discourse was that 
between true French citizens who remained loyal to the republican principles enshrined 
by the nation’s past, and the relatively small number of traitors who betrayed France and 
collaborated with her enemies or who had taken advantage of the nation’s misfortunes for 
personal gain. 
 Always an element of concern for the French public, the fate of the prisoners and 
deportees increasingly played a role in public discussion after news of war crimes and 
camp conditions became more widely known. To the French people the continuing 
suffering of the prisoners and deportees became an ongoing symbol of Nazi barbarity nd 
the crimes committed against the French people. While this view of the captives mad  
them important to the French people during the final months of war, it did not actually 
bestow them with special status. While the deportees and prisoners were continuing to 
suffer in German captivity, within the context of the shared sacrifice discour e, their 
plight symbolically represented the plight of all of France, not a unique experinc . 
 In a way Frenay’s and the M.P.D.R.’s handling of the return can be seen as a 
metaphor for the reaction of the entire French nation towards the deportees and priso ers. 
While often shocked by, and at times even moved to vigilante violence by the poor state 
of mental and physical health found in many of the returning deportees, the French 
people did not encourage outspokenness on their part about their experience.84 The 
French public reacted to the return of these groups with sympathy, but sympathy of  
finite nature. While the nature of the homecoming was partially shaped by the nation’s 
economic limitations and by Frenay’s administration, it was also shaped by thediscourse 
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of shared sacrifice and the public’s perception of how deserving the returnees wer  of 
elevated national status. The two largest groups of returnees, the workers and the 
prisoners of war, were seen by much of the public as compromised, and this qualified any 
compassion they might receive. 
 Returning labor deportees were often held in suspicion by members of their 
community for their failure to evade conscription and join the maquis. Those laborers 
who had left voluntarily to work in Germany at the encouragement of the Vichy 
government were often seen as collaborators and at times greeted with violence upon 
their return.85 Even though only a minority of the returning workers had gone to Germany 
of their free will, many French citizens seemed to have simply treated the whol group as 
suspicious rather than attempt to determine who had been and who had not been 
deported. A November 1944 M.P.D.R. report prepared by Frenay himself appears to 
demonstrate that the minister shared much of the public’s divided mind on the returning 
workers. In the report Frenay encouraged his ministry to act with restraint regarding 
returning workers, “to avoid real misunderstandings,” but also wrote that “it remains 
well-established that in several cases voluntary work for German victory was done by a 
few fanatics who are candidates for treason.”86 Based on subsequent reports prepared by 
the M.P.D.R. (but unlike the above document, not signed by Frenay himself) the search 
for traitor workers which Frenay’s November report appeared to favor was not acted 
upon. By the following month the ministry was encouraging a proper welcome for all
returning workers. In December 1944 an unsigned M.P.D.R. report determined that 
efforts would not be made by the ministry to distinguish between workers who had 
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volunteered to go to Germany from those who had gone against their will.87 On 15 
February 1945 the M.P.D.R. sponsored a radio address reminding the French people that 
most of the workers who went to Germany were not volunteers and so returning men and 
women should not be mistreated by “those who want to find scapegoats.”88 Despite these 
efforts, many returning workers received a cold, if not outright hostile, reception. Even 
after generations of sporadic work by former labor deportees to rehabilitate their image 
the workers remain seen in France today as a group of “ill-loved exiles” in the words of 
historian Philippe Buton.89 
 The POWs were also seen by many of their countrymen as tainted. As 
demonstrated earlier, during the war Vichy propaganda portrayed the prisoners’ standards 
of living as higher than in fact they had been, and exaggerated the degree of loyalty they 
held for the Vichy government. This was done for purposes of increasing domestic 
support for the regime and its pro-collaboration policies.90 The result of these false 
representations was that many French citizens viewed the POWs as not having suffered a 
difficult captivity and as stubborn supporters of a dictatorial regime. 
 Prisoners of war were also inevitably unfavorably compared to those veterans of 
43-45 and resistance combattants. Some saw the prisoners of 1940 not as a group to 
which gratitude was owed but as the ones who had failed to defend the nation and, thus, 
associated them with national shame and weakness. Historian Christophe Lewin 
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eloquently summarized the returning POW’s situation: “The Resistance, The F.F.I., The 
Soldiers of 43-45- those who history had accorded a second chance- the artisans of the 
victory, occupied the honored positions. [The prisoners] were regulated to the role of the 
eternally vanquished.”91 
 The M.P.D.R. did attempt to counter the view that the prisoners were a shameful 
group. During the winter of 1944-45, it sponsored an exposition in 
 
Paris about the French prisoners and 
deportees still held in Germany. Pierre 
Lamblin, himself a former prisoner, wrote a 
weekly column in the weekly newspaper 
Combat to keep the memory of the prisoners 
and deportees fresh in his readers’ minds. 
Lamblin’s description of the Paris exhibition 
demonstrated its purpose of countering the 
years of  (La France au Combat, January 11, 1945, p.2) 
 
Vichy propaganda. After visiting the exhibition, Lamblin wrote, one would understand 
that the prisoners held no love for the Vichy government, that De Gaulle and the “flam
of the resistance” within them had kept their hope alive during the final years of their 
exile.92 The M.D.P.R. also organized a national information campaign dubbed “The 
Week of the Absent One” to help the nation prepare for the great return. By March 1945 
Frenay was satisfied with the work his ministry had done in these regards. By that point 
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he believed “the nation was psychologically prepared to welcome its sons home.”93 
Through this propaganda campaign the M.P.D.R. attempted to de-stigmatize the prisoners 
prior to their return; however, in one prominent way, the French provisional government 
also strongly reinforced the view of the prisoners being less than deserving of special
status. Returning prisoners of war were immediately demobilized upon their return to 
France and were not recognized as veterans. As will be examined in more detail in the 
epilogue, many of the prisoners of war were surprised and deeply wounded by the 
government’s decision to deny them recognition as veterans. While much of the former 
prisoners’ lobbying efforts in 1945 focused on winning concrete forms of assistance from 
the government, such as health care and housing allowance, their main focus quickly 
became winning something much less tangible, the right to call themselves veterans.94  
 The prisoners’ efforts to win increased benefits and recognition were handicapped 
by the dire economic conditions of the nation in 1945, and by the discourse of shared 
sacrifice, which labeled efforts such as theirs to gain unique group recognition for 
wartime service as selfish and damaging to national unity. 
 The homecomings of the two smallest groups of returnees, the political and racial 
(in almost all cases Jewish) deportees, were also affected by the discourse of shared 
sacrifice. While the political and racial deportees were, in reality, two separate groups 
brought into captivity for different reasons, in practice the French media and government 
tended to meld the two. In most newspaper representations Jewish and political deportees 
were combined in the form of the undistinguished concentration camp survivor. While at 
first this may seem nonsensical, given the context of 1945 it is more understandable. In 
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the immediate aftermath of World War II concentration camps were not understood to be 
as closely associated with the Nazi anti-Jewish genocidal program as they are today. 
Concentration camp inmates were assumed to be a diverse mix of victims, of whom the 
Jews were certainly a part, but not a defining part. For this reason the French viewed all 
persons interred in Nazi concentration camps as victims of the same fate, not aware of the 
distinction that existed between labor camps and extermination camps. 
 The few Jewish deportees who returned were encouraged by the Jewish 
community to define their captivity not in racial terms, but as their part of the overall 
French trauma. In effect they were encouraged to shed the ethnic identity that had made 
them a target of genocide, and instead continue the long Jewish pursuit of acceptance by 
the French population at large by recommitting themselves to a national identity rather 
than a racial or religious one. Add to this lack of advocacy on their own part the degree of 
shame many in France undoubtedly felt after learning what had happened to the Jews 
whom they had allowed to be deported, and it is easily understandable why few non-
Jewish persons cared to emphasize the plight of this group.95 While the French people 
cannot be held responsible for the murder of Jews deported from France during the war, it 
must be recognized that all French men and women were aware on some level of the 
targeted persecution Jews received during the war, both from the Vichy government and 
the German occupiers. Undoubtedly many were aware of much more. A strong moral 
condemnation of Nazi murder of French Jews could not be frankly delivered without 
some degree of self examination, an exercise the French people were not ready to accep  
in 1945.  
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 For the Jews to emphasize their unique suffering during the war would be a 
challenge to the discourse of shared sacrifice. A community which had spent generations 
attempting to meld into the French body politic would have been especially reluctant to 
position themselves as a group disruptive to national unity. Indeed the Jewish community 
harbored reasonable fears of igniting a renewed wave of anti-Semitism within France 
itself.96 The Jews sense of vulnerability was reinforced by a brief wave of anti-Semitism 
in Paris during the spring of 1945.97 Having only recently observed firsthand the lack of 
fraternity (if not outright hostility) some of their neighbors held for Jews, security may 
have seemed a higher virtue than recognition among many.98  
 Unlike the POWs and workers, the status of the political deportees was actually 
elevated by shared sacrifice. Upon their return to France, unlike the prisoners and labor 
deportees, political deportees held no ‘taint’ to qualify their embrace by the French 
nation. In reality many persons who fit into the category of political deportee had not 
actually performed acts of bravery or patriotism to cause their deportation. Many had 
found their way into camps simply by being hostages or common criminals sent by Vichy 
officials into Germany to meet Nazi demands for specific numbers of reprisal victims to 
punish resistance attacks. Despite these distinctions all political deportees were treated as 
the embodiment of French patriotism and courage. In general, French political deportees 
were sent to labor camps where they suffered an extremely harsh captivity defined by 
intense physical labor, unpredictable violence, and the virtually unchecked sprea  of 
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contagious disease. The resulting mortality rate among the political deporte s reflected 
this experience. Of the 63,085 persons who can be classified as belonging to this group, 
only 59% (37,025) returned to France.99 This number is even more telling given that most 
French political deportees were in captivity for nine months or less.100 
 Megan Koreman writes in her study of the return of the deportees, “The [political] 
deportees reached the apex of the moral hierarchy by combining in one person Resistance 
engagement with the type of patriotic suffering thought to ennoble the soul.”101 British 
historian Julian Jackson supports this point of view, “In the hierarchy of virtue in post-
war France, the [political] deportees had come to occupy a central place only just below 
the resisters. They symbolized the suffering of the French nation in the war, and were 
depicted as having been spiritually purified by their terrible experience in the camps.”102 
Political deportees represented the “true France,” and like the mythical Jewish lamed 
vovniks,103 through their suffering they purified the nation of its sins and, with their 
persons, provided a refutation of France as a morally depraved nation of collaborators. 
Within the Jewish community, the few thousand returning Jewish deportees were 
encouraged to not challenge the view that their deportation had been motivated by factors 
other than their French patriotism and resistance to Nazi tyranny.104 “[For the Jews] the 
tacit – and sometimes specifically stated – condition for being reintegrated into the [post-
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war] national community was conforming to prevailing conditions and toning down any 
specific demands.”105 
 
The impact of shared sacrifice on the Grand Retour of 1945 
 If the Gaullist narrative of shared sacrifice had not been promoted, the French 
government might have reacted differently to the returning groups of prisoners and 
deportees. Given the prevailing discourse any group demanding individual recognition 
threatened to break apart the fragile unity fostered in 1945, and also threatened the unique 
heroic status of the only group of French citizens who were granted an elevated form of
honor, the living and dead members of the resistance. After the war resistance 
organizations closely guarded their status, unwilling to see it diluted or diminished 
through reexamination. In the Resistance’s black and white vision of the war, prison gray 
could only bring unwanted confusion. Megan Koreman concludes in her study that the 
deportees did more than simply discomfort the nation, “…they posed an unbearable 
contradiction to the founding myth of postwar France… [by] … subverting the myth’s 
assertion of equal victimhood, because their physical presence made it quite clear hat 
some French men and women had suffered extraordinarily for France’s liberation while 
others had profited from its occupation. One could not consider the deportees and believe 
the Gaullist myth at the same time.”106 
 De Gaulle consciously provided France with a comforting historical narrative in 
order to foster national unity. France’s relatively rapid recovery from the war lends 
support to remembering this era of apparent domestic unity as successful. Of course, 
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success is the product of sacrifice and, in this case, the sacrifice was paid in large part by 
the returning deportees and prisoners. 
 On 11 November 1945, the first Armistice Day of the post-war era, France 
honored its heroes of World War II. Fifteen individuals who had died for France were 
buried in a state ceremony at Mont Valérien, the site of numerous German executions of 
French hostages. Laid to rest were the remains of nine soldiers, three resist rs, two 
political deportees, and one prisoner of war who had been killed in an escape attempt. 
The categories and proportions of remains to be interned, symbolically determining those 
who belonged in the hierarchy of honor, and those whose war experiences were too 
murky to be rendered full honor, had been originally suggested by Henri Frenay.107 
Absent from the burial ceremony were the laborers, the Jews, and the prisoners who had 
failed in their duty to escape. 
 It would be another nine years before the French nation decided to add a sixteenth 
plot to the Mont Valérien site to commemorate the deportees. In keeping with their 
official discourse of undifferentiated sacrifice, the plot was not filled with the body of a 
single deportee but; rather, an urn carrying the mixed ashes of representatives from all 
deportee groups. Recognition of the unique nature of the Jewish experience would not be 
addressed for another generation, the era of France’s obsessive reanalysis of its dark 
years which Henry Rousso has dubbed as the “return of the repressed.”108 In France it 
was only at this point, 30 years after the return, that the unique nature of the Jewish 
Holocaust began to be separated from that of the overall deportation. 
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 If the nation were not as economically distressed as it was in 1945 perhaps the 
attempts by the POWs to gain military benefits might have received a more open 
reception by the government and thus encouraged other groups, the labor deportees in 
particular, to explore this indirect path to official recognition. As it was the French nation 
was not in a position, economically or psychologically, to more satisfactorily address the 
problems of the returnees of 1945 and, thus, almost two million individuals experienced a 
homecoming that failed to provide them with the recognition and individualized 
compassion that would have helped them move forward from trauma and rebuild their 
lives. The return could have been the first chapter of a new beginning; instead it was 
remembered by many as the last chapter of a long nightmare. 
 In April of 1945 Simone Rohner, recently liberated from Ravensbruck, arrived 
back in France. Weak from violence and disease, head shaven to rid her body of lice, she 
was mistaken by civilians as a collaborator reeling from the just punishment served out 
on those who had attached themselves to the occupiers. She remembered: 
Civilians looked at us with an air of disgust, some insults were flung at 
us. We looked at each other in surprise. What?  France did not know 
about the deportees?... We had to endure scathing words; we cried in 
rage from it… we received a hostile reception… [and] we were 
shocked.109 
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“They will never reach 89 years!” This refers to the age of Marshal Philip Pétain, which he evoked at his 
arrest as a mitigating factor in shielding him from prosecution for crimes of collaboration. (La France au 
Combat, 24 June 1945, p 1.)
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Epilogue: The Prisoners in Postwar France 
 Upon their return to France the prisoners were surprised by the lack of 
comprehension their countrymen and woman had about their captivity. Many believed 
the captivity had not been a harsh experience, believing perhaps that the prisoners had 
suffered less in Germany than had those who spent the war in occupied France. Many 
also believed the prisoners had been strong supporters of the Vichy regime. Both of these
misconceptions had been fostered by the Vichy government’s wartime propaganda.1 The 
returning prisoners were greeted warmly but not as their fathers had been in 1918. Instead
the provisional government grouped the prisoners together with the other returning 
deportee groups and treated them more as returning refugees.2 Th  prisoners were also 
surprised to learn that the new provisional government did not recognize them as anciens 
combattants.3 France had changed a great deal while they were in Germany. The 
prisoners had to learn the new political and social landscape. They also had to come to 
accept that they would not receive the joyous homecoming they had dreamed of while in 
Germany. Adoration of the type displayed in 1918 was reserved for the soldiers of De 
Gaulle and the resistance. The France the prisoners returned to was not the France of 
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1918, nor even the France of 1940, and they were seen more as part of the defeat of 1940 
than the victory of 1945.4 
 The prisoners were not alone in receiving a disappointing homecoming. The 
700,000 workers who returned at their side received less financial support from the 
government than the prisoners and political deportees, and, in many cases, were greetd 
more as collaborators than as deported citizens. One worker remembered the “amused 
expressions” he received from those he talked with about his deportation following the 
war. “I am not comparing myself with a concentration camp survivor, but I spent two 
years and three months as a forced laborer, abused and deprived throughout. It was a hard 
time.”5 
 Only the political deportees and the few returning racial deportees associated with 
them- men and women who were assumed to have been deported due to their resistance 
activity- were afforded unqualified recognition in postwar France. The elevat d status of 
the political deportees did not stem from their suffering in captivity, but rather from the 
patriotism and bravery they were assumed to have displayed which caused their 
captivity.6 If the prisoners and workers were recognized primarily as victims of war who 
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had played some part in their own misfortunes, the deportees were seen as unqualified 
national heroes.7  
 The focus of this epilogue is the prisoners’ organized effort to overcome the 
stigma of their captivity and establish themselves as honorable veterans and secure the 
same benefits and recognition extended to other veterans. In pursuit of these goals the 
prisoners challenged the official discourse of shared sacrifice (defined in the previous 
chapter) as well as popular perceptions regarding their military service in 1940. The 
former POWs believed they had to define themselves as separate from the workers, and 
even from the honored political deportees, in order to establish their claim as being 
“anciens combattants” rather than “war victims.” This campaign had to be waged at the 
same time the prisoners were rebuilding their family and professional lives as well as, in 
many cases, restoring their physical and mental wellbeing. The story of the French POWs 
captivity did not end with the arrival of a tank at a prison gate and cheers, or even with 
their arrival back at their family’s doorstep. Their story, like most that involve trauma 
long drawn out, had a long coda made up of compromise victories and partial resolutions. 
 
The Formation of the M.P.G.D.R. and the F.N.C.P.G. 
 In 1945 the former POWs organized behind François Mitterrand, himself a former 
prisoner and resistance leader,8 to begin what would be their long struggle to win rights 
and recognition. The prisoners were fortunate to have an advocacy organization 
established prior to their liberation, the existence of which goes a long way in explaining 
why the POWs were more successful in winning benefits and recognition than were the 
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less organized workers.9 During meetings in 1944 in London two POW resistance groups 
operating in occupied France- the Rassemblement National des Prisonniers de Guerre 
(R.N.P.G.) (aka the “Pinot-Mitterrand” group), and the communist Comité National des 
Prisonniers de Guerre (C.N.P.G.), were fused with a group organized overseas by the 
Free French and led by Charles De Gaulle’s nephew Michel Cailliau.10 This new united 
organization was named the Mouvement de Résistance des Prisonniers de Guerre et 
déportés (M.R.P.G.D.). Mitterrand returned to France in February 1944 and made the 
paper unification achieved in London a reality inside occupied France through his 
organizational work. He acted as the leader of the combined movement throughout the 
next year. Mitterrand and the M.R.P.G.D. played an active role during the Paris 
insurrection. Following the liberation of the capital Mitterrand was named the acting 
secretary-general of the M.P.G.D. inside France by the provisional government until he 
was relieved by Henri Frenay on 1 September 1944. Thus, briefly, Mitterrand headed 
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both the official government ministry and the independent prisoners’ federation at the 
same time.11 
 After the Germans were driven out of most of France the accumulated frustration  
of the prisoners and their lack of faith in Frenay’s ministry led to friction betwe n the 
M.P.G.D. (the provisional government ministry) and the M.R.P.G.D. (the independent 
prisoners’ movement). As described in chapter nine, the M.R.P.G.D. began organizing a 
legislative lobbying campaign and a series of public protests in early 1945 to pressure the 
provisional government into addressing the returnees’ concerns. The prisoners’ prote ts 
were widely reported in newspapers and, judging by the coverage, not seen as 
unreasonable acts.12 As the M.R.P.G.D.’s role morphed from that of a resistance 
movement into that of an advocacy organization for former POWs it was reformed into 
the Fédération Nationale des Combattants Prisonniers de Guerre (F.N.C.P.G.) in April 
1945.13 
 Two of Mitterrand’s earliest publications, an essay published shortly after his 
escape in the pro-Vichy literary journal Revue de l’État Nouveau,14 and his first 
substantial political statement, a bound essay named “L s Prisonniers de Guerre Devant 
la Politique,” published in late 1945,15 both expressed his conviction that the prisoners 
and other French citizens who had been deported to Germany could assume a leading role 
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in revitalizing French society. Mitterrand believed the captivity had forced th  prisoners 
and deportees to confront the flaws in French society, and had reminded them to put aside 
their differences in service of working for a better future for their nation. While 
Mitterrand’s political vision was similar to one of the central elements of the Vichy 
regime’s prisoner of war propaganda campaign- the notion of the captivity being a 
purifying process preparing the prisoners to play a key role in reforming Frace upon 
their return- Mitterrand did not share the regime leadership’s view about what a reformed 
France should look like. His 1942 essay is too brief and sentimental to provide a clear 
picture of his thinking. The vision he laid out in his 1945 pamphlet for a revitalized 
France had much more in common with the Conseil national de la Résistance harter of 
1943 than with the values of the Révolution Nationale. Mitterrand did think the captivity 
might have helped purify him and his companions, but not in the manner which the Vichy 
leadership had expected. Mitterrand’s political sensibilities changed radically during the 
war and his captivity. In 1939 he was a socially conservative young man who politically 
identified with the traditional right. By 1943 he had abandoned his prewar political 
beliefs and reestablished himself as left leaning political leader who envisioned a national 
renewal based upon secular and patriotic communal values. 
 Mitterrand was not alone in his vision of mobilizing the captivity as the base for a 
postwar political movement. Cailliau, Frenay and others leaders held similar hopes of 
creating a larger movement which would hold the former POWs, workers and political 
and racial deportees together following their return.16 Just as the unity which had formed 
between these different groups in Germany crumbled after their return to Fance, so did 
hopes for a unified movement. Perhaps this fracturing of the groups was actually brought 
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about by their liberation. What had originally united these groups while they were in 
Germany were their shared hardships.17 After the war the prisoners wanted to be seen as 
veterans, not as victims of deportation. The veteran identity the prisoners worked to 
establish transcended the captivity and, in doing so, de-emphasized similarities they had 
with the other deported groups. The prisoners’ efforts to win recognition as veterans 
would have been complicated had they identified themselves first as deported captives 
rather than as soldiers. Internal divisions among the prisoners, workers, and deportees 
were becoming evident even before the Grand Retour had concluded.18 Nevertheless, 
Mitterrand, Cailliau and others continued to attempt to fashion a unified political 
movement out of the combined returnee community throughout 1945 and 1946. These 
efforts were held back largely by the lack of interest the political deportees and POWs 
had in association with the workers. The deportees were already an honored group in 
France upon their return, and the prisoners hoped to secure their position in postwar 
society through recognition as honorable veterans. The workers were widely perceived as 
politically compromised by their work in Germany.19 Association with these men and 
women offered no benefit to the deportees and POWs. In historian François Cochet’s 
words, despite its prominent backers, the larger returnee movement never amounted to 
anything that rose above the level of being “a little noisy” before it faded into a historical 
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footnote.20 As documented in chapter nine, government posters and repatriation programs 
might have treated the workers as part of the same Grand Retour community that also 
included the prisoners and the deportees, but this is not how the prisoners and deportees 
saw the situation. The deportees saw themselves as heroic patriots. The prisoners saw 
themselves as veterans. Neither group wanted to be associated with the “victim” workers. 
 
The Work of the F.N.C.P.G. 1945-1947 
 Even if the F.N.C.P.G. could not claim to be the core of a national political 
movement it could claim to speak on behalf of the former POWs. The federation gained
de facto official status when it was recognized by Frenay and the M.P.D.R. in 1945 and 
provided with substantial government subsidies for administrative costs and social 
projects.21 The F.N.C.P.G.’s membership numbers also argue for its recognition as a valid 
representative for the POW community. In 1945 the F.N.C.P.G. already had a 
membership of 952,108. The following year membership rose to 1,027,111.22 
 The F.N.C.P.G.’s postwar efforts initially focused on immediate tangible oals, 
such as winning medical care for the prisoners and securing emergency short-term 
housing and financial aid for destitute former prisoners. Within a relatively short period 
of time its focus shifted towards less tangible goals, chief among them recognition of the 
prisoners’ as combattants and increasing awareness of the long-term medical and “social” 
ailments from which former POWs continued to suffer.23 This focus on long-term 
projects was evident during the federation’s first national congress, held in November 
1945. Judging by the topics addressed at this conference and their continuing coverage in 
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the federation’s newsletter, Le P.G., from late 1945 the F.N.C.P.G. focused on four 
projects: 1) caring for prisoners with lingering problems stemming from their captivity; 
2) organizing a national community of former prisoners through mutual support 
programs; 3) securing financial aid for destitute former POWs; and, 4) their “Battle for 
Honor.”24 The “Battle for Honor” involved not only the former prisoners’ fight to win 
recognition as combattants, but also their contesting derogatory stereotypes and 
misconceptions about their service in 1940 and the conditions of their captivity.25 Each 
issue of Le P.G. featured a column updating the readership on the federation’s efforts in 
these areas.  
 Benefiting from the F.N.C.P.G.’s organization, the prisoners were able to win 
partial redress of some of their immediate postwar concerns. On 15 June 1945 several 
prisoner and deportee representatives were added to the Consultative Assembly.26 At this 
same time the prisoners were assured of continued health care at public expensefor at 
least the next nine months.27 Another area of success was the federation’s growing ability 
to have the national government take its views and demands seriously. The federation 
enjoyed a string of favorable political developments in 1946 and 1947, all of which can 
be, at least to some degree, attributed to its growing influence. The first of these 
developments was the creation of the Ministère des Anciens Combattants et Victimes des 
deux Guerres (M.A.C.V.G.) in 1946. Laurent Casanova, a man much more favorably 
inclined to the F.N.C.P.G. than Henri Frenay, was appointed the first head of this new 
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ministry. In 1947 Casanova was replaced by an even more sympathetic figure, one of the 
founders of the F.N.C.P.G., François Mitterrand. The irony of a former F.N.C.P.G. vice 
president presiding over a ministry which little over a year earlier the federation had 
publicly demonstrated against provides one indication of the growing political 
prominence of the federation. Mitterrand and the members of the F.N.C.P.G. must have 
felt a great sense of satisfaction in the work they had done during the previous two years 
to bring about this turn in events. While each of these three developments were political
victories for the F.N.C.P.G., a closer examination of each demonstrates why they are best 
understood as partial or compromise victories. 
 In 1946 Frenay, believing he had completed the work of the government in the 
repatriation and reintegration of the prisoners, workers and deportees, resigned as hea of 
the M.P.G.D. In the spring of 1945 Frenay’s ministry had opposed bringing the returnees 
together under the same ministry with the anciens combattants, arguing that the two 
groups lacked a “common link,” and were best administered separately.28 Rather than 
simply eliminate the ministry, as Frenay had urged, the government instead re ained the 
offices working on behalf of the returnees and folded them into a reestablished ministry 
representing veterans. The combined organization was named the Ministère des Anciens 
Combattants et Victimes des deux Guerres (M.A.C.V.G.) with Laurent Casanova named 
as head. The creation of this ministry was a mixed result for the F.N.C.P.G. On the one
hand it demonstrated the government’s acceptance of the need for long-term, if not 
permanent, programs to address the needs of the returnees; on the other hand, as the 
former POWs were not recognized as anciens combattants, they now had a recognized 
category in the government’s bureaucracy, that of “victims of war.” Perhaps t e creation 
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of the M.A.C.V.G. can be seen as a way the government expanded the concept of public 
support for the prisoners, workers and deportees while avoiding the divisive political 
debate regarding who did and who did not qualify for veteran status. The creation of the 
ministry could also be seen as a repudiation of the point of view promoted by Frenay and 
others which held that the problems of the returnees should be handled as no more than a 
temporary humanitarian project. It was through this new ministry that the prisone s were 
able to secure many of the tangible benefits they sought. 
 Although Casanova was a communist and thus of a very different political 
mindset than Frenay, in ways his appointment served as confirmation of the already
established molds of prejudices within the government for the prisoners. The new 
minister had been a POW from 1940-42, but he had escaped and spent the rest of the war 
actively engaged in the resistance. His appointment reinforced the viewpoint that 
honorable prisoners escaped. Those who remained in Germany were victims, not men 
meriting consideration for leadership positions in the newly reconstituted nation. Further 
reinforcing this pattern was the naming of Mitterrand, another escapee, as Casanov ’s 
replacement the following year. 
 The F.N.C.P.G. reacted positively to Casanova’s appointment, if for no other 
reason than after its frustrating relationship with Frenay almost any change was likely to 
be greeted by the federation as one for the better. In an editorial published in Le P.G. 
François Mitterrand praised Casanova’s early efforts to meet with federation 
representatives so as to better stay informed on the merits of the prisoners’ ccerns. The 
editorial implicitly contrasts Casanova’s respectful attitude toward the F.N.C.P.G. and his 
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recognition of their concerns as legitimate with Frenay’s dismissive attitude.29 Le P.G.’s 
legislative update report also praised Casanova in that same newsletter, reporting on his 
“desire to work with the diverse organizations and, more specifically, the quality of his 
rapport with the federations and movements….” As part of this new relationship 
Casanova decided to take weekly meetings with the F.N.C.P.G.’s national 
representatives, through which “he hoped to form an effective and practical 
collaboration.”30 Almost immediately after Frenay left the ministry the tenor of dealings 
between the government and the F.N.C.P.G. radically changed. Where Frenay had 
acknowledged the existence of the F.N.C.P.G. but reacted with hostility to the 
federation’s efforts to advocate on behalf of the prisoners, Casanova talked of his 
relationship with the federation as a “collaboration.” 
 Under Casanova the former POWs made progress in several areas targeted by 
F.N.C.P.G. lobbying. Medical benefits, which had already been extended for political 
deportees but were due to expire in February 1946 for former POWs, were extended.31 
Some rehabilitation centers used by former prisoners suffering from long-term ailments 
were kept open after their original scheduled closure date.32 President Félix Gouin met 
with representatives of the F.N.C.P.G. in February 1946, the first time the federation h d 
been given an official audience by the head of state. Housing assistance from the 
government was extended for an additional twelve months, through April 1947.33 The 
government also opened preliminary discussions with F.N.C.P.G. representative on the 
topics of pensions and public housing benefits. The national committee of honor 
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instructed its regional juries to begin hearing petitions of former prisoners who were 
seeking recognition as members of the resistance. Apparently up to this point these juries 
had tabled most petitions filed by POWs without examination of their merits.34 
 The collaborative relationship between the F.N.C.P.G. and the government 
perhaps reached its peak in 1947 when François Mitterrand replaced Casanova as head of 
the ministry. Mitterrand, a founder of the F.N.C.P.G. and its directing vice president in 
1945-46, had left his post at the federation to pursue elected office in 1946. After winning 
a seat in the Chamber of Deputies, Mitterrand he was named minister of the M.A.C.V.G. 
in Paul Ramadier’s cabinet in January 1947. Taking into consideration Mitterrand’s 
inexperience and his youth, (at 30 years Mitterrand was the youngest cabinet member) 
one might be tempted to read his appointment as strong evidence of the political power 
the returnee movement35 had accumulated over the last two years. While his ties to the 
returnees were certainly a factor working in his favor, Mitterrand’s core value to 
Ramadier was more likely his ability to position himself as an anti-communist left-
centrist. Another consideration which calls into question the view that Mitterrand owed 
his appointment primarily due to his influence over the F.N.C.P.G. membership is that his 
relationship with much of the federation’s leadership was rather cool at the time of his 
appointment. In late 1946 Mitterrand had precipitated a divisive debate within the 
federation by pushing for it to engage the government on a wide spectrum of political 
issues, many of which were not directly related to the former prisoners’ specific needs. 
Mitterrand’s ambitious program brought him into conflict with those federation leaders 
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who wanted to keep the organization politically neutral, and also with communists who 
opposed any attack which might destabilize the new republican government.36 P rhaps 
Mitterrand’s inability to have his wide-ranging vision accepted by the fedration at its 
second national congress redirected him towards elected office in the coming months. 
Upon entering office Ramadier, a socialist, began a program of reducing communist 
control over French governmental agencies. Casanova had appointed many communists 
to posts within the M.A.C.V.G. and Mitterrand, upon taking over the ministry, was 
expected to reduce this group’s influence. Rather than immediately begin work on issues 
prioritized by the F.N.C.P.G. Mitterrand spent his first days in office breaking a 
communist organized strike among ministry personnel.37 Mitterrand’s willingness to 
engage the communists was probably at least as important a factor in his securing the 
appointment as was his familiarity with the concerns of veterans and former POWs and 
his ability to mobilize these men behind the new government. 
 Regardless as to why Mitterrand was named minister of the M.A.C.V.G., and 
regardless as to the positive relationship the federation had with the outgoing Casanova, 
the F.N.C.P.G. immediately recognized his appointment as a triumph. Le P.G. article 
announcing Mitterrand’s appointment was simply entitled, “Our Minister.” Federation 
president Jean Bertin, while acknowledging his past differences with Mitterrand, 
enthusiastically embraced the new minister, writing, “It is with full confidence that we, 
veterans of 1939-1940, former prisoners of war, join with François Mitterrand, who 
recognizes our status as combattants, and our rights as prisoners.” In a hand written note 
published by Le P.G. under his portrait Mitterrand positioned himself as still very much 
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part of the prisoners’ movement. “Each of us, no matter what his place, must continue to 
endlessly serve the goal for which we have fought so long. And for my part, this I will 
do.”38 
 Mitterrand’s warm note to the federation upon taking his seat at the M.A.C.V.G. 
was the last time he would be featured so prominently in the newsletter. A frequent theme 
in Mitterrand biographies is his political expediency. Outside of remaining in the left-
center of French politics and his advocacy of a somewhat vaguely defined Marxist model 
for society, Mitterrand seemed to have very few consistent political positions throughout 
his forty plus years in elected office. Mitterrand built coalitions and alliances to advance 
his own career, or his legislative agenda, but did not display much loyalty towards partie
or individuals. As he explained towards the end of his life, “I was attracted to sociali m, 
but not by the parties that represented it.”39 Dogma and blind loyalty were of no use to 
Mitterrand. The malleability of Mitterrand’s politics and alliances have made him a 
despised figure in French politics by many who value ideological consistency and party 
loyalty over pragmatic governance. It was this same pragmatism and ability to form 
temporary coalitions which allowed Mitterrand to build a very successful political career 
spanning five decades. This trait was already evident in 1947. While the F.N.C.P.G. 
continued to have a good working relationship with the M.A.C.V.G. throughout 
Mitterrand’s tenure, and progress was made in some of the federation’s targeted areas, 
such as pensions and recognition, overall the working relationship between the federation 
and the ministry does not appear to have significantly changed from what it had been 
during Casanova’s ministry. Rather than be “Our Minister” as the F.N.C.P.G. had hoped,
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in office Mitterrand balanced the needs of the government he served with those of his 
former colleagues. His tempered style of administration allowed him to spend ten of th  
next fourteen years serving in a variety of ministerial posts under a series of 
governments. 
 While the F.N.C.P.G. was able to incrementally win tangible benefits for the 
former POWs, their “Battle for Honor” was less successful. As this campaign developed 
it increased the separation between the prisoners and the larger deportee community. 
Rather than embrace the communal legacy of suffering and join with the labor deportees 
to work on mutually beneficial goals, the prisoners instead attempted to put the captivity 
behind them, to rid themselves of what many among them saw as the lingering shame of 
being defined by their defeat and captivity instead of being simply rememberd as 
veterans. The ability to carry a card identifying oneself as an ancien combattant carried 
great weight with many former prisoners. Few countries match the level of reverence 
France holds for her veterans. Free admission to museums, reserved seats on train , the 
respectful attention of civil servants, these are just some of the small ways honor is 
rendered in France to a veteran. The status of veterans in French society reached its peak 
during the late-1920’s and 1930’s. During these years large veterans associations won for 
their members benefits and the deference of political and cultural leaders. Veterans were 
looked upon as men who had earned an elevated moral position within French society, 
men due respect.40 Winning recognition as anciens combattants would provide the former 
prisoners with tangible benefits, but more important to the members of the F.N.C.P.G. 
were the moral aspects of this recognition. A government decision to deny the former
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prisoners this status in 1945 was seen by many as tantamount to a declaration that their 
military service had not been valuable, not worthy of recognition, perhaps not even 
honorable. When this policy decision was challenged by the F.N.C.P.G., the government 
quickly recognized that treating all former POWs without any regard for their service was 
an untenable position.41 
The former prisoners had expected to spend their first years back in France 
helping rebuild the nation, not fighting for a recognition they had expected as a matter of 
course. As documented in chapter two, the vast majority of the former POWs had either 
surrendered under the orders of superior officers or during the gray week following 
Marshal Pétain’s national call for an end to the fighting and the actual armistice. Most 
could argue, with considerable justification, that they had relatively little control over the 
circumstances of their surrender. The F.N.C.P.G. referring to this campaign as their 
“Battle for Honor” was a telling word choice. The former prisoners were not o ly 
fighting to overturn a government policy decision related to tangible benefits, they were 
also engaged on the intangible plane where shared memory is constructed. To serve the 
former prisoners’ postwar needs the F.N.C.P.G. found it necessary to defend their service 
in 1940 by combating misconceptions and negative stereotypes. Starting in 1945 the 
F.N.C.P.G. was engaged in the construction of history, or, if you prefer, in the 
deconstruction of an early draft of history. 
The provisional government went through a slow process of re-examining its 
policies towards the former POWs, evidenced by the expansion of benefits offered from 
1945 forward. As this re-examination process was beginning, a public debate centering 
upon the appropriateness of recognizing the former prisoners as veterans on an equal 
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basis with veterans of other conflicts was also underway. Several important political 
groupings in France, among them veterans of the First World War and spokespersons of 
the combattant resistance, urged that if the prisoners were to be treated as anciens 
combattants this deference should be granted selectively based upon what the individual 
had done in 1940 while in uniform.42 Some of the criteria proposed included only 
granting veteran status to men who had served in combat units for a period of 90 days, 
and only to men who had served in units which had actually been involved in combat. 
These restrictions were proposed by the Union Française des Anciens Combattants 
(UFAC), the World War I veterans association and were similar to the standards used by 
this organization to determine qualification for membership. For a World War I soldier to 
qualify for a carte du combattant he had to have served for at least 90 days in a combat 
zone. Since the 1940 campaign only lasted six weeks, and since the UFAC did not 
recognize time spent in captivity as service time, this 90-day restriction would have 
disqualified almost all French soldiers who fought in 1940 from being recognized as 
combattants.43 
 The value judgment driving the debate over the awarding of the cart du 
combattant was that soldiers who did not fight, or who only fought for a short period of 
time, did not deserve to be recognized as having served the nation. Under the UFAC 
proposal the only French soldiers who served in 1940 who would have received 
recognition would have been those few who had managed to somehow rejoin the struggle 
against Germany after 1940 by joining a recognized combattant resistance organization 
or the reformed French Army. These were possibilities simply not open to the majority of 
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prisoners who spent the war in Germany. Much of the public discourse surrounding this 
debate belittled the efforts of the French soldiers of 1940. The former prisoners saw 
themselves represented as ineffective and cowardly soldiers who had failed to l ve up to 
the standards set by their fathers in the trenches of World War I, and who now lacked the 
grace to quietly fade back into civilian life. A regular feature in Le P.G. was the 
reprinting of particularly disparaging articles about the former prisoners which had been 
printed in other French newspapers, followed by a brief editorial response. A particularly 
prominent example of the low regard many French leaders held for the prisoners was 
Charles De Gaulle’s reaction at being reminded of his own captivity during the First 
World War by a delegation of former prisoners in 1945. According to a witness, the 
normally detached head of state “unleashed his fury” at the reference. To De Gaull , 
Frenay, and many others, the prisoners were a reminder of defeat and Vichy politics.44 
 The central goal of the F.N.C.P.G.’s “Battle for Honor,” winning official 
recognition of the prisoners as nciens combattants, was never fully achieved. At least 
the government ensured that the former prisoners would not be recognized as belonging 
to the same category as the veterans of their father’s generation. Before 1945 the French 
government had issued a c rte du combattant to all wartime veterans. Rather than issue 
this card to the former POWs, the government initially printed and awarded a new card to
the ex-captives which identified them not as anciens combattants but as former POWs. 
When the F.N.C.P.G. took issue with these cards the government then proposed replacing 
them with a card which identified their holders as “combattants du 39/40.” This card 
would have effectively denied time spent in captivity was also time spent in military 
service and would have separated French soldiers who fought in 1940 from those who 
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fought in World War I and in the later stages of World War II. In the end the federation’s 
efforts stalled with the government’s agreement, facilitated by Mitterrand, to issue a 
newly created identity card to all former prisoners which identified them as a 
“combattant de 39-45.” Missing from this card was the simple identification of their 
holders as anciens combattants, as was any association they had with other veterans.45 
Included on the “combattant de 39-45”  cards were dotted lines on which were recorded 
the unit the card holder was attached to, his induction date, and his dates of captivity. 
When this information was included the card could not be presented without identifying 
the holder as a former POW. 
 The F.N.C.P.G. saw the recognition of the former POWs as combattants on their 
identification cards as a victory, but a partial one, due to the qualified manner in which 
the recognition was offered. The men who served in 1940, and who in many cases spent 
the next five years in German captivity, were categorized as a separate type of 
combattants, distinct from the larger community of veterans that had been held in such 
high regard. Nevertheless, the F.N.C.P.G. recognized the recognition of the former POWs 
as combattants as a meaningful improvement over the initial government plan to leave 
them completely unrecognized, and later to issue them a card which only identified them 
as prisoners of war. The inclusion of the term combattant removed some of the stigma 
from these cards.46 
 One aspect of the entire “Battle for Honor” and the F.N.C.P.G.’s long fight for the 
carte du combattant which many of the prisoners found particularly bewildering was that 
their honor, their loyalty to their homeland, was being judged, by-in-large, based upon 
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what had happened during a few days in May or June of 1940, while their behavior 
during the subsequent five years in captivity was ignored. The arguments against their 
being recognized as veterans harkened back to the distinctions between prisoners based 
on their “capture identity” described in chapter two. While the public discourse over 
recognition focused on their service and capture in 1940, among the prisoners 
themselves, these matters had declined in importance as their captivity wore on. Within 
the society formed by French POWs in Germany, the other method of categorization 
described in chapter two, their “captivity response identity,” had much more come to 
define how they saw their conduct during the war. Prisoners differentiated one an th r 
primarily based not on how they were captured, but on how they conducted themselves as 
a prisoner- on their mental approach to captivity. The postwar public discourse described 
above overlooked all aspects of the prisoners’ behavior from 1940 through 1945 save 
successful escape attempts. Prisoners who had happened to be assigned to a unit which 
saw extensive combat would have presumably been recognized as more deserving of 
honor and benefits than those who had been assigned to units which saw less or no 
combat. This would have been true even if the first prisoner spent the entire war actively 
promoting collaboration and the later had spent the same years working to the best of his 
abilities against German war aims. While this debate was going on the F.N.C.P G. 
conducted a similar process of passing judgment on the conduct of individual prisoners. 
The F.N.C.P.G. evaluated the men based not upon their conduct during 1940, but upon 
their conduct throughout their captivity, on their “captivity response identity.” The 
F.N.C.P.G. formed an “Honor Jury” to review and pass judgment on former prisoners 
suspected of dishonorable conduct. These juries reviewed charges against former 
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prisoners for such activities as active collaboration, denunciations, buying favor with the 
Germans for early release or special treatment, spreading Vichy and/or German 
propaganda, and, in the case of officers, volunteering to work. These “trials,” or perhaps 
more properly “reviews” as these evaluations were not state sanctioned, resulted in a list 
of approximately 5,765 former POWs guilty of dishonorable service from the 
federation’s perspective. If these men were members of the F.N.C.P.G. they were 
expelled and the list was turned over to the government as individuals which the 
F.N.C.P.G. did not believe were due recognition as veterans. Based on surviving records 
it appears that the most common offenses were denunciation of fellow POWs (or 
informing) and collaboration with the Germans.47 
 While the F.N.C.P.G. was unable to win the full recognition as anciens 
combattants which the former prisoners’ desired, it found more success in its pursuit of 
another intangible goal- increasing the public’s and medical community’s awareness of 
the long-term physical and mental dysfunctions many of prisoners had developed while 
in captivity or shortly after their return to France. 
 A large portion of the French returnees of 1945 suffered from conditions which 
today would likely be recognized as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (P.T.S.D) or Chronic 
Depression. The nature of a soldier’s homecoming is considered by many research rs to 
be one of the key factors in determining if he or she will develop post-war social or 
psychological dysfunctions. According to this view, a homecoming which provides a 
veteran with stability, support and validation will decrease the likelihood of developing 
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these problems. A homecoming lacking these attributes produces the opposite result.48 I 
believe the disappointing homecoming experience of the prisoners is linked to the 
development or exacerbation of the problems which plagued many of them. 
 It was quickly noticed that a significant number of the returnees were not 
bouncing back from their captivity. Alexander Werth, a resident of Paris in 1945, wrote 
that it was clear to him and many other French citizens that the captivity had “done 
something” to many of the former POWs, men he describes as having returned from 
Germany “more or less alive.”49 Many of the former prisoners felt they were looked 
down upon. They remembered being referred to as the “soldiers of the raised hands,” 
“collaborators” or even as “traitors.” They believed that an enormous gap had developed 
in the people’s perception between the “glorious victors of 44/45” and the “shameful 
combatants of 39/40.”50 Historian Yves Durand wrote of a widespread culture of 
“anxiety” among the newly returned men, a sense among them that they had to justify 
themselves to their countrymen. Many returning prisoners formed the impression that the 
nation did not accept their problems as real, and that following their liberation they wer  
on their own in sorting out their lives.51 Many developed the sense that their sacrifices, 
even the sacrifices of their companions who had died during the war, were forgotten. 
Even among loved ones many prisoners felt completely alone and had little hope of 
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bridging this chasm of incomprehension. Many who wanted to speak about their captivity 
believed they would be hard pressed to find a willing audience. They believed they had 
become, in historian François de Lannoy’s words, “the scapegoats on whom the French 
people pushed off the sins of a shameful period in their history, a period they would 
rather forget.”52 Many prisoners soon learned that, to reintegrate into French society, it 
was best that they ignore the insults and slights, rid themselves of the hopes they had 
built up in captivity, and accept the new order of things.53 François Mitterrand 
remembered a less humiliating reception in 1942, but one that encouraged silence on the 
prisoners’ part none the less: “I fear that they speak about the prisoners like they speak 
about the dead; praising their merits, singing their praises, but seeing as their best quality 
that they no longer interfere with the living.”54 
 Not surprisingly many returning prisoners fell into a dysfunctional mental state
upon their return. The former prisoners suffered from elevated levels of substance abuse, 
higher levels of unemployment and divorce, and tended to be more likely to commit 
domestic abuse and suicide, or engage in criminal activity.55 
 With the recognition that something was “not right” with many of the prisoner, 
and the desire to help them recover, the government initially focused on lingering 
problems believed to be the result of damage done to the former captives’ respiratory, 
digestive and nervous systems by poor living conditions and diets of the captivity. A 
voluntary health survey conducted by the Department of the Seine and the Ministry of 
Public Health between July and November 1945 on the department’s 205,905 returnees 
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(86,624 of who participated) found approximately a third of the former prisoners who 
responded (11,705 out of 31,354) suffering from some lingering malady. While only two 
were listed as suffering from serious mental illness, large numbers reported roblems 
which are associated with P.T.S.D. and depression, such as excessive fatigue, high-blood 
pressure or hyper-tension and the apparently catch-all condition of “injured nervous 
systems.” A follow up study the following year found about half as many reported 
problems (14,805 out of 86,006), but perhaps surprisingly, the number listed with severe 
mental illness had grown to fifty-three.56 Additional planned follow-up surveys of these 
same returnees were not conducted, perhaps due to budgetary constraints. Other studies 
on French POWs during the next five years also indicate a high rate of problems lik ly of 
a psychiatric nature. A study of six hundred former POWs conducted between 1946 and 
1950 reported finding subjects suffering from “melancholia, manic fits, hyper-
emotionality, anxiety attacks, nervous crises, crying fits, profuse sweating, . . . trembling, 
. . . and sexual dysfunction.”57 In her invaluable study of the prisoners’ wives, Sarah 
Fishman found that sixteen of the forty-nine women she spoke with reported their 
husbands suffering from what she described as “analogous psychological states.” “Most 
frequently, the women described the repatriated prisoners as bitter (aigri); other 
descriptions included hardened, uncommunicative (renfermé), irritable, and aggressive. . . 
others fell into a state of depression and became somber and oversensitive.”58 
 The issue of prevalence is highly relevant to this discussion. It is not surprising at 
all that one would find large numbers of former POWs suffering from some form of 
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psychiatric dysfunction following their captivity. That these types of problems were an 
almost inevitable consequence of war and captivity was a reality not lost on the
provisional government officials planning for the repatriation. A study by the M.P.D.R. 
in August 1944 warned that insufficient attention was being paid to preparations for 
psychiatric care for returning prisoners and deportees.59 Despite the experience of the 
First World War and the 1944/45 preparations, insufficient though they proved to be, the 
French government and medical community reacted as if they were surprised by th  
extent of the problem. An analytical study of the prevalence of psychological problems 
among the returning prisoners is simply not possible. Psychiatric diagnosis common 
today, such as P.T.S.D. and depression, simply did not exist in 1945. Even if these 
diagnoses had existed, no study more comprehensive than the Seine survey was 
undertaken, and this survey suffered from several methodological shortcomings. It wa  
voluntary, so individuals could self-select out. Of those individuals who did participate, 
some did so via paper forms, other via office visits, and still others via home visits. The 
examiners had no expertise in identifying psychiatric problems, and for the most part 
were focused on better defined ailments such as tuberculosis and ulcers. The other studies 
suffer from small sample size limitations.60 
 While the prevalence of psychiatric problems among the prisoners’ can not be 
established with any degree of accuracy through analytical means, other evidenc  
indicates that the French people perceived more of the former prisoners as having trouble 
reacclimating to civilian life than they had expected. In addition to the studies described 
above, and the attention given to troubled former captives in Le P.G. and other 
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contemporary sources, a whole new area of medical research developed at this time in 
response to the common perception in France that the former captives were suffering 
long-term ailments due to their captivity. 
 Early accounts of these long-term ailments very possibly resulting from 
respiratory disease and malnutrition were grouped together with dysfunctions that today 
would be more likely recognized as of a psychological nature under the umbrella 
diagnosis of the “pathology of the deportation.” This new area of medical interest was 
chronicled in the pages of Le P.G. as early as 1946. The early research, originally 
prompted by the slow recovery of many of the French returnees, soon blossomed into a 
wider field of research which included studying similar problems in war victims in 
Britain, the United States, Germany, Belgium and eventually by the 1950’s, Poland. The 
term “pathology of the deportation” was retained into the 1950’s to describe the 
collective health and “social” problems war victims suffered from long after the end of 
the war. Following the publication of a study of 2,300 former deportees which focused on 
the persistent digestive problems which more than half of them were still suffering from, 
the first Congrès de la pathologie des déportés met in Paris. Beyond the digestive 
problems, this research concluded that a “great number” of the subjects “had succumbed” 
to “psychological misery.”61 In 1956 the French national office for Anciens Combattants 
and the National Center for Scientific Research jointly published a book length study 
edited by Doctor Charles Richet. By this point former POWs had been replaced by 
concentration camp survivors as the primary focus on medical research, however the 
work stressed that military prisoners, specifically those held in WWII Stalags and Oflags, 
were susceptible to this pathology. The pathology was defined as involving both 
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“medical” and “social” issues, which combined to leave its victims, even more than a 
decade removed from captivity, “defeated by life.” Those suffering from this pathology 
were described as having prematurely aged between ten and thirty years. Seve al of the 
ailments considered to be part of this pathology would today most likely be considered to 
be psychiatric. Among these were claustrophobia, social anxiety, avoidance of society, 
obsessions related to food and shelter, manic and excessive work habits, or, extreme 
general fatigue, feelings of excessive anguish and the desire for solitude. The report 
argued for recognition of these men and women as “victims of war” and thus due the 
same government benefits as any other individual suffering from war injury. An 
international conference on the pathology was held in Copenhagen in 1954 to bring 
together researchers from across the world, and their findings were presented at the 
Conférence medico-légale internationale later that year.62 
 France in 1945 was certainly not a society unaccustomed to dealing with postwar 
recovery. After the experience of World War I the French people and medical community 
had a pre-existing idea of what to expect from returning veterans and war victims. Their 
apparent surprise at the prevalence and depth of the prisoners’ postwar problems argues 
that likely more of these returning men were suffering psychiatric problems then what the 
French had come to expect. 
 Former POW Georges Hyvernaud chronicled his own struggles eloquently in his 
auto-biographical novel “The Cattle Car.” The book is a testament to the prisoners’ sense 
of waste when they looked back on the five years they left in Germany, a testament to 
their feelings of profound disappointment in finding their homecoming so much less than 
the one they had dreamed of, and their sense of helpless rage over their complete inability 
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to make their fellow citizens understand the captivity. There was no romanticizing of the 
captivity in his work. He did not remember it as a time of purification or camaraderie. He 
described it as “the experience of the absurd endured on the level of daily misery by the 
most ordinary individuals.”63 Hyvernaud used the cattle car in which he had been 
transported into Germany as a symbol for the inhumane journey all of Europe had 
embarked upon in the twentieth century. It was not a journey he had chosen, and one that 
as an individual he had almost no ability to control: 
Maybe we are not going anywhere. We are there. That’s the way it is. A freight 
train crawling though an enormous silent disaster. Into it they have packed men 
instead of goods. The doors of the cars are fastened shut, bolted, pad-locked. 
Nothing like it to instill in you the feeling of an inevitable fate. . . [It is a title] that 
show[s] how we people are jammed into and lost inside the unintelligible, inside 
dark emptiness. Those who struggle and those who don’t put up a fight. And those 
who explain where they are and where they are going, as if they knew, as if the 
situation their buddies were in didn’t apply to them.64 
 
 When asked by a friend why he had titled his book “The Cattle Car” Hyvernaud 
went blank. How to explain the symbol to a man who had spent the war in his 
hometown? A man who had joined the resistance at the last possible moment, and was 
now lauded as a local hero and charged with designing the town’s new memorial 
honoring the men and women who died in their struggle against German oppression. 
You submit uncomprehendingly, you scream justifications in the face of people 
who are deaf, . . . In the end you resign yourself and shut up. I thought of my 
landlady. Of the masses. Of all those people buried inside the mass of people 
locked up within events and things. I thought of [my fellow prisoners], of my 
buddies from 1940. Of the snow-covered plains [of his Pomeranian work site.] Of 
the freight trains that used to flow like slow gray worms over the dead face of 
Europe. 
 
 Hyvernaud’s captivity did not end with his return to France in 1945. Nor did that 
of so many of his compatriots. Lacking the Vichy-era misrepresentations of the captivity; 
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lacking the official and daily attacks on their honor; perhaps benefiting from the support 
of a ministry more prepared and willing to help them re-acclimate to civilian life, 
Hyvernaud and his fellow prisoners might have found communicating with their fellow 
countrymen a less insurmountable undertaking. 
 
Conclusion 
 By documenting the circumstances of capture in 1940, the conditions of captivity 
from 1940-45, the adverse effects of the Vichy regime’s propaganda campaign and the 
provisional government’s repatriation policies, this study has demonstrated why the 
captivity is best studied as an event which started in the battlefields of France and 
Belgium in 1940 and continued well after the end of hostilities. It has challenged 
misunderstandings about the mass surrenders of 1940 and the treatment of the prisoners
in Germany. It has placed their reception back in France within the context of their full 
war experience, and in so doing, has made the provisional government’s policies and the 
French people’s attitudes towards the prisoners more comprehensible. It has shown that 
the primary goal of the prisoners’ postwar political lobbying campaign was recognition as 
honorable veterans. The chronological and geographic scope of this study, as well as the 
enormous number of individuals, policies and events involved, inevitably has resulted in 
some areas being less fully explored than the author would have hoped for in a more 
perfect situation. Despite its imperfections, this study makes a significant and original 
contribution to the study of France during the era of the Second World War, the treatment 
and employment of prisoners of war during the 20th century, Vichy regime domestic 
policies and practices, the reconstruction of French national identity during the liberation 
era, and the consequences of governmental policies on veteran reintegration. 
 360
Bibliography 
 
UNPUBLISHED SOURCES 
 
Public Archives 
Archives nationales. Paris, France. 
F/9/2007 
F/9/2180, 2190-2191, 2307-2308, 2320, 2347-2348 - Service diplomatique des 
prisonniers de guerre. 
F/9/2907-2908 - Direction du service des prisonniers de guerre, 3e bureau. 
F/9/2926, 2937 - Direction du service des prisonniers de guerre, 5e bureau. 
F/9/3105 - Commissariat aux prisonniers, déportés et réfugieés du Comité français de la 
libération nationale. 
F/9/3124-3125 - Commissariat aux prisonniers, déportés et réfugieés du Comité français 
de la libération nationale. Direction du rapatriement. 
F/9/3168-3173 - Ministère des prisonniers, déportés et réfugieés. Cabinet. 
F/9/3224, 3249 - Ministère des prisonniers, déportés et réfugieés. 
F/9/3243-3244 - Ministère des prisonniers, déportés et réfugieés. Direction du 
rapatriement. 
F/9/3881 
Archives nationales. Centre des Archives Contemporaines. Fontainbleau, France.
19980172 - Article 12. 
19980333 - Fusion de l’office des « combattants » et de l’office des « prisonniers » 
(1945-1947). 
Beueau des archives des victimes des conflits contemporaines. Caen, France. 
 
 
Centers of Documentation 
Institut d’histoire du temps présent. Paris, France. 
 ARC 074-38 État français prisonniers de guerre 
 ARC 090 Fond Jacques BENET 
 ARC 065 Font Robert Vaysset 
Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine. Paris, France. 
 Fonds Jean Vedrine 
Centre d’Histoire de la Résistance et de la Déportation. Lyon, France. 
 
 
Archives of Associations 
Archives de François Mitterrand. Paris, France. 
Fédération nationale des combattants prisonniers de guerre et combattants d’Algérie, 
Tunisie et Maroc. Paris, France. 
 
 
 361
Unpublished dissertations or articles 
Dombrowski, Nicole Ann. “Beyond the Battlefield, The French Civilian Exodus of May-
June 1940.” Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1995. 
 
Gayme, Evelyne. “L’image des prisonniers de guerre français de la seconde guerr  
mondiales, 1940-2000.” Thèse docteur de l’Université Paris X, 2002. 
 
Mann, Gregory. “The Tirailleurs Elsewhere:  Military Veterans in Colonial and Post-
Colonial Mail, 1918-1968.”  Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 2000. 
 
Quinton, Laurent. “Une literature qui ne passé pas; Récits de captivité des prisonniers de 
guerre français de la Seconde Guerre mondiales (1940-1953).” Thèse de 
doctorate, Université Rennes 2, 2007. 
 
Thomas, Gregory. “Post-Traumatic Nation: Medical Manifestations of Psychological 
Trauma in Interwar France.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, 
Berkeley, 2004. 
 
Workman, Debra. “Refusing the Unacceptable: The Women of the Association Nationale 
des Anciennes Déportées et Internées de la Réstance (ADIR).” Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Kansas, 2006. 
 
 
Lectures 
Poznanski, Renée. “Jewish Voices in a ‘Strange Silence.’ Jews and the Shoah in France 
After Vichy.” Presentation at the University of Kansas Hall Center, Lawrence, 
Kansas, 15 September 2006. 
 
Quinn, James. “The Long Holiday; The community of three million French captives in 
Germany 1940-1945,” Presentation at the Council for European Studies 
Seventeenth International Conference, Montreal, Canada, April 2010. 
 
Woodall, John. “Challenges to Ethical Social Development After War.” Lectur 
delivered as part of the University of Kansas Peace and Conflict Studies series,
Lawrence, Kansas, 10 November 2006. 
 
 
Interviews 
Lloyd Martin Jones, interviewed by author, Lawrence, Kansas, 2007. 
 
 
 
 362
PUBLISHED SOURCES 
 
Official Documents and Document Collections 
Pontaut, Jean-Marie and Éric Pelletier.  Chronique d’une France Occupée:  Les rapports 
confidentiels de la gendarmerie 1940-1945.  Neuilly-sur-Deine: Éditions Michel 
Lafon, 2008. 
 
Ministère des prisonniers, déportés et réfugiés. Bilan d’un effort. Paris: Éditions du Rond-
Point, 1945. 
 
Ministère de la Sante Publique. Le contrôle medical des rapatriés dans le department de 
la Seine; Bilan sanitaire et social. Paris: Louis Arnette, 1947. 
 
Veterans Administration. P.O.W. Study of Former Prisoners of War, 3rd Printing. 
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980. 
 
 
Contemporary Journals and Newspapers (1940-1946) 
La Montagne (Puy-de-Dôme) 
Le Moniteur du Puy-du-Dôme 
Defense de la France 
Franc-Tireur 
Combat 
Le Monde 
Les Cahiers Politiques 
Le P.G. 
 
 
Primary Source Published Works 
Ambriere, Francis. The Long Holiday. Translated by Elaine P. Halperin. Chicago: Ziff-
Davis Publishing Co., 1948. 
 
Beauvoir, Simone de. Wartime Diary. Translation and notes by Anne Deing Cordero. 
Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009. 
 
Bloch, Marc. Strange Defeat, A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940. Translated by 
Gerard Hopkins. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1968. 
 
Brunel, Henri-Victor. Marche a l’exil, La geste des captifs. Paris: G. Durassié & Cie., 
1952. 
 
Bugeaud, Pierre. Militant Prisonnier de Guerre, Une bataille pour l’histoire. Paris: Les 
Nouvelles Editions du Pavillon, 1990. 
 
 363
Dancy, Pierre. S.T.O. Déportés du travail; ton départ, ta vie en Allegmagne, ton retour. 
La Havre: Delauney, 1946. (Brochure published by the Fédération nationale des 
Déporés du Travail) 
 
Dennett, Carl P. Prisoners of the Great War. Authoritative Statement of Conditions in the 
Prison Camps of Germany. American Red Cross deputy commissioner to 
Switzerland in charge of finding, feeding, clothing and otherwise caring for 
American prisoners in German prison camps. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1919. 
 
Duras, Marguerite. The War, A Memoir. Translated by Barbara Bray. New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1986. 
 
Dutourd, Jean. The Taxis of the Marne. Translated by Harold King. New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1957. 
 
Flanner, Janet. Paris Journal, Volume One, 1944-1955. San Diego: Harcourt Brace & 
Company, 1965. 
 
Folcher, Gustave. Marching to Captivity, The War Diaries of a French Peasant, 1939-
1945.  Translated by Christopher Hill. London: Brassey’s, 1996. 
 
Fraisse, Paul. Écrits de captivité 1940-1943. Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de 
l’homme, 1991. 
 
Frenay, Henri. The Night Will End. Translated by Dan Hofstadter. New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Co., 1976. 
 
Guerlain, Robert. Prisonnier de Guerre, Derrière les fils barbelés, des armées se lèvent.  
London: Hachette, 1944. 
 
Hélion, Jean. They Shall Not Have Me.  The Capture, Forced Labor, and Escape of a 
French Prisoner of War. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1943. 
 
Hyvernaud, Georges. Skin and Bones. Translated by Dominic Di Bernardi. Marlboro: 
Marlboro Press, 1994. 
 
Josso, Lucien. Le Refus, 1940-1945. Paris: Daulpha Éditions, 2003. 
 
Laloux, Henri. Avril 1945, Libéré ar l’armée rouge.  L’incroyable odyssée d’un 
prisonnier de guerre français K.G. Paris: Editions Heimdal, 1997. 
 
Malaquais, Jean. War Diary. Translated by Peter Grant. Garden City: Double Day, 
Doran, 1944. 
 
 364
McCarthy, Daniel J. The Prisoner of War in Germany; The care and treatment of the 
prisoner of war with a history of the development of the principle of neutral 
inspection and control. New York: Moffat, Yard and Company, 1918. 
 
Mitterrand, François. “Pèlerinage en Thuringe; Notes d’un Prisonnier de guerre,” Revue 
de l’État Nouveau, No. 5, December 1942: 693-97. 
 
Mitterrand, François. Les Prisonniers de Guerre Devant la Politique. Paris: Éditions du 
Ront-Point, 1945. 
 
Mitterrand, François & Elie Wiesel. Memoir in Two Voices. Translated by R. Seaver and 
T. Bent. New York: Arcade Publishing, 1996. 
 
Mullins, Claud. The Leipzig Trials: An account of the war criminals’ trials and a study of 
German mentality. London: H. F. & G. Witherby, 1921. 
 
Werth, Alexander. France in Ferment. London: Jarrolds Publishers, 1934. 
 
Épreuve collective et mémoires, l’expérience de la captivité. Paris: Peuple et Culture – 
Education Permanente, 1992. 
 
Les KG parlent.  Avant-propos de René Laumond. Paris: Éditions Denoël, 1965. 
 
 
Secondary Works 
Adler, Amy, et. al. eds., Military Life: The Psychology of Serving in Peace and Combat, 
Volume 2: Operational Stress. Westport: Preager Security International, 2006. 
 
Alary, Eric, and Bénédicte Vergez-Chaignon and Gilles Gauvin. Les Français au 
quotidien 1939-1949. Paris: Perrin, 2006. 
 
Alexander, Martin. The Republic in Danger: General Maurice Gamelin and the Politics 
of French Defense, 1933-1940. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
 
Azéma, Jean-Pierre. From Munich to the Liberation, 1938-1944. Translated by Janet 
Lloyd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
 
Becker, Annette. Oubliés de la grande guerre.  Humanitaire et culture de guerre. 
Populations occupies, déportés civils, prisonniers de guerre. Paris: Éditions 
Noêsis, 1998. 
 
Bell, David. François Mitterrand, A Political Biography. Cambridge: Polity, 2005. 
 
Belot, Robert. Henri Frenay de la Résistance à l’Europe. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2003. 
 
 365
Bertin-Maghit, Jean-Pierre. Les Documenteurs des Années Noires, Les Documentaires de 
Propagande, France, 1940-1944. Paris: Nouveau Monde Éditions, 2004. 
 
Best, Geoffrey. Humanity in Warfare. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. 
 
Biess, Frank. Homecomings: Returning POW’s and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar 
Germany.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. 
 
Blatt, Joel, ed. The French Defeat of 1940, Reassessments, Providence: Berghahn Books, 
1998. 
 
Blond, Georges. La Grande Armée. Translated by Marshall May. New York: Arms and 
Armour Press, 1995. 
 
Brendon, Piers. The Dark Valley; A Panorama of the 1930’s. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2000. 
 
Burrin, Philippe. France Under the Germans, Collaboration and Compromise. 
Translated by Janet Lloyd. New York: The New Press, 1996. 
 
Cazeneuve, Jean. Essai sur la psychologie du prisonnier de guerre. Paris: Presses 
universitaires de France, 1945. 
 
Chrastil, Rachel. Organizing for War, France 1870-1914. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2010. 
 
Christophe, Robert. Les flammes du Purgatoire:Histoire des prisonniers de 1940. Paris: 
Éditions France-Empire, 1979. 
 
Cochet, François. Les exclus de la victoire: Histoire des prisonniers de guerre, déportés 
et S.T.O. (1945-1985). Paris: S.P.M., 1992. 
 
Cochet, François. Soldats sans Armes. La captivité de guerre: Une approche culturelle.  
Brussels: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1998. 
 
Cooper, Frederick. Colonialism in Question; Theory, Knowledge, History. Berkley: 
University of California Press, 2005. 
 
Crémieux-Brilhac, Jean-Louis. Les Français de l’an 40 Tome I, La Guerre ouit ou non? 
Paris : Gallimard, 1990. 
 
Crémieux-Brilhac, Jean-Louis. Les Français de l’an 40 Tome II, Ouvriers et soldats. 
Paris : Gallimard, 1990.  
 
 366
Dancy, Pierre. Déportés du Travail; Ton départ ta vie en Allemagne, Ton retour. Paris: 
bound pamplet published by the Fédération Nationale des Déportés du Travail, 
1946.  
 
Datner, Szymon. Crimes Against POWs; Responsiblities of the Wehrmacht. Warszawa: 
Zachodnia Agencja Prasowa, 1964. 
 
de Lannoy, François. La Libération des Camps: Un million de prisonniers de guerre 
français, Mai 1945. Bayeux: Editions Heimdal, 1995. 
 
Diamond, Hanna. Fleeing Hitler: France 1940. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
 
Doughty, Robert. The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 
1919-1939. Hamden: Archon Books, 1985. 
 
Doughty, Robert. Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940. Hamden: Archon 
Books, 1990. 
 
Doyle, Robert C. Voices from Captivity: Interpreting the American POW Narrative. 
Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1994. 
 
Durand, Yves. La Captivité: Histoire des prisonniers de guerre français 1939-1945. 2e 
ed. Paris: Fédération Nationale des Combattants Prisonniers de Guerre et 
Combattants d’Algérie, Tunisie, Maroc, 1981. 
 
Durand, Yves. La Vie quotidienne des prisonniers de guerre dans les stalags, les oflags 
et les kommandos, 1939-1945.  Paris: Hachette, 1987. 
 
Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste. La Décadence, 1932-1939. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1979. 
 
Echenberg, Myron. Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West 
Africa, 1857-1960. Portsmouth: Heinemann Educational Books, Inc., 1991. 
 
Eizenstat, Stuart. Imperfect Justice; Looted Assets, Slave Labor, and the Unifinished 
Business of World War II. New York: Public Affiars, 2003. 
 
Evrard, Jacques. La Déportation des Travailleurs Français dans le IIIe Reich. Paris: Les 
Grandes Études Contemporaines, Fayard, 1972. 
 
Figley, Charles R. ed. Stress Disorders among Vietnam Veterans; Theory, Research and 
Treatment. New York: Brunner/Mazel Publishers, 1978. 
 
Figley, Charles R., ed., Compassion Fatigue, Coping with Secondary Traumatic Stress 
Disorder in Those Who Treat the Traumatized. London: Brunner-Routledge, 
1995. 
 
 367
Fischer, Fritz. World Power or Decline: The Controversy over Germany’s Aims in the 
First World War. Translated by Lancelot L. Farrar, Robert Kimber and Rita 
Kimber. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1974. 
 
Fishman, Sarah. We Will Wait: Wives of French Prisoners of War, 1940-1945. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1991. 
 
Fogg, Shannon. The Politics of Everyday Life in Vichy France, Foreigners, Undesirables, 
and Strangers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
 
Freeman, Sharon Morgillo et. al. eds., Living and Surviving in Harm’s Way; A 
Psychological Treatment Handbook for Pre- and Post-Deployment of Military 
Personnel. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
 
Friend, Julius. The Long Presidency; France in the Mitterrand Years, 1981-1995. 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1998. 
 
Garrett, Richard. P.O.W. London: David and Charles Publishers, Ltd., 1981. 
 
Gascar, Pierre. Histoire de la captivité des Français en Allemagne (1939-1945). Paris: 
Éditions Gallimard, 1967. 
 
Gilda, Robert. Marianne in Chains: Everyday Life in the French Heartland under the 
German Occupation. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2002. 
 
Glantz, David, and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped 
Hitler. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995. 
 
Gordon, Bertram. Collaborationism in France during the Second World War. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1980. 
 
Gordon, Bertram, ed.  Historical Dictionary of World War II France.  The Occupation, 
Vichy and the Resistance, 1938-1946. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1998. 
 
Greene, Nathanael. From Versailles to Vichy, The Third French Republic, 1919-1940. 
New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1970. 
 
Helphand, Kenneth I. Defiant Gardens: Making Gardens in Wartime. San Antonio: 
Trinity University Press, 2006. 
 
Herbert, Ulrich. Hitler’s Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany Under 
the Third Reich. Translated by William Templer. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997. 
 
Hesseltine, William Best. Civil War Prisons: A Study in War Psychology. Columbus: 
Ohio State University Press, 1930. 
 368
 
Hirschfeld, Gerhard, ed. The Policies of Genocide; Jews and Soviet Prisoners of War in 
Nazi Germany. London: Allen & Unwin Publishers, Ltd. 1986. 
 
Hobsbawm, Eric J. The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848. New York: Mentor Books, 1962. 
 
Horne, Alistair. To Lose a Battle: France 1940. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 
1969. 
 
Horne, John and Alan Kramer. German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. 
 
Howard, Michael. War and the Liberal Conscience. New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1986. 
 
Hull, Isabel. Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial 
Germany. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005. 
 
Jackson, Julian. The Popular Front in France: Defending Democracy, 1934-38. 
Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
 
Jackson, Julian. France, The Dark Years, 1940-1944. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001. 
 
Jackson, Julian. The Fall of France, The Nazi Invasion of 1940. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003. 
 
Jackson, Julian.  Charles de Gaulle.  London:  Haus Publishing, 2003. 
 
Jenkins, Brian, ed. France in the Era of Fascism. Essays on the French Authoritarian 
Right. New York: Berghahn Books, 2005. 
 
Kewward, H. R. In Search of the Maquis; Rural Resistance in Southern France 1942-
1944. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. 
 
Kedward, H. R. and Nancy Wood eds. The Liberation of France; Image and Event. 
Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1995. 
 
Kershaw, Ian. The Hitler Myth, Image and Reality in the Third Reich. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987. 
 
Kiesling, Eugenia C. Arming Against Hitler: France and the Limits of Military Planning.  
Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1996. 
 
Knapp, Andrew ed. The Uncertain Foundation; France at the Liberation, 1944-47. 
Houndsmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.  
 369
 
Koreman, Megan. The Expectation of Justice: France 1944-1946.  Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1999. 
 
Kramer, Alan. Dynamics of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World 
War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
 
Krivosheev, G. F., ed. Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century. 
London: Greenhill Books, 1997. 
 
Kulka, Richard. Trauma and the Vietnam War Generation; Report of Findings from the 
National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study. New York: Brunner/Mazel 
Publishers, 1990. 
 
Laborie, Pierre. L’opinion française sous Vichy, Les Français et la crise d’identité 
nationale 1936-1944.  Paris:  Éditions du Seuil, 2001. 
 
Lagrou, Pieter. The Legacy of Nazi Occupation; Patriotic Memory and National 
Recovery in Western Europe, 1945-1965. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000. 
 
Larkin, Maurice. France Since the Popular Front, Government and People 1936-1986. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. 
 
Lawler, Nancy. Soldiers of Misfortune: Ivoirien Tirailleurs in World War II. Athens: 
Ohio University Press, 1992. 
 
Lerner, Paul. Hysterical Men: War, Psychiatry and the Politics of Trauma in Germany, 
1890-1930. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. 
 
Lewin, Christophe. Retour des prisonniers de guerre francais: naissance et 
développement de la F.N.P.G., 1944-1952. Paris: Publication de la Sorbonne, 
1986. 
 
Liberman, Peter.  Does Conquest Pay?  The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial 
Societies.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. 
 
Lüdtke, Alf and Bernd Weisbrod eds. No Man’s Land of Violence: Extreme Wars in the 
20th Century. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2006. 
 
Marrus, Michael and Robert Paxton. Vichy France and the Jews. New York: Schocken 
Books, 1983. 
 
Martin, Benjamin. France in 1938. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2005. 
 
 370
May, Ernest. Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France. New York: Hill and Wang, 
2000. 
 
Milward, Alan S. The New Order and the French Economy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1970. 
 
Moore, Bob & Kent Fedorowich, eds. Prisoners of the Reich; Germany’s Captives, 1939-
1945. London: Leo Cooper Ltd., 1988. 
 
Muir, Rory. Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1998. 
 
Novick, Peter. The Resistances Versus Vichy: The Purge of Collaborators in Liberated 
France.  London: Chatto & Windus, 1968. 
 
Ousby, Ian. Occupation: the Ordeal of France, 1940-1944. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1998. 
 
Paxton, Robert. Vichy France, Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944. New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1972. 
 
Paxton, Robert. The Anatomy of Fascism. New York: Vintage Books, 2004. 
 
Péan, Pierre. Une jeunesse française, François Mitterrand 1934-1947. Paris: Fayard, 
1994. 
 
Pollard, Miranda. Reign of Virtue, Mobilizing Gender in Vichy France. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
 
Poznanski, Renée. Jews in France During World War II. Translated by Nathan Bracher. 
Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 2001. 
 
Prost, Antoine. In the Wake of War, Les Anciens Combattants and French Society 1914-
1939. Translated by Helen McPhail, Oxford: Berg, 1992. 
 
Prost, Antoine. Republican Identities in War and Peace, Representation of France in the 
19th and 20th Centuries. Oxford: Berg, 2002. 
 
Rachamimov, Alon. POWs and the Great War: Captivity on the Eastern Front. Oxford: 
Berg, 2002. 
 
Rioux, Jean-Pierre. The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958. Translated by Godfrey Rogers. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
Richet, Charles and Antonin Mans. Pathologie de la Déportation. Paris : Plon, 1956. 
 
 371
Rochat, G. Una Ricerca Impossible, Le Perdite Italiane nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale. 
Italia Contemporanea, 1995. 
 
Rousso, Henry. The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991. 
 
Sauvy, Alfred. La Vie Économique des Français de 1939 a 1945. Paris: Flammarion, 
1978. 
 
Scheck, Raffael. Hitler’s African Victims: The German Army Massacres of Black French 
Soldiers in 1940. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
Schrijvers, Peter. Liberators; The Allies and Belgian Society 1944-1945. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
 
Shennan, Andrew. De Gaulle. London: Longman, 1993. 
 
Shennan, Andrew. Rethinking France; Plans for Renewal 1940-1946. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989. 
 
Shephard, Ben. A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century.  
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. 
 
Shirer, William. The Collapse of the Third Republic: An Inquiry into the Fall of France 
in 1940.  New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969. 
 
Siegel, Mona L. The Moral Disarmament of France; Education, Pacifism and Patriotism, 
1914-1940. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
 
Sigg, Bernard W. Le silence et la honte; Névroses de la guerre d’Algérie. Paris: 
Messidor/Éditions socials, 1989. 
 
Soucy, Robert. French Fascism, The Second Wave, 1933-1939. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1995. 
 
Speed, Richard B. III. Prisoners, diplomats, and the Great War: a study in the diplomacy 
of captivity. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1990. 
 
Stouffer, Samuel A., et al. The American Soldiers: Combat and its Aftermath, Vol. II. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965. 
 
Sweets, John F. The Politics of Resistance in France, 1940-1944. DeKalb: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 1976. 
 
Sweets, John F. Choices in Vichy France: The French Under Nazi Occupation. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
 372
 
Thomas, Martin. Britain, France & Appeasement, Anglo-French Relations in the Popular 
Front Era. Oxford: Bert, 1996. 
 
Tissier, Pierre. The Riom Trial. London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1942. 
 
Todorov, Tzvetan. A French Tragedy: Scenes of Civil War, Summer 1944. Translated by 
Mary Byrd Kelly. Hanover: University Press of New England, 1996. 
 
Vance, Jonathan, ed. Encyclopedia of Prisoners of War and Internment. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1998. 
 
Veillon, Dominique. Vivre et Survivre en France 1939-1947. Paris: Éditions Payot & 
Rivages, 1995. 
 
Vinen, Richard. The Unfree French: Life under the Occupation. New York: Allen Lane, 
2006. 
 
Virgili, Fabrice. Shorn Women, Gender and Punishment in Liberation France. Translated 
by John Flowers. Oxford: Berg, 2002. 
 
Weaver, Suellen, and Nora Stewart. Factors Influencing Combat Stress Reactions and 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Literature Review. Washington D.C.: Army 
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1988. 
 
Weber, Eugen. The Hollow Years, France in the 1930’s. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 
1994. 
 
Werth, Alexander. France in Ferment. London: Jarrolds Publishers, 1934. 
 
Werth, Alexander. France 1940-1955. Boston: Beacon Press, 1956. 
 
Wieviorka, Annette. Déportation et genocide; Entre la mémoire et l’oubli. Paris: 
Hachette Littératures, 1992. 
 
Williams, Tom, ed. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorders: A Handbook for Clinicians. 
Cincinnati: Disabled American Veterans, 1987. 
 
Winter, Jay and Antoine Prost. The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 
1914 to present. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
 
Young, Robert J. In Command of France: French Foreign Policy and Military Planning, 
1933-1940. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978. 
 
 
 373
Articles 
Abbal, Odon. “Les Prisonniers de la Grande Guerre.” Guerres mondiales et conflits 
contemporains, no. 147 (1987): 5-30. 
 
Alexander, Don. “Repercussions of the Breda Variant.” French Historical Studies 8, no. 
3 (1974): 459-88. 
 
Billig, Joseph. “Le role des prisonniers de guerre dans l’économie du IIIe reich.” Guerres 
mondiales et conflits contemporains, o. 37 (1960): 53-76. 
 
Boudot, François. “Aspects de l’histoire de la captivité.” L’Actualité de l’histoire, no. 10 
(1955): 22-35. 
 
Boudot, François. “Sur la psychologie du prisonnier, Thèse et souvenirs.” Revue 
d’histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale, no. 25 (1957) : 88-98. 
 
Boudot, François. “Les prisonniers des kommandos et l’image de la France.” Revue
d’histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale, no. 71 (1968) : 49-76. 
 
Bowles, Brett. “Newsreels, ideology, and Public Opinion under Vichy: The Case of La 
France en Marche.” French Historical Studies, Vol. 27, no. 2 (2004): 419-63. 
 
Bowles, Brett. “German Newsreel Propaganda in France, 1940-1944.” Historical Journal 
of Film, Radio and Television 24, no. 1 (2004): 45-67. 
 
Bowles, Brett. “Illuminating the Dark Years: French Wartime Newsreel  on DVD.” 
Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, Vol. 27, no. 1 (2007): 119-25. 
 
Braudel, Fernand. “La captivité devant l’histoire.” Revue d’histoire de la deuxième 
guerre mondiale, no. 25 (1957) : 3-5. 
 
Butterworth, Susan Bindoff. “Daladier and the Munich Crisis: A Reappraisal.” Journal of 
Contemporary History 9, no. 3 (1974): 191-216. 
 
Cairns, John C. “Along the Road Back to France 1940.” American Historical Review 64, 
no. 3 (1959): 583-603. 
 
Cairns, John C. “Some Recent Historians and the “Strange Defeat” of 1940.” Journal of 
Modern History 46, no. 1 (1974):  60-85. 
 
Chabord, Marie-Thérèse. “Les organismes français chargés des prisonnier , déportés et 
réfugiés (Alger 1943 – Paris 1945).” Guerres mondiales et conflits 
contemporains, no. 42 (1961): 17-26. 
 
Connelly, Mark, and Walter Miller. “The BEF and the Issue of Surrender on the Western 
Front in 1940.” War in History 11, no. 4 (2004): 424-41. 
 374
 
Davis, Gerald H. “Prisoners of War in Twentieth-Century War Economics.” Journal of 
Contemporary History 12, no. 4 (1977): 623-34. 
 
D’Hoop, Jean-Marie. “Note sur les evasions.” Guerres mondiales et conflits 
contemporains, no. 25 (1957): 66-77. 
 
D’Hoope, Jean-Marie. “La main-d’oeuvre franise au service de l’Allemagne. ” R vue 
d’histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale, no. 81 (1971): 73-88. 
 
D’Hoop, Jean-Marie. “Propagande et attitudes politiques dans les camps de prisonniers : 
le cas des oflags.” Revue d’histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale, no. 122 
(1981): 3-26. 
 
D’Hoop, Jean-Marie. “Les prisonniers de guerre, 1939-1945, la captivité des Français.” 
Revue d’histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale, no. 137 (1985): 119-21. 
 
D’Hoop, Jean-Marie. “Les prisonniers français et la communauté rurale allemand  (1940-
1945).” Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, no. 147 (1987): 31-47. 
 
D’Hoop, Jean-Marie. “Prisonniers de guerre français témoins de la défaite allemande 
(1945).” Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains, no. 150 (1988): 79-98. 
 
Doughty, Robert. “The Enigma of French Armored Doctrine 1940.” Armor 83, no. 5 
(1974): 39-48. 
 
Ferguson, Niall. “Prisoner Taking and Prisoner Killing in the Age of Total Wr: Towards 
a Political Economy of Military Defeat.” War in History 11, No. 2 (2004): 148-
92. 
 
Fishman, Sarah. “Grand Delusions: The Unintended Consequences of Vichy France’s 
Prisoner of War Propaganda.” Journal of Contemporary History 26, No. 2 (1991): 
229-54. 
 
Fishman, Sarah. “The Messiness of Everyday Life Under the Occupation.” Pr ceedings 
of the Western Society for French History, Vol. 30 (2002): 64-70. 
 
Fogg, Shannon. “Denunciations, Community Outsiders, and Material Shortages in Vichy 
France.” Proceedings of the Western Society for French History. Vol. 31, (2003). 
 
Gleason, Philip. “Identifying Identity: A Semantic History.” Journal of American History 
69, no. 4 (1983): 910-931. 
 
Gunsburg, Jeffrey. “The Battle of the Belgian Plain, 12-14 May 1940: The First Grea
Tank Battle.” Journal of Military History 56, no. 2 (1992): 207-44. 
 
 375
Imlay, Talbot. “Paul Reynaud and France’s Response Nazi Germany, 1938-1940.” 
French Historical Studies 26, no. 3 (2003): 497-538. 
 
Jackson, Julian. “The Long Road to Vichy.” French History 12, no. 2 (1998): 213-24. 
 
Jones, Heather. “The Final Logic of Sacrifice? Violence in German Prisoner of War 
Labor Companies in 1918.” The Historian 68, no. 4 (2006): 770-91. 
 
Jones, Heather. “The German Spring Reprisals of 1917: Prisoners of War and the 
Violence of the Western Front.” German History 26, no. 3 (2008): 335-56. 
 
Jones, Heather. “A Missing Paradigm? Military Captivity and the Prisoner of War, 1914-
1918.”  Immigrants & Minorities 26, Issue 1 & 2, (2008): 19-48. 
 
Kedward, H.R. “Patriots and Patriotism in Vichy France.” Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society 32, (1982): 175-92. 
 
Koreman, Megan. “A Hero’s Homecoming: The Return of the Deportees to France, 
1945.” Journal of Contemporary History 32, no. 1 (1997): 9-22. 
 
Kramer, Steven Philip. “La crise économique de la libération.” Guerres mondiales et 
conflits contemporains, no. 111 (1978): 25-44. 
 
Lewin, Christophe. “Le retour des prisonniers de guerre français (1945)” Guerres 
mondiales et conflits contemporains, o. 147 (1987): 49-79. 
 
Lorcin, Jean. “Le journal de captivité du «silencieux».” Guerres mondiales et conflits 
contemporains, no. 207 (2002): 77-95. 
 
MacKenzie, S. P. “The Treatment of Prisoners of War in World War II.” The Journal of 
Military History 66, no. 3 (1994): 487-520. 
 
Messerschmidt, Manfred. “The Wehrmacht and the Volksgemeinschaft.” Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1983): 719-44. 
 
Michel, Henri. “Les travaux de la commission d’histoire de la captivité.” Revue d’histoire 
de la deuxième guerre mondiale, no. 25 (1957) : 78-87. 
 
Moore, Bob. “Unruly Allies: British Problems with the French Treatment of Axis 
Prisoners of War, 1943-1945.” War in History 7, no. 2, (2000): 180-98. 
 
Moret-Bailly, Jean. “Le camp de base du Stalag XVII B.” Revue d’histoire de la 
deuxième guerre mondiale, no. 25 (1957): 7-46. 
 
Murray, Williamson. “The Strategy of the “Phoney War”: A Re-Evaluation.” Military 
Affairs 45, no. 1 (1981): 13-17. 
 376
 
Nachtigal, Reinhard. “The Repatriation and Reception of Returning Prisoners of War, 
1918-22.” Immigrants & Minorities 26, no. 1 (2008): 157-84. 
 
Occhino, Filippo, Kim Oosterlinck and Eugene N. White. “How Much Can a Victor 
Force the Vanquished to Pay? France under the Nazi Boot.” J urnal of Economic 
History 68, Iss. 1 (2008): 1-45. 
 
Prestwich, Patrica. “‘Victims of War?’ Mentally-Traumatized Soldiers and the State, 
1918-1939.” Proceedings of the Western Society for French History, Vol. 31 
(2003). 
 
Quinn, James. “Shared Sacrifice and the Return of the POW’s and Deportees to France, 
1945.” Proceedings of the Western Society for French History, Vol. 35 (2007): 
277-88. 
 
Recham, Belkacem. “Les indigènes nord-africans prisonniers de guerre.” Guerres 
mondiales et conflits contemporains, o. 223 (2006): 109-26. 
 
Scheck, Raffael. “The Prisoner of War Question and the Beginnings of Collaboration: 
The Franco-German Agreement of 16 November 1940.” Journal of 
Contemporary History 45, Issue 2 (2010), 364-88. 
 
Segesser, Daniel Marc. “The Punishment of War Crimes Committed against Prisoners of 
War, Deportees and Refugees during and after the First World War.” Immigrants 
& Minorities 26, Issue 1 & 2 (2008): 134-56. 
 
Sweets, John F. “Hold That Pendulum! Redefining Fascism, Collaborationism and 
Resistance in France.” French Historical Studies 15, no. 4 (1988): 731-58. 
 
Thomas, Martin C. “The Vichy Government and French Colonial Prisoners of War, 
1940-1944.” French Historical Studies Vol. 25, No. 4 (2002): 657-92. 
 
Towle, Philip A. “Japanese Treatment of Prisoners in 1904-1905 – Foreign Officer’s 
Reports.” Military Affairs, 39, Issue 3 (1975): 115-117. 
 
Wharton, Steve. “Unwilling Film Stars: Service de Travail Obligatoire and its Filmic 
Representations.” Proceedings of the Western Society for French History 26, 
(1998?): 372-82. 
 
Young, Robert J. “The Aftermath of Munich: The Course of French Diplomacy, October 
1938 to March 1939.” French Historical Studies 8, no. 2 (1973): 305-22. 
 
Young, Robert J. “The Strategic Dream: French Air Doctrine in the Inter-War Period, 
1919-39.” Journal of Contemporary History 9, no. 4 (1974): 57-76. 
 
 377
Young, Robert J. “French Military Intelligence and the Franco-Italian Alliance, 1933-
1939.” The Historical Journal 28, no. 1 (1985): 143-68. 
 
 
Fictional Literature 
Dutourd, Jean. The Best Butter. Translated by Robin Chancellor. New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1955. 
 
Hyvernaud, Georges. The Cattle Car. Translated by Dominic Di Bernardi and Austryn 
Wainhouse. Evanston: Marlboro Press/Northwestern, 1997. 
 
